“Türkiye must shift its viewpoint toward Arab and periphery nations, reevaluate its interest, and establish credibility. Türkiye needs to be a country that produces security, not one that consumes security.”

Why did Ankara return to the normalization process from “precious loneliness”? Is it possible that the strategy of trying to strike a balance between global powers would be successful? What will be the future of Türkiye’s relations with NATO and the EU? Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, president of the Foreign Policy Institute and professor of international affairs at METU, responded to questions from Harici over Türkiye’s foreign policy.

• What were the facts that drove Türkiye into the normalization process with the countries of the region? What were the benefits or drawbacks for Türkiye from their “precious solitude”?

In my opinion, Türkiye is one of the Arab Spring’s biggest losers. The Turkish government has made certain blunders because it overestimated its economic, military, technological, and political might. A goal of “bringing stability, freedom, and democracy to the Middle East,” as the foreign minister of the time put it, was and is impossible for Türkiye to pursue. Arab countries are still in the same situation; it was Türkiye that suffered the loss.

The return from this policy is correct. If these mistakes had not been made, Türkiye would be at a much more advanced point today. Yet, enormous blunders have been made in the policies toward Syria, Egypt, Israel, and the Arab Gulf states. It is appropriate for Türkiye to start normalization and take a step back. I wish it hadn’t, but it would be a major failure in Türkiye’s foreign policy. Türkiye must shift its viewpoint toward Arab and periphery nations, reevaluate its interest, and establish credibility. Türkiye needs to be a country that produces security, not one that consumes security. Therefore, normalization is good; it is better to follow balanced policies. A multifaceted foreign policy best serves Türkiye’s geopolitical and geo-economic interests. To be on friendly terms with all of them, rather than just one or two. That is the powerhouses, i.e., the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the rising powers of Brazil, India, and China. Maintaining positive ties with them benefits Türkiye as well. As we are swiftly shifting towards a multipolar rather than unipolar world in the centennial anniversary of the Turkish Republic this year, Türkiye needs to accordingly redraw its intellectual, economic, technical, and diplomatic mental map. If we do not have this mental map, we have a tough task ahead of us, but if we make changes, it will be better.

• Does the balance policy pursued in foreign policy have a chance of success?

Türkiye has indeed started to talk about balance policies again. This is a concept used in the 19th century. The Ottoman Empire also pursued a policy of balance. Yet, I believe this goes beyond the scope of the balance policy. All of this has to do with a shift in geopolitics.

Furthermore, Türkiye is a security producer. When you include the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Middle East, and Balkans in regional trends, it is remarkable that Türkiye was one of the rare countries not attacked in the post-Cold War period. Of course, this inevitably brings a new perspective in Türkiye’s relations with its neighbors. I can see that Türkiye’s balancing policies have been implemented successfully during the war between Russia and Ukraine. Balance policies are actually good, and it is necessary not to lose balance. That is how life is in general. Türkiye has wasted energy, time, and money for the last decade due to its unbalanced policies. Now, this shift back to balanced policies is sound. The Turkish response to the Arab Spring diverged from those traditional balances. Now we go back again to the balances. The balance is good. Türkiye must gain trust in the international arena; Türkiye must become a reliable, understandable, and identifiable country again.

• If the US bases in Greece pose a threat to Türkiye, as the Turkish government says, is it a contradiction that Türkiye is in NATO?

Not at all; it is just a quarrel within the family. If two NATO members are at war with each other, then the founding spirit of NATO is no longer relevant. This will not be the case. The elections in Türkiye and Greece are imminent. We hear such things at every election. Perhaps an answer can be given to whether the US’s approach prioritizes Türkiye or Greece. The easiest way to send weapons to Ukraine is via Greece because we have good relations with Russia. With Ukraine, we keep a steady balance. So, what is supposed to do? Which country can be used instead of Türkiye? 1-Poland, 2-Greece. From there, weapons make their way to Ukraine. But neither Türkiye, Greece, or the USA will declare war on Russia for Ukraine. In other words, the USA cannot get up and declare war on Türkiye after this time. If this occurs, we may begin talking about the new world.

• Türkiye’s EU membership is an issue that is hardly discussed today. How do you see the future of Türkiye-EU relations?

For now, values-based relations between Türkiye and the EU are irrelevant since they are based only on geostrategic ties. The tensions and problems in Türkiye’s relations with the EU are very important. There were trends away from the EU in Türkiye, but there were also currents inside the EU that sought to keep Türkiye out. The insights that “EU policies towards Türkiye are forcing Türkiye toward Russia” have been proven true.

We see that Türkiye is in search of a multidimensional policy. In other words, it is not just a center-facing one. As the debate has widened to include concerns such as whether or not it should be a member of the Shanghai Five, whether it is beneficial for Türkiye to become closer to Russia, or where will its ties with China go, Türkiye’s primarily NATO and EU-centered approach turns out to be no longer adequate, and need for an approach going beyond that appears. This is not a new policy; Türkiye followed it in the early years of the Republic and the 60s-70s. Therefore, accelerating the transition to a democratic parliamentary system in Türkiye is the only option to overcome the bottleneck in Türkiye’s ties with the EU. Türkiye should be committed to furthering its own internal changes in terms of political ideals. Still, the EU should see Türkiye as a part of its future security-wise, technologically, politically, and culturally rather than commenting on a single party or person.

• Before Russia–Ukraine Conflict, the European Union’s “strategic autonomy project” was a hot topic. This post-war project is no longer on the agenda. Has the autonomy goal for Europe been sidelined?

The short answer is no because this is what Europe has always desired and will continue to desire. The West has been following Geneva’s spirit as the European Union since 1954. Yet, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has been a crucial step, so the EU has to put the plan on hold for now. From the very beginning, for the USA, it is not desirable for Europe to have a military structure, what they call duplication.

It is crucial to know what Germany will do with France here. Yet, prior efforts to form a combined German-French military had also failed. No matter from which perspective we look, the strategic autonomy debate in Europe has been rendered moot for the next 5-10 years. As NATO strengthens, including countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the new mechanism relies more on the USA than Europe. For this reason, the concept of strategic autonomy is particularly challenging right now.