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‘Türkiye should be a security producer, not a security consumer’

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“Türkiye must shift its viewpoint toward Arab and periphery nations, reevaluate its interest, and establish credibility. Türkiye needs to be a country that produces security, not one that consumes security.”

Why did Ankara return to the normalization process from “precious loneliness”? Is it possible that the strategy of trying to strike a balance between global powers would be successful? What will be the future of Türkiye’s relations with NATO and the EU? Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, president of the Foreign Policy Institute and professor of international affairs at METU, responded to questions from Harici over Türkiye’s foreign policy.

  • What were the facts that drove Türkiye into the normalization process with the countries of the region? What were the benefits or drawbacks for Türkiye from their “precious solitude”?

In my opinion, Türkiye is one of the Arab Spring’s biggest losers. The Turkish government has made certain blunders because it overestimated its economic, military, technological, and political might. A goal of “bringing stability, freedom, and democracy to the Middle East,” as the foreign minister of the time put it, was and is impossible for Türkiye to pursue. Arab countries are still in the same situation; it was Türkiye that suffered the loss.

The return from this policy is correct. If these mistakes had not been made, Türkiye would be at a much more advanced point today. Yet, enormous blunders have been made in the policies toward Syria, Egypt, Israel, and the Arab Gulf states. It is appropriate for Türkiye to start normalization and take a step back. I wish it hadn’t, but it would be a major failure in Türkiye’s foreign policy. Türkiye must shift its viewpoint toward Arab and periphery nations, reevaluate its interest, and establish credibility. Türkiye needs to be a country that produces security, not one that consumes security. Therefore, normalization is good; it is better to follow balanced policies. A multifaceted foreign policy best serves Türkiye’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests. To be on friendly terms with all of them, rather than just one or two. That is the powerhouses, i.e., the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the rising powers of Brazil, India, and China. Maintaining positive ties with them benefits Türkiye as well. As we are swiftly shifting towards a multipolar rather than unipolar world in the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic this year, Türkiye needs to accordingly redraw its intellectual, economic, technical, and diplomatic mental map. If we do not have this mental map, we have a tough task ahead of us, but if we make changes, it will be better.

  • Does the balance policy pursued in foreign policy have a chance of success?

Türkiye has indeed started to talk about balance policies again. This is a concept used in the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire also pursued a policy of balance. Yet, I believe this goes beyond the scope of the balance policy. All of this has to do with a shift in geopolitics.

Furthermore, Türkiye is a security producer. When you include the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, and Balkans in regional trends, it is remarkable that Türkiye was one of the rare countries not attacked in the post-Cold War period. Of course, this inevitably brings a new perspective in Türkiye’s relations with its neighbors. I can see that Türkiye’s balancing policies have been implemented successfully during the war between Russia and Ukraine. Balance policies are actually good, and it is necessary not to lose balance. That is how life is in general. Türkiye has wasted energy, time, and money for the last decade due to its unbalanced policies. Now, this shift back to balanced policies is sound. The Turkish response to the Arab Spring diverged from those traditional balances. Now we go back again to the balances. The balance is good. Türkiye must gain trust in the international arena; Türkiye must become a reliable, understandable, and identifiable country again.

  • If the US bases in Greece pose a threat to Türkiye, as the Turkish government says, is it a contradiction that Türkiye is in NATO?

Not at all; it is just a quarrel within the family. If two NATO members are at war with each other, then the founding spirit of NATO is no longer relevant. This will not be the case. The elections in Türkiye and Greece are imminent. We hear such things at every election. Perhaps an answer can be given to whether the US’s approach prioritizes Türkiye or Greece. The easiest way to send weapons to Ukraine is via Greece because we have good relations with Russia. With Ukraine, we keep a steady balance. So, what is supposed to do? Which country can be used instead of Türkiye? 1-Poland, 2-Greece. From there, weapons make their way to Ukraine. But neither Türkiye, Greece, or the USA will declare war on Russia for Ukraine. In other words, the USA cannot get up and declare war on Türkiye after this time. If this occurs, we may begin talking about the new world.

  • Türkiye’s EU membership is an issue that is hardly discussed today. How do you see the future of Türkiye-EU relations?

For now, values-based relations between Türkiye and the EU are irrelevant since they are based only on geostrategic ties. The tensions and problems in Türkiye’s relations with the EU are very important. There were trends away from the EU in Türkiye, but there were also currents inside the EU that sought to keep Türkiye out. The insights that “EU policies towards Türkiye are forcing Türkiye toward Russia” have been proven true.

We see that Türkiye is in search of a multidimensional policy. In other words, it is not just a center-facing one. As the debate has widened to include concerns such as whether or not it should be a member of the Shanghai Five, whether it is beneficial for Türkiye to become closer to Russia, or where will its ties with China go, Türkiye’s primarily NATO and EU-centered approach turns out to be no longer adequate, and need for an approach going beyond that appears. This is not a new policy; Türkiye followed it in the early years of the Republic and the 60s-70s. Therefore, accelerating the transition to a democratic parliamentary system in Türkiye is the only option to overcome the bottleneck in Türkiye’s ties with the EU. Türkiye should be committed to furthering its own internal changes in terms of political ideals. Still, the EU should see Türkiye as a part of its future security-wise, technologically, politically, and culturally rather than commenting on a single party or person.

  • Before Russia–Ukraine Conflict, the European Union’s “strategic autonomy project” was a hot topic. This post-war project is no longer on the agenda. Has the autonomy goal for Europe been sidelined?

The short answer is no because this is what Europe has always desired and will continue to desire. The West has been following Geneva’s spirit as the European Union since 1954. Yet, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been a crucial step, so the EU has to put the plan on hold for now. From the very beginning, for the USA, it is not desirable for Europe to have a military structure, what they call duplication.

It is crucial to know what Germany will do with France here. Yet, prior efforts to form a combined German-French military had also failed. No matter from which perspective we look, the strategic autonomy debate in Europe has been rendered moot for the next 5-10 years. As NATO strengthens, including countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the new mechanism relies more on the USA than Europe. For this reason, the concept of strategic autonomy is particularly challenging right now.

Diplomacy

Defense Priorities director warns US air strategy in Middle East faces tactical limits

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The collapse of a tentative memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, coupled with the diminishing strategic returns of American air power, has left the United States locked in an unsustainable, low-intensity conflict with Iran, according to Benjamin Friedman, Policy Director at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities.

Speaking in an interview on the YouTube channel Harici with host Sarp Sinan Hacır, Friedman attributed the failure of the short-lived US-Iran memorandum primarily to the Trump administration’s diplomatic missteps, vague draft language, and unrealistic expectations regarding a comprehensive settlement.

“Both sides really deserve some blame, but the Trump administration deserves the bulk of the blame for drafting an agreement that was so vague on key terms,” Friedman said, citing ambiguities surrounding the timeline for unfreezing Iranian assets and the scope of American commitments to restrain Israeli military operations in Lebanon.

Friedman emphasized that deep-seated mistrust in Tehran, exacerbated by repeated instances where diplomatic engagement was followed by Israeli or American military strikes, led Iranian negotiators to adopt an unyielding posture. At the same time, he noted that Iran likely miscalculated by using disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz to aggressively force leverage.

“The Trump administration remained intent on this sort of grand bargain that would restrain Iran seeking weapons development… and I think they continue to misread the Iranian willingness to sign that kind of deal,” Friedman noted, adding that Tehran viewed its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz as essential despite the risk of provoking further strikes.

Expressing deep skepticism over the prospects for a lasting diplomatic breakthrough, Friedman criticized the administration’s reliance on informal envoys such as Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner over professional diplomatic channels, predicting that the baseline outcome will remain an unpredictable, episodic conflict.

“What’s more likely is a kind of on-off-again kind of war—sort of what we’re in now, where we have occasional strikes, with the United States perhaps by accident adopting the Israeli model of ‘mowing the lawn’ periodically,” Friedman said.

Addressing the efficacy of US air power, Friedman argued that military operations against Iranian targets have reached a point of diminishing returns. While early strikes successfully eliminated critical high-value assets—such as over-the-horizon radar systems that targeted anti-ship missiles—Iran’s ballistic missile and long-range drone capabilities remain largely intact and operational.

He pointed to a recent strike on a base hosting US personnel in Jordan, launched from western Iran over a distance exceeding 1,000 kilometers, as evidence of Tehran’s sustained strike precision and the tactical limits of American interdiction efforts.

“The war is a failure for air power even in a tactical sense,” Friedman stated. “Initially, we looked at it and said we had a lot of success in destroying targets, but as more information came out, it turned out they had maybe more than half of their missiles and launchers survive the initial phase of the war.”

Friedman observed that the global proliferation of low-cost, high-precision guidance technology has permanently altered the strategic landscape, neutralizing the traditional invulnerability of forward-deployed US installations. “The precise effects of air power that used to be almost a monopoly of the United States… is actually making our posture in the region less sustainable,” he said, warning that similar vulnerabilities would be vastly amplified in any potential high-intensity conflict with China.

As an alternative to open-ended military engagement, Friedman suggested that Washington consider a complete military withdrawal from the region, even if it entails accepting Iranian transit fees on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. “The cost of preventing that through perpetual outbursts of warfare is much higher than just accepting it,” he noted.

Turning to regional dynamics, Friedman addressed Israel’s current absence from active strike operations against Iran, characterizing it as a calculated move to preserve its own air defense interceptors while relying on Washington to bear the operational and political burdens of containment.

On European security and the broader alliance structure, Friedman offered a critical assessment of the NATO summit in Ankara and the administration’s “NATO 3.0” concept. He described the white paper led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an effort to coerce European states into escalating defense expenditures and purchasing American hardware under the threat of reduced security guarantees, rather than executing a structured, strategic US posture adjustment.

“This is not a real US withdrawal; it’s a kind of pressure to up your loyalty in a particular way,” Friedman said, noting that major European powers such as Germany, France, and the UK lack a compelling existential incentive to construct independent, large-scale conventional war-fighting capabilities.

Regarding bilateral relations with Ankara, Friedman noted that US-Turkish tensions have eased considerably following the shift in American posture in Syria and progress toward resolving long-standing friction points, including the F-35 program and S-400 procurement. He added that while Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed frustration over Washington’s constructive engagement with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the White House has maintained its strategic course despite pressure from domestic pro-Israel lobbying groups.

Addressing internal Republican Party dynamics, Friedman highlighted the evolving public stance of Vice President J.D. Vance, whose cautious criticism of Israeli influence and emphasis on divergent national interests reflects broader ideological shifts within the conservative base.

“Vance is more representative of the shift in the Republican Party,” Friedman said. “He’s criticizing them in a limited way and saying, ‘Our interests are different.’ From the perspective of those of us who would like the United States to have a more distant relationship from Israel, it’s progress.”

Looking ahead to the upcoming US midterm elections, Friedman anticipated that a loss of congressional control by the Republican Party would severely curtail the administration’s domestic executive overreach, though its structural impact on foreign policy execution and Middle Eastern operations would remain comparatively limited.

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UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham pledges full support to Ukraine in meeting with Zelenskyy

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UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Portsmouth, England.

Zelenskyy is the first world leader Burnham has met in person since taking office, with the prime minister committing to building a “firm partnership” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine.

Demonstrating their support, the two leaders toured a military base in Portsmouth where 200 Ukrainian troops are currently undergoing naval training exercises.

Burnham described his meeting with the Ukrainian president as “warm” and said he plans to visit Ukraine soon.

“We will build this together and address the various issues President Zelenskyy is facing, many of which we discussed today,” Burnham said.

The meeting follows an announcement by London that it will share intellectual property rights to assist Kyiv’s war effort.

The new prime minister announced that the UK will share the “Stone Cloak” electronic warfare system—which is fitted to drones to prevent detection—and will assist Ukraine in mass-producing the technology.

Burnham has focused primarily on domestic matters since replacing Keir Starmer, who faced criticism from elements within his own party for spending too much time abroad and focusing heavily on foreign affairs.

However, Burnham sought to signal continuity in Britain’s policy toward Ukraine. In one of his first phone calls after becoming prime minister last week, Burnham invited Zelenskyy to visit the UK “as soon as possible.”

Starmer spent his final full day as prime minister in Kyiv, where he announced £255 million in funding for Ukraine.

Speaking to Sky on Monday, Zelenskyy said his telephone conversation with Burnham had been “very good.”

The Ukrainian leader noted that Starmer had previously assured him that “the new government would maintain the policy of supporting Ukraine during the war.”

The new prime minister told the Ukrainian leader it was “no coincidence” that he was his first international visitor since moving into Downing Street.

“The purpose of this is to send a very clear message. We stand 100% with Ukraine, I personally stand 100% with you, and I will fully deliver on every commitment this country has made to Ukraine,” Burnham said.

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Ukraine targets first prototype of European Freyja missile defense system in early 2027

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As Ukraine continues to lobby allies for new weapons capabilities to counter Russian missile strikes, the country aims to have a prototype of the Freyja anti-ballistic system, developed in partnership with European allies, ready in the first half of next year.

David Aloyan, deputy secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council and director of the Freyja project, stated—as reported by Reuters—that an international steering committee tasked with calculating research and development costs will meet for the first time in the near future.

The anti-ballistic coalition was officially established two weeks ago at a summit held in the French capital, Paris. The summit was attended by leaders of 10 European nations, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, alongside roughly 12 defense industry contractors.

Providing details on the timeline, Aloyan said: “We have an ambitious goal because we are working on a very tight schedule. We aim to have a viable prototype that can show its first practical results in the first half of next year.”

Ukraine remains chronically dependent on US-made Patriot air defense systems, which are currently the only weapons capable of reliably intercepting Russia’s hypersonic and high-velocity ballistic missiles. However, Patriot deliveries have faced persistent disruptions driven by political fluctuations, low inventory levels, and extended production cycles.

The Russian military intensified its ballistic missile strikes this month against the capital, Kyiv, and the southern port city of Odesa. Facing salvos of dozens of missiles, Ukraine was unable to destroy the majority of incoming targets due to a severe shortage of interceptor munitions.

The Ukrainian government has indicated that it is prepared to contribute a launch vehicle and an interceptor missile to the Freyja initiative. In comments made this month, President Zelenskyy remarked that the project has now become purely a “matter of testing,” expressing hope that the system will become operational within a year.

Kyiv expects its allies to provide specialized expertise and technology in advanced radars, sensors, and missile guidance and control electronics. Defense contractors participating in the project include Eurosam—the consortium behind the SAMP/T system—as well as Leonardo, Thales, and Saab.

Fire Point, the Ukrainian missile and drone manufacturer that developed the Flamingo cruise missile, announced that it will serve as the primary industrial partner for the project. The company disclosed last month that it had reached an agreement with German defense producer Hensoldt to supply the radar components required for the initiative.

The Freyja project stands out as an effort to construct a lower-cost alternative to the Patriot system, on which many European nations also rely. Other European air defense assets, such as the Franco-Italian SAMP/T and the German-made IRIS-T, have not yet demonstrated sufficient operational capability in intercepting ballistic missiles.

Zelenskyy likened the operational framework of the Freyja coalition to a Lego arrangement, in which defense industry leaders assemble interconnected components.

Emphasizing the flexibility of the design, Aloyan noted that manufacturers have been tasked with developing a system architecture featuring interchangeable components, stating:

“The core logic of this system is that it possesses an open architecture. If Denmark says, ‘I want a Freyja system configured with a Danish-made Weibel radar,’ that is possible. If Sweden states that it wishes to integrate a Saab system, that presents no issue either.”

Aloyan added that establishing a dedicated administrative body or fund to direct all project contributions and secure stable, continuous financing remains among the options under consideration.

The Ukrainian official stressed that direct corporate participation alongside sovereign governments would streamline bureaucracy, concluding: “The coalition must advance on practical grounds rather than political ones.”

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