America
Balances in 2024 and projections to 2025 for Latin America and the Caribbean
Analysing the most important issues that occurred in a region over an entire year, just like making a weather forecast for a trip that has not yet begun or is just beginning, is not only a challenge, it is a risk. We then assume this risky task with the certainty that many important things will be left out of this review. We also warn about the feasibility of the scenarios that may – or may not – materialize during 2025. Our intention is only to offer an approximation to some of the most notable events in the Political, Economic, Social and Security and Defense spheres in a rich and complex region: Latin America.
Political issues
2024 was the year in which the largest number of voters went to the polls in the world, and, indeed, the political agenda of 2024 in Latin America and the Caribbean, in general, and in Venezuela in particular, was marked by the presidential election. In addition to Venezuela (July 28), El Salvador (February 4), Paraná (May 5), Dominican Republic (May 19), Mexico (June 2), Uruguay (October 27 and November 24) celebrated general elections. In October, Brazil and Chile held municipal and regional elections.
Thus, at the end of 2024, the political map in South America has been made up of 6 of the 10 most important countries under the command of different “leftists”: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela. While the countries governed by the right and the extreme right are: Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru (the latter country began being left-wing, but, after the coup against Pedro Castillo, it turned to the right). It should be noted that we do not include in this list: Guyana, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Aruba, Curacao, Bonaire, or French Guiana, countries and territories strongly subject to European neocolonialism and American imperialism, which is why their political influence is relative, in the region.
In the political sphere, without a doubt the re-election of President Nicolás Maduro is the greatest achievement for Venezuela, since – despite the constant attacks and coup attempts – the continuity of the political project begun at the end of the last century with the victory of President Hugo Chávez in December 1998, and the subsequent establishment of the Bolivarian Revolution, has remained standing, facing threats and emerging politically victorious. Maduro’s leadership has been reaffirmed in the presidential elections of July 28. Chavismo also has a majority in the Legislative Branch.
In Brazil, Lula’s government has shown its fragility both internally, by losing massively in the municipal elections, where the right was left in control of 13 of the 15 most important cities in the country, and externally, by not participating in the meeting of the BRICS, in Kazan, Russia, due to health problems, but above all, by not supporting Venezuela’s entry into the multilateral bloc. With these and other political positions, Lula demonstrated that he is not in a position to be “the older brother” of Venezuela or any country in South America, which is mostly progressive or left-wing, and although they are not totally anti-capitalist, they are anti-imperialist.
On the other hand, in Mexico, the MORENA Party made history again by electing a woman as president for the first time. In the June 2024 elections, Claudia Sheinbaum won with the largest number of votes in the country ‘s democratic history. In these elections, new representatives were also elected to integrate the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies and other federal and local authorities. MORENA, together with allied parties, obtained the majority of positions and seats.
It is worth noting that Mexico plays a very important role in regional politics, given its influence on Central America, where the greatest political tensions occur in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. Furthermore, Mexico is now a political counterweight to the interests of the United States in South America, as well.
Argentina has played an opposite role for the region in 2024, since the arrival of Javier Milei has provided spaces and air for imperialist pretensions and for the resurgence of fascist, neo-fascist, even Naziist movements in the region, which come to support the idea of white supremacy and Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA), which Milei transformed into “Make Argentina Great Again.” Domestically, Milei has demonstrated his own political strength and has maintained with positive image and popular support. Proof of this is that, even without a parliamentary majority, the Argentine Congress approved laws and legislative powers, with which Milei has managed to apply his ultra-liberal government program delivered to the superpowers and their allies. The current Argentine president has strengthened, like no other government before, his alliance with the United States and Israel.
Another issue that has divided and challenged, in 2024, the Latin American left is the confrontation between Evo Morales and the current president of Bolivia, Luis Arce. At the end of October, the former president, coca grower leader and until then presidential candidate was attacked by Bolivian police and military, who made an attempt on his life. The Bolivian Justice has disqualified Morales from participating in the presidential elections of August-October 2025. With Evo out of the presidential race and Arce without popular support, the return of the right in Bolivia seems inevitable.
Economic matters
According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL), the economies of our region, during 2024, continue to be trapped in a trap from which they cannot escape: low capacity for growth. Latin America’s GDP growth this year was 2.2%, and 1% when the 2015-2024 decade is considered. This indicates a stagnation of GDP per capita, in some cases as a result of economic recession. Several of the strongest countries have faced different macroeconomic, fiscal and monetary challenges.
Brazil: In 2024 the South American giant suffered one of the largest devaluations of a monetary cone in the world. The Real, the Brazilian currency, lost between 25-30% of its value against the dollar. The trigger was the presentation and distrust of the fiscal adjustment proposed by the Lula administration. Despite Lulista’s economic policy called “National Consumerism” by its detractors, Brazil has one of the highest tax burdens in the world. In addition, the Brazilian government has not significantly increased the minimum wage, which will begin in 2025 at $250. According to several economic analysts, the real enemy of the Brazilian government is “the Brazilian government”, since what continues to rise is the operating expenses of the gigantic Brazilian public apparatus.
Mexico: The second largest economy in Latin America had a 3% devaluation of its currency in 2024, after learning of the victory of Donald Trump in the United States, who will formally assume the White House on January 20, 2025. The Mexican currency went from 16 to 20 pesos per dollar in one year. However, in just a few weeks, the Mexican peso has managed to stabilize. Meaning that, despite this slight devaluation, the Mexican currency remains strong against the dollar compared to other countries in the region. Mexico enjoys one of the lowest inflation rates in Latin America (5%) and one of the highest basic salaries (approximately $450).
Argentina: The first year of Javier Milei’s government has been a truly shock therapy for the Argentine economy. The ultra-liberal (anarcho-capitalist) left all prices of all goods and services to the discretion of the market, causing an increase in poverty levels, which exceeded 50% of the population, during the first half of 2024. The fall in the inflationary indices were mainly due to lower demand, that is, lower consumption capacity. Milei also eliminated protection barriers in favor of the international speculative market and began a process of privatization of state companies favoring international capital, which generated “trust” in the market in its management, and a reduction in the exchange gap between the dollar and the Argentine peso. The peso became “stronger” and Argentina more expensive. Finally, salary wages did not increase at the same rate. In November, an Argentine family needed an income of $1,000 to not be considered poor. The current minimum wage is $280, one of the lowest basic salaries in the region.
Venezuela: The country closes a positive year in economic matters, thanks to the increase in its oil production, which in several months of 2024 exceeded one million barrels per day (BPD). The Venezuelan government also managed to control inflation and sustainably maintain the reactivation of its economic apparatus. The salary issue continues to be a pending issue to be solved, since the announcement made on the 1st. May, (Workers’ Day in Venezuela and other countries in Latin America and the world), did not satisfy the working class that faces a dollarized economy daily. It is worth noting the economic line that Venezuela follows, with the holding in Caracas of the XXV World Forum on Special Economic Zones and the Transition to New Economic Models. This forum is a space specially designed to explore economic and financial investments with China.
At the multilateral level, this year saw the completion of the MERCOSUR-European Union Agreement. On December 6, in Montevideo, Uruguay, and after 25 years of negotiations, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the European Union (EU) signed a Letter of Intent to reach a Free Trade Agreement (FTA), a requirement prior to the Treaty, through which each Member State will establish which products will have their tariffs affected and which will not.
Social issues
Cyclical advances and setbacks have allowed inequality to continue to be a persistent problem in the region. The gap between rich and poor has widened, generating social and political tensions. Extreme poverty had increased with the pandemic to 13% and decreased to 10% in 2023, but is still above 8.5% in 2024. One in three households in the lowest income quintile lacks access to social protection, according to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL).
172 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean do not have sufficient income to cover their essential needs and, among them, 66 million cannot purchase a basic food basket, indicates the Social Panorama Report of Latin America and the Caribbean 2024.
In several Latin American countries, political instability is a recurring phenomenon. Internal conflicts, institutional crises and corruption are realities that have affected governability and democratic stability in the region. This phenomenon is increased by the conditions of economic slowdown in the region.
Latin America continues to be a region of origin, transit and destination of migrants and refugees. The economic, political and social crises, as well as economic conditions in countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, Nicaragua and Haiti, Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador, have caused a considerable migratory flow, generating tensions and challenges in terms of social inclusion and human rights. .
The increase in intraregional migration is largely driven by Venezuelan emigration. It is estimated that in June 2023 there were more than 6 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the region, living mainly in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Chile and Brazil. The improvement in Venezuela’s economy has led to a return of Venezuelan immigrants to the country. The Venezuelan government also has strengthened the program “Vuelta a la Patria” (Return to the Homeland) and the care of Venezuelan immigrants abroad. The Bolivarian government also created the Vice Ministry of Comprehensive Care for Migration, which depends on the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry, and reinvigorated the Great Mission Return to the Homeland.
The effects of climate change are having a significant impact in Latin America, exacerbating the vulnerability of populations already affected by poverty and social exclusion. Droughts, floods and extreme weather events are affecting the food security, health and well-being of entire communities in the region.
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic still persist, which has had a devastating impact on Latin America, both in terms of public health and the economy and social well-being. The health crisis has revealed the deficiencies of public health systems, the fragility of social protection networks and the vulnerability of the most disadvantaged sectors of the population.
National Security and Defense Issues
In 2024, Latin America and the Caribbean did not see open conventional war conflicts. However, certain issues were present on the regional agenda that could have escalated into a war and threatened the security of the region:
Border tensions: Territorial disputes between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in the San Juan River region; the controversy over the delimitation of the maritime border between Chile and Peru; the tensions between Guatemala and Belize due to the territorial dispute over the territory of Belize; tensions between Argentina and Chile regarding the demarcation of the border in the Patagonia region; and the border dispute over the Essequibo between Venezuela and Guyana. They are all part of imperial interests for control of the natural resources of our region.
Internal conflicts: In Colombia, despite the peace processes signed with the FARC and the ELN, armed groups and tensions continue to exist in several Colombian regions; Political tensions in Venezuela have been a focus of conflict in recent years, after the application of unilateral coercive measures imposed by the US and European countries. This year Maduro suffered an attempted coup d’état, following the election results of July 28; the crisis in Haiti that has generated political and social instability, as well as a wave of violence in the country; and the attempted coup d’état in Bolivia, denounced by President Luis Arce.
Imperialist pretensions. Trump has expressed his interest in militarily invading Mexico and Panama. Fact that allows us to appreciate the interest of American dominance towards the region. In addition, he has promised to undertake stabilization actions against the economies of the countries Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela through unilateral coercive measures, the so-called “sanctions.” We remember that, respecting the principle of free sovereignty of States, in Public International Law no State is able to sanction another.
The Aragua Train (El Tren de Aragua). This transnational criminal organization has been the subject of regional security concerns, especially in the United States. Although it was created in Venezuela, in the state of Aragua, from which it takes its name, currently its area of criminal activity occurs outside of Venezuela. Trump has blamed the “Aragua Train” for practically all crime in the United States. This has been difficult to prove and even to believe, but it can be presumed that it will be part of the Trump Administration’s Domestic Security Agenda.
Arms race. In 2024, the military policy of the governments of Latin America and the Caribbean, in order to strengthen their National Defense policies, was oriented mainly towards the maritime and air areas. They strengthened their maritime military power, countries such as Chile, Mexico and Nicaragua worked on remodeling their naval fleet, while Guyana received an ocean patrol vessel from England. For their part, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay strengthened their air power with the purchase of CAZA brand aircraft; Honduras with the purchase of 6 Airbus H145 helicopters; and Costa Rica with the acquisition of two drones granted by the US. However, according to Statistica, the statistics portal for macro data from Spain, the countries that generate the greatest military spending in Latin America and the Caribbean are Brazil, Mexico, Colombia , Chile and Argentina.
Likewise, the political relations of the countries in the region in military matters during 2024 reflected agreements on Security and Defense between countries such as Mexico-Brazil, Argentina-El Salvador, Colombia-The United Nations Organization (UN). However, there was also the presence of relations with international actors outside the region with agreements between Trinidad and Tobago-United States, the talks for the Colombia-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreement and Argentina’s interest in joining NATO.
It is striking how there have been negotiations and military operations in countries that share a border with Venezuela, which receive or negotiate with external actors in the region that could encourage an invasion. Colombia negotiates its entry into NATO, which is a threat to the Security of Venezuela; Trinidad and Tobago signed a Security Agreement with the United States; and Guyana received a patrol vessel from England.
In the face of growing competition between the United States, Russia and China, Latin America and the Caribbean has once again become a strategic priority, as can be seen from recent documents from the current US administration, and from Trump’s own public pronouncements.
The greatest foreign military influence in the region is the United States, through its military bases, Joint Operations and the Southern Command. Then, there is Russia, which has supplied weapons and military equipment, as well as technical assistance for the maintenance and modernization of its defense systems to Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Argentina, among other countries. In third place is China, because its relations with the countries in the region are mainly economic.
In 2024, Latin America experienced a boom in the purchase of weapons. The new arms race, as part of the military industry, drives other competitions, for example, the space race and nuclear development. Regarding this last issue, President Milei announced that Argentina will build its IV Nuclear Power Plant, and that his country wishes to become a regional and world power in the development of nuclear energy.
To close the arms issue, we must keep in mind that the countries of the region sold sovereignty and bought military-technological dependence, by acquiring weapons and military equipment from the United States and Europe; since they have not bought the best and the most modern, but rather planes and weapons that are “left over” or are no longer used by the superpowers. It is also worth remembering that, since World War II, the Americans and Europeans have been historical allies, for Which in the event of any war would have no qualms about acting against Latin America and cutting off vital supplies, spare parts, equipment, etc.
Projections: What’s coming for 2025
In 2025, even with the arrival of reinforcements (Mexico and Uruguay), most left or center-left governments will face the challenge of strengthening themselves internally and externally to face the arrival of Donald Trump to the White House, on January 20.
It is likely that many of Trump’s threats will remain in the discursive or rhetorical order, however, the future is uncertain and the Republican may cause some surprises or scares, both in Latin America and in other regions. For now, the great beneficiary of Trump’s return is clearly Milei, or it should be, since the Argentine president has shown himself, from minute 1, determined to obey and flatter Trump, in alarming and outrageous measures. Let us remember that, while several Latin American leaders and presidents, including Lula, Petro, Boric and Cristina Fernández, expressed their support for the Democratic Party candidate, Kamala Harris; Milei, in the United States, openly supported Trump. This is something that the Republican leader will not easily forget.
In that sense, 2025 will find Latin America waiting for threats from Donald Trump, who has stated that he wants to invade Mexico, with the excuse of fighting drug trafficking, and Panama, to control the strategic canal.
In economic matters, CEPAL projects that in 2025, the region will not be able to escape the trap of low economic growth either. However, the region’s weakness is not only caused by an unfavorable economic context, but also by the persistence of a growing rejection of political parties and the traditional way of doing politics.
Latin American economies depend largely on the stability of their commercial exchange. In that sense, 2025 regional economies will depend on the health of the economy of their main trading partners: China and the United States mainly. China’s Ministry of Commerce, for example, has just launched an investigation into imported beef, especially from Brazil (40%) and Argentina (15%). Any trade measure by China will impact these latin american economies.
MERCOSUR-European Union Agreement. It is still early to know where this bicontinental agreement will lead. It should be considered that, as we previously mentioned, Latin America has been experiencing a process of economic slowdown; many of its countries already have fiscal policies of market opening to encourage foreign investment, but nothing of that has helped. Thus, it seems that the low economic capacity for European investment in MERCOSUR does not ensure the economic growth of the active member countries of the South American bloc.
In short, 2025 is projected as a year in which the correlation of forces in Latin America and the Caribbean will continue to be favorable to the right and the extreme right.
Latin American integration will continue to be an issue to work on, given that the political scenario will be under the strong influence of the United States government. Countries in the region will experience pressure from foreign powers due to the current international dynamics, where there are two power blocs: China, Russia and allies, on the one hand, and the United States, the European Union and allies, on the other.
The open wounds between Venezuela, Brazil and Colombia can begin to heal, if the United States pressures these three countries at the same time. However, the positions of Brazil and Colombia with respect to the United States do not seem to want to confront the North American country.
The developing regional conflicts, for example the Bolivian case, do not seem to be decreasing in intensity. In any case, we must be alert to the continuous imperialist attacks against Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Trump has already threatened to stop buying Venezuelan oil and to increase unilateral coercive measures.
It is even likely that the North American president, Donal Trump, will serve as a platform to validate a parallel government by recognizing Edmundo González Urrutia as president of Venezuela.
Conclusions
Any analysis of our region must be done with the understanding that, like other regions of the world, Latin America is in the middle or crossed by the fight for global hegemony between the United States and China. The growing presence of the Asian giant in the most precious area of influence for the United States, wrongly called by Americans “backyard,” is undoubtedly an element that adds greater political tension to the region.
At the political level, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela continue to set anti-imperialist guidelines and, for this reason, are the main focus of attacks by the United States and its allies. Specially Venezuela, which as soon as Maduro was re-elected, had to face a coup d’état and questions about the electoral process of Latin American leaders and countries that were supposed to be allies and that when there were doubts about the electoral processes in their countries, they received recognition of Venezuela, immediately and without giving rise to destabilizing attempts.
We can particularly mention the painful role (painful for the left) played by Lula in Brazil; Cristina Fernandez in Argentina; Gustavo Petro in Colombia; Gabriel Boric in Chile; all supposedly consider themselves leftist. It seems that they, and other “left” leaders, have not become aware that only the unity of the people and governments in the face of imperialism will make us strong as a region and as States.
And that joining media trends, or even Fake-News, only makes themselves and their progressive or “left-wing” proposals weaker. Once again we mention Lula as an example of this, since his refusal to approve Venezuela’s entry into the BRICS caused him to be rejected by the majority of the progressive and left-wing sectors of Brazilian society, as well as the largest social movement in Brazil and Latin America: the Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST).
In another order, although there are political and economic tensions that have represented dangers to the Security and Defense of the region, for example, due to the increase in irregular migration, crime and regional arms race; Without a doubt, the role of the Argentine president, Javier Milei, in opening the doors of the United States, the United Kingdom and even the NATO, represents an unprecedented threat to Latin America.
Finally, the influence and interference that the Trump Administration may cause in and against Latin America is indeed a great uncertainty. In part it will depend on how other world conflicts develop and the role that the United States, China, Russia, Turkey, Israel, and others, want and can play in them. For all this, in the face of the global disorder that prevails in the world today, Venezuela will always call for the solidarity of the people and will insist on Latin American and Caribbean unity.
America
US Senate panel seeks records in Trump-linked crypto investigation
Richard Blumenthal, the ranking Democrat on the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI), has requested documents from cryptocurrency exchange Binance, Tether, and crypto projects linked to President Donald Trump as part of inquiries into potential financial irregularities and conflicts of interest.
The documents were requested to be submitted by 4 January 2027.
Senators warned that they would resort to compulsory measures if the request was refused.
Entities sent document requests include World Liberty Financial and Fight Fight Fight LLC, both linked to President Trump’s family.
Blumenthal began examining the activities of these entities in May 2025 following reports that they may have engaged in transactions with foreigners under federal criminal investigation, attracted investments from foreign governments, and violated public ethics rules.
Notably, in 2026, it emerged that individuals close to the Abu Dhabi royal family had signed an agreement with the Trump family to purchase 49% of the shares in World Liberty Financial for $500 million.
The company, founded in September 2024 by the US President and his sons, launched a token called WLFI.
According to official disclosures, Trump made $800 million from this token alone.
Conversely, crypto analytics firm Nansen calculated, by tracking 1.48 million crypto wallets, that approximately two-thirds of those who invested in the token after its launch in January 2025 incurred losses.
While many retail investors spent several thousand dollars on purchases, the largest investors poured in millions of dollars.
Trump also launched his own memecoin, TRUMP, on 17 January 2025, prior to his inauguration.
Rising 10.6-fold in value within three days, the cryptocurrency’s market capitalisation reached $15 billion at its peak.
However, after those three days, the price entered a downturn, plunging by 97%.
Trump reported in his financial disclosure that he earned $635 million in income from sales of these memecoins.
In July 2026, Blumenthal held public hearings on the family crypto projects from which the President made $1.4 billion.
The losses suffered by TRUMP memecoin investors were also addressed during these hearings.
Cryptocurrency exchange Binance and Tether, which issues the largest stablecoin, USDT, are under scrutiny over their dealings with the Trump administration.
Lawmakers suspected conflicts of interest stemming from the exchange’s collaboration with World Liberty Financial.
Previously, a group of senators had demanded an inquiry into the terms of the presidential pardon granted to Binance founder Changpeng Zhao.
Separately, The New York Times reported that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) gaining access to American artificial intelligence chips coincided with a $2 billion investment by a UAE entity into Binance using USD1, a stablecoin issued by World Liberty Financial.
While this deal rapidly expanded the volume of tokens in circulation, it enabled Trump’s company to generate revenue from interest on government bonds where USD1 reserves were held.
Trump, for his part, described the report as slander.
America
US credit card debt hits record $1.29 trillion, New York Fed reports
Americans’ credit card debt reached a record $1.29 trillion in the third quarter, according to a new report published by the New York Fed.
Falling behind on credit card payments can trap struggling households in a cycle of fees, credit score downgrades, and increasingly expensive borrowing.
Although delinquency rates across the country have shown improvement, the latest figures indicate that financial distress is concentrated in lower-income communities.
Consumer credit card balances rose by $22 billion in the third quarter, representing an increase of 1.7%. This figure is $52 billion higher than it was a year earlier.
The figures are not adjusted for inflation, which may mean that part of the increase reflects rising prices rather than more borrowing in real terms.
Total household debt, which includes mortgages, student loans, and auto loans, rose by $334 billion in the third quarter to reach a record $19.1 trillion.
This total represents an increase of $5 trillion compared to 2019, just before the pandemic.
The volume of credit card balances falling into serious delinquency is declining, indicating some improvement in Americans’ ability to make their payments on time.
The rate of credit card debt transitioning into serious delinquency fell to 6.9% in the third quarter. However, this rate remains distinctly higher than the 5.2% recorded prior to the pandemic.
Americans living in lower-income neighbourhoods are facing greater difficulty in keeping up with their credit card payments compared to more affluent groups, according to a separate report published by the New York Fed on Tuesday.
Delinquency rates across all neighbourhood income tiers remain above pre-pandemic levels, while the gap between the wealthiest and poorest areas has widened since 2022.
In the lowest-income neighbourhoods, 10.3% of credit card balances transitioned into serious delinquency over the past year.
This is more than double the 4.4% rate observed in the wealthiest neighbourhoods.
The average credit card balance per borrower now stands at $6,678, according to TransUnion’s third-quarter analysis report.
Among borrowers under the age of 30, the rate of credit card debt falling at least 90 days delinquent reached the highest level, according to the Fed’s report.
Democrats won the midterm elections promising to bring down prices, but delivering relief that voters can genuinely feel in their household budgets will be a difficult target to achieve.
America
Mamdani quietly asks Trump to release detained immigrants
New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani is using his rapport with US President Donald Trump to secure the release of selected detained immigrants.
According to reporting by Politico, Mamdani persuaded Trump during their second White House meeting in February to free a university student who had been detained that day by ICE.
The outcome served as validation for Mamdani, who pointed to the release of the Columbia University senior as proof that his surprisingly cordial relationship with Trump could produce tangible results for New Yorkers.
Mamdani subsequently continued to seek similar immigration-related interventions from the Republican president.
Since that February meeting, Mamdani and his aides have quietly forwarded the names of approximately two dozen immigrant New Yorkers held in ICE custody to Trump’s team, asking the president to order their release.
Two sources familiar with the matter said Mamdani most recently shared names of detained immigrants during a September meeting with Trump at Gracie Mansion.
The sources said the individuals in question had no serious criminal records, though they declined to disclose their identities, citing safety concerns.
According to Politico, these ongoing efforts regarding detained immigrants indicate Mamdani’s belief that he can leverage his rapport with Trump to advance causes the mercurial president might not ordinarily support.
Mamdani’s decision not to disclose these continued appeals publicly suggests an inclination to keep his interventions private to improve their chances of success.
Yet it remains unclear whether any immigrant besides Columbia University student Elmina Aghayeva has actually been released as a result of these efforts, and concern is mounting within City Hall that the window for securing such releases may be closing.
Mamdani’s aides working on the releases, including his Chief of Staff Elle Bisgaard-Church, communicated primarily with Trump’s White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, according to people familiar with the matter.
Last week, Trump replaced Wiles with Stephen Miller, the architect of the administration’s most hardline immigration proposals and one of the loudest internal voices urging the president to pursue a mass deportation agenda in his second term.
A person familiar with the Mamdani administration’s thinking said the mayor’s team views it as unlikely that Miller will continue cooperating in the manner Wiles did, given his stance on immigration.
Mamdani spokesperson Dora Pekec declined to comment on internal concerns regarding Miller and did not provide details about the immigrants whose release the mayor had requested.
Pekec noted, however, that Mamdani has “consistently advocated directly on behalf of New Yorkers in his calls and meetings with the president.”
Murad Awawdeh, a close Mamdani ally and president and CEO of the New York Immigration Coalition, said the mayor’s team should not halt engagement with the Trump administration on immigration matters because of Miller’s promotion:
“Stephen Miller is a cruel individual who has spent his career attacking immigrants, but he is not the president; Donald Trump is, and this is his deportation agenda. New York expects the president to work with the mayor to serve this city and end the terror in our communities. Miller’s promotion changes none of that.”
Mamdani’s warm dynamic with Trump has confounded both allies and critics.
During last year’s New York mayoral election, Trump referred to Mamdani as a “communist lunatic” and threatened to have him arrested.
In turn, the 35-year-old democratic socialist branded the president a “fascist” and pledged to fight him relentlessly if elected mayor.
Yet that animosity fell away late last year during their first White House meeting, where an amicable tone prevailed.
The thaw culminated in September at Gracie Mansion, where Trump said Mamdani had “great potential” to be a “terrific mayor.”
Mamdani returned the compliment by noting that the president had “built quite a bit of housing in our city.”
Despite the polite exchange, questions remain over how much substantive progress Mamdani can genuinely secure through Trump, including on immigration.
To date, Aghayeva’s release stands as one of the few concrete concessions Mamdani has obtained from Trump.
Aides on both sides are also discussing a multi-billion-dollar federally backed housing initiative in Queens, and last month Mamdani used his channel to Trump to help secure a temporary visa for a Ghanaian woman whose son was shot and killed in the Bronx.
Beyond those instances, few tangible results have emerged, though Trump’s decision not to enact punitive measures against New York is viewed by Mamdani’s allies as a win for the city.
Trump’s political standing is widely seen as weakened following the Republican Party’s loss of both houses of Congress in elections last Tuesday.
How this political shift will affect Trump’s willingness to engage with ideological adversaries such as Mamdani remains uncertain.
Miller’s appointment as chief of staff appears to signal little presidential interest in moderation, particularly on immigration policy.
Even so, the mayor said last week that he does not intend to stop seeking Trump’s assistance, despite “fierce” policy disagreements.
“We have found an area of common interest in the well-being of New York City, and as long as that can deliver for our city, I’m going to keep that door open,” Mamdani told Politico on Friday in Puerto Rico.
Mamdani and other elected officials from New York had gathered in Puerto Rico for the annual Somos political conference.
Two days later, in an interview on Fox News, a network Trump is known to watch regularly, Mamdani described a “productive relationship” with the president, saying the two text and speak by phone frequently:
“Through those conversations, we were able to get a New Yorker out of ICE detention. We were able to secure a visa for a grieving mother who would have otherwise had to watch her son’s funeral from thousands of miles away. What that tells me is: My job is to deliver for New Yorkers, and I have to work with whoever has the power to do that, wherever they may be.”
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