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Will Putin march from Belarus to Kiev?

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The effects of the Russia-Ukraine war are changing the whole world permanently. With the energy crisis, the central banks’ radical interest rate decisions, mass protests, and the accelerated arms race, we say goodbye to 2022.

In December, Japan abandoned its post-World War II “pacifist” policy and released a strategy paper that envisaged a record-breaking military budget, already suggesting the military tensions of the coming years. There are numerous references to the Russia-Ukraine war in Japan’s new strategy document.

The war in Ukraine, which has become the front line in the great power competition, is in the front line of the “East” – “West” competition. So, what will be the course of events? Is Russia preparing a new attack on Kyiv through Belarus with fresh troops? Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s visit to Belarus with a heavy delegation of Foreign and Defense Ministers and economic staff, has fueled doubts.

I don’t think Belarus will be involved,” says retired Lieutenant General, former Head of Turkey’s General Staff Intelligence İsmail Hakkı Pekin, who assessed the concern frequently voiced in the Western media.

“The war will prolong” consensus

One thing is certain about the war that has lasted 10 months in Ukraine: the conflict will be prolonged. “Of course, this is a long-term process,” Russian leader Vladimir Putin said at the beginning of December. “Russia is planning a long war,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said on 16 December.

UN Secretary-General Antoino Guterres said, ”We have no illusions that true peace negotiations will be possible in the immediate future.”

Retired Lieutenant General İsmail Hakkı Pekin, on the other hand, makes the following assessment: “The West wants to carry this conflict into the Caucasus and inner regions of Russia in the future”:

There are Chechens on both sides fighting on both Russia’s and Ukraine’s side. Circassians aren’t active yet. The West wants to use Chechens, Circassians and Tatars to establish a battalion against Russia and hit it from behind. They’re thinking of taking action in the rear areas of Russia. They are preparing the region for action, including Georgia. The Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict may also be rekindled. Turkey needs to be very careful.

What’s the meaning of Putin’s visit to Belarus?

According to official statements by the parties, the economic agenda was widely discussed in the visit. However, in the last month of 2022, we witnessed a series of developments that led to comments that the war would shift to the north of Ukraine through Belarus. By the middle of December, Russian leader Putin would gather the field commanders and the staff team conducting the operation in Ukraine and say, “I want to hear your short- and medium-term suggestions about the operation”.

Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu also inspected troops involved in the frontline operation in Ukraine on site in December. Shoigu also travelled to Belarus on December 3 and signed a classified protocol on regional security, the contents of which were not made public. The Ministry of Defence of Belarus announced the start of a combat readiness inspection on December 13 and the completion of the inspection on December 19. On the same day, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko welcomed Putin with bread and flowers at Minsk airport. Shoigu was in Belarus for the second time in a month.

Ukraine’s concern about Belarus

On February 24, what allowed Russian soldiers to quickly enter the gates of Kyiv was that Belarus opened its territory to Russian soldiers. About 50 miles from Kyiv, troops flowed into Ukraine from the Belarusian border, but when the desired success was not achieved in a short time, Russia withdrew from the vast plains to the east of Kyiv and Ukraine and concentrated on the Donbass region. Russia’s rapid entry and the following withdraw formed this phase of the war.

In October, Putin put General Sergey Surovikin, who became famous for his Syrian experience, in charge of the Ukrainian operation. Following the attack on the Kerch Bridge, Russia began to carry out heavy attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure, especially electricity, water, and natural gas. By November, General Sergey Surovikin had decided to withdraw the Russian army from the western Kherson region. Russian soldiers were regrouped. The infrastructure of the capital Kyiv was paralyzed by the missile attacks, and at this stage, the scenarios about Belarus began to be voiced. By the 10th month of the operation, Russia had provided a road connection from Donbass to Crimea and turned Azov into an internal Russian sea. In fact, Putin, the leader of Russia, said, “Even Peter I had fought for access to the Azov Sea.” But the question was whether Putin was still targeting Kyiv.

In his interview with the Economist last week, the head of Ukraine’s armed forces, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi said Russia is preparing to attack with some 200,000 fresh troops. According to Zaluzhnyi, one of the possible attack points of the Russian army is Belarusian territory. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov rejected comments that Belarus would join the “special military operation”, saying it was “stupid” and “groundless”.

So, what does all this say about the future of the war?

According to former Head of Turkey’s General Staff Intelligence Ismail Hakkı Pekin, Moscow is trying to distract its enemy and his forces through Belarus. Commenting recently that the military mobilization in Belarus “requires the Western forces to take measures against Belarus”, Pekin states that in this way the pressure of Ukraine on the Russian forces on the southern front can be reduced. As a matter of fact, Ukrainian Deputy Interior Minister Yevhen Yenin told the BBC that they would strengthen the Ukrainian defence line on the Belarusian border in case of a new attack.

“There may be a partial truce. It is considered that the war will last for a long time. I do not expect a critical operation until spring,” he said, adding that the parties would remain passive when winter comes. According to Pekin, “Russia is trying to capture some territories during the winter. After taking them, he plans to fortify the defense line and stay there.

Pekin does not foresee Belarus’ involvement in the war at this stage, portrayed the current situation by saying, “They expect Russia to accept defeat. Russia will suffer. The West will suffer even more than Russia.

RUSSIA

What does Russia’s update of its nuclear doctrine mean?

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Russia has updated its nuclear deterrence policy, defining threats to the security of Belarus as a potential justification for the use of nuclear weapons. While experts argue that these changes are largely declaratory, they also suggest that the timing of this update may be linked to U.S. missile support for Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the amendments to the doctrinal document entitled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. The announcement was made during a meeting on 25 September 2024, where Putin revealed the changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine.

In June 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov hinted at the need for an update, citing lessons learned from military operations. The new text, in line with Putin’s directives, introduces significant changes to the conditions under which nuclear weapons can be used:

Nuclear retaliation is now justified in cases where critical threats arise to the security of not only Russia but also Belarus.

The updated doctrine expands the scope of threats to include cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), hypersonic weapons, and other aerospace attack systems. Previously, the scope was limited to ballistic missile attacks.

The doctrine highlights the importance of continuous updates to adapt to evolving security conditions.

When asked whether the publication of this doctrine was connected to the U.S. decision to send ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the idea of coincidence, stating that the document was published “on time.”

Peskov emphasized a critical new provision: If a non-nuclear state attacks Russia with the backing of a nuclear-armed state, it will be treated as a joint nuclear attack. This underscores Russia’s heightened sensitivity to Western support for Ukraine, especially in light of escalating tensions with NATO.

Several experts have weighed in on the implications of the updated nuclear doctrine:

Alexander Yermakov, a specialist at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), noted that the changes largely clarify existing provisions. For instance, the scope of retaliation has expanded to include drones and cruise missiles, whereas previous documents only referred to ballistic missile attacks.

According to Yermakov, the timing of the doctrine could be a strategic response to recent U.S. military aid to Ukraine: “These changes were announced earlier. However, in light of recent developments, they were published to remind of the risks of possible escalation.”

Dmitry Stefanovic, an expert from the Centre for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, highlighted that the new doctrine reflects global nuclear trends.

Stefanovic noted that some countries have increased their arsenals, new nuclear-weapon states have emerged, and the importance of the nuclear factor has increased in recent years.

The expert added that the doctrine contains elements that strengthen nuclear cooperation with Belarus.

“The updated document further clarifies the issue of the ‘nuclear threshold’ – the necessary conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. This is no cause for relief, either for Russia or its rivals. If the risk of direct confrontation with the US and NATO remains, a scenario of rapid nuclear escalation is always possible,” Stefanovic said.

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U.S. rehearses nuclear strike on Russian border

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NATO’s Joint Air Forces Command has announced that the United States’ B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers recently conducted a training bombing mission at the Cudgel range near Kaliningrad Oblast.

The exercise was coordinated with Italian and German fighter jets, demonstrating NATO’s operational cooperation. It involved dropping laser-guided bombs from an altitude of six kilometers as part of the Vanguard Merlin exercise, a tactical program organized by U.S. rotational units in Europe.

The deployment of B-52 bombers to Europe is described by NATO as a routine measure aimed at “protecting allies and deterring potential threats.”

In early November, the U.S. Air Force stationed four B-52 aircraft at Mildenhall Air Base in the UK. Since their arrival, the bombers have flown over Finland, Sweden, the North Sea, and Lithuania, expanding NATO’s aerial presence in the region.

On 15 November, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported, citing sources within President Joe Biden’s administration, that the United States plans to increase its deployed nuclear warheads in response to growing threats from Russia, China, and North Korea.

The report revealed that the White House had previously drafted a classified directive to prepare for potential simultaneous conflicts with Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang. While the strategy emphasizes the development of non-nuclear deterrence, it also considers enhancing nuclear capabilities.

These proposals are currently under evaluation by the Pentagon, with final decisions expected from the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump.

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Russia will not give Israel guarantees on Hezbollah

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In an interview with RIA Novosti, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Russian President’s special envoy to Syria, stated that Moscow could not provide Israel with guarantees to prevent “arms smuggling” from Syria to Lebanon.

Earlier reports from the Israeli press indicated that Israel would like to see Russia as a mediator in the Middle East peace settlement. Lavrentiev confirmed that Israel had requested guarantees from Russia to prevent Shiite groups from moving military equipment through Syria to Lebanon. However, he clarified that this demand could not be met.

“This would require the establishment of new checkpoints along the border, a task that does not fall within the competence of the Russian military in Syria,” Lavrentiev explained.

When asked about Israel’s expectation of a security guarantee, Lavrentiev responded, “First of all, we cannot give such a guarantee.”

Reports have previously indicated that Israel has been in contact with Moscow regarding the regional settlement process. It was even suggested that Strategic Planning Minister Ron Dermer, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest advisors, was planning a confidential visit to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Itamar Eichner, a columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, noted in his column yesterday that Israel understands Russia’s influence over Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. “This is why Tel Aviv seeks guarantees from Moscow to prevent arms smuggling and to stop the Lebanese terrorist organization from recovering from the war,” Eichner wrote.

Commenting on Israel’s desire to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border, Lavrentiev highlighted a recent attack near Khmeimim Air Base in Syria. Although this incident took place about a month ago and did not directly impact Russian troops, Lavrentiev felt compelled to address it.

“Israel carried out an airstrike near Khmeimim. They did not target the air base directly, as they know this would have serious consequences for Israel. Reports suggest that the strike targeted warehouses and buildings in the vicinity,” Lavrentiev stated.

He also mentioned that the Russian Defense Ministry had “sent a representative to Israel” for further discussions.

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