On December 8, the Syrian opposition factions, namely the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)” coalition and the “Syrian National Army,” announced that they had captured and taken control of Damascus. On the same day, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who had been in exile in Russia, announced his resignation and ordered the former government to peacefully transfer power to opposition forces. No one expected that the Assad regime, which had endured the trials of a decade-long civil war, would crumble under the opposition’s offensive in just 12 days, collapsing with unprecedented speed and bringing an end to the Assad family’s half-century-long rule in Syria.

A review of this “Syrian War 2.0,” which broke out at the end of November, reveals that the Assad regime was not only quickly defeated by the opposition forces but also lost to Israel, Türkiye, and was ultimately abandoned by its long-term supporters, Russia and Iran. At the core, however, the regime’s own incompetence was its downfall. In short, a combination of complex and multifaceted factors led to the historic collapse of Assad’s regime.

On November 27, opposition factions based in the Idlib province launched a surprise offensive. In just two days, they breached the government’s defenses, entered Aleppo province, and seized control of the provincial capital, Aleppo city, which Damascus had held for eight years. A week later, the rebels expanded their offensive, moving southward and easily capturing Hama and Homs in central and western Syria before finally taking Damascus.

In just 12 days, the Syrian military failed to mount any large-scale, organized defense of the regime. Neither Russia nor Iran took significant action to assist the Assad regime against the relatively weak rebel coalition. The Lebanese Hezbollah sent only 2,000 fighters to express support when Damascus was about to fall, but they were soon forced to withdraw. Meanwhile, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces outright refused to intervene. In short, the support Assad received during the “Syrian War 1.0” was entirely absent. The “Axis of Resistance” or the “Shia Crescent” disintegrated completely on the western flank of the Eastern Mediterranean, and both Russia and Iran lost their strategic assets and spheres of influence in the region.

At this critical juncture for the state and the regime, from Aleppo to Hama, Homs, and Damascus, there was no sign of fierce or effective resistance from the Syrian military or armed civilians. Instead, there was a total collapse of military morale and public support, an internal failure unlike the determined defense seen four years ago. Notably, the opposition forces were not overwhelmingly powerful nor internationally legitimized.

The anti-government forces were primarily led by the HTS coalition, with the Türkiye-supported “Syrian National Army,” based in Afrin along Syria’s northwestern border, coordinating the attack. The HTS coalition is formerly known as the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, the “Al-Nusra Front.” Due to its terrorist roots and current activities, the organization has been designated a terrorist group by the United Nations, the United States, and Türkiye.

The “Syrian National Army,” on the other hand, is a Turkish-backed proxy force aimed at countering Kurdish separatist groups in the Afrin region, preventing them from linking up with Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. This supports Türkiye’s control over the so-called “safe zone” in northern Syria, disrupts the vertical connectivity of cross-border Kurdish networks, and suppresses Kurdish insurgency and separatist movements within Türkiye.

The sudden collapse of Syrian government forces under attack from northwestern rebel forces was unexpected. However, a closer examination of the region’s geopolitical dynamics reveals that this outcome was inevitable.

Firstly, various opposition factions had laid low, recuperating and significantly improving their combat capabilities. Since the ceasefire brokered by Russia and Türkiye in March 2020, the opposition factions entrenched in northwestern Syria had bided their time for four years, waiting for a chance to rise again. Once they sensed weaknesses in government forces or a relaxation of defenses, they were bound to break the ceasefire, expand their control, and wage war to sustain their growth and aim for ultimate power.

Secondly, the four-year ceasefire had caused the Syrian government to neglect the strategic threat posed by the northwest, particularly failing to fortify Aleppo, its largest city and a critical stronghold. Russian forces stationed in Syria and Iranian military advisors also became complacent, failing to monitor the rebels’ recovery, assess the threat of a counteroffensive, or prepare for war. Following the outbreak of this conflict, Russia immediately dismissed its military commander in Syria, Sergei Kisel, replacing him with General Alexander Chaiko—a move reflecting accountability for negligence.

Thirdly, the year-long “Sixth Middle East War” further complicated the region’s already intricate geopolitical landscape. Israel’s “Second Lebanon War” severely weakened Hezbollah forces and further undermined Iran’s military presence in Syria, creating an ideal opportunity for rebel forces to launch their comeback from the northwest. According to Russia’s Gazeta, Aleppo’s defense had been primarily entrusted to the Syrian Republican Guard’s 32nd Division, local militias, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. However, many of these forces had recently been redeployed to combat revived ISIS sleeper cells in the Syrian desert, leaving the northwestern defenses hollow. Frequent Israeli bombings in the Aleppo suburbs further weakened the remaining forces, causing the defenses to collapse entirely.

Fourthly, just before Israel reached a ceasefire agreement with Lebanon, it carried out targeted bombings of the Syria-Lebanon border crossings, severing Hezbollah’s land routes between Syria and Iran. This not only dismantled the western flank of the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance” but also emboldened Syrian rebel forces to exploit the power vacuum.

Fifthly, on a broader strategic level, the protracted war in Ukraine and the increasingly volatile standoff between Russia and NATO distracted Moscow from Syria, a relatively minor chessboard. Similarly, Iran, entangled in its year-long conflict with Israel and juggling a “seven-front” resistance axis, failed to focus on Syria or anticipate the sudden resurgence of rebel forces.

Sixthly, the “Astana Process” countries—Russia, Iran, and Türkiye—agreed to abandon Assad’s regime in pursuit of a negotiated settlement for a “post-Assad Syria.” Following the outbreak of this conflict, both Russia and Iran refrained from intervening decisively to rescue Assad, opting instead to align with Türkiye and restart the “Astana Process,” effectively sealing Assad’s fate.

After the resumption of hostilities, Syria, Russia, and Iran uniformly accused Israel and the United States of orchestrating the rebels’ counteroffensive. Türkiye, which had been deeply involved in the Syrian civil war, remained silent for several days before officially announcing its support for overthrowing the Assad regime. In reality, the rapid progression of the “Syrian War 2.0” and the roles of the various actors supporting the rebels reflect a complex web of interests and calculations.

Firstly, the United States was not the instigator or driving force behind the rebels. From the beginning of the conflict, the United States emphasized that it had no involvement in the offensive and publicly pressured Türkiye. According to Israel’s Jerusalem Post, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and urged Ankara to restrain the “Syrian National Army” offensive and ensure stability in Syria. Although the U.S. dislikes the Assad regime, which aligns closely with Russia and is part of the “Axis of Resistance” with Iran, it does not wish to see Syria plunge into new chaos, allowing radical and terrorist forces to grow again, which could force the U.S. into another counterterrorism war in the Middle East. On December 2, AFP quoted a U.S. State Department spokesperson as saying that the United States would not, under any circumstances, support the HTS, a terrorist organization. Reuters reported that while calling on all sides to stabilize Syria, the U.S. government was also considering lifting sanctions on Syria to drive a wedge between it and Iran.

Secondly, Türkiye was one of the main drivers of the rebels’ large-scale offensive. Without Türkiye’s support or tacit approval, the “Syrian National Army” would not have been able to coordinate with forces like HTS. Türkiye has long insisted that the Syrian government must engage in dialogue with the opposition and form an inclusive government, while also pushing for the normalization of relations between Damascus and Ankara. However, the Syrian government categorizes the armed groups in the northwest as terrorist organizations and refuses dialogue under the premise that Türkiye continues to occupy Syrian territory in the north. Analysts argue that Türkiye viewed this new wave of conflict as an opportunity to pressure Damascus into submission, or even overthrow it, to further dominate the post-Assad era and shape the geopolitical landscape of the new Middle East.

Thirdly, Israel has played a significant role in weakening the “Axis of Resistance” and exacerbating the conflict. During the “Syrian War 1.0,” extremist and terrorist organizations had exploited the hostile relationship between Syria and Israel, as well as the Syrian army’s reluctance to use heavy weapons near the Israeli ceasefire line. Analysts believe that the use of heavy weaponry, drones, and advanced electronic warfare by the rebels in this round of fighting indicates the involvement of Israeli intelligence agencies. Both sides share a common enemy in the Syrian government and its allied “Resistance Front.” Although Israel officially denies involvement in the attacks, the implicit understanding between the two parties is evident. With the resurgence of the Syrian conflict, Israel has succeeded in further diverting the attention and resources of the “Resistance Axis,” reducing pressure on Israel from the northeast and Iran. On December 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu excitedly proclaimed that the collapse of the Assad regime was a “direct result of Israel’s actions against Iran and Hezbollah” and declared, “This has triggered a chain reaction across the Middle East.”

Fourthly, Ukraine has also been accused of involvement in the conflict. On December 3, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations accused Ukrainian intelligence agencies of assisting Syrian rebels, including providing weapons, training, and operational guidance targeting Russian forces in Syria. On December 4, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated these accusations, alleging that Ukrainian authorities were directly involved in the Syrian rebels’ offensive. Ukraine has remained silent on these allegations, and no third-party evidence has confirmed Ukrainian intelligence’s involvement. However, theoretically, forcing Russia to open a second front in the Middle East could alleviate Ukraine’s military pressure in the east of Ukraine.

As a pivotal state in the “Shia Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” Syria’s evolving conflict has profound implications. Hezbollah, which previously deployed troops to aid Damascus during the regime’s defensive battles, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces have both declared their unwillingness to send forces across borders to assist this time. Although Iran has repeatedly stated its readiness to deploy troops upon the Syrian government’s request, no concrete action has been taken. Russia has also declared its continued support for the Syrian government. However, beyond deploying its existing forces and equipment in Syria to fend off rebel advances and conducting missile drills in the Eastern Mediterranean for deterrence, Russia lacks the willingness or capacity to mount a large-scale military intervention as it did during the “Syrian War 1.0.”

The collapse of the Assad regime is not a victory for the Syrian people but rather the result of a combination of the government’s incompetence and external interference. Regime change in Damascus does not signify the beginning of long-term peace and stability in Syria; rather, it may mark the start of a new round of power struggles. Western, central, and southern Syria are now under the control of the HTS and the “Syrian National Army”; northern Syria is dominated by Türkiye’s “safe zone”; eastern and northeastern Syria are controlled by U.S.-backed Kurdish forces; and the southwestern Golan Heights, encompassing over 1,200 square kilometers, have long been under Israeli occupation. Over the past week, Israel has further expanded its defensive perimeter, capturing several key positions on the Syrian side… This “partitioned” Syria faces continued vulnerability to external manipulation and an even more uncertain future.

As soon as the Hezbollah operation, which was launched by Israel with a great psychological operation, ended in failure, the jihadist terrorist organizations that have been hiding in the Idlib region of Syria for years suddenly sprang into action. It was reported that the advance of HTS (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) and its affiliates, which has caused a serious stir among political Islamist groups in Turkey, had taken control of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, and was heading south towards Hama, only to be stopped there for the time being by the Syrian army.

The Turkish media and political Islamists, who at the beginning of the Israeli attack on Hezbollah (17-18 September) had headlined “Hezbollah is finished, Israel has done a great job” after Israel blew up the pagers and radios used by the organization and killed its leadership, including Hassan Nasrullah, were hinting at a new Syrian operation centered on Idlib. So, Hezbollah was finished, and it was only a matter of time before Israel crushed Lebanon. From both Lebanon and the Golan, it would quickly cross into Syria and pounce on the forces they called the Assad ‘regime’. There was another detail to this scenario. The jihadist terrorist organizations led by HTS, which were based in Idlib on our border, would also mobilize from the north and finish off Syria.

Even an opening was planned on the basis of this scenario. Since Israel would unleash the PKK/PYD forces in Syria on us on the way to our border, we had to embrace the ‘Kurds’ by making an opening to them first. In this way, we would take the ‘Kurds’, in fact the PKK/PYD, away from Israel. Of course, in return, we would have to change our constitution into a federal one and form a confederation with these ‘Kurds’, which was not such a big deal. After all, wasn’t the state of the Republic of Turkey wrongly founded on national-unitary principles? In other words, while Israel was trying to establish a federal or autonomous Kurdistan in the Middle East, we were going to establish this project ourselves and applaud it as a success.

Your mind/brain is burnt, isn’t it? Yes, this was indeed the great opening that was unimaginable. If we put aside the words of the opening and focus on the Syrian issue again, the answer to the words ‘Israel will come from the south towards our borders and threaten us with the PKK/PYD’, which was actually used as a justification for the opening, was clear. If Israel was going to come from the south and try to establish a Kurdistan by threatening Turkey together with the PKK/PYD, we should have fought against this project by normalizing our relations with Syria, which was against this project, instead of doing what Israel wanted to do, which was to establish a Kurdistan.

That was the way of reason. There would have been no point in proposing a series of crazy opening projects, as if to say to Israel ‘don’t bother, we are ready to create Kurdistan and we are preparing its infrastructure’; but all these discussions have now changed their content. Although the capture of Aleppo by the HTS and the continuation of its attacks southwards towards Damascus seem to have delighted a significant part of the media, which thinks that a victory has been achieved, it seems certain that when this party ends and the facts start to emerge, we will start talking about other things.

Possible outcomes

Let us first ask the question: Can Russia and Iran leave Syria completely alone? From Russia’s point of view, the answer to this question is clearly ‘no’, because for Russia Syria is its most solid military base in the Middle East. This has been the case since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Syria participated in that war (Yom Kippur War) together with Egypt, but later, when Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat made a compromise with the U.S. and Israel and turned to a policy of reclaiming the territories lost to Israel in 1967 in a peace treaty, Cairo’s military relations with the Soviet Union were almost nil. And Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, became the Soviet Union’s biggest military ally from the mid-1970s.

From those years until the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Moscow provided Damascus with an abundant supply of advanced air defense weapons, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, and conventional weapons. Military ties between Moscow and Damascus continued, albeit at a slower pace, under Yeltsin, who ruled the Russian Federation from the collapse of the Soviet Union until the early 2000s, when Putin took over the Kremlin. By the time of the dirty war launched by the US and its allies (2011), military relations between Moscow and Damascus seemed to have reached a strategic level again, and this level was more or less maintained throughout the war.

Abandoning Syria is not an option for Russia. Such a situation would mean a serious loss of prestige for Russia, which is waging a de facto war against the collective West in Ukraine, and it would have to dismantle its military bases in Syria. Given that its relations with the Greek Cypriots and Greece have become hostile, Russia would have great difficulty even sailing ships in the eastern Mediterranean.

Iran cannot leave Syria either. Iran cannot support Hezbollah in Lebanon if it leaves Syria completely to political Islamist and PKK/PYD groups. In fact, the strategic relations between Tehran and Damascus began with the establishment of an anti-imperialist, anti-American and anti-Israeli regime after the Islamic Revolution in Iran. When the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, believing that the Iranian armed forces had lost considerable power during the revolution, declared war on Iran, all Arab states except Syria sided with Saddam Hussein, while Hafez al-Assad established close relations with the Iranian government.

These relations, which gradually turned into strategic military cooperation, continued uninterrupted and Syria played the role of a strategic bridge between Iran and Hezbollah for years… In fact, it can be said that one of the main reasons for attacking Syria was to break this link, and the 2011 dirty war was aimed at breaking this anti-Israeli bloc. Today, if Iran leaves Syria alone, it will also leave Hezbollah alone. It cannot do this because in such a case Iran, which has created outposts against Israel by taking advantage of the strategic mistakes made by the U.S. since the invasion of Iraq, could be quickly dismantled from these points and confined to its own borders, and in such a case there should be no doubt that efforts to destroy the Iranian regime from within will be accelerated.

What kind of a Syria?

Military support from Russia and Iran may be slow and limited, but it is certain that at some point these two states will take action against the jihadist terrorist groups in Syria. What they will do at that point is an important question mark. Because if we see the current HTS attacks, as Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan put it, as the result of the internal dynamics and the refusal of the Assad regime, which we always see as guilty and responsible, to listen to the just and legitimate demands of the people (! ), which erupted as a result of the Assad regime’s refusal to listen to the just and legitimate demands of the people (!) – this is what Fidan said after his meeting with his Iranian colleague – what are we going to do if Russia, Iran, and Syria gain the military upper hand on the ground against these groups? Especially after the publications of the pro-government media, which give Syrian cities number plates…

Moreover, if our policy, which has nothing to do with our national interests and which we are pursuing only to harm Assad, succeeds and HTS manages to hold the areas it controls, including Aleppo, this will lead to the emergence of two Terrorist Territories on our southern borders. One controlled by HTS and its affiliates and the other by the PKK/PYD region east of the Euphrates… Have we thought how this would benefit Turkey? Or if Assad fulfils the instructions we are now giving in a patronizing way – to take Syria out of its national-unitary structure and turn it into a federation – and if federated/autonomous parts such as the HTS region and the PKK/PYD region with their own military power are formed within this country, what benefit will this bring to Turkey?

On the other hand, we know from the refugees and terrorist organizations we face that this policy has placed an enormous burden and strategic cost on our country. None of this existed before 2011. With the current policy, it is quite possible to fall out with Russia, Iran and even China. Arab countries may also oppose us and demand that we leave Arab lands immediately. Could this damage our relations with Egypt, for example, which is very sensitive to all these radical Islamist organizations? Can we destroy the Astana platform with our own hands and convince our partners there – Russia and Iran – that we have nothing to do with all these events?

On the other hand, are we aware that by contributing to such a mess in Syria, we are destroying Trump’s option to withdraw from Syria? And that we are playing into the hands of Israel and the U.S. deep state, which is determined to create a Kurdistan… In my opinion, our foreign policy has returned to the factory settings of 2011 and things are not going to go well. I hope I am wrong.

Perhaps the most attractive aspect of Trump is that everyone has their own Trump. He says he will ‘drain the swamp’ and gets votes from the anti-establishment. He says, ‘I’m going to cut taxes for the rich’ and gets support from the rich. On the one hand he says he will give Israel unlimited support; on the other hand he goes to the Arabs and says, ‘I will end the Gaza war’. The most interesting thing is that all these discourses are reciprocated. Unlike the Democrats, who are afraid of offending everyone and cannot say anything to anybody, he manages to reach every segment of society in this way.

This personalized Trump experience has brought the conservatives back to power. Of course, this is not just an electoral issue. As the new cabinet for the new term becomes clear, a similar equation exists in foreign policy. While some look at the appointment of Marco Rubio and say ‘look, this guy is working for the neocons’, others point to Tulsi Gabbard and rejoice ‘here’s the isolationist Trump we’ve been looking for’. However, Trump’s new term codes are based on two words: balance and obedience. The people chosen for the cabinet were chosen to satisfy both wings of the Republican Party, but more importantly to show unconditional loyalty to Trump.

The main reason for this is Trump’s big victory. Unlike in 2016, the absolute victory in this election makes it exceedingly difficult for Trump’s policies to be debated. Moreover, the MAGA crowd, which did not do well in the 2022 midterms, subsequently suppressed the party to such an extent that names like Nikki Haley or Mike Pence, who were publicly identified as neocons, disappeared during the primary process. In fact, after the elections, we realized that the party’s old-timers, like the Cheneys, did not have much of an impact on conservative public opinion. All this makes the MAGA movement the dominant party in the new cabinet.

However, there are arguments against MAGA’s dominance in this balancing act. For example, the fact that members of the Trump cabinet such as Pete Hegseth have signaled ‘continued support’ on the Ukraine issue has created the impression that the neocon wing of the party could be strong in the new administration. But it is a little more complex than that.

The wind of peace in Ukraine

As the Ukrainian war enters its third year and the tide has turned in Russia’s favor, all eyes have turned to Trump’s biggest promise, the ‘peace on day one’ plan. Of course, cabinet members’ statements on Ukraine are still confusing. So, what will Trump’s Ukraine policy be?

One of the most important aspects of Trump’s policy is his personal aesthetic. The image of himself created by his actions should be very positive. For example, Trump cannot accept Biden’s disgrace in Afghanistan. In this respect, he is more concerned with aesthetics than other politicians. In Ukraine, an environment in which Russia swallows the whole of Ukraine will not make Trump look good. If a peace process is to succeed, Ukraine cannot come to the table with weak and reluctant allies. No matter how much Trump’s son Donald Trump Jr. told Zelenskyy that ‘you have a month’s allowance left’, the Trump administration cannot take such a stance. Why should Russia negotiate peace if support for Ukraine is going to be cut anyway? For a realistic peace deal, the U.S. needs to give the impression that it will continue to provide arms support if the talks fail. Whether Trump likes it or not, the country he leads is a party to the war in Ukraine. So, he will have to balance the desire for peace with the bells of war.

The situation on the ground is working against Ukraine. Despite lowering the recruitment age to twenty-five, the manpower problems have not been solved. The U.S. is urging Ukraine to lower the age to eighteen. But the 18-25 age group is the smallest demographic group in Ukraine. Conscripting them will exacerbate Ukraine’s demographic crisis in the coming years. In addition, there is a desertion crisis in Ukrainian brigades that cannot enter the rotation. Between January 2024 and August 45,543 Ukrainian soldiers deserted. The total number of desertions since 2022 is 81,167. In other words, half of the desertions in the entire war took place in the last 8 months. These are, of course, ‘minimum’ figures. Desertions that Ukraine can keep track of. It is difficult to know the real number.

Besides, Ukraine’s Kursk adventure is not going well. While waiting for the Russian army to move its troops in a panic, they had to move their own troops to protect the Russian territory they had captured. This accelerated the Russian advance in Donbass. At 490 square kilometers, Russia gained the most territory in all but the first month of the war. This is precisely why Trump’s final withdrawal of support for Ukraine would weaken his hand in peace talks. Trump would prefer a Ukraine that has solved its manpower problem at the peace table.

A similar equation in Syria

Over the past three days, the world has been shocked by the offensive launched by Syrian opposition groups in Aleppo. The offensive resulted in the capture of Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, which has been the scene of fierce clashes for more than four years during the Syrian civil war. In addition to Aleppo, the Syrian National Army (SNA) captured the Kuweires airbase to the east of the city and surrounded the Tal Rifaat region controlled by YPG-PKK elements.

The emergence of such a chaotic environment in Syria can be seen as ‘the footsteps of the Trump era’. Statements such as ‘reconsidering relations with the YPG’ in Project 2025, the Republican presidential preparation programme, as well as Trump’s desire to withdraw from Syria, raise this possibility. However, I believe that these developments are independent of the foreign policy of the Trump era. Trump has not even taken office yet and he has to prioritize domestic issues. In particular, he will seek to reduce Democratic influence in the Pentagon and the intelligence community.

In my interviews with Atlantic Council member Rich Outzen and George W. Bush-era security adviser Dov Zakheim over the past few years, I have often heard the statement that ‘west of the Euphrates, the U.S. would not be bothered’ about Turkey’s operations in Syria. The equation that has emerged today should be assessed mainly between Iran, Syria and Turkey. We need more time to observe the new U.S .policy in the region.

In conclusion, it is useful to see Trump’s foreign policy as a pendulum that will swing back and forth between MAGA and neoconservative balance in the coming years. The direction in which the pendulum will swing will be determined by Trump rather than the Pentagon. This is why other countries will try to ‘humour’ Trump in their relations with the U.S. As I said, everyone has their own Trump… Let’s see how many different Trumps the next four years will show us!