OPINION
10 years of the economic miracle Silk Road: 10 years of Germany’s downfall
Published
on
The New Silk Road project is ushering in a new era of human civilization. Over 200 states and organizations are participating in it voluntarily. German politics, however, has so far shown no interest in letting Germany participate and in guiding German companies to the forefront of the new world order. Emotions instead of facts guide their actions. The consequences for the economy are fatal.
For more than ten years, the German economy, but also the German population, has increasingly been struggling with domestic problems. These include high real estate prices, major deficits in healthcare and education, and its own rail and highway infrastructure. Digitization, a nationwide network or autonomous driving, increasingly seems a long way off. Now the war in Ukraine is adding to the burden. The energy crisis, masses of additional refugees and a lack of orders are putting additional strain on the beleaguered system. Politicians, however, have a new goal: decoupling from economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, and with it the coup de grace for Germany.
While Germany’s political goal is to stay afloat, the rest of the world thinks differently. This is about development, about the future. About the step into a new era. Gigantic megaprojects with enormous population masses from China, India, Bangladesh, Africa or South America play a decisive role. To participate in a new Silk Road with gigantic orders, companies have almost unlimited new opportunities to expand their business. German companies, however, are excluded. Not because China wants it. But because German politicians feel emotionally, factlessly uncomfortable and do not understand the opportunities the project offers. President Xi Jinping even wanted the West to participate in a meeting with Donald Trump. The New Silk Road is now celebrating its 10th anniversary and is the prime example of Germany’s lack of development in the last 10 years. It is about development. It is about a shared future for humanity.
Silk Road as a new economic wonder of the 21st century
China has initiated the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) to promote a new global connectivity and application of 21st century knowledge. The goal is to develop a forward-looking globalization that finally breaks away from the old structures of hegemony and tribute from the Cold War and colonialism era. The BRI is not an exclusively East Asian concept, nor does it follow any particular principle. China wants to help other countries follow their own development path and stay away from war, ideology models and tribute systems. Instead, it is strengthening international cooperation with other countries. In the age of the Internet, it is about freedom, openness, shared interests, and inclusion of other countries. Energy facilities, gas and refinery facilities are being shared, as well as information provided via cable, satellite, data centers, etc.
The world is going through a new phase of global order, with challenges in climate and nature, as well as geopolitical disputes. In the era of digital economy, data and data infrastructures are invaluable, in line with Artificial Intelligence and advanced technologies. This is not only a physical megaproject, but also a digital interconnection to open up new opportunities in the interest of consumers, businesses and digital administrations.
Unhindered trade for a free global market
Cooperation along the Silk Road means the development of economic levels, not only to promote the overall economy of China, but especially to strengthen the health of the world economy and international trade and business. It is also about linking the facilities of individual countries for an overall goal in trade and investment to enable a freer market. It is about a peaceful development towards a common future of mankind. Stability and trade developments are to be promoted in the sense of win-win cooperation. Legal hurdles are to be adjusted and further developed in order to create prosperity in the interest of all people.
The BRI supports the redesign of existing, outdated structures towards new growth processes that adapt to the developing world. According to the WTO, trade between China and the EU is the largest and third largest import and export region in the world in 2021, accounting for 13% to 10% of total global trade in goods. The import and export volume totals USD 828.11 billion, growing by 27.5% year by year. China remains the largest trading partner of the EU. The European Union is China’s second largest trading partner, with 52% of exports to China consisting of machinery and vehicles, 20% of other manufactured goods, and 15% of chemical products. The EU imports 56% machinery from China, 35% other manufactured goods and 7% from chemicals.
In 2000, the volume of trade between Africa and China was USD 10 billion. By 2014, it had risen to USD 220 billion, reaching a total of USD 250 billion in 2021. China is thus Africa’s largest trading partner. The Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, for example, has been able to boost Kenya’s growth by 1.5 percentage points and directly create 50,000 jobs.
Connectivity of the facilities
One of the main projects is the connectivity of facilities, especially the connection of roads and bridges to promote the local economic situation and unleash the potential. However, over the past decade, there have been challenges in the areas of technology, publicity, and funding. The BRI has funded more than 3,000 megaprojects through 2022 with an investment of $1 billion alone. At the same time, the West failed in projects. Roads longer than 3 km and buildings with more than three stories were built by China. Funding of smaller projects by Western taxpayers, on the other hand, is often unsuccessful and illustrates the ineffectiveness of the latest Western-funded projects.
The BRI’s first tunnel in Uzbekistan now allows for a transfer of only 900 seconds instead of a 1-2 day bypass. 13 of China’s projects became so well known that they were even printed on banknotes of 11 countries. From 2013 to 2021, the contract volume has increased from $71.94 billion to $134.04 billion. According to statistics from the Engineering News-Record (ENR), the number of Chinese companies also investing in the private sector has increased from 55 in 2012 to 79 in 2021. The share of total sales increased from 13.1% to 28.4%.
Highways, expressways, train links and fast trains are being built. In the Maldives, the first overseas bridge was built in 2018, named after the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge. Western politicians considered the project unrealistic and did not want to support it In Jamaica, Montenegro and Uganda, the first highways were built.
Most developing countries are heavily dependent on the agricultural industry. Without adequate transportation links, it is difficult to ship these products and thus generate revenue. The 480 km train link between Mombasa’s port and Kenya’s capital, Nairobi, creates an important connection and enables 40,000 jobs. According to the World Bank’s Global Container Port Performance Index 2020, the Port of Djibouti even ranked first in Africa as a BRI project. Both the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan and the 142 km train line between Jakarta and Bandung, as well as the China-Laos Highway with a length of 1035 km, were built.
All companies are committed to environmental protection as well as international social responsibility to respect local habitats, and a global co-corporate governance structure. Since 2019, the focus has been on high quality BRI cooperation. This means greener technologies and investments, as well as the implementation of the Digital Silk Road, the Health Silk Road, and the Smart Silk Road. It also aims to avoid the construction of new coal-fired power plants. One example is the Addis Ababa Riverside Green Development Project in China.
Financial structure
Many developing countries have neither the prerequisites nor the conditions to attract economic investors. Nor do they have their own facilities and financial resources to finance their own development. Without external support, adequate development is difficult. However, since the emergence of the BRI, the BRI’s own large financial institutions have played an important role. Thus, local institutions work together with international and private partners. Chinese banks such as China Development Bank and China Export Import Bank are the main suppliers to the Belt and Road Initiative. Organizations such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund, traditional international financial institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and private companies also support the initiative.
In 2021, China’s direct investment amounted to $213.48 billion. In 2016, the People’s Bank of China concluded multilateral cooperation agreements with the African Development Bank, the International Financial Cooperation within the World Bank Group and the Inter-American Development Bank. This involved a volume of US$7 billion. In the private sector, by the end of 2021, around 500 Chinese private companies had made investments worth US$43.08 billion.
Capacity structures
By 2021, China has signed cooperation agreements with 40 countries to create institutional production capacity. This involves the export of products along the Silk Road as well as the construction of factories in target countries and the transfer of supporting industries and equipment. This also means the transfer of capacities, capital and technologies. The cooperation has been expanded to 13 states and now includes steel, chemical, lighting, automotive, communications, engineering, space, shipbuilding and submarine industries.
These are industrial parks. Currently, there are 70 such parks along the Belt and Road and 3000 projects in total. Countries along the Belt and Road have massive oil and steel reserves, estimated at about 67.6 tons. Most countries along the BRI are in the early or middle stages of industrialization. Therefore, there is a high demand for technical industries, but the share of foreign investment (foreign direct investment) is low. China invests in infrastructure, while the West erects political hurdles and divides the world into good and evil.
It is claimed that China steals raw materials like the West and shifts its production abroad. In fact, China shifts its production in countries of BRI to optimize according to demand in each place and promote bilateral steel production. Through the shared future principles of the member countries, the steel is used with each other to promote the parties according to demand.
In Serbia, the Hesteel Smederevo steel plant was invested by China. President Xi Jinping has personally ensured that this was done to preserve jobs. As a result, more than 5,000 jobs have been secured and another 50,000 created. In Ethiopia, the Adama Wind Power Project is considered the green roof of Africa. Together with China’s Hydropower Engineering Consulting Group and CGCOC, a project has been launched to produce up to 51 MW in the first phase and up to 153 MW in the second phase. This amount is equivalent to 20% of the capital’s electricity needs. Annually, 630 million kilowatt-hours of clean energy will be generated, resulting in a saving of 185,000 tons of coal and carbon dioxide emissions, saving 61,000 tons of emissions per year.
China’s investments are supposedly causing the countries in question to fall into a debt trap. However, based on numerous analyses and articles, it appears that the real cause of over-indebtedness is to be found in the West, as the Western private sector refuses to write off debt. Since 2004, private investors have been contributing to debt generation. The “debt trap” theory is put forward by the West to hurt China. In fact, the reality is that China forgoes debt when it is necessary. In May 2021, China forgave $1.3 billion in debt in Africa.
Damage for Europe and Germany
The funding is available. The cooperation and infrastructure projects are underway. Germany can join them and enable its own companies to gain a foothold in the new market. The BRI project can also boost the domestic economy, create jobs and secure long-term investment projects. The finances generated can be used to stabilize national problems and compensate for them. Massive amount of new jobs and orders will be created and new markets. Unfortunately, CDU, SPD, FDP and especially the Greens are currently ensuring that the project is confronted. With US Think Thanks as advisory bodies any cooperation is to be prevented. At the same time, however, US companies themselves are participating in the new market. This is driving Germany into an economic suicide.
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“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?
Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.
But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.
In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.
These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.
This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.
The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.
The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.
This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.
The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.
Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.
OPINION
Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East
Published
3 days agoon
18/11/2024By
Ma XiaolinOn November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.
Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.
Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.
Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.
Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.
However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.
Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.
Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.
Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.
In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”
It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.
The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.
Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.
With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.
Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.
Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.
Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.
Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.
Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.
Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.
Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.
These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.
Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.
In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.
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