Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.

Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.

Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.

Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.

Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.

Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.

These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.

Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.

In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.

The American elections ended “as expected” with Trump’s victory. The polls were wrong again, often showing Trump and Kamala Harris neck and neck. Trump did well both in the overall vote and in the swing states. At the time of writing, the results for the House of Representatives have not been finalized. If they win a majority there too, the Republicans will have won a huge victory. In addition to the presidency, Trump will give them overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress, state governorships and state legislatures.

What will Trump do and how will he do it?

This time I followed the American election at the annual forum of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia. The annual forum was attended by a group of about fifty to sixty academics, think-tankers, and experts from around the world, and about twenty to thirty experts from Russia, including, as usual, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (second day) and Russian President Putin (closing session on the last day). Deputy Prime Minister Novak and Kremlin Chief of Staff Oreshkin also attended the Forum, speaking at length and answering questions. As was the case last year, Putin’s introductory speech and subsequent Q&A session lasted more than four hours. He spoke with an incredibly clear content and style, without mincing words.

One of the most striking aspects of the Forum, which I attended for the second time (4-7 November), was that all participants were following the U.S. election with great interest. After Trump’s victory became clear, you could hear different comments from participants depending on which country they came from. For example, while those from Russia and other countries welcomed Trump’s arrival with the expectation that he would put an end to the policy pursued so far by the collective West in the war in Ukraine, guests from China and/or those focusing on China thought that there could be fierce winds between Washington and Beijing.

Similarly divergent views were immediately apparent among participants from Middle Eastern countries. For example, while some Middle Eastern participants were somewhat positive about the serious possibility of an American withdrawal from Syria and Iraq under Trump, Iranian participants spoke of the possibility of war between Iran and a Trump administration that is likely to fully support Israel.

On the other hand, Western participants (such as the UK and Canada) tended to see Trump’s arrival as the beginning of the end of the neo-liberal economic order. The neoliberal economic models, which have catastrophically widened the gap between rich and poor and almost eliminated the middle class, the foundation of democracies, are already being harshly criticized by the experts participating in the Valdai meetings.

First assessments

First of all, the Western participants emphasized the beginning of the end of neo-liberal economic policies. It seems that neoliberal economic policies have been rejected in their home country, America. Especially since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic policies, which the U.S. not only implemented but also imposed almost everywhere in the world, have been turned into an opportunity for their own rapid development by countries like China and Vietnam, which have implemented nationalist and planned development models, while in most developed countries, especially in the U.S., these policies have caused great rifts in societies. The consequences for us are perhaps among the worst in the world…

The main reasons for Trump’s exit were the excessive monetization of the entire U.S. system, the massive retreat from industrial production, and the fact that while the economy grew, it had no positive impact on the lives of a large part of the population. What remains to be seen is how much of what Trump says will be translated into policy and action. For example, will it be possible to force companies that have invested in industry and advanced technology in China, other Far Eastern countries, and Mexico for decades to come back and invest in the U.S.? If not, will Trump be able to impose high tariffs on goods from countries that export massive amounts of goods to the U.S., especially China, as he said during the campaign? And will he be able to maintain public support for such measures?

On the other hand, if Trump, who has promised to cut taxes, does so, how will he deal with the rapidly growing budget deficit and the national debt, which has already exceeded 35 trillion dollars and whose annual interest rate is around one trillion dollars (and will probably continue to rise)? I wonder if he will be able to seriously reduce the country’s defence spending, despite the fact that the arms companies, which are the most important part of the structure we will briefly describe as the Deep State, are engaged in a battle with him to prevent him from winning the elections? Perhaps… Maybe he even has to…

Foreign policy options

Trump has tied himself in knots over the war in Ukraine. There is no doubt that Trump, whose words ‘If I were president, I would not have allowed this war to start, if I were re-elected, I would end it with a few phone calls’ are etched in our memories, will take serious steps to end the war in our north. The opposition will be all the components of the American deep state, especially the arms companies, and the governments in Europe. If Trump, who this time seems to be more prepared for a comprehensive struggle with the Deep State, is not assassinated and consolidates his power, he can turn his statements on the Ukrainian war into policy.

The second opposition he is likely to face on the Ukraine war will be the weak governments in Europe. For the Baltic states, which would like to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and then see that huge country torn to shreds, and for the European states that have turned the historical grievances of the former Eastern Europe into their own Russia policy, Trump’s election is a disaster in the truest sense of the word.

They can say to Trump: ‘Let’s continue the war in Ukraine, you can continue your arms and financial aid, we will fully support you in your China policy, and if you want, we can even go as far as recognizing Taiwan as an independent state’. However, such a policy would mean that Trump would be doing the opposite of everything he has said so far – especially on Ukraine. On the other hand, while Trump may be preparing for a trade war with China, we do not know much about his intention to start a hot war, or rather a proxy war, over Taiwan.

It goes without saying that Trump is totally opposed to wars against overseas countries, which have become a concept of hatred in the eyes of a large part of American society and which cause enormous costs. Therefore, we can say that Trump may engage in trade wars with China while focusing on stopping the war in Ukraine, but beyond that he is more likely to stay away from a proxy war that risks setting the entire world on fire.

Middle East scenarios

We know that Trump wanted to withdraw from Syria and Iraq during his first term, but the deep state elements prevented this with many maneuvers, and in the case of Syria, Ambassador James Jeffrey, who was America’s special envoy after 2019, said in a statement after Trump lost the elections that they deceived the president by pretending to withdraw from Syria. It is even possible to speak of Trump’s determination on this issue. It is even easy to say that the same determination is in question for Iraq. All this can create extremely important opportunities for Turkey, which we will discuss in our articles and Strategic Compass broadcastings in the coming weeks.

The question of Trump and Israel undoubtedly requires extensive analysis. There is no doubt that there is a lot of truth in theses such as that he will be strongly pro-Israel, that he will march on Iran or that he will unleash Israel on Iran. On the other hand, it may be misleading to expect that Trump, who has consistently stated that he will not start a new war in the Middle East, will give Israel or Netanyahu, whom he does not like very much, a blank cheque.

This is because we know that he unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran, which had been reached in the previous period, in order to please the Israeli lobby, whose help and support he needed in his fight against the deep state, especially in his first term, and that he has made the agreement obsolete and turned to a policy of maximum pressure against Iran. However, all this does not mean that he will now start a war with Iran, especially in a multipolar world order… Since the probability of America and/or Israel winning a war with Iran is low and Iran will not be an easy target, we can assume that Trump’s support for Israel will be subject to certain limitations. All this shows that we are/will be at the beginning of a very extraordinary period.

On November 6, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate and former U.S. president, won the 2024 presidential election by an overwhelming margin, reclaiming the White House after a four-year hiatus and becoming the 47th president of the United States. Concurrently, the Republican Party secured a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The controversial return of Trump as the head of state and the Republican Party’s potential absolute control over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches led global observers to exclaim that “America has changed!” and consequently, “the world is about to change too!”

The 2024 U.S. presidential election was notably dramatic and full of surprises. President Joe Biden, the Democratic incumbent, withdrew from the race mid-campaign due to health issues. Trump, despite facing significant opposition and surviving an assassination attempt, managed a successful comeback. Vice President Kamala Harris, who assumed the Democratic candidacy, initially led in the polls but ultimately suffered a resounding defeat on election day. With this dramatic power shift, prospects of a comprehensive reversal in the established domestic and foreign policies of the Democratic Party have elicited varied reactions—from joy to dismay—within the U.S. and beyond.

Republicans in the U.S. are undoubtedly jubilant, having backed the right candidate in Trump, who, despite initial skepticism during his first campaign, secured at least 312 electoral votes (preliminary figures), cementing a historic victory. Trump is now the second U.S. president to return to the White House through election after previously leaving office. The Republican Party is also poised to secure control over both houses of Congress and numerous state governments, with a Supreme Court already dominated by conservative justices aligned with Republican ideals.

Trump’s victory brings elation to his financial backers, grassroots supporters, industrial workers, and the farming community. These groups resonate with Trump and the Republican Party’s “America First” doctrine and are expected to relish the policies reversing Democratic initiatives and yielding tangible benefits over the next four years.

Conversely, Democrats are facing profound disappointment. Their tenure in the White House was abruptly cut short by the Republican resurgence, culminating in what may be seen as a historic and humiliating defeat, with significant implications for their influence over all three branches of government.

Minority communities, immigrants, leftist progressives, the renewable energy sector, and establishment figures are similarly disheartened by the resurgence of Trump and conservative forces. The return of Trump is expected to stifle minority and immigrant rights, potentially entrenching the U.S. political landscape with a Trumpian ethos. Progressive social movements advocating sexual freedom and the expanding transgender industry are likely to face stringent crackdowns, and the momentum for green and clean energy initiatives may stall. Furthermore, establishment figures fear that the Trump administration could seek to further challenge the American legal system, aiming to consolidate super-executive powers.

Isolationist groups in the U.S. are predictably celebrating, viewing this electoral outcome as a rejection of Biden’s globalist approach and a reassertion of Trumpian and Republican worldviews. The pursuit of “Making America Great Again” and the primacy of “America First” are expected to steer the U.S. away from alliances based on shared values and international obligations, leaning towards mercantilism and self-interest, thus eroding the responsibilities traditionally borne by the world’s leading power and potentially signaling the decline of American hegemony.

In contrast, globalist advocates express profound concern. Trump’s first term already disrupted globalization, alliance networks, and America’s leadership within the Western world. The modest progress made by the Biden administration in restoring these elements is likely to be undone, leaving advocates of “Pax Americana” deeply disappointed.

America’s international allies, too, are split in their reactions, aware of Trump’s policy directions and past actions. Many fear that “Trump 2.0” will push U.S. policies towards greater radicalism and polarization, shunning the compromises and moderation typical of Democratic administrations.

Notably, some U.S. allies and partners who share Trumpian ideology and leadership traits welcome his return. In Europe, far-right movements and Euroskeptics are particularly pleased. Their shared stance on white supremacy, anti-minority and anti-immigrant sentiments, opposition to globalization, and resistance to environmental initiatives align closely with Trump’s platform. Trump’s previous endorsement of Brexit and his initial victory emboldened Europe’s far-right forces. His triumphant return will likely invigorate these groups and even inspire neo-fascist movements with newfound enthusiasm and momentum.

Political leaders in South America who mirror Trump’s ideological style are likely to celebrate his return to power. Among them are Argentina’s President Javier Milei, who came to office a year ago and is often dubbed the “Argentine’s Trump,” and Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro, ousted two years prior but steadfastly strategizing his political comeback. Both leaders anticipate that the resurgence of Trumpism will bolster their political influence and governance models across Latin America.

Traditional European establishment figures, globalists, advocates of European integration, and proponents of transatlantic relations are, in contrast, likely to view Trump’s return with dismay. Memories of Trump’s earlier tenure, during which he undermined the European Union, emboldened far-right movements, pressured NATO members to increase defense spending under the threat of withdrawal, and unilaterally exited various multilateral agreements and international treaties, still linger. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump severed air and sea connections with Europe, effectively abandoning traditional allies. Today, European leaders have two new concerns: Trump could instigate a trade war with Europe through the imposition of tariffs and force European nations to purchase U.S. oil and gas at high prices.

Reactions in Europe to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict are similarly mixed. A second Trump administration might alter the dynamics of U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Europe, and Russia-Europe relations, potentially reducing NATO’s involvement in the conflict and increasing the likelihood that Europe would have to bear greater military responsibilities independently.

Russia, for its part, would likely welcome Trump’s return. Trump has previously expressed admiration for President Vladimir Putin’s strong leadership style and has advocated for a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, aiming for a normalization of U.S.-Russia and Europe-Russia relations. Should Trump reduce military aid to Ukraine or pressure European nations to sacrifice Ukrainian interests, Russia, currently holding battlefield advantages, could see an expedited path to victory. European nations, sensing this possibility, have proactively signed security pacts with Ukraine to ensure collective defense in the event of diminished U.S. involvement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may be entering another “darkest hour.” The recently disclosed “peace plan” by Trump, while promising continued military assistance, proposes an 800-mile-long demilitarized zone between Russia and Ukraine and bars Ukraine from joining NATO for the next 20 years. A potential ceasefire modeled after the Korean Armistice Agreement could see both sides halting active combat along current lines, resulting in a prolonged stalemate.

The U.S.’s partners in the Middle East are similarly split, with one clear beneficiary and several discontented parties. The Middle East today differs from its state four years ago, as regional states increasingly emphasize autonomy and seek intra-Islamic dialogue and reconciliation, no longer placing their hopes solely in U.S. involvement—with Israel being the notable exception.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the powerful Israeli far-right are undoubtedly delighted by Trump’s re-election. Trump’s staunch support for Israel, paralleled by his antipathy toward Iran and Palestine, signals that Israel will find a dependable ally in Washington. This support comes at a critical time, as the Democratic administration’s patience in the region has waned. With Trump back in power, Israel is expected to confidently pursue its objectives across multiple strategic fronts, leveraging U.S. backing for maximum effect. Although Trump is not inclined to entangle the U.S. in Middle Eastern conflicts, he is likely to apply pressure tactics to force concessions from Israel’s adversaries.

For Palestinians, Trump’s return represents a deepening of their plight. They recall that it was Trump who controversially recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, sidelined them with the “Deal of the Century,” downgraded diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, suspended economic and humanitarian aid, and withdrew from UNRWA due to its pro-Palestinian stances.

Iran will also face heightened military, diplomatic, and economic pressure, with an increased likelihood of direct conflict with Israel. Iranians cannot forget Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term in office and the subsequent tightening of sanctions. Trump’s directive in 2020 that led to the U.S. military’s targeted killing of General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which triggered missile strikes against U.S. bases in the Middle East, remains etched in their collective memory.

Saudi Arabia, despite its relatively warm relationship with Trump, may have more reasons for concern than joy. Riyadh faces a complex dilemma between pragmatic and moral imperatives regarding the Palestinian cause. The kingdom has chosen to distance itself from Israel and pursue rapprochement with Iran. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is wary of serving as a “cash dispenser” under U.S. pressure and being coerced into buying American arms, a recurring pattern during Trump’s first term. The potential for a new U.S.-Saudi oil and gas rivalry, spurred by Trump’s plans to flood the market with American energy exports, could exacerbate tensions.

In the Asia-Pacific, responses are similarly mixed, even within individual U.S. partners. Compared to Biden, Trump prioritizes profit over partnership, exhibiting a greater focus on economic and trade benefits for the U.S., while downplaying military alliances and geostrategic commitments.

North Korea may harbor expectations that Trump’s return could lead to a shift from the Biden administration’s policy of strategic neglect, potentially rekindling the momentum of the three summits between Kim Jong-un and Trump. These summits, initially promising steps toward U.S.-North Korea normalization, were effectively stalled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, mutual distrust, and changes in political leadership. A renewed Trump administration could reignite dialogue that has, until now, remained an unfinished diplomatic endeavor.

In contrast, South Korea and Japan are likely apprehensive about Trump’s potential policies that could undermine their military alliances. Trump’s history of pressuring allies to increase defense spending and imposing tariffs on imported goods might compel these nations to recalibrate their strategic positions amidst U.S.-China rivalry, risking a precarious diplomatic balance.

Countries like Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and India are aware that Trump, known for his transactional approach, might deprioritize their strategic partnerships. This could shift the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, where economic interests are placed above security alliances.

China, labeled as the primary adversary by both major U.S. parties, has already experienced the Democratic Party’s assertive policies and Trump’s aggressive tactics during his previous term. Consequently, Beijing has remained composed in response to the White House’s change of leadership, neither cheering nor fearing Trump’s return. China is prepared for Trump’s strategic maneuvers, especially given his doctrine of caution in military engagements but willingness to escalate trade, technology, and financial confrontations. It anticipates that a second Trump term may not lead to military conflicts but could intensify economic warfare, including trade disputes and restrictions on Chinese investments.

On November 7, President Xi Jinping and Vice President Han Zheng sent congratulatory messages to President-elect Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance, reaffirming China’s consistent principles in handling bilateral relations and expressing expectations for continued engagement. The development of U.S.-China relations under Trump’s leadership is poised to be the focal point of global attention, representing a key determinant of world peace and security.

Proponents of Taiwan independence are among the biggest losers in this shift in U.S. leadership. The Republican Party’s platform has remained silent on Taiwan, omitting any mention of its defense. Trump himself previously demanded that Taiwan contribute 10% of its GDP as a “protection fee,” signaling a transactional approach to its security.

With the Biden administration’s push to transition Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) into a “Made-in-America” entity, thereby eroding Taiwan’s core industries, further challenges loom. Elon Musk, who maintains a close rapport with Trump and supports the “One China” principle, recently urged his aerospace suppliers to cease sourcing components from Taiwan. This move underscores his recognition of the Chinese market’s importance and implies that Trump’s Taiwan policy may align with Musk’s strategic interests. Consequently, Taiwanese independence leaders, such as William Lai, are left in a precarious position, facing significant political and economic setbacks.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.