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Turkey’s energy ‘hub’ dream and Russia’s proposal

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The pandemic, war, geopolitical competition, and political preferences resulted in inefficient use of available resources and thus created the gas crisis. After the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 sabotage, the idea that Turkey could play a more effective role in the energy market has been discussed. Due to sanctions restricting the import of Russian gas into the European market, the transport of it to Europe via Turkey is only one aspect of the issue.

In a broader sense, could the energy crisis that broke out with the Russia-Ukraine war have opened a new window of opportunity for Turkey to become a global player in energy? When alternative sources such as Central Asian gas and Iranian gas are added to the equation, it seems to be a serious possibility for Turkey to turn into an energy vein for Europe, at least on paper. The fact that Turkey is the most suitable route for the transport of potential gas in the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe in the medium and long term can be considered as one of the advantages of the “geographical location”, which is frequently mentioned.

Remarks from the leaders

As for the choice of Turkey as the energy hub, Russian President Vladimir Putin said in October “It’s because direct engagement with European partners is very difficult. We can establish a gas center in Turkey very quickly.” and drew great attention. According to Putin, Europe will be willing to buy Russian gas through the transfer center to be established in Turkey.

Speaking at the capacity increase ceremony of Silivri Natural Gas Storage Facility owned by BOTAS in Silivri, President Erdoğan said, “We had important meetings with my dear friend Mr. Putin on this subject. We have taken and are taking our steps and thus Thrace will become a hub in natural gas. We carry out our work on this together with our energy partners in our region,” he said.

These statements do not include technical details. Are the conditions for Turkey to become the main player in the gas market, which is a direct part of geopolitical competition, as convenient as it seems? According to experts; ‘Yes…’ However, the definition of “hub” here needs to be clarified by decisionmakers. Because being a “transit country” where gas comes and goes from Turkey and being one of the international centers such as TTF, NBP or Henry Hub where the price is determined are completely different.

Former BOTAS General Manager Gökhan Yardım, evaluating the issue to Harici, said, “Turkey can be a gas hub. But with current thinking, it’s very challenging. The legal infrastructure is crucial. Both the Westerners and the Easterners will come,” he said, pointing out both the potential and the shortcomings he sees.

What do we know?

Turkey reinforced its transit position with the TurkStream, which came into play in 2018. However, Russia did not provide the parameters necessary for Turkey to be a “hub” based on this project. One of the main factors of being a hub is that the price of gas is determined in the market to be established in Turkey and Turkey being a commercial beneficiary.

“The electronic platform for trading in the natural gas center may be established in the coming months. The price of natural gas for European consumers will be largely determined at the center. It’s crazy what’s happening in Europe’s own centers,” Russian leader Putin said. Would it be wrong to assume that he no longer considers Turkey as a transit country?

“I don’t know the details of the offer,” former BOTAS General Manager Yardım said, “In regard to Putin’s statement, I believe they are thinking of a system like the electronic sales platform they made earlier. As for the possible plan in Moscow’s mind, I believe the Russians are thinking of a system in which they will buy gas, choose the companies themselves, collect the offers themselves and say, ‘You won this much, the average price was this much at the end of the month.’

“It is not an issue to be solved in 3-5 months”

The schedule of the project is another matter. Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Fatih Dönmez has announced that their goal is to start the project to establish gas hub in Thrace within a year. Dönmez noted, “It is not an issue to be dealt with in 3-5 months. Perhaps we can start with a more limited number of markets in the transition period before a permanent market. Then the schedule will be pushed forward a little more” emphasizing the need for time.

Commenting on Dönmez’s prediction of a “one year” period, Yardım believes that the upcoming elections and the balances that the government looks after between the West and Russia are also decisive in this project. “I think this will cool down a bit before the elections,” he said, assessing that Ankara would not want to “get in wrong with the U.S. directly.”

How can it work?

Turkey already has a gas exchange. Its name is Energy Exchange Istanbul (EXIST) or Enerji Piyasaları İşletme A.Ş. (EPİAŞ) by its Turkish name. The website of the institution states that EXIST, which was established on March 18, 2015, works in harmony with Turkey’s goal of “becoming a central country in energy trade” and is on the way to become an energy exchange that is referenced on a global scale.

Former BOTAS General Manager Yardım explains the operation of the system that will be the center as follows:

“In EXIST, the names of the gas suppliers and buyers are not disclosed. Neither the seller nor the buyer is known in the transactions in EXIST. Gases are nationalized to be traded in EXIST. Both seller companies and buyer companies need to establish a company in Turkey and obtain a license in accordance with the legislation of EMRA.”

After this process, buyers and sellers create supply and demand just like in the stock market by trading on EXIST’s Continuous Trade Platform. The price is determined through this mechanism. Buyer and seller bids meet each other without the bidders being known and the price is formed. EXIST guarantees the payments through TAKASBANK.

“Gazprom wants to make the electronic sales platform transactions it has stopped in Europe in Turkey.” Gökhan Yardım clarifies the difference between being a ‘transit’ and a ‘center’ as follows:

“Gazprom will sell gas within its sales platform. Buyers will receive the gas transmitted through Turkey. This does not make Turkey a gas hub as the gas is only transferred through Turkey. Gas should be sold in Turkey. All trading transactions of liquidity should be made in Turkey and the money should remain in Turkey. Turkey has all kinds of infrastructures. All procedures and rules of EXIST are suitable for these steps. If Gazprom desires, it can buy a certain share from EXIST. Other European companies can also do the same. The important thing is to perform these transactions through EXIST.”

Why would Europe buy Russian gas from the Turkish stock market?

Gökhan Yardım explains:

“Europe may take a negative stance at first, but if more gas comes to Turkey, the gas transmitted through TANAP can also be traded here. LNG that is coming from America can be traded here. The bigger the market, the more eager Europe becomes. But if there’s only one player, Russia, then they won’t be willing. If too many players and too much gas come to Turkey, then a different picture will emerge.”

‘Atlantic Council’ analyses

According to Atlantic Council analysis, by Yevgeniya Gaber in December, “Turkey’s desire to play a major role in regional energy infrastructure is not only geopolitically driven but also economically and technically feasible.”

The analysis also highlights Turkey’s gas storage capacity and the advantages of having pipelines at the intersection. However, in the analysis it is advocated that, for Turkey to be an energy hub, “Russian gas can’t be a key part of the plan.”

According to Yevgeniya Gaber, the Ukrainian Foreign Policy Expert; “diversification of existing routes and suppliers, independence in decision-making through an independent institution, market demand and supply that determine prices, and political will of potential partners to get involved in the projects…” are the basic conditions for establishing an energy hub.

Putin’s project to make Turkey a gas hub could increase Ankara’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels and Moscow in strategic issues, and further endanger Ankara’s complex relations with the West, the author says.

Similar views are echoed in another analysis of Atlantic Council on December 20. It is emphasized that Turkey’s dream of becoming a gas hub will not be realized without adopting liberal market principles. In his article, Eser Özdil claims that BOTAS’s dominant role in the Turkish energy market is the most important obstacle to Turkey becoming a gas hub. According to the author, BOTAS’s dominant role should be restricted, its dominance on the market with mass subsidization should end, in short, Turkey’s gas market should be completely liberalized…

Of course, in such a scenario, it is not possible to predict the future of gas price to be consumed by the household in times of crisis.

Available capacities

The Blue Stream has a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters. TurkStream’s total capacity is 31.25 billion cubic meters (bcm). Currently, TANAP has a capacity of 16 billion bcm. These pipelines, which meet Turkey’s gas needs, also transfer some gas to Europe. Nord Stream 1 and 2 have a total annual gas transport capacity of 110 billion cubic meters (bcm). From this point of view, it seems inevitable to increase capacity and build a new pipeline.

The European Union (EU) needs around 400 bcm of gas per year. It is impossible for the lines passing through Turkey to respond to this need in its current form. Therefore, the construction of a new gas pipeline or capacity-building opportunities need to be evaluated. Building new pipelines from Russia amidst war environment in the Black Sea is another question. On the other hand, the need for the project in case peace is restored is another point.

Currently, although the seller is different, Europe may not be eager to buy Russian gas from the Turkish stock market. The EU, which imported 43.5 percent of its gas from Russia in 2021, uses 7.5 percent of Russian gas this year. The pressure put by the U.S. on Nord Stream 2 should be considered as well.

In summary, “being a hub” covers Turkey’s right to be a commercial beneficiary of the natural gas that passes through it. Gases from various sources will be traded on EXIST’s stock exchange and will bring buyers and sellers together. The greater the market depth, the greater the hub quality. First, a regional consensus at the initial stage, especially between the EU and Russia, seems essential to becoming a hub.

Since we will be revisiting this discussion, let’s end it here for now with the following questions:

Is the ‘active neutrality’ policy or being in the ‘right place’ geopolitically, being a member of NATO and simultaneously following the ‘Asia Anew Initiative’ policy sufficient to become an ‘energy hub’?

Can Turkey create a different alternative center between Russia’s proposal and the current market regulations?

Or are all these foreign policy orientations opposites that cancel each other out?

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Huawei lobbying investigation leads to searches at EP offices in Strasbourg

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According to two officials knowledgeable about the matter who spoke to POLITICO, police authorities conducted searches in two offices belonging to European Parliament (EP) political assistants in Strasbourg.

Police had previously sealed the offices on March 13, the same day authorities raided more than 20 addresses in Belgium and Portugal as part of an investigation into alleged corruption within the EP benefiting Huawei. Officials confirmed on Thursday that these offices were searched.

One of the officials confirmed that the search in Strasbourg was part of the investigation into Huawei’s lobbying activities.

Members of Parliament and their assistants have offices in the institution’s building in Brussels, where regular parliamentary activities take place, and at the official seat in Strasbourg, France, where plenary sessions are held.

Two offices in Brussels were sealed and searched earlier this month and have since been returned to their occupants.

According to judicial documents seen by POLITICO, Belgian prosecutors are investigating whether Huawei made illegal payments to commission an open letter signed by eight European parliamentarians defending the interests of the Chinese tech giant.

The Belgian prosecutor’s office announced that four individuals are accused of corruption and forming a criminal organization, and one person is accused of money laundering.

A parliamentary assistant to Italian center-right MEP Fulvio Martusciello was arrested in Italy on March 20. According to the institution’s press services, the assistant has been suspended by Parliament. It is alleged that Martusciello’s office in 2021 spearheaded the effort to promote the letter under investigation.

A Huawei spokesperson previously stated that the company “has a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption or other misconduct and is always committed to complying with all applicable laws and regulations.”

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Leaked draft reveals German coalition disagreements on key policies

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Until last Sunday, the CDU/CSU, which emerged as the leading party from the early federal elections, and the SPD, which came in third, negotiated the coalition agreement in 16 working groups.

Despite the intended confidentiality, many of the final documents were leaked to the media. Numerous proposed changes within the documents indicate that the parties are still far from reaching an agreement on many points.

The policy agendas under negotiation include migration; heating, energy, and climate; compulsory military service and military equipment; transportation, construction, and housing; citizen’s income; and finance.

Migration

Migration is one of the most hotly debated topics. Although CDU leader Friedrich Merz has announced a transformation in migration policy, the SPD is unwilling to follow suit on all points.

There is agreement that police at Germany’s permanently controlled borders should be able to turn back asylum seekers “in coordination” with neighboring countries, but what this precisely entails remains unclear.

Furthermore, Algeria, India, Morocco, and Tunisia will be quickly categorized as safe countries of origin, making it harder to obtain asylum. Immigrants who commit serious crimes will be deported.

Another clear decision is that no new admission programs will be opened for foreigners in vulnerable situations. Existing ones, such as for Afghans, will be terminated “as much as possible.” Individuals with subsidiary protection status will also not be allowed to bring their families from their home countries, though this affects only about a third of temporarily recognized refugees.

According to the final report of the migration working group, deportations to Afghanistan and Syria are planned, “starting with criminals and individuals at risk,” even though the new rulers in Syria are persecuting minorities.

Several minor measures have been agreed upon to deport more people more quickly. For instance, legal counseling before deportation will be abolished; previously, those legally rejected could still be legally represented.

In the future, the Federal Police will also be able to request detention to prevent those required to leave the country from absconding. Previously, only immigration authorities could do this.

Heating, energy, and climate

Although the CDU/CSU wants to view the new government’s energy policy as a “new beginning,” many points already agreed upon seem like a continuation of initiatives started by the traffic light coalition government that collapsed last year.

The likely CDU-SPD government does not intend to change the cornerstones of climate and energy policy: the commitment to climate neutrality by 2045, the coal phase-out by 2038, emissions trading, the expansion of renewable energy sources, and the use of hydrogen.

The construction of numerous new gas-fired power plants planned by the coalition government will also proceed. However, the early phase-out of coal power generation by 2030, once desired by the Greens, will be canceled.

The ‘Black-Red’ government now wants to permanently reduce the price of electricity by at least five cents per kilowatt-hour by lowering the electricity tax and grid fees. Energy-intensive industrial companies will also receive relief through an industrial electricity price, but this will cost the state billions.

How the expansion of electricity grids will proceed is unclear. The CDU/CSU wants to prioritize the construction of high-voltage overhead lines, which are cheaper but more exposed than underground cables. The SPD prefers underground cables to prevent protests.

The CDU/CSU wants to “exploit the potential for conventional gas production in Germany” and hopes for a breakthrough with new-generation nuclear power plants.

It also demands a quick review of whether recently decommissioned nuclear power plants can be reactivated, although experts have serious doubts about this. The SPD opposes all of these points.

Leaders also seem poised for difficult discussions regarding the long-debated heating law. The CDU/CSU wants the law repealed as announced but wishes to continue the “heating subsidy.” The Social Democrats only want to amend the law and make the subsidy socially graduated.

There is apparent agreement on climate money, but this too will likely remain theoretical. They state they want to return the revenue from the CO₂ price to citizens, but conditional on introducing “non-bureaucratic and socially graduated relief and subsidies for housing and mobility.” Despite billions in new debt, there is no money for a lump-sum payout.

Compulsory military service and the Bundeswehr

Discussions about the future of the German Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) are also ongoing. The working paper of the Foreign Relations and Defense Working Group shows consensus that the Bundeswehr must become stronger “short-term, decisive, and sustainable.”

Investments could be rapidly initiated through a “Bundeswehr Infrastructure Acceleration Act,” but this law has been in effect since 2022, and bureaucracy remains the biggest obstacle to the swift procurement of weapons and equipment.

The CDU/CSU therefore wants to remove some powers from the Koblenz Procurement Office and appoint an agency for this purpose. They also aim for a “multi-year investment plan,” because a single legislative period is considered too short for arms development and procurement.

The CDU/CSU also wants to reactivate compulsory military service. The SPD opposes this, favoring voluntary service for all and a “broad societal debate” on its introduction.

Transportation, construction, and housing

Regarding transportation, there is only one point of disagreement between the SPD and CDU/CSU: the speed limit on highways. The SPD wants a limit of 130 kilometers per hour, while the CDU/CSU rejects any limit.

On the other hand, there is clarity on the future of the Deutschlandticket (the subscription ticket for buses and trains) beyond 2025. There was initial resistance within the CDU/CSU, but an agreement has now been reached to continue the subscription. However, the price will increase “gradually and with social responsibility” starting in 2027.

The new coalition partners plan to fully utilize the special infrastructure fund for their plans to renovate the railway network: the SPD succeeded in increasing investments and establishing an infrastructure fund with a binding, long-term financing commitment for the railways.

Money from the special fund will also flow into the current renovation concept for busy high-speed train lines, thereby freeing up budget funds for neglected secondary lines.

At the same time, the future government partners are opening up a new financing gap of 5 billion euros for the railway. Until now, the road network had cross-financed the rail network with the help of revenue from truck tolls. In the future, however, financing cycles within a transport sector will remain closed, and truck tolls will flow to Autobahn GmbH.

From a climate policy perspective, air transport seems to be regressing. The likely new federal government wants to reverse the increase in the air traffic tax and continue supporting regional airports, which are often unprofitable.

However, there is at least some relief for local public transport: the SPD managed to ensure that federal regionalization funds primarily flow into local transport.

The SPD also achieved a victory in housing. The rent freeze, unpopular with the CDU/CSU, will be extended for another two years.

Citizen’s Income implementation

It has been agreed that the Citizen’s Income (Bürgergeld), introduced by the coalition government, will be renamed the “new basic income.”

Job centers will receive more money for administration. Conditions will be tightened. Accordingly, every unemployed person must “actively strive to find work.”

Sanctions will be applied “faster, simpler, and less bureaucratic.” Benefits for those who persistently refuse work will be completely cut, in line with the Karlsruhe jurisprudence.

The citizen’s allowance, which Ukrainians also receive and which the state sometimes grants without sanctions, had previously sparked heated debates about fairness.

Public finance

Negotiators have barely agreed on financial details. The CDU/CSU and SPD were able to gain some breathing room in the federal budget by relaxing the debt brake for defense spending. However, the additional fiscal leeway is limited, and the list of expensive election promises both parties want to implement is long.

Ultimately, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the solidarity surcharge (additional tax) legal on Wednesday. This means the federal government will retain annual revenues of 13 billion euros.

The main point of contention is what is possible regarding taxes. For example, it is argued that there isn’t enough money for broad income tax cuts. The SPD wants to increase the tax burden on high earners. This could increase federal revenues, but it is doubtful whether the CDU/CSU will agree to tax increases.

The CDU/CSU particularly wants to reduce the corporate tax from the current 30% to 25%. However, the SPD is only prepared to do this from 2029 and only wants to reduce it by one percentage point.

There is agreement on making investments in Germany more attractive. Depreciation rules are planned to be improved so that investment costs can be deducted from taxes.

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F-35 debate intensifies across Germany and Europe

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The debate over a potential withdrawal from the US F-35 fighter jet program is heating up in Germany and other European countries.

The background to this is that the jet can only be used with the approval of the US government, and restrictive provisions, for example regarding spare parts and software, make it impossible to escape dependence on the US in military operations with the F-35.

In Berlin, former “transatlanticists” in particular are pushing for withdrawal from the F-35 procurement program to achieve military independence.

Last week, a copy of the purchase agreement for the 35 F-35 fighter jets that Berlin decided to procure in March 2022 was leaked to the German magazine Stern. Details of the framework conditions for the purchase, which will cost €8.3 billion, thus emerged.

This purchase is being handled as part of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, which is subject to strict rules. The F-35 purchase agreement grants Washington the authority to “terminate or suspend performance in whole or in part” without further notice “if required by the national interests of the US.” This means the US can unilaterally change the delivery time and quantity at any time. Contractual penalties are generally not provided for in the FMS procedure; legal recourse is excluded.

Once an F-35 fighter jet is delivered, no further modifications are permitted; spare parts and regularly required software updates are only available from the US manufacturer Lockheed Martin. According to the wording in the purchase agreement, “The customer is not authorized to carry out repair and maintenance work beyond the unit maintenance level.” This already guarantees that the German Air Force’s F-35s will only fly when the US administration wants them to.

Furthermore, the F-35’s basic software is kept secret. Therefore, it is impossible to check whether the jet can be influenced externally, but many assume this is possible. Data generated during operation, and especially during any mission, is collected and subsequently stored on Amazon Web Services, making it easily accessible to US authorities.

Finally, the US Foreign Assistance Act allows the US to “monitor the end-use” of the F-35 “at any time.” A “well-informed” source told the magazine Stern, claiming, “Targets, routes, indirectly tactics… US technicians are always on the plane.” An insider with “intelligence service knowledge” also explicitly confirmed this to the magazine, stating that “all mission planning is monitored in the US.”

Since last week, calls have been growing louder in Europe to avoid procuring F-35 jets if possible, or to withdraw from the agreement if a contract has already been signed. This was triggered on the one hand by the Trump administration’s decision to prohibit Ukraine from using US satellite data, and on the other hand by Washington’s continued efforts to acquire the autonomous Danish territory of Greenland.

For example, Danish conservative MP Rasmus Jarlov stated on X that he now regrets supporting Denmark’s decision to purchase 27 F-35 jets for its air force. Jarlov said, “I can imagine a situation where the US demands Greenland from Denmark and threatens to disable our weapons.” Jarlov argued that Copenhagen would then no longer be in a position to defend itself, making the purchase of US weapons “a security risk we cannot take.” He contended that Denmark will invest heavily in armaments in the coming years and should avoid American weapons wherever possible.

Some NATO countries are now considering abandoning the F-35. For example, Canada plans to withdraw from the F-35 purchase, but has already paid for 16 fighter jets due to be delivered early next year. According to Defense Minister Nuno Melo, Portugal, which previously planned to buy the US fighter jet, is also changing its mind. The French company Dassault Aviation has now offered to supply Rafale jets to the Portuguese government.

The Rafale is a fourth-generation fighter jet, unlike the fifth-generation F-35, but it is cheaper and requires no US components, thus offering independence from the US. French President Emmanuel Macron argued on March 16 that European countries should, in principle, switch from the F-35 to the Rafale; furthermore, the new Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defense system could be used instead of the US Patriot air defense system.

One challenge stems from the fact that a number of European NATO countries, such as the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, already possess F-35 jets. Many other countries, including officially neutral Switzerland, have placed binding orders for the aircraft.

Conflicting voices are also rising in Germany. Former “transatlanticists” in particular are distancing themselves from the F-35 procurement. Former Airbus CEO Thomas Enders, now president of the influential think tank German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), said last week, “Nobody needs the F-35”; Enders added that he “would be the first to cancel it under these new geopolitical conditions.” CDU foreign policy expert Roderich Kiesewetter also called for a “review of existing contracts with the US,” such as the F-35 purchase agreement, stating, “It is now absolutely essential to look for alternatives.”

Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, however, favors continuing with the F-35 purchase. One of the reasons he cites for this is nuclear sharing, whereby German Air Force fighter jets could drop US nuclear bombs in a war scenario. Observers note that dropping US nuclear bombs is already only possible on orders from Washington, making it irrelevant whether the F-35s could be paralyzed by the US as long as they are available solely for nuclear sharing. However, nuclear sharing itself is no longer considered secure.

Berlin has already transferred approximately $2.42 billion to Washington for the F-35 and has begun costly modifications at Büchel Air Base, where the US fighter jets are to be stationed.

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