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What does Iran wants from the Taliban?

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The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, which shares a common language, culture and religion with the people of Afghanistan. Iran, especially after the “Islamic Revolution” in that country, has had close relations with the governments and people of Afghanistan. But in most cases, Tehran has intervened in Afghanistan’s internal affairs to secure his own interests.

Iran’s government, which is more ideological, has always been afraid of the functioning of democratic governments based on modern values ​​in Afghanistan. With the coming to power of the People’s Democratic Party, which had the support of the former Soviet Union, the Islamic Revolution took place in Iran under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the “monarchy regime” fell. Iran’s Mullahs’ government was worried about the implementation of such a regime in Afghanistan.

Although the Democratic Party of Afghanistan was also a regime with leftist ideas and influenced by “communism”, it was not like Iran. This issue forced Iran to start supporting Shiite Islamist groups to create obstacles for the current government of Afghanistan.

Of course, he also achieved some successes in this regard. The groups that had the support of the Iranian government played a large role in the civil wars. But despite the new order in Afghanistan and the presence of NATO forces led by the United States of America, Iran did not play a significant role in Afghanistan’s internal relations.

At first, Iran tried to raise its position in Afghan relations by financially supporting the office of the previous president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai. However, the US played a key role in major national decisions and Iran’s efforts failed. Iran changed its approach and returned to the trick of the seventies and provided financial and arms support to the Taliban group against the Afghan government and American forces. In some cases, it also provided shelter for Taliban leaders.

Although the Taliban and Iran did not have a good relationship after the killing of the diplomats of this country in Mazar-e-Sharif by the Taliban, but with regard to the “enemy of an enemy is a friend” category, Iran established relations with the Taliban to secure its interests and supported them in this way.

Iran lobbied for the Taliban group and dragged Russia’s foot into the issue in order to be able to ground the US in Afghanistan. The government of Iran, with the support of the Taliban, was hindering the progress in dam construction and containment of Afghanistan’s waters.

After the Taliban came to power

With the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Iran has openly supported the Taliban. With the signing of the Doha agreement between the Taliban and the United States, Iran increased its support to the Taliban against the forces of the previous Afghan government. But the question that arises is what did Iran want from the Taliban and what does it still want?

Although the main reasons why Iran supported the Taliban have not been made public, it is most likely that Iran supports the Taliban for several reasons and wants to be closer to them;

Lack of water: Iran is currently facing a shortage of water resources. If the dam construction project expands on the waters that flow to Iran, the problem of water shortage in the neighboring provinces of Afghanistan will double, which is a big challenge for the government of that country. Although the Taliban have stated from time to time that they control the waters of Afghanistan, in practice they have left a lot of water for Iran.

Expansion of ISIS activities: Iran is worried about the expansion of Islamic State (IS) militants in Iran due to its common land border with Afghanistan. The IS group, whose scope of activities has expanded from Iraq and the Middle East to some parts of Afghanistan, has deep opposition to the Shiites Muslims and Iran government is mostly controlled by the Shittes. Therefore, the only suitable option to prevent IS from entering Iran is the Taliban.

Drug trafficking: Afghanistan has played a major role in the production of drugs in the world and in the region. With the return to power of the Taliban regime, the production and smuggling of drugs to neighboring countries has increased. Iran is worried about drug production and smuggling to that country. Proximity to the Taliban is a mechanism used by Iran to smuggle drugs.

Durability of the Taliban government: Currently, the strengthening and stability of the Taliban government is in the interest of Iran. Because the level of dissatisfaction with Iran’s government has increased within that country, and any development along with human freedoms in Afghanistan will increase the concerns of Iran’s government. On the other hand, Iran and the Taliban, two ideological systems, Sunni and Shia, seek their survival in close relations.

Finally, Iran wants the Taliban to support its interests in Afghanistan as a proxy group. The Iranian government knows very well that it has no way out without having relations with the Taliban group.

In order to have support at the regional level and not be marginalized, the Taliban prefer to maintain relations with Iran. In order to expand its relations with the Taliban, and especially with Donald Trump’s inauguration as United States president, Iran sent its foreign minister to the Taliban so that the Taliban would stand by Iran in future events that will take place between the United States and Iran. Even though the Taliban do not have such ability, for Iran, even the weakest friend is better than none at the moment.

Asia

China outpaces India in race for Russian crude oil supplies

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China has accelerated its crude oil purchases from Russia to replace oil shipments originating from the Middle East.

According to a Reuters report based on data from energy analytics firm Kpler, China is outpacing India in the Russian oil market.

India’s crude imports from Russia’s European ports fell by approximately 30% in August.

Beijing’s increased purchases could curb India’s exports of refined petroleum products and consequently trigger a diesel and gasoline shortage across Asia.

While China previously favoured ESPO blend crude shipped from Russia’s Asian ports, the share of its purchases from Russia’s European ports, consisting primarily of the Urals grade, has climbed to 31%.

Russian crude imports by India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, dropped to 1.87 million barrels per day in August. This volume remained well below the 2.79 million barrels per day recorded in July.

Under this scenario, which poses a risk to the Asian region, India stands as the region’s largest exporter of diesel and gasoline.

However, the country’s total crude imports in August were recorded at 4.17 million barrels per day. This figure marked the lowest level since the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East.

If the tightening raw material supply prevents Indian refineries from maintaining processing throughput, a severe deficit in refined products could emerge across the Asian market starting in September.

The Times of India previously reported that India’s Russian crude imports reached their highest share since 2022 in July.

During that period, Russia supplied more than half of India’s total crude imports of just over 5 million barrels per day, delivering 2.8 million barrels per day.

At the end of July, the Russian government extended its temporary export ban on gasoline, diesel, and other fuel types until 31 January 2027.

Under the restrictions that took effect on 1 August, direct exports of diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils by refiners will be exempted starting 1 September.

Bloomberg reported in June that Russian Urals crude was being sold in India at a $3.90 discount per barrel against international benchmarks after a hiatus of more than two months.

Urals crude traded at a discount again on 29 May for the first time since mid-March.

According to The Times of India, however, this discount on Russian Urals crude had almost entirely evaporated by early August.

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Japan sharpens defense posture while strengthening Turkish ties

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In an extensive interview on the Harici YouTube channel hosted by journalist Elif Ilhamoglu, Asia-Pacific research specialist and journalist Mehmet Asil Gonultas provided a comprehensive analysis of East Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.

Focusing on the newly released 2026 Japanese Defence White Paper, Tokyo’s military posture, foreign policy recalibrations under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and expanding bilateral ties with Turkiye, Gonultas detailed how systemic anxieties regarding China, Russia, and North Korea are reshaping the region.

“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats”

Addressing the release of Japan’s updated national security strategy document, Gonultas noted that the nearly 600-page publication represents the longest and most assertive security outline produced by Tokyo to date. He underscored that the tone toward regional competitors has hardened markedly compared to previous editions.

“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats in this year’s document,” Gonultas said. “Regarding Russia, the text explicitly characterizes its military presence on the contested Kuril Islands as an occupation, particularly following the recent visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to one of the islands. North Korea is evaluated through the operational lens of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Pyongyang is actively refining its military capabilities, deploying personnel, utilizing drones, and gaining battle-tested experience in an active combat zone.”

Gonultas explained that the characterization of Beijing as a deteriorating security risk reflects a trajectory that has intensified steadily over recent years. “While China has been identified as a primary security concern since at least 2022, the rhetorical severity increases with every iteration. This year’s assessment is the heaviest yet, directly mirroring the firm posture of the state,” he stated.

Contrasting the current administration with former leadership, Gonultas remarked, “Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated a relatively moderate approach, maintaining that Japan and China must find ways to coexist peacefully given their geographic reality. However, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted an uncompromising stance toward Beijing even prior to assuming office.”

He noted that Beijing’s actions have reinforced Tokyo’s apprehensions: “Beijing continuously provides justification for this stance. During recent missile testings, Beijing claimed to have informed Japan in advance, but Tokyo clarified that notice was provided merely 30 minutes prior to launch, emphasizing that no formal permission was granted. Furthermore, Chinese naval vessels regularly test boundaries in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese warship recently targeted a Japanese fighter jet with a guidance laser. The white paper explicitly argues that China’s actual military expenditures significantly exceed its publicly declared defense budget.”

Following the publication of the document, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense swiftly issued formal condemnations, accusing Tokyo of fanning regional tensions and reverting to historic militarism. “China reacted directly by asserting that this document reflects rising Japanese militarism,” Gonultas said. “In response, Tokyo points to China’s rapid rearmament, its inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking Japanese territory, its maritime incursions, and its anti-aircraft capabilities targeting Japanese military aviation.”

“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons”

Turning to the structural and military capabilities outlined in the white paper, Gonultas clarified that Tokyo is prioritizing high-technology defense systems and diplomatic-economic integration rather than unconventional deterrence.

“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons,” Gonultas emphasized, addressing recent media speculation surrounding defense policy debates. “While domestic discussions on nuclear deterrence surfaced during the era of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, implementing such a policy remains politically impossible. Regardless of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority, strong internal factions vehemently oppose the concept. When Abe tentatively raised the question of nuclear deterrence after leaving office, then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida immediately rejected the notion. Kishida, who remains an influential parliamentary figure, reaffirmed only recently that Japan must unconditionally oppose nuclear armament.”

Clarifying recent remarks made by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi regarding the public taboo surrounding nuclear debates, Gonultas observed, “The prohibition against discussing nuclear weapons is not a formal statutory ban, but rather a deeply ingrained societal consensus. The public remains firmly opposed to even raising the topic. Defense Minister Koizumi, whose personal popularity has risen significantly among right-wing factions since taking office, uses this rhetoric largely as a political signaling strategy to consolidate his base as he positions himself for a future prime ministerial run.”

Gonultas outlined Tokyo’s actual defense investments, highlighting unmanned systems and domestic defense manufacturing. “Japan’s primary technological focus centers on advanced drone infrastructure,” he stated. “Furthermore, Japan has revised its historical restrictions on arms exports. While the constitution was previously interpreted to ban the export of lethal weaponry—limiting sales strictly to search-and-rescue or non-lethal equipment—legislative shifts now permit defensive exports, provided they are directed toward allied nations that are not actively engaged in armed conflict.”

“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China”

Evaluating Tokyo’s strategic dependence on Washington, Gonultas emphasized that Japan’s defense planners view the US alliance as indispensable for national survival.

“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China’s sheer scale,” Gonultas stated. “This fundamental reality forces Japanese policymakers to maintain flawless relations with Washington at all costs. Recently, when a US serviceman was implicated in an assault incident on Okinawa Island, Defense Minister Koizumi explicitly declined to criticize the US military, drawing sharp domestic backlash. Yet, this reflects Tokyo’s overriding priority: retaining the US strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.”

“Both the Japanese government and the general public harbour deep anxieties regarding Chinese intentions, particularly concerning a potential military move against Taiwan,” Gonultas continued. “Should China blockade or seize Taiwan, Japan’s vital maritime trade routes would be compromised at Beijing’s discretion. Aside from the United States, no regional power possesses the capacity to offer meaningful deterrence.”

Gonultas added that this strategic anxiety has intensified under the current US administration. “Japanese planners are operating under immense pressure to keep US President Donald Trump fully committed to regional security, even as Washington signals potential adjustments to its military posture, including reductions in joint exercises with South Korea,” he noted. “To build a broader network of deterrence, Tokyo is actively cultivating overlapping bilateral and trilateral security partnerships with Australia, the Philippines, India, and South Korea, aiming to anchor US power within the region.”

“Constitutional limits restrict Japanese forces to purely defensive operations”

Addressing whether growing regional friction could lead to direct military confrontations, Gonultas pointed to the legal constraints governing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.

“The likelihood of Japan initiating or engaging in direct offensive conflict remains minimal,” Gonultas stated. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution explicitly renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of offensive war potential. All military assets held by Japan are structured strictly for self-defense, meaning operational force can only be applied after Japanese territory sustains an explicit attack.”

“When Prime Minister Takaichi previously stated that Japan would protect Taiwan in the event of an invasion, any operational support would realistically be limited to logistics, non-combatant evacuation operations, and naval resupply missions for US forces, rather than direct front-line engagement,” Gonultas explained. “Although Takaichi favors constitutional revision, the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly pacifist and deeply attached to Article 9, driven by demographic aging, historical memory, and a profound fear of military escalation.”

“Turkiye is viewed as a reliable and capable defense partner”

Highlighting expanding diplomatic and industrial engagement between Ankara and Tokyo, Gonultas noted that defense procurement and technological cooperation have gained significant momentum.

“Following high-level diplomatic engagements, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Tokyo and subsequent defense agreements signed at the SAHA EXPO defense exhibition, bilateral security cooperation has entered a concrete phase,” Gonultas said. “Japan is actively seeking to acquire drone technology. Importantly, Tokyo does not merely wish to purchase off-the-shelf equipment; it seeks technology transfers and co-production frameworks to understand manufacturing methodologies. Ankara has demonstrated a positive reception to these discussions.”

“Turkiye is viewed in Tokyo as a reliable, highly capable defense actor and a non-aggressive diplomatic mediator,” Gonultas added. “With negative public perception toward Israel reaching 80% in Japan, Tokyo has deliberately diversified its defense partnerships away from Tel Aviv, placing increased value on its historical alliance with Turkiye.”

Gonultas further observed that diplomatic coordination extends into Central Asia. “Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Eri Arfia, who is of Uyghur origin and fluent in Turkish, visited Istanbul and met with representatives of the Organization of Turkic States, expressing Japan’s interest in securing observer status,” Gonultas explained. “Tokyo views Turkiye as a vital bridge to Middle Eastern energy stability and Central Asian critical mineral supply chains.”

“Takaichi’s public approval ratings have dropped toward 50%”

Analysing domestic political dynamics, Gonultas reported that Prime Minister Takaichi faces mounting economic pressures that threaten her initial political momentum.

“While Prime Minister Takaichi entered office with approval ratings approaching 70%, recent surveys show public support dropping toward 50%, with some independent polls placing approval near 40%,” Gonultas stated. “The primary driver behind this decline is economic dissatisfaction. Despite state interventions to stabilize the yen around 170 per US dollar following energy price surges caused by the Iran conflict, living costs remain elevated.”

“Voters supported Takaichi expecting structural economic revitalization, but the administration has heavily prioritized ideological and administrative initiatives—such as designating Osaka as a secondary capital alongside its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, enacting national flag protection laws, and tightening permanent residency requirements for foreign workers,” Gonultas explained. “Although the government plans to cut consumption taxes on food items from 8% to 1%, prominent figures within her own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including former Prime Minister Ishiba and veteran leader Taro Aso, have publicly questioned the fiscal viability of these plans.”

Concurrently, economic authorities face severe macroeconomic challenges following joint currency interventions by the US and Japan. “While joint interventions successfully halted the chaotic depreciation of the yen beyond the 170 threshold, Japanese government bond yields recently hit 30-year highs of approximately 3%,” Gonultas noted. “To offset inflationary pressures on households, the government has facilitated a 5% average wage increase—the highest in recent decades—while coordinating with Washington to maintain exchange rate stability.”

Concluding his evaluation of Tokyo’s regional policy, Gonultas noted that despite broader regional instability, Japan continues to maintain active diplomatic communication with Tehran to safeguard energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz. “Tokyo maintains functional diplomatic channels with both Washington and Tehran, leveraging its neutral diplomatic standing to support regional maritime stability and energy security,” Gonultas concluded.

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Pakistan top court orders Imran Khan moved from prison to hospital

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The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that former Prime Minister Imran Khan must be transferred from prison to a hospital.

Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) announced on Tuesday that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had ordered the transfer of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from prison to a hospital. The ruling meets a long-standing demand from his party and family, who have voiced concerns over his health.

The 73-year-old cricketer-turned-politician has been imprisoned since August 2023, following convictions in a series of cases that he maintains were politically motivated after his removal from office in 2022.

His sons had repeatedly raised concerns over the past year regarding his deteriorating health, while his lawyers stated that he had suffered significant vision loss in his right eye during his time in detention.

PTI spokesman Zulfikar Bukhari said: “This is a welcome decision. We wish this had happened earlier so that his eye and overall health would not have deteriorated this much.”

Bukhari added: “He should remain in the hospital until all doctors are satisfied.”

Khan’s spokesman Naeem Haider Panjutha stated on X that the court had directed Khan to be moved to Shifa International Hospital within 48 hours and to remain there until 16 September.

Since being ousted from power in a no-confidence vote, Khan has faced numerous legal proceedings, including cases involving state gifts and unlawful marriage. While some convictions have been suspended or overturned, appeals against others remain pending. Khan denies the charges against him.

In February, leading figures from the global cricket community, including prominent names from across the border in India, expressed “deep concerns” over Khan’s prison conditions and demanded improved treatment for him.

PTI came to power in 2018 and retains a broad support base across key provinces. However, the party was stripped of its electoral symbol ahead of the 2024 elections, forcing its candidates to contest the polls as independents.

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