Opinion
From Great Power Competition to Strategic Stability: A New Orientation of China-US Relations
U.S. President Donald Trump paid a state visit to China from May 13 to 15, 2026. For the current turbulent international order, this summit between the two great powers of China and the United States is of extraordinary significance, bringing a degree of certainty to an uncertain world.
A major focus of domestic and international attention is that during his visit to China, Trump appeared far more rational, restrained and pragmatic than he did in Europe. In Europe, he often treated allies with emotional outbursts, unilateral pressure and even public mockery; in Beijing, by contrast, he moderated his tone, chose his words carefully, stressed respect for China and a willingness to cooperate, demonstrating a greater sense of realpolitik and diplomatic propriety.
During his tour at Zhongnanhai, he even remarked that if he gets used to this place, he might not want to leave. He also expressed hope of visiting China again in six months. All this points to productive communications between the two sides. The most important outcome was their agreement to build a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability. This is clearly a major new development and transformation in China-U.S. relations, which will undoubtedly send strong reverberations, profoundly shaping not only the societies of both nations but also the global strategic landscape and the existing structure of international relations.
What Is the “China-US Constructive Relationship of Strategic Stability”?
Although no joint communiqué was issued nor press conference held following President Trump’s visit to China, the Chinese side nonetheless spoke highly of the trip, describing it as a “historic meeting”. The reason lies in the two sides’ agreement to build a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.
Strategic stability originally refers to a state among nuclear-armed powers where mutual deterrence prevents nuclear war. The concept emerged from U.S.-Soviet arms control during the Cold War and now also describes peaceful relations between major powers. In the current China-U.S. context, “strategic stability” is understood broadly to mean that the two countries can maintain a stable framework in their most crucial interactions.
How should we understand the new positioning of a “constructive relationship of strategic stability”? During the meeting on May 14, President Xi Jinping put forward the “four should-bes” to define this new framework: It should be positive stability with cooperation as the mainstay, healthy stability with competition kept within bounds, normal stability with differences under control, and durable stability with peace in prospect. Each dimension of “stability” leaves considerable room for interpretation.
The first dimension: cooperation as the mainstay. Over the past decade, both the Trump administration’s launch of two trade wars and the Biden administration’s building of a “small yard with high fences” and imposing high-tech export controls on China have created massive disruptions to the normal operations of enterprises in both countries and to bilateral trade. As the world’s two largest economies, frequent frictions caused by U.S. policies are clearly abnormal and detrimental to the economic development of both nations and the world. It is therefore essential to return to a tone centered on cooperation.
The second dimension is well-regulated competition. The United States is prone to the Thucydides Trap mindset and harbors deep misgivings about China’s rise and development. Nevertheless, China has no intention of engaging in zero-sum games where one side wins and the other loses. From Chinese perspective, competition between nations is inevitable. Yet the world today faces the fundamental task of expanding common interests rather than dividing existing gains. We embrace sound competition and reject vicious rivalry; otherwise, the world risks repeating the tragedies of World War I, World War II and even the Cold War.
The third dimension is manageable differences. Disagreements are inevitable in China-U.S. interactions. However, if economic, trade, technological, cultural and academic exchanges are all politicized and securitized, even ordinary bilateral issues will escalate into strategic confrontations. A mature major-country relationship does not mean the absence of disputes, but the ability to keep dialogue intact even after disagreements arise.
The fourth dimension is foreseeable peace. It targets the most fundamental and bottom-line principle in China-U.S. relations: the two countries must avoid war. Today’s China-U.S. relationship is no longer a simple bilateral tie between two isolated nations, but two core pillars embedded in the global industrial chain, financial system, technological system and security architecture. Therefore, foreseeable peace requires strategic self-awareness from both sides: competition must not escalate into conflict, and confrontation must never lead to war. Neither side shall gamble the future of 1.4 billion Chinese people, over 300 million Americans and the entire world on an unaffordable conflict for short-term political gains.
These signals released from this summit indicate that both sides are striving to shift their relations from confrontation to a new phase featuring controllable competition and pragmatic cooperation.
The Constructive Significance of the New Positioning of China-U.S. Relations
These “four should-bes” are not a one-sided expectation that China places on the United States, but rather a mutual commitment between the two countries. The definition put forward by the Chinese leader has received high recognition from the U.S. side. Therefore, there is good reason to believe that this new framework will serve as the strategic guideline for China-U.S. relations over the next three years, which will cover Trump’s second term, because it benefits both nations.
For China, what matters more are the strategic gains from this meeting: namely, persuading the United States to embrace a framework of constructive strategic stability. China’s paramount strategic goal is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which demands a stable external environment. Yet since Trump’s first term, China has faced containment by the United States and its allies across trade, technology, finance, and geopolitics, posing severe challenges to its development. China has long sought to transcend the Thucydides Trap. While it does not shy away from competition and stands ready to uphold its interests in economic and trade frictions with the U.S., it has no desire for strategic rivalry. Instead, China aims to steer bilateral relations back to a path of rationality, communication, and non-confrontation, so as to secure a stable external environment for economic growth.
For the United States, it places greater emphasis on the pragmatic benefits of this visit. The U.S. signaled its intention to visit China as early as last year, aiming to leverage its perceived victories over Venezuela and Iran to pressure China. However, the war in Iran has yet to end, and it has produced significant blowback against the U.S., exposing few critical realities to the world:
First, the U.S. cannot defeat Iran, and a power unable to subdue Iran has no credible path to conquering China.
Second, although China is the world’s largest energy importer, it faces no imminent risk of energy shortages.
Third, surging domestic inflation and oil prices in the U.S. have stoked public discontent, undermining Trump’s prospects in the midterm elections.
Fourth, the U.S. failed to defeat China in the trade war, instead hitting a wall. In February, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the massive tariffs imposed by the Trump administration under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) were illegal.
Fifth, a series of events like the maiden flight of China’s sixth-generation fighter jet, the May 7th India-Pakistan air battle, the September 3 military parade, and the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict have convinced the U.S. that military coercion is unlikely to bend China to its will.
From the U.S. perspective, a reality-based assessment compels recognition of China’s international standing. Moreover, China’s neutral stance in multiple global crises has led the U.S. to view it as a rational, predictable, and negotiable strategic rival rather than an entirely uncontrollable challenger.
For the world at large, the realization of strategic stability in China-U.S. relations also contributes to global peace and stability. In this era of major-power games, world development and security are confronted with numerous challenges: rising global unrest and armed conflicts, sluggish economic growth mounting pressures on people’s livelihoods, stagnant technological progress and retrogressive international cooperation, a fractured international order and unbalanced rule-based systems, deteriorating diplomatic atmospheres and setbacks to peaceful diplomacy, ineffective governance over global issues, and small and medium-sized countries being reduced to pawns in great-power contests. The gravest crisis facing the world today lies not in troubles plaguing individual nations, but in the prevalent global state of instability, uncertainty and unpredictability. As the world’s two largest economies, China and the United States bear the responsibility to deliver stable expectations for the whole world.
The Future of China-U.S. Relations
In the short term, the proposal of a constructive strategic stability relationship between China and the United States means there will still be opportunities for positive interactions over the next six months. President Xi Jinping has agreed to pay a visit to U.S. in September 2026, and there is a high probability that the two leaders will meet again at the APEC Summit in Shenzhen and the G20 Summit in the United States again. In other words, the two countries will continue to maintain engagement, intensify cooperation on the basis of managing differences, and foster a favorable atmosphere for multiple rounds of head-of-state diplomacy in the period ahead.
Nevertheless, the “constructive strategic stability relationship between China and the United States” still faces an even bigger test that will determine its true substance. The Taiwan issue is the most sensitive and core issue in China-U.S. relations, representing China’s vital core national interest. This is a bottom line and red line that cannot be traded or trampled on.
On board Air Force One returning to the U.S. after his China visit, Trump laid out his latest “Four Don’ts” on Taiwan: Don’t want anyone to pursue independence; Don’t want to send troops thousands of miles to fight a war; Don’t become a backer for “Taiwan independence”; Don’t easily commit to arms sales to Taiwan.
This statement does not represent a shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. While the first three “Don’ts” can be seen as a form of strategic reassurance to China, the deliberate ambiguity on arms sales preserves the core tool of “using Taiwan issue to contain China”. In short, Trump has not abandoned the “Taiwan card” during this visit, and he still seeks to use it as a tool to constrain China. Accordingly, whether Trump approves a US$14 billion arms sale to Taiwan, which is the largest single arms deal in U.S. history, will not only test U.S. political commitments but also directly determine whether major conflict between China and the U.S. could break out in the future.
Though this visit facilitates the realization of strategic stability between China and the United States, the structural contradictions between the two sides in ideology, development models, technological competition and geopolitical strategies remain unresolved. In line with the logic of strategic defense, strategic stalemate and strategic counteroffensive, China-U.S. relations have entered the phase of strategic stalemate. Yet how long this phase will last remains uncertain. It is likely to be extremely protracted, spanning two to three decades or even longer until the two countries attain balanced strength across all fields.
China harbors no intention of challenging America’s dominant status, while the U.S. can hardly abandon its attempt to contain China. Hence, during this strategic stalemate, bilateral relations may witness intermittent frictions and truces, with neither side able to subdue the other. Both sides have to cooperate amid competition, which will become the new normal of bilateral ties.
In any case, the vision of a constructive strategic stability relationship is a bitter yet effective remedy proposed by China for China-U.S. relations and global peace. It does not cure minor ailments, but targets the entrenched fatal malady of hegemonic anxiety. This prescription requires joint adherence by both sides. China has demonstrated utmost sincerity and steadfast resolve. Now the ball is in America’s court, especially in the hands of decision-makers in Washington. Will it lay aside arrogance and embrace an equal, stable and sustainable new framework of bilateral relations, or remain trapped in the illusion of acting from a position of strength and rush headlong down the path of confrontation? It is hoped that this Beijing summit will mark a fresh starting point for bilateral ties. If both sides fully implement the constructive strategic stability relationship, reduce emotional decisions and excessive securitization tendencies, and step up pragmatic communication and tangible cooperation, it will prove a blessing for China, the United States and the entire world.
*Dr. Yang Chen
Associate Professor and Executive Director, Center for Turkish Studies, Institute of Global Studies, Shanghai University
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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