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The future of war after Kherson

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What had been rumored anxiously for some time by the supporters of Russia’s ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine came true; the commander of the operation, Sergei Surovikin, announced that they would withdraw the troops from Kherson region to the left bank of Dnieper River. Civilians had already begun to be evacuated in mid-October, based on the intelligence that Ukraine could destroy the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, causing flooding.

The Russian general staff seems to have decided that the troops in Kherson cannot rely on supplies coming through Dnieper. The Ukrainian general staff agrees: their army destroyed Russia’s logistic hubs, command, and supply systems, and therefore “the enemy had no choice but to resort to fleeing from Kherson.”

So, both sides are convinced that the Kherson issue is a military imperative. There is no doubt that this is one of the aspects of this matter. However, it is not difficult to predict that the issue will have far too political dimension and consequences, given that Kherson is one of the Ukrainian oblasts that joined the Russian Federation in a referendum last September and the “forever with Russia” billboards in the city are kept in mind.

Public reactions in Russia

In Russia, it is doubted that the left-wing and right-wing parties of United Russia have significant differences in their political stance toward Ukraine. It’s not possible to find a party in Duma against ‘Special Military Operation.’

However, the forces led by the right-wing Rodina and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the left-wing Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) are critical of the way in which the operation is conducted, and this is becoming increasingly political. In particular, the CPRF argues that the military issue cannot be resolved unless the operation is called ‘war’ and the economy is restructured accordingly. Russia’s left-wing also expected the Putin administration would carry out a ‘left turn’ with the Ukrainian war because of its nature. But the United Russian government continues following its way, ignoring calls from the left to nationalize the economy.

Another criticism is the fate of local people, now in the hands of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in Ukraine’s oblasts next to Russia. One of the reasons for Putin’s leadership’s intervention in Ukraine was the liberation of the Russian-speaking people living in the east of the country from neo-Nazi pressure. Although it is now considered Russian territory, the lives of pro-Russian people are feared in Kherson, which has been abandoned to Ukraine. Indeed, Ukrainian troops’ posts shared on their Telegram account after entering the city reveal that this terrible expectation has become a reality.

The Russian media, on the other hand, exhibits a great deal of criticism and polyphony, contrary to our perception and that of the West. For example, an article in Russia’s most popular military news portal topwar.ru states that Kherson was handed over without a single bullet being fired, yet ‘sold’ and ‘shameless propagandists’ would legitimize it. The article remarks that what the Russian leadership calls a ‘Special Military Operation’ means war all over the world, and that Russia must now put aside ‘commercial interests’ and engage in ‘a real war’.

According to another website, Katyusha, if the withdrawal from Kherson is not due to a cunning strategy, this is the greatest defeat of the Russian army since 1991, and it is inevitable that the confidence of ordinary people in the leadership of the country will be shaken. Katyusha remains hopeful that the retreat is a trap, but it also does not rule out the possibility that the abandonment of Kherson was due to a backdoor diplomacy between the U.S. and Russia. Both publications suggest that the death of Deputy Governor of Kherson, Kirill Stremousov, who was reportedly killed in a car crash, was questionable, as he opposed the evacuation.

Domestic political conflicts in Russia

While the war continues and the cracking voices in the local public are rising, some polarizations in politics also emerge. Although it is not the first ring of Russian leadership, the polarizations in the second ring are getting deeper.

The most obvious example of this is the interaction between Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder and owner of Wagner, and Alexander Beglov, Governor of St. Petersburg. Prigozhin and media outlets close to him had been claiming for some time that Beglov had established a ‘criminal organization.’ Prigozhin’s company Concord took another step and applied to the Prosecutor General’s Offices of the Russian Federation and the intelligence organization FSB to have Beglov investigated on charges of ‘high treason’. If we give the Latvian-based Meduza website the benefit of doubt, the reason Prigozhin has been waging war on Beglov is because the Governor of Petersburg interfered with some of Wagner’s founders’ business ventures. Finally, the business center Wagner wanted to build in St. Petersburg was denied by the governor’s office.

It should also be noted that Prigozhin’s side also includes Chechnya leader, Ramzan Kadyrov. The two were targeted by General Alexandr Lapin, the commander of the Central Military District, who left his post citing health problems and was replaced by Andrey Mordvicev, close to the Prigozhin-Kadyrov duo.

Kadyrov’s actions are not limited to this. The Chechen leader has long been criticizing the Russian army openly. After the defeat at Liman, Kadyrov blamed General Lapin and Prigozhin immediately joined him. Some believe that the Kadyrov-Prigozhin duo’s public criticism of the Russian armed forces stems from Wagner’s ‘private business relations.’

It’s clear that this issue is more intricate than it seems. The two are thought to be mainly aimed at Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov. Several retired officers and columnists also responded to the salvos of the Kadyrov-Prigozhin duo, describing the pair’s behavior as ‘demotivating.’

Potential secret alliance with the United States

The media also voiced their suspicions that there might be a secret compromise between Moscow and Washington. The Kherson retreat is still more suspicious after Nikolai Patrushev, the secretary of the Security Council of Russia and Jake Sullivan, the United States National Security Advisor, allegedly held a secret meeting.

Sources close to Russia say the Putin leadership has decided to end the war by reaching a comprehensive agreement with the ‘Collective West’. The fact that both Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said they did not exclude negotiations with Ukraine and the West could also be seen as a signal. Following the missiles that fell on a village in Poland, regardless of Kyiv’s and Warsaw’s call for the implementation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, U.S. President Joe Biden’s refusal to blame Russia is also a sign that something has been ‘cooked’ behind closed doors.

The understanding that such an agreement is favored by the Russian leadership, as well as China, India, Turkey, Iran, and other Middle Eastern countries, is becoming widespread. In the West, the influence of the Kadyrov-Prigozhin duo, which comes from Russia and is thought to be a ‘hawk’, is not much exaggerated. The closest example of this is an article published on Carnegie discussing the influence of the Kadyrov-Prigozhin duo on the Kremlin. “They talk the talk, Putin won’t listen to them,” concludes the article’s author in a nutshell.

The weak Trumpist wave in the U.S. by-election also seems to have pushed the Russian leadership to seek a deal. Undoubtedly, the possible presidency of Trump, seen as the voice of American industrialists, will be preferred in Russia. But now that these hopes have been shelved, a need for contact with the ‘Collective West’ seems to have arisen. The meeting of U.S. and Russian spy chiefs in Turkey also speaks volumes more than nuclear fear.

RUSSIA

What does Russia’s update of its nuclear doctrine mean?

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Russia has updated its nuclear deterrence policy, defining threats to the security of Belarus as a potential justification for the use of nuclear weapons. While experts argue that these changes are largely declaratory, they also suggest that the timing of this update may be linked to U.S. missile support for Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the amendments to the doctrinal document entitled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. The announcement was made during a meeting on 25 September 2024, where Putin revealed the changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine.

In June 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov hinted at the need for an update, citing lessons learned from military operations. The new text, in line with Putin’s directives, introduces significant changes to the conditions under which nuclear weapons can be used:

Nuclear retaliation is now justified in cases where critical threats arise to the security of not only Russia but also Belarus.

The updated doctrine expands the scope of threats to include cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), hypersonic weapons, and other aerospace attack systems. Previously, the scope was limited to ballistic missile attacks.

The doctrine highlights the importance of continuous updates to adapt to evolving security conditions.

When asked whether the publication of this doctrine was connected to the U.S. decision to send ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the idea of coincidence, stating that the document was published “on time.”

Peskov emphasized a critical new provision: If a non-nuclear state attacks Russia with the backing of a nuclear-armed state, it will be treated as a joint nuclear attack. This underscores Russia’s heightened sensitivity to Western support for Ukraine, especially in light of escalating tensions with NATO.

Several experts have weighed in on the implications of the updated nuclear doctrine:

Alexander Yermakov, a specialist at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), noted that the changes largely clarify existing provisions. For instance, the scope of retaliation has expanded to include drones and cruise missiles, whereas previous documents only referred to ballistic missile attacks.

According to Yermakov, the timing of the doctrine could be a strategic response to recent U.S. military aid to Ukraine: “These changes were announced earlier. However, in light of recent developments, they were published to remind of the risks of possible escalation.”

Dmitry Stefanovic, an expert from the Centre for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, highlighted that the new doctrine reflects global nuclear trends.

Stefanovic noted that some countries have increased their arsenals, new nuclear-weapon states have emerged, and the importance of the nuclear factor has increased in recent years.

The expert added that the doctrine contains elements that strengthen nuclear cooperation with Belarus.

“The updated document further clarifies the issue of the ‘nuclear threshold’ – the necessary conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. This is no cause for relief, either for Russia or its rivals. If the risk of direct confrontation with the US and NATO remains, a scenario of rapid nuclear escalation is always possible,” Stefanovic said.

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U.S. rehearses nuclear strike on Russian border

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NATO’s Joint Air Forces Command has announced that the United States’ B-52H Stratofortress strategic bombers recently conducted a training bombing mission at the Cudgel range near Kaliningrad Oblast.

The exercise was coordinated with Italian and German fighter jets, demonstrating NATO’s operational cooperation. It involved dropping laser-guided bombs from an altitude of six kilometers as part of the Vanguard Merlin exercise, a tactical program organized by U.S. rotational units in Europe.

The deployment of B-52 bombers to Europe is described by NATO as a routine measure aimed at “protecting allies and deterring potential threats.”

In early November, the U.S. Air Force stationed four B-52 aircraft at Mildenhall Air Base in the UK. Since their arrival, the bombers have flown over Finland, Sweden, the North Sea, and Lithuania, expanding NATO’s aerial presence in the region.

On 15 November, The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported, citing sources within President Joe Biden’s administration, that the United States plans to increase its deployed nuclear warheads in response to growing threats from Russia, China, and North Korea.

The report revealed that the White House had previously drafted a classified directive to prepare for potential simultaneous conflicts with Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang. While the strategy emphasizes the development of non-nuclear deterrence, it also considers enhancing nuclear capabilities.

These proposals are currently under evaluation by the Pentagon, with final decisions expected from the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump.

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RUSSIA

Russia will not give Israel guarantees on Hezbollah

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In an interview with RIA Novosti, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Russian President’s special envoy to Syria, stated that Moscow could not provide Israel with guarantees to prevent “arms smuggling” from Syria to Lebanon.

Earlier reports from the Israeli press indicated that Israel would like to see Russia as a mediator in the Middle East peace settlement. Lavrentiev confirmed that Israel had requested guarantees from Russia to prevent Shiite groups from moving military equipment through Syria to Lebanon. However, he clarified that this demand could not be met.

“This would require the establishment of new checkpoints along the border, a task that does not fall within the competence of the Russian military in Syria,” Lavrentiev explained.

When asked about Israel’s expectation of a security guarantee, Lavrentiev responded, “First of all, we cannot give such a guarantee.”

Reports have previously indicated that Israel has been in contact with Moscow regarding the regional settlement process. It was even suggested that Strategic Planning Minister Ron Dermer, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest advisors, was planning a confidential visit to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Itamar Eichner, a columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, noted in his column yesterday that Israel understands Russia’s influence over Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. “This is why Tel Aviv seeks guarantees from Moscow to prevent arms smuggling and to stop the Lebanese terrorist organization from recovering from the war,” Eichner wrote.

Commenting on Israel’s desire to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border, Lavrentiev highlighted a recent attack near Khmeimim Air Base in Syria. Although this incident took place about a month ago and did not directly impact Russian troops, Lavrentiev felt compelled to address it.

“Israel carried out an airstrike near Khmeimim. They did not target the air base directly, as they know this would have serious consequences for Israel. Reports suggest that the strike targeted warehouses and buildings in the vicinity,” Lavrentiev stated.

He also mentioned that the Russian Defense Ministry had “sent a representative to Israel” for further discussions.

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