Asia
As the U.S. expands its bases, will the Philippines be able to maintain a balance with China?
The Philippines granted the United States expanded access to its military bases on Thursday.
The defense ministries of both countries announced Washington would be granted access to four more regions under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
The agreement was reached during a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who visited South Korea earlier this year to bolster deployment of advanced weapons such as fighter jets and bombers to the Korean Peninsula, also to deploy more military forces and weapons in the Philippines.
In a joint announcement, the Philippines and the United States agreed to accelerate the full implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which aims to support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the two countries.
As part of the agreement, the United States has allocated $82 million for infrastructure improvements at five existing EDCA sites and has expanded its military presence to four new regions in “strategic areas of the country,” according to the statement.
New bases target China
The statement did not specify where the new areas would be. The former Philippine military chief told Reuters that the United States had previously requested access to bases on the island of Palawan, which overlooks the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the northern land mass of Luzon, the Philippines’ closest region to Taiwan.
Philippine military officials and defense experts said some government officials were concerned that news about these locations would anger China.
According to an analysis published in the Global Times, Luzon and Palawan are very close to the Taiwanese island of Nansha, respectively, and “the intention of targeting China could not be more obvious.”
More recently, U.S. forces have intensified and expanded joint training focusing on combat readiness and disaster response with Filipino troops on the nation’s west coast, which faces the South China Sea, and in its northern Luzon region.
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
The EDCA allows U.S. access to Philippine military bases for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment and the building of facilities such as runways, fuel storage and military housing, but not for a permanent presence.
Austin said: “This is not about permanent basing, but it is a big deal, it is a really big deal… This is an opportunity to increase our effectiveness, increase interoperability.”
The Philippines was home to two largest U.S. Navy and Air Force bases outside of the American mainland. However, after the Philippine Senate refused to extend the use of the bases, they were closed in the early 1990s.
Although American forces returned for large-scale combat exercises with Filipino troops under a 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement, they could not obtain a base. The Philippine Constitution forbids the permanent establishment of foreign troops and their involvement in local combat.
The 2014 EDCA allowed U.S. forces to pre-position equipment and return forces in Philippine military bases, but Marcos’ predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, had suspended the practice to maintain closer ties with China.
After Marcos was elected president, Joe Biden was the first foreign leader to call to congratulate Marcos, and senior Washington officials visited the Philippines regularly.
Manila’s balance policy
Washington is keen to expand its security options in the Philippines against China, while Manila aims to strengthen its defenses against disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea and a possible escalation in the Taiwan Strait.
A senior White House official told the Financial Times the initiative was “part of their strategic efforts across the region,” stressing that it was very important to Biden.
The Philippines sees the United States as a crucial counterweight to China in the region, and Washington has pledged to come to the defense of the Philippines if Filipino forces, ships, or aircraft come under attack in the contested waters.
On the other hand, the Philippines is trying to pursue a policy of not taking sides between China, its largest trading partner, and the United States. Philippine President Marcos’ visit to China last month was an indication that Manila is seeking to maintain ties with Beijing. Marcos also reiterated his commitment to the “one China” policy in a recent private interview with the Financial Times.
That’s why Philippine officials insisted ahead of Austin’s visit that military cooperation with the United States “does not target any third party.”
The Philippines is critical to Washington
However, the revival of the defense relationship with Washington by Philippine President Marcos could change this balance policy. The U.S. is using the same stick on the Philippines that it uses on the Asia-Pacific countries – the “China threat”.
The Biden administration is pushing the idea that if Beijing challenges the Philippines’ control over the disputed islands in the South China Sea or attacks Taiwan, the Philippines will be at risk of becoming part of the battlefield.
In this context, Austin said during the visit that the United States and the Philippines are “committed to strengthening their mutual capacities to resist armed attack” and stressed that these defensive efforts are important against China’s influence on the South China Sea.
Lisa Curtis, an Indo-Pacific expert at the Washington-based CNAS think tank, also stressed that the Philippines’ position is critical to the entire U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of a dispute over Taiwan, Washington would certainly see Manila as a staging ground for logistical support and U.S. forces, Curtis said.
Meanwhile, the Philippine president is reportedly traveling to Japan next week to expand security and trade cooperation between Manila and Tokyo.
Beijing has voiced concerns about Marcos’ visit to Japan, according to two people familiar with the discussions, highlighting the challenge the Philippines faces in trying to balance its economic interests with China and its relations with the United States and its allies.
The extent to which the Philippines can successfully maintain the balance policy in the face of the attack attempt that the U.S. and NATO have pursued so far in the Asia-Pacific through the “Chinese threat” discourse remains a question.
Asia
China outpaces India in race for Russian crude oil supplies
China has accelerated its crude oil purchases from Russia to replace oil shipments originating from the Middle East.
According to a Reuters report based on data from energy analytics firm Kpler, China is outpacing India in the Russian oil market.
India’s crude imports from Russia’s European ports fell by approximately 30% in August.
Beijing’s increased purchases could curb India’s exports of refined petroleum products and consequently trigger a diesel and gasoline shortage across Asia.
While China previously favoured ESPO blend crude shipped from Russia’s Asian ports, the share of its purchases from Russia’s European ports, consisting primarily of the Urals grade, has climbed to 31%.
Russian crude imports by India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, dropped to 1.87 million barrels per day in August. This volume remained well below the 2.79 million barrels per day recorded in July.
Under this scenario, which poses a risk to the Asian region, India stands as the region’s largest exporter of diesel and gasoline.
However, the country’s total crude imports in August were recorded at 4.17 million barrels per day. This figure marked the lowest level since the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East.
If the tightening raw material supply prevents Indian refineries from maintaining processing throughput, a severe deficit in refined products could emerge across the Asian market starting in September.
The Times of India previously reported that India’s Russian crude imports reached their highest share since 2022 in July.
During that period, Russia supplied more than half of India’s total crude imports of just over 5 million barrels per day, delivering 2.8 million barrels per day.
At the end of July, the Russian government extended its temporary export ban on gasoline, diesel, and other fuel types until 31 January 2027.
Under the restrictions that took effect on 1 August, direct exports of diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils by refiners will be exempted starting 1 September.
Bloomberg reported in June that Russian Urals crude was being sold in India at a $3.90 discount per barrel against international benchmarks after a hiatus of more than two months.
Urals crude traded at a discount again on 29 May for the first time since mid-March.
According to The Times of India, however, this discount on Russian Urals crude had almost entirely evaporated by early August.
Asia
Japan sharpens defense posture while strengthening Turkish ties
In an extensive interview on the Harici YouTube channel hosted by journalist Elif Ilhamoglu, Asia-Pacific research specialist and journalist Mehmet Asil Gonultas provided a comprehensive analysis of East Asia’s shifting geopolitical landscape.
Focusing on the newly released 2026 Japanese Defence White Paper, Tokyo’s military posture, foreign policy recalibrations under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, and expanding bilateral ties with Turkiye, Gonultas detailed how systemic anxieties regarding China, Russia, and North Korea are reshaping the region.
“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats”
Addressing the release of Japan’s updated national security strategy document, Gonultas noted that the nearly 600-page publication represents the longest and most assertive security outline produced by Tokyo to date. He underscored that the tone toward regional competitors has hardened markedly compared to previous editions.
“China, Russia, and North Korea are explicitly named as threats in this year’s document,” Gonultas said. “Regarding Russia, the text explicitly characterizes its military presence on the contested Kuril Islands as an occupation, particularly following the recent visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to one of the islands. North Korea is evaluated through the operational lens of the Russia-Ukraine war, where Pyongyang is actively refining its military capabilities, deploying personnel, utilizing drones, and gaining battle-tested experience in an active combat zone.”
Gonultas explained that the characterization of Beijing as a deteriorating security risk reflects a trajectory that has intensified steadily over recent years. “While China has been identified as a primary security concern since at least 2022, the rhetorical severity increases with every iteration. This year’s assessment is the heaviest yet, directly mirroring the firm posture of the state,” he stated.
Contrasting the current administration with former leadership, Gonultas remarked, “Former Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba advocated a relatively moderate approach, maintaining that Japan and China must find ways to coexist peacefully given their geographic reality. However, Prime Minister Takaichi adopted an uncompromising stance toward Beijing even prior to assuming office.”
He noted that Beijing’s actions have reinforced Tokyo’s apprehensions: “Beijing continuously provides justification for this stance. During recent missile testings, Beijing claimed to have informed Japan in advance, but Tokyo clarified that notice was provided merely 30 minutes prior to launch, emphasizing that no formal permission was granted. Furthermore, Chinese naval vessels regularly test boundaries in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and a Chinese warship recently targeted a Japanese fighter jet with a guidance laser. The white paper explicitly argues that China’s actual military expenditures significantly exceed its publicly declared defense budget.”
Following the publication of the document, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense swiftly issued formal condemnations, accusing Tokyo of fanning regional tensions and reverting to historic militarism. “China reacted directly by asserting that this document reflects rising Japanese militarism,” Gonultas said. “In response, Tokyo points to China’s rapid rearmament, its inventory of ballistic missiles capable of striking Japanese territory, its maritime incursions, and its anti-aircraft capabilities targeting Japanese military aviation.”
“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons”
Turning to the structural and military capabilities outlined in the white paper, Gonultas clarified that Tokyo is prioritizing high-technology defense systems and diplomatic-economic integration rather than unconventional deterrence.
“There is no question of acquiring nuclear weapons,” Gonultas emphasized, addressing recent media speculation surrounding defense policy debates. “While domestic discussions on nuclear deterrence surfaced during the era of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, implementing such a policy remains politically impossible. Regardless of a ruling party’s parliamentary majority, strong internal factions vehemently oppose the concept. When Abe tentatively raised the question of nuclear deterrence after leaving office, then-Prime Minister Fumio Kishida immediately rejected the notion. Kishida, who remains an influential parliamentary figure, reaffirmed only recently that Japan must unconditionally oppose nuclear armament.”
Clarifying recent remarks made by Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi regarding the public taboo surrounding nuclear debates, Gonultas observed, “The prohibition against discussing nuclear weapons is not a formal statutory ban, but rather a deeply ingrained societal consensus. The public remains firmly opposed to even raising the topic. Defense Minister Koizumi, whose personal popularity has risen significantly among right-wing factions since taking office, uses this rhetoric largely as a political signaling strategy to consolidate his base as he positions himself for a future prime ministerial run.”
Gonultas outlined Tokyo’s actual defense investments, highlighting unmanned systems and domestic defense manufacturing. “Japan’s primary technological focus centers on advanced drone infrastructure,” he stated. “Furthermore, Japan has revised its historical restrictions on arms exports. While the constitution was previously interpreted to ban the export of lethal weaponry—limiting sales strictly to search-and-rescue or non-lethal equipment—legislative shifts now permit defensive exports, provided they are directed toward allied nations that are not actively engaged in armed conflict.”
“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China”
Evaluating Tokyo’s strategic dependence on Washington, Gonultas emphasized that Japan’s defense planners view the US alliance as indispensable for national survival.
“Japan is acutely aware that it cannot stand alone against China’s sheer scale,” Gonultas stated. “This fundamental reality forces Japanese policymakers to maintain flawless relations with Washington at all costs. Recently, when a US serviceman was implicated in an assault incident on Okinawa Island, Defense Minister Koizumi explicitly declined to criticize the US military, drawing sharp domestic backlash. Yet, this reflects Tokyo’s overriding priority: retaining the US strategic presence in the Indo-Pacific.”
“Both the Japanese government and the general public harbour deep anxieties regarding Chinese intentions, particularly concerning a potential military move against Taiwan,” Gonultas continued. “Should China blockade or seize Taiwan, Japan’s vital maritime trade routes would be compromised at Beijing’s discretion. Aside from the United States, no regional power possesses the capacity to offer meaningful deterrence.”
Gonultas added that this strategic anxiety has intensified under the current US administration. “Japanese planners are operating under immense pressure to keep US President Donald Trump fully committed to regional security, even as Washington signals potential adjustments to its military posture, including reductions in joint exercises with South Korea,” he noted. “To build a broader network of deterrence, Tokyo is actively cultivating overlapping bilateral and trilateral security partnerships with Australia, the Philippines, India, and South Korea, aiming to anchor US power within the region.”
“Constitutional limits restrict Japanese forces to purely defensive operations”
Addressing whether growing regional friction could lead to direct military confrontations, Gonultas pointed to the legal constraints governing Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.
“The likelihood of Japan initiating or engaging in direct offensive conflict remains minimal,” Gonultas stated. “Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution explicitly renounces war and prohibits the maintenance of offensive war potential. All military assets held by Japan are structured strictly for self-defense, meaning operational force can only be applied after Japanese territory sustains an explicit attack.”
“When Prime Minister Takaichi previously stated that Japan would protect Taiwan in the event of an invasion, any operational support would realistically be limited to logistics, non-combatant evacuation operations, and naval resupply missions for US forces, rather than direct front-line engagement,” Gonultas explained. “Although Takaichi favors constitutional revision, the Japanese public remains overwhelmingly pacifist and deeply attached to Article 9, driven by demographic aging, historical memory, and a profound fear of military escalation.”
“Turkiye is viewed as a reliable and capable defense partner”
Highlighting expanding diplomatic and industrial engagement between Ankara and Tokyo, Gonultas noted that defense procurement and technological cooperation have gained significant momentum.
“Following high-level diplomatic engagements, including Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s official visit to Tokyo and subsequent defense agreements signed at the SAHA EXPO defense exhibition, bilateral security cooperation has entered a concrete phase,” Gonultas said. “Japan is actively seeking to acquire drone technology. Importantly, Tokyo does not merely wish to purchase off-the-shelf equipment; it seeks technology transfers and co-production frameworks to understand manufacturing methodologies. Ankara has demonstrated a positive reception to these discussions.”
“Turkiye is viewed in Tokyo as a reliable, highly capable defense actor and a non-aggressive diplomatic mediator,” Gonultas added. “With negative public perception toward Israel reaching 80% in Japan, Tokyo has deliberately diversified its defense partnerships away from Tel Aviv, placing increased value on its historical alliance with Turkiye.”
Gonultas further observed that diplomatic coordination extends into Central Asia. “Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Eri Arfia, who is of Uyghur origin and fluent in Turkish, visited Istanbul and met with representatives of the Organization of Turkic States, expressing Japan’s interest in securing observer status,” Gonultas explained. “Tokyo views Turkiye as a vital bridge to Middle Eastern energy stability and Central Asian critical mineral supply chains.”
“Takaichi’s public approval ratings have dropped toward 50%”
Analysing domestic political dynamics, Gonultas reported that Prime Minister Takaichi faces mounting economic pressures that threaten her initial political momentum.
“While Prime Minister Takaichi entered office with approval ratings approaching 70%, recent surveys show public support dropping toward 50%, with some independent polls placing approval near 40%,” Gonultas stated. “The primary driver behind this decline is economic dissatisfaction. Despite state interventions to stabilize the yen around 170 per US dollar following energy price surges caused by the Iran conflict, living costs remain elevated.”
“Voters supported Takaichi expecting structural economic revitalization, but the administration has heavily prioritized ideological and administrative initiatives—such as designating Osaka as a secondary capital alongside its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, enacting national flag protection laws, and tightening permanent residency requirements for foreign workers,” Gonultas explained. “Although the government plans to cut consumption taxes on food items from 8% to 1%, prominent figures within her own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including former Prime Minister Ishiba and veteran leader Taro Aso, have publicly questioned the fiscal viability of these plans.”
Concurrently, economic authorities face severe macroeconomic challenges following joint currency interventions by the US and Japan. “While joint interventions successfully halted the chaotic depreciation of the yen beyond the 170 threshold, Japanese government bond yields recently hit 30-year highs of approximately 3%,” Gonultas noted. “To offset inflationary pressures on households, the government has facilitated a 5% average wage increase—the highest in recent decades—while coordinating with Washington to maintain exchange rate stability.”
Concluding his evaluation of Tokyo’s regional policy, Gonultas noted that despite broader regional instability, Japan continues to maintain active diplomatic communication with Tehran to safeguard energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz. “Tokyo maintains functional diplomatic channels with both Washington and Tehran, leveraging its neutral diplomatic standing to support regional maritime stability and energy security,” Gonultas concluded.
Asia
Pakistan top court orders Imran Khan moved from prison to hospital
The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that former Prime Minister Imran Khan must be transferred from prison to a hospital.
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) announced on Tuesday that the Supreme Court of Pakistan had ordered the transfer of former Prime Minister Imran Khan from prison to a hospital. The ruling meets a long-standing demand from his party and family, who have voiced concerns over his health.
The 73-year-old cricketer-turned-politician has been imprisoned since August 2023, following convictions in a series of cases that he maintains were politically motivated after his removal from office in 2022.
His sons had repeatedly raised concerns over the past year regarding his deteriorating health, while his lawyers stated that he had suffered significant vision loss in his right eye during his time in detention.
PTI spokesman Zulfikar Bukhari said: “This is a welcome decision. We wish this had happened earlier so that his eye and overall health would not have deteriorated this much.”
Bukhari added: “He should remain in the hospital until all doctors are satisfied.”
Khan’s spokesman Naeem Haider Panjutha stated on X that the court had directed Khan to be moved to Shifa International Hospital within 48 hours and to remain there until 16 September.
Since being ousted from power in a no-confidence vote, Khan has faced numerous legal proceedings, including cases involving state gifts and unlawful marriage. While some convictions have been suspended or overturned, appeals against others remain pending. Khan denies the charges against him.
In February, leading figures from the global cricket community, including prominent names from across the border in India, expressed “deep concerns” over Khan’s prison conditions and demanded improved treatment for him.
PTI came to power in 2018 and retains a broad support base across key provinces. However, the party was stripped of its electoral symbol ahead of the 2024 elections, forcing its candidates to contest the polls as independents.
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