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New era in Turkiye-Israel normalization: Decision to appoint ambassadors

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The recent dialogue between Ankara and Tel Aviv aimed at normalizing relations has brought along the decision to bring bilateral relations back to a diplomatic level.

Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu has announced that they have decided to appoint an ambassador to Tel Aviv within the framework of the mutual maximization of diplomatic relations between Turkiye and Israel.

Stressing that a dialogue process with Tel Aviv started with the election of Isaac Herzog as President, Çavuşoğlu said, “The process continued with Herzog’s visit to Turkiye and then my visit to Israel, the visit of the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid to Ankara.”

Announcing the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in the field of aviation, Çavuşoğlu said that a Mixed Economic Commission meeting would be held at the beginning of September. Israel also announced in early July that it had decided to reopen its Economic and Trade Office, which it had closed at the time of the deterioration of political relations.

Stressing that Turkiye will not give up the Palestinian cause, Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu said, “We will continue to defend the rights of Palestine, Jerusalem and Gaza”.

President Erdogan had also previously made a statement about the resuming relations: “It will allow us to help our Palestinian brothers.”

The emphases on regional matters drew attention

“Israel and Turkiye will return to full normalization of relations, including reinstating ambassadors and consuls-general,” Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said in a statement.

Lapid’s argument that this step would contribute not only to deepening bilateral ties, but to strengthening regional stability drew attention.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog also emphasized the improvement of economic relations and mutual tourism in his Turkish tweet by tagging his counterpart Erdogan on his social media account.

Statement of support from the US

The US Embassy has posted a statement of support for the new period in Ankara-Tel Aviv relations. The following message was shared on the social media account of the Embassy:

“U.S. Embassy Ankara welcomes the news that Turkiye and Israel will exchange ambassadors as part of the normalization of relations between the two countries.”

From ‘One minute’ to normalization

In a session at the World Economic Forum held in Davos in early 2009, then Prime Minister Erdogan reacted to the words of former Israeli President Shimon Peres defending the attacks on Gaza with “One minute” outburst and left the session saying, “Davos is over for me.”

Although this outbreak caused a crisis in bilateral relations, the main breakdown occurred after Israel’s Mavi Marmara attack in 2010. After Israeli commandos raided the Mavi Marmara ship, seeking to break the blockade in Gaza, and killed 9 Turkish citizens, relations were minimized, and diplomatic representation was reduced to the level of charge d ‘affaires.

In 2016, steps were taken to normalize relations and mutual ambassadors were appointed. However, in 2018, Turkiye recalled its ambassador for consultations and asked Israel to take a similar step after Israel opened fire on Palestinians protesting the United States Embassy in Jerusalem, killing 60 people.

The dialogue between the new Israeli President Isaac Herzog, who took office on July 7, 2021, and President Erdogan gave the signals of normalization. Afterwards, during Herzog’s visit to Turkiye on March 9 and 10, steps to improve cooperation were discussed. Herzog became the first Israeli leader to visit Turkiye since 2008.

During a visit to Ankara on June 23 by then Israeli Foreign Minister, current Prime Minister Yair Lapid, a statement was made regarding the upgrading of relations to ambassador level, which have been at the level of charge d ‘affaires since 2018. Çavuşoğlu and Lapid announced their decision to start working on mutually reappointing of ambassadors at a press conference.

There are some elements in the ups and downs of relationship between two countries that are perceived as both crises and opportunities:

The Iran factor

Israel has redeveloped its relations with the Gulf countries, trying to establish a line against Iran, which it regards as an ‘existential threat’ in the region. At a time when Iran is close to a nuclear deal, Israel is looking for new actors to expand its frontline in the region.

Tel Aviv, which seeks to include Turkiye in its strategy to balance Iran in the region, recently claimed that the Iranian secret service is planning attacks against Israeli tourists and officials in Turkiye. Following the assassination of Colonel Hassan Sayyad Khodaei, a senior commander of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the possibility of a “revenge attack” by Iran against Israeli citizens in Turkiye was pointed out.

Turkiye, on the other hand, cooperated with Tel Aviv by conducting operations against some Iranian citizens in line with the intelligence from Israel. Upon this, Israeli President Herzog personally called President Erdogan and thanked him.

While the two countries’ cooperation in the field of intelligence was thought to unsettle Iran, the emphasis on ‘regional stability’ in the leaders’ statements drew attention. It is evident that the cooperation that Turkiye and Israel will develop in the field of military and intelligence will serve Tel Aviv’s strategy of balancing Iran in the region. Therefore, it can be asserted that the Iran factor has an important place in Israel’s desire to get closer to Turkiye.

The Israeli press also reported that both countries “see Iran’s presence in Syria as a threat to their stability” and that they “want to strengthen coordination in Syria.”

Hamas agenda

One of the security issues between Turkiye and Israel is Hamas, one of the Palestinian resistance movements. While Israel designates Hamas as a “terrorist group”, Turkiye denies this.

Last year, Israel announced it required to see Ankara take some steps against the presence of Hamas leaders in Turkiye before starting negotiations on a settlement. Thereupon, the Israeli press claimed that “people identified with Hamas have been deported from Turkiye.” Palestinians living in Turkiye denied the allegations.

It is not certain whether Hamas agenda has come up in the latest talks or whether Israel has made any demands.

The elections factor

On the other hand, elections are approaching in Israel, which have turned into a crisis and will be held for the fifth time in four years.

As Israel’s longest-running prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is being discussed for re-election as Prime Minister on November 1, Lapid, who will race in the election as Prime Minister, is trying to prove his effectiveness and leadership during this period. Therefore, Lapid may consider rapprochement with Turkiye important for his own political future.

Eastern Mediterranean tension

Despite some time of normalization talks between the two countries, tensions are rising in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel has deepened its cooperation with Greece in recent years, while in the Eastern Mediterranean, it frequently holds trilateral and bilateral exercises with Greece and the United States.

The last of these exercises took place on July 13. The two air forces reportedly conducted training exercises “on coping with various scenarios, advancing both countries’ readiness to fight in multiple scenarios and airborne refueling Greek fighter jets.”

In addition, just before his visit to Turkiye, the Israeli President visited Nicosia on March 2 and met with the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, Nicos Anastasiades, and pledged to him that “rapprochement with Turkiye would not be at the expense of disrupting its strategic relations with Cyprus.”

Israel is also known to be uncomfortable with Turkiye’s presence in Libya and to see it as a threat to its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The gas project…

On the other hand, the Israeli press reported that Erdogan was “in an effort to develop a gas pipeline that would deliver Israeli natural gas directly to Turkiye in order to ease Turkiye’s dependence on Russian gas” and “could aim to use restored relations as a stepping stone.”

In addition to bringing gas from Israel and using it in its domestic market, the project of exporting Israeli gas to Europe via Turkiye has been on the agenda for a long time. Although this is an option for Europe, which is experiencing an energy crisis due to sanctions against Russia after the Ukrainian crisis, it is stated that Israeli gas alone will not be enough. There are also various political and economic uncertainties on the subject.

Israel’s plan to build a pipeline to Southern Cyprus and Greece effectively collapsed after the United States withdrew its support for the East-Med Pipeline Project last year. Whether Tel Aviv will engage in this project with Turkiye at the expense of confronting its partners in the Eastern Mediterranean remains a question mark.

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Russia open to Syria’s BRICS membership amid leadership shift

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Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov announced that if Syria’s new government applies to join BRICS, its request would be taken into serious consideration. Speaking to TASS news agency, Ryabkov stated, “There is no doubt that we seriously consider the applications of all countries, and Syria is no exception.” However, he emphasized that BRICS would not pressure or influence Syria’s decision, saying, “We are not forcing anyone, we are not encouraging anyone to do anything, and we respect any choice.”

In October, Syria’s ambassador to Moscow, Bashar Jaafari, revealed that Damascus was actively discussing the possibility of joining BRICS. Moscow has reaffirmed its support for Syria in this pursuit, highlighting the historic ties between the two nations. The BRICS bloc, originally founded in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, expanded in 2011 with the inclusion of South Africa. In a significant wave of growth, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates became members as of January 1, 2024.

Recent developments suggest a strategic shift in Moscow’s approach to Syria. The Kremlin has begun direct negotiations with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a key political and military entity in the region, to safeguard Russian military interests in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed contact with HTS’s political committee. Meanwhile, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani, now identifying as Ahmed Sharaa, expressed openness to redefining relations with Russia, noting the opportunity to “reconsider relations in a way that serves common interests.”

Simultaneously, the Syrian Embassy in Moscow raised the flag of the new administration, signaling readiness to follow directives from the country’s new leadership. This marks a notable pivot in the geopolitical alignment between Russia and Syria.

Former diplomat Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, highlighted Russia’s pragmatic approach. In an interview with The Guardian, he remarked, “Moscow prefers to work with those who have power and control and discards those who lose it.”

Dara Massicot, an analyst at the Carnegie Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin, noted that while Russia could extend financial, energy, or resource-based support to the new Syrian government, the coalition’s specific demands remain uncertain.

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EU sanctions Dutch oil trader for breaching Russian oil price cap

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For the first time, the European Union (EU) has imposed sanctions on a European national for violating the price cap on Russian oil exports. Nils Trost, a Dutch oil trader residing in Switzerland, faces sanctions for his involvement in breaching the $60-per-barrel price ceiling imposed by Western countries. Swiss authorities are also investigating his company, Paramount Energy & Commodities SA.

According to an EU statement, Trost’s Geneva-based company transferred its Russian oil trading operations in June 2022 to its Dubai-based subsidiary, Paramount Energy & Commodities DMCC. The EU alleges that this subsidiary regularly traded Russian crude oil at prices exceeding the established $60-per-barrel limit.

The $60 price ceiling on Russian crude oil, implemented in December 2022, was part of Western efforts to curb Moscow’s oil revenue while maintaining global supply. Under the sanctions, trade involving Western insurers and financiers must adhere to this price limit. However, Paramount’s Dubai subsidiary continued trading East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) grade oil, which typically trades at prices above the ceiling, unlike Russia’s Urals crude.

Trost has denied violating sanctions, arguing that his UAE subsidiary is legally independent and not bound by EU sanctions. Speaking to The Financial Times, he claimed that his lawyers assured him the operations of subsidiaries in the UAE are exempt from EU restrictions as long as they remain uninvolved with the European parent company. Trost also attributed the sanctions to what he described as the “machinations” of his former business partner, Gaurav Kumar Srivastava.

Swiss law allows foreign subsidiaries of Swiss companies to operate independently of Swiss sanctions. However, if direct links—such as financial transfers or managerial directives—between the parent company and subsidiaries are established, such actions could constitute a sanctions violation. The Swiss Federal Government’s Expert Group on Business Cycles (SECO) began examining the activities of Paramount and other companies in early 2023.

In the spring of 2024, SECO forwarded its findings to Switzerland’s Attorney General’s Office, recommending criminal proceedings based on two separate investigations. While the prosecutor’s office accepted one case, it rejected the other. The names of the involved companies remain undisclosed.

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Türkiye’s Moment in Europe’s Eyes: Von der Leyen’s High-Stakes Visit Amid Syria’s Turmoil

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Ahmetcan Uzlaşık, Brussels

Brussels, Dec 16, 2024 – European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s upcoming visit on December 17 to Türkiye comes at a pivotal moment for Syria, a country emerging from the long shadow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As Syria faces unprecedented political shifts, von der Leyen’s discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will not only address the immediate humanitarian crisis but also shape the future of EU-Türkiye cooperation in the region.

Ahmetcan Uzlaşık

The fall of Assad’s regime has raised hopes for a new era in Syria, yet the transition brings both risks and uncertainties. Ursula von der Leyen, in a statement ahead of her visit, emphasized the importance of continued EU support for Syria’s people, saying, “The collapse of the Assad regime offers new hope for the Syrian people. But this moment of change also carries risks and brings hardship. With the situation on the ground so volatile, our help to the people of Syria is ever more important.”

Von der Leyen: “We Are Committed to Providing Essential Aid”

The European Union has swiftly mobilized to address the urgent needs of those affected by the ongoing conflict and political upheaval in Syria. The Commission announced the launch of a new Humanitarian Air Bridge operation, delivering 50 tonnes of health supplies to Türkiye from its stockpiles in Dubai. These supplies will then be transported to northern Syria to alleviate the mounting health crisis. Additionally, 46 tonnes of shelter and education materials will be delivered, with EU funding now reaching €163 million in total humanitarian aid for 2024.

“We are committed to providing essential aid, including trauma kits, medical supplies, and food parcels to over 60,000 Syrians in the north,” said von der Leyen on December 13. The EU’s expanded humanitarian efforts reflect the urgency of the situation. However, despite the scale of this intervention, questions remain about the long-term effectiveness of these efforts, as many sanctions on Syria are ongoing.

“Türkiye will be a primus inter pares partner in dealing with Syria for the EU”

Von der Leyen’s visit comes at a time when Türkiye, a candidate country of the EU, increased its geopolitical importance in the region. Having long supported opposition forces against Assad, Türkiye is now portrayed in the West as one of the winners of the Syrian civil war.

Türkiye’s role in hosting over 4 million Syrian refugees has made it one of the most directly affected nations by the conflict, while it made Ankara important as an gate-keeper of migration before the eyes of European politicians. As von der Leyen prepares for her meeting with Erdoğan, the focus will likely be on reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation to manage the refugee crisis, protection of the minorities in Syria and prevent further instability that might cause another domestic conflict.

“We must work together to ensure that Syria’s territorial integrity is preserved and that the rights of all its people, especially minorities, are protected,” von der Leyen stated on 13th December.

Sophie Desmidt, Associate Director at ECDPM, emphasized that Türkiye’s role is central to the EU’s strategy. She noted that “Türkiye will be a primus inter pares partner in dealing with Syria for the EU, and von der Leyen will underline this during her visit.” Desmidt also highlighted the likelihood of Türkiye leveraging its position for additional EU support, especially given its pivotal role during the migration crisis. She added, “US leadership is in lame duck mode until Trump takes office, and whether he will be a spoiler or a power broker remains to be seen. I think Erdogan is keen to assert his leadership, over Iran, which plays in the EU’s cards”.

Kaja Kallas: The challenge of EU’s new face in diplomacy

The former Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, came to the office on December 1, as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Recent statements from Kaja Kallas, the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, add another layer of context to von der Leyen’s visit. Kallas has underscored the EU’s commitment to ensuring stability in the region, an issue of particular importance in light of Syria’s ongoing instability. On December 8, she tweeted, “Our priority is to ensure security in the region. I will work with all the constructive partners, in Syria and in the region.”

On December 14, Kallas emphasized the EU’s support for Syria’s political transition, stating, “Syria faces a hopeful but uncertain future. That’s why we all agreed in Aqaba on important principles: stability, sovereignty, territorial integrity, but also respect for minorities, institution build-up and unity of government that includes all the groups in Syria.”

Before going into her first Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, on December 16, Kallas announced that she had appointed “A European top diplomat” to go to Damascus and make contact with the new government and people there.

Kallas also stated that the bloc could ease sanctions on Syria if its new leadership forms an inclusive government and respects women’s and minority rights. She also noted that many EU foreign ministers urged Syria to eliminate Russian influence, including military bases, after the Foreign Affairs Council meeting.

“EU leadership wants decreased migration pressure”

Desmidt answered what might be the possible effects of the political crisis in Germany and France in the context of a leadership problem. “This will be a challenge for the time being, but pending the outcome of the German elections, things could move relatively fast. My sense is that EU leadership across the board, including the Commission, Parliament, and EU heads of state and government, and their domestic constituencies are by and large on the same page when it comes to the outcome they want to see as a result of support to Syria: decreased migration pressure on the EU.”

She added that there are other players who will contribute ideally to a joint EU action, such as António Costa, the new Council President, who will have the task of mobilizing member states around a common position, and Dubravka Šuica, the new Commissioner for the Mediterranean. Kaja Kallas, Desmidt noted, will have to demonstrate that this is a priority for her, as her profile has been strong in Ukraine and Russia. “She already took action over the weekend, traveling to Jordan to speak to representatives from the U.S., Türkiye, and Arab states,” she pointed out.

“Politics will ultimately trump moral frameworks”

Desmidt reinforced this view, warning against premature disengagement. “The EU has, on many occasions, been criticized for relinquishing in practice its emphasis on human rights and democracy and has been seen by many partners outside the EU as operating on double standards—being hard-line on some regimes but more lenient towards others, especially when interests are at play.”

She noted that “Politics will ultimately trump moral frameworks, but the EU should be clear on its position and interests. Closing the door to engagement with Syria’s transitional government now would also close the space for the EU to act constructively and effectively.” She drew parallels to Afghanistan, where the EU adopted a principled yet pragmatic approach to engagement with the leadership to support the people.

Looking forward, the EU faces a delicate balancing act. The potential return of Syrian refugees, combined with the need for reconstruction, will test the EU’s commitment to the region. The European Commission has already pledged to continue funding the rebuilding of Syria’s infrastructure, but as von der Leyen acknowledged, this will require the cooperation of all regional players, including Türkiye.

“The reconstruction of Syria will require significant resources, and the EU is ready to play its part,” said von der Leyen. “But it is essential that we work together with our regional partners to ensure that the political transition is inclusive and sustainable.”

Desmidt noted that budget constraints and the rise of far-right parties in Europe might further complicate these efforts. “The EU won’t shoulder the cost of reconstruction alone. Partners in the region, such as the Gulf states, will need to step up. Ideally EU’s role should focus on coordinating and supporting a regionally owned process, that prioritises respectful and innovative domestic and foreign policy solutions that pave the way for Syria’s long-term reconstruction” she concluded.

Desmidt also outlined potential avenues for support, such as international donor conferences, joint reconstruction funds with the World Bank and Asian and Islamic Development Banks, and a regional peace process and plan. She also suggested the possibility of an EU Envoy for Syria. She concluded, “I fear that other conflict zones, besides the Middle East and Ukraine, will suffer from a reallocation of interests and funds, notably Africa, as the return of migrants and easing migration pressure on the EU is higher up the political priority list than, for example, Sudan or the Sahel at the moment.”

“With the new configuration in Syria, Türkiye’s Importance Has Undoubtedly Grown in Europe”

Dr. Kadri Taştan, a non-resident senior fellow in Brussels, gave a Türkiye perspective by highlighting Türkiye’s strategic position in light of Syria’s transformation.

“Türkiye’s importance has undoubtedly grown in the eyes of Europe,” he said, pointing to Ankara’s consistent support for Syrian opposition groups even during times when the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime seemed improbable. According to Dr. Taştan, this steadfast backing has placed Türkiye in a particularly advantageous position as Syria undergoes a significant transition.

“In the short term, Türkiye is the most effective and profitable country in this new configuration, especially considering its longstanding relationships with the opposition forces,” he explained.

Security and Migration are the cornerstones of EU-Türkiye Cooperation

When asked about potential areas of collaboration between the EU and Türkiye , Dr. Taştan identified two primary points of focus: security and migration.

“Cooperation between the EU and Türkiye will center on security—specifically combating terrorism—and migration,” he said. While these two areas present clear opportunities for joint efforts, Dr. Taştan expressed skepticism regarding Europe’s ability to contribute significantly to Syria’s reconstruction.

“I don’t think Europeans can provide substantial support for reconstruction. The political environment in Europe is not conducive to this,” he noted, citing the ongoing challenges faced by the EU’s leading nations. “The two locomotive countries of Europe are facing significant political instability, and the rise of populist movements makes large-scale commitments difficult.”

Dr. Taştan also emphasized that migration and refugee return programs could become a cornerstone of EU-Türkiye cooperation. He suggested that the EU might utilize civil society organizations to fund and implement these programs through Türkiye.

“The EU can finance these initiatives through Türkiye, using entities like civil society organizations to ensure the effective management of migration and the safe return of refugees,” he added.

Last Visit Sparked Controversy Over Seating Arrangement

As European Commission President prepares for her upcoming visit to Türkiye, memories of the infamous “sofagate” incident still linger. During her 2021 visit, von der Leyen was left without a chair in a meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and EU Council President Charles Michel, sparking global criticism and allegations of sexism.

The Two last saw each other during the European Political Community (EPC) Summit in Budapest, which took place in early November 2024.

As Ursula von der Leyen heads to Ankara, the stakes are high for both the EU and Türkiye in navigating Syria’s fragile transition. The visit represents a critical moment to redefine EU-Türkiye relations, balancing humanitarian aid, migration cooperation, and geopolitical strategy.

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