Asia
As the U.S. expands its bases, will the Philippines be able to maintain a balance with China?
The Philippines granted the United States expanded access to its military bases on Thursday.
The defense ministries of both countries announced Washington would be granted access to four more regions under the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).
The agreement was reached during a visit by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who visited South Korea earlier this year to bolster deployment of advanced weapons such as fighter jets and bombers to the Korean Peninsula, also to deploy more military forces and weapons in the Philippines.
In a joint announcement, the Philippines and the United States agreed to accelerate the full implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which aims to support combined training, exercises, and interoperability between the two countries.
As part of the agreement, the United States has allocated $82 million for infrastructure improvements at five existing EDCA sites and has expanded its military presence to four new regions in “strategic areas of the country,” according to the statement.
New bases target China
The statement did not specify where the new areas would be. The former Philippine military chief told Reuters that the United States had previously requested access to bases on the island of Palawan, which overlooks the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and the northern land mass of Luzon, the Philippines’ closest region to Taiwan.
Philippine military officials and defense experts said some government officials were concerned that news about these locations would anger China.
According to an analysis published in the Global Times, Luzon and Palawan are very close to the Taiwanese island of Nansha, respectively, and “the intention of targeting China could not be more obvious.”
More recently, U.S. forces have intensified and expanded joint training focusing on combat readiness and disaster response with Filipino troops on the nation’s west coast, which faces the South China Sea, and in its northern Luzon region.
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
The EDCA allows U.S. access to Philippine military bases for joint training, pre-positioning of equipment and the building of facilities such as runways, fuel storage and military housing, but not for a permanent presence.
Austin said: “This is not about permanent basing, but it is a big deal, it is a really big deal… This is an opportunity to increase our effectiveness, increase interoperability.”
The Philippines was home to two largest U.S. Navy and Air Force bases outside of the American mainland. However, after the Philippine Senate refused to extend the use of the bases, they were closed in the early 1990s.
Although American forces returned for large-scale combat exercises with Filipino troops under a 1999 Visiting Forces Agreement, they could not obtain a base. The Philippine Constitution forbids the permanent establishment of foreign troops and their involvement in local combat.
The 2014 EDCA allowed U.S. forces to pre-position equipment and return forces in Philippine military bases, but Marcos’ predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, had suspended the practice to maintain closer ties with China.
After Marcos was elected president, Joe Biden was the first foreign leader to call to congratulate Marcos, and senior Washington officials visited the Philippines regularly.
Manila’s balance policy
Washington is keen to expand its security options in the Philippines against China, while Manila aims to strengthen its defenses against disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea and a possible escalation in the Taiwan Strait.
A senior White House official told the Financial Times the initiative was “part of their strategic efforts across the region,” stressing that it was very important to Biden.
The Philippines sees the United States as a crucial counterweight to China in the region, and Washington has pledged to come to the defense of the Philippines if Filipino forces, ships, or aircraft come under attack in the contested waters.
On the other hand, the Philippines is trying to pursue a policy of not taking sides between China, its largest trading partner, and the United States. Philippine President Marcos’ visit to China last month was an indication that Manila is seeking to maintain ties with Beijing. Marcos also reiterated his commitment to the “one China” policy in a recent private interview with the Financial Times.
That’s why Philippine officials insisted ahead of Austin’s visit that military cooperation with the United States “does not target any third party.”
The Philippines is critical to Washington
However, the revival of the defense relationship with Washington by Philippine President Marcos could change this balance policy. The U.S. is using the same stick on the Philippines that it uses on the Asia-Pacific countries – the “China threat”.
The Biden administration is pushing the idea that if Beijing challenges the Philippines’ control over the disputed islands in the South China Sea or attacks Taiwan, the Philippines will be at risk of becoming part of the battlefield.
In this context, Austin said during the visit that the United States and the Philippines are “committed to strengthening their mutual capacities to resist armed attack” and stressed that these defensive efforts are important against China’s influence on the South China Sea.
Lisa Curtis, an Indo-Pacific expert at the Washington-based CNAS think tank, also stressed that the Philippines’ position is critical to the entire U.S. alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. In the event of a dispute over Taiwan, Washington would certainly see Manila as a staging ground for logistical support and U.S. forces, Curtis said.
Meanwhile, the Philippine president is reportedly traveling to Japan next week to expand security and trade cooperation between Manila and Tokyo.
Beijing has voiced concerns about Marcos’ visit to Japan, according to two people familiar with the discussions, highlighting the challenge the Philippines faces in trying to balance its economic interests with China and its relations with the United States and its allies.
The extent to which the Philippines can successfully maintain the balance policy in the face of the attack attempt that the U.S. and NATO have pursued so far in the Asia-Pacific through the “Chinese threat” discourse remains a question.
Asia
Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets
Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.
Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.
The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.
The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.
Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.
The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.
Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.
The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.
Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.
The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.
Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.
Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.
Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.
According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.
This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.
The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:
“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”
Asia
Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions
Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.
Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.
The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.
China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.
Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.
The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.
It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.
However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.
Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.
Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.
On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.
The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.
Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.
Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.
Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.
Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.
According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.
Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.
The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.
A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.
These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.
Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.
Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.
Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.
Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”
Asia
China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers
China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.
China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.
In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.
The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.
Financial sector stability
China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.
China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.
“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.
Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.
Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan
Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.
The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.
Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.
Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.
Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.
Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.
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