Ma Jinting, Research Assistant Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University

The first EU-Central Asia Summit was held on April 3-4, 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The summit was organized under the “5+1” pattern, a dialogue mechanism between the EU and the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

The summit is a milestone of EU-Central Asia relations, further deepening the cooperation between the EU and the Central Asian countries and marking a deeper strategic partnership. The themes of the summit focused on economic cooperation and investment, geopolitical and security cooperation, climate change and regional energy cooperation, cooperation for sustainable development, as well as humanistic exchanges and medical cooperation. It was also the first time that Central Asian leaders met with Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and António Costa, President of the European Council.

Undoubtedly, both the scale and the outcome of the summit show the importance that the EU attaches to Central Asia and the determination of Central Asia to cooperate with the EU. On the one hand, the EU proposed to invest in the “Global Gateway” program, and on the other hand, Central Asia stood by the EU on hot issues. Although the substantive progress after the summit is not yet known, it can be seen that the EU is trying to realize a more sustainable layout of Central Asia through institutionalized cooperation, so as to enhance the influence of the EU in the complex international situation.

The Samarkand Declaration: a new stage in EU-Central Asia relations

Under the profound changes in the landscape of globalization and multipolarity, the deepening of cooperative relations between the EU and Central Asia is an inevitable trend. In Costa official statement to the EU Council before the summit, he said that we are living in a world of disorder and division, a viable solution for the EU is to build a strong partnership, thus promoting the prosperity and development for EU.

At present, Under the background of unilateralism, geopolitical conflicts, the international cooperation mechanism of multilateralism is increasingly important. Multilateralism emphasizes the solution of transnational problems through institutionalized international cooperation, dialogue mechanisms and rule systems, thus enhancing the EU’s influence on international issues. Therefore, the EU has taken the lead in building an institutionalized and open platform through the “5+1” conference pattern. From the perspective of the Central Asian countries, based on the concept of multilateralism,the active participation of Central Asian countries in the dialogue platform can enhance the strategic autonomy of them and maximize their national interests without relying on the big powers.

Before the summit, a relatively stable framework for the EU’s Central Asian policy had already been formed. In the political and diplomatic fields, the EU and Central Asian countries discuss cross-border governance issues such as security and counter-terrorism through the Senior Officials Dialogue mechanism. In the economic and trade field, the EU focuses on energy issues and achieve long-term economic cooperation through reciprocity. For example, the EU is Kazakhstan’s main economic and trade partner, with EU investments accounting for more than 40 percent of the state’s foreign investment by 2024. In return, Kazakhstan imports a wide range of industrial and consumer goods from the EU. In the field of people to people exchanges, the EU provides assistance to Central Asian countries in education, health, law and democracy building through the Global Gateway program. At the same time, the EU opens numbers of opportunities at universities and promotes knowledge sharing between academic institutions.

On the basis of the previous cooperation, both EU and Central Asia countries issued a joint declaration, the joint declaration following the first European Union-Central Asia summit (also called “the Samarkand Declaration”) at the summit. The Samarkand Declaration includes six main elements: first, defining the strategic partnership between the EU and Central Asia; second, advancing “the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” (EPCAs); third, promoting the implementation of the “Global Gateway” program in various areas. Third, promoting the implementation of the “Global Gateway” program in various fields, in which the EU has said it will invest 12 billion euros; fourth, supporting the construction of intermediate corridors; fifth, strengthening security cooperation in counter-terrorism and border security; sixth, jointly addressing international issues such as climate change and water resource governance. In short, the summit upgraded the political and economic aspects of the relationship on the basis of the original cooperation mechanisms, marking an upgrade of the EU’s strategic orientation towards Central Asia. The Samarkand Declaration demonstrates the willingness of the EU and Central Asia to deepen cooperation in the face of increasing global uncertainty, and highlights the EU’s attempts to build an institutionalized system of cooperation in Central Asia.

Central Asia in great power competition: The EU’s logic and challenges of engagement

The consideration of EU on Central Asia has three main points. First, Central Asia is located in the hinterland of the Asian and European continents, and is the land transportation hub of Asia and Europe, so Central Asia is also regarded as a “strategic landmark” by the big powers. Traditionally, Central Asia has been in Russia’s sphere of influence for a long time, and Russia has maintained its influence in Central Asia through alliances. For example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which is a military alliance led by Russia, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which focuses on economic development. Since the Ukrainian crisis, the EU has accelerated its strategic layout in Central Asia with the intention of weakening Russia’s influence in Central Asia. The United States, on the other hand, treats Central Asia as a fulcrum for maintaining regional stability, countering terrorism, and containing major powers. Since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, the U.S. has begun to emphasize the role of Central Asia as a “transition region.” Meanwhile, the “Global Gateway” program intends to counterbalance China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” in order to curb China’s influence in Central Asia. The “Global Gateway” program provides alternatives in the areas of infrastructure and digital connectivity to build the EU’s “Asia-Europe Corridor”.

Secondly, abundant energy resources make Central Asia highly dependent in the international community. Central Asia is one of the world’s regions rich in oil, natural gas, and rare metal resources. In particular, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, have strong energy export capacity, which makes them extremely attractive to external powers. The EU-Central Asia Summit will further plan the construction of an “intermediate corridor” to enhance the complementarity of the two sides in the fields of energy and transportation.

Finally, Central Asia has a large population and a broad market. Although there is frequent trade between Europe and Central Asia, it is mainly concentrated in the natural resources. China and Russia, as important trading partners of Central Asia, have long dominated the foreign trade structure of Central Asian countries. The EU hopes to expand its share of the Central Asian market with the help of an institutionalized platform. However, the strategic autonomy of Central Asian countries has been strengthened in recent years, and it is still unknown whether the EU’s vision can be realized.

In conclusion, the EU wants to further expand its influence and appeal in Central Asia through this summit, but may have a huge gap when it comes to official policies and the real truth on the ground. In the perspective political-security, Central Asia already has a relatively deep security bundle through the construction of a military defense system with Russia. At the same time, Central Asia have close contacts with Turkey and NATO. In the perspective political and security, the influence of EU is limited. EU can only through the participation of international hotspot issues in the way to draw Central Asian countries. In perspective of the economic and trade , the EU has a certain degree of influence in Central Asia, but in the overall economic exchanges still fall behind China. For example, according to a report released by the Statistics Agency of Kazakhstan, China is Kazakhstan’s top trading partner as of 2024. In perspective the area of international, the EU emphasizes values such as the rule of law and sustainable development, but the acceptance of the values varies due to the different differences among the Central Asian countries. As a result, the EU’s overall influence in Central Asia is limited, and it is not an “external leader” in Central Asian affairs, but rather permeates its influence through specific international issues.

China: Seeking cooperation rather than confrontation

China has consistently maintained a pluralistic and open mind to multilateral relations. China Upholding the principles of multilateralism, adhering to the norms of international relations , abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

China has been actively engaged in maintaining multilateral diplomatic relations by concrete actions in the context of the Global Initiative for Development, Security and Civilization. Respecting the state of development and the diversity of civilizations in each region, China hopes to work with Central Asia, the EU and other actors to promote peace, stability and development in the international community.

From China’s perspective, China has never regarded the EU as a strategic competitor and looks forward to cooperation on international issues. In Central Asia, the foreign policy of some small and medium-sized countries follows the model of balanced diplomacy, which allows them to seek space for development. Central Asia’s active cooperation with the EU can not only ease its overdependence on big powers, but also promote the stable development of the region.

In fact, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an open and inclusive development platform, and China is willing to explore cooperation paths with other actors, to jointly promote the sustainable development for international society. As Liu Jianchao, Minister of the Foreign Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, said in his speech at the Young Experts’ Club of the Upper House of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, “Central Asia is located in the center of Asia and Europe, with a special and important geographic position, and broad prospects for development. China and Central Asian countries have promoted the building of a China-Central Asia community of destiny, shaping a model of regional cooperation on the world map of seeking common development, sharing peace and moving forward together.”

In recent years, based on the special geopolitical environment, the internal cooperation of Central Asian countries has significantly increased. Starting in 2018, the leaders of the five Central Asian countries have been strengthening regional identity and cooperation mechanisms by holding summit. The pattern of organizing the EU-Central Asia Summit is also a multilateral cooperation based on regional consensus. The Central Asian countries are not only in frequent contact with the EU, but also actively participate in international affairs by participating in the “Central Asia-China” and “Central Asia-US” C5+1 dialogues.Those willingness have shown their ability to take action in international affairs.

Energy development and regional stability in Central Asia have become the critical issues. How to deal with the relationship between national development and the major powers, and maintain a balance between taking sides on hotspot issues and strategic autonomy, are issues that the Central Asian countries need to address.

On May 16, Middle East time, U.S. President Trump concluded a four-day official visit to three Arab countries in the Middle East. This marked Trump’s first state visit since reentering the White House, continuing his tradition of valuing the Middle East’s commercial and geopolitical significance. Although Trump unexpectedly “skipped” Israel, America’s top regional ally, this three-country trip — expected to be a “harvest tour” — proved fruitful. Whether it was selling arms, attracting investment, declaring policies, or “harvesting” enemies or strategic opponents, he achieved dazzling results. Judging solely by Trump’s success in massively “attracting funds,” the U.S. not only reinforced its military hegemony, but also showcased its outstanding geopolitical leverage and financial siphoning capabilities, making it hard for other powers or economies to keep up in the short term. In short, the United States remains the only extraterritorial power with strong shaping influence in the Middle East.

Starting May 13, Trump’s Middle East tour began in Saudi Arabia and ended with Qatar and the UAE. The entire process highlighted his “power diplomacy” and “transactional diplomacy.” These three countries are among the wealthiest in the Arab world and heavily rely on the U.S. for national security. It was widely expected that Trump would “suck in” massive amounts of money during the trip — yet the outcome still surprised many.

To ensure that wealthy but weak Gulf monarchies like Saudi Arabia continue their “ransom” policy — paying large sums to the U.S. for safety and status — Trump high-profiled his return to the White House by declaring he would dedicate his first foreign visit’s “first night” to Riyadh. Moreover, Trump invited Saudi Arabia to host the first high-level U.S.-Russia talks, giving full prestige to the host. He even suggested renaming the “Persian Gulf” to the “Arabian Gulf,” showing thorough preparation and calculated gestures.

Eight years ago, Trump’s first visit to the Gulf reaped over $115 billion in arms sales from Saudi Arabia, secured a ten-year $400 billion Saudi investment promise, and finalized a $40 billion arms deal with Qatar. On this return trip, Trump dropped his previous arrogant posture of mocking Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman at the White House. Instead, at the “Saudi-U.S. Investment Forum 2025” on May 13, he humbled himself, lavished praise, even flattery, repeatedly lauding the young host’s “greatness” and “wisdom,” which earned smiles, warm applause, and standing ovations from the de facto ruler.

U.S.-Saudi relations have entered a new honeymoon phase, arguably the highest point since the turn of the century. The key lies in benefit exchanges and petrodollar deals. On the day Trump arrived in Riyadh, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a $142 billion arms deal, involving five categories of defense equipment and services from over ten American defense firms. Saudi Arabia also pledged to invest $600 billion in the U.S. to strengthen bilateral strategic ties, promote economic prosperity, and jointly aim to raise the investment total to $1 trillion in the coming months. This marked the largest arms and investment deal ever between the two nations. Saudi investments will bolster America’s energy security, defense industry, technological leadership, and access to global infrastructure and critical minerals.

Trump is very familiar with the subtle relations among the wealthy Arab neighbors — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are both rising powers in the Arab League and compete economically and politically. Qatar, previously suppressed and isolated by the duo, has remained resilient thanks to its wealth and U.S. favor — earning a reputation as the “invincible Gulf mini-power.” Trump’s deliberate inclusion of all three countries aimed to leverage Saudi Arabia to draw in Qatar and the UAE, realizing his grand goal of a “trillion-dollar harvest tour.”

Just before Trump’s visit, Qatar’s royal family bypassed U.S. legal restrictions and donated a luxurious $400 million Boeing 747-8 aircraft via the Pentagon to Trump, replacing the over 40-year-old Air Force One. During his visit to Doha on May 14, Trump flattered Emir Tamim of Qatar, describing U.S.-Qatar relations as a “loyal friendship” and saying the two sides “liked each other.” The same day, the U.S. and Qatar signed over $243.5 billion in economic cooperation agreements. This included Qatar’s purchase of 210 Boeing aircraft worth $96 billion — the largest order in Boeing’s history. Qatar also agreed to buy $3 billion worth of MQ-9B drones and anti-drone systems.

In 2017, during Trump’s first visit to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, he first supported Saudi claims that Qatar was “funding terrorism,” and soon after helped Qatar to “clear its name.” This opportunistic approach — hitting then comforting — allowed Qatar, which hosts the largest U.S. air base in the Gulf, to gain strong protection by frantically purchasing U.S. arms, ultimately escaping the intense pressure and “siege” from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

With the massive “gift packages” from Saudi Arabia and Qatar as a foundation, on the 15th, Trump’s final stop was the UAE, where he facilitated the signing of cooperation agreements exceeding $200 billion. This also included a joint venture to build a data center covering 260,000 square meters with a 5GW capacity — enough to power 2.5 million Nvidia B2000 chips. In fact, as early as March this year, during a U.S. visit by UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh bin Zayed, it was already promised that the UAE would establish a 10-year investment framework worth $1.4 trillion in the United States. This means the UAE proactively and early presented its lavish “gifts” to the White House even before Trump’s Gulf tour had begun.

Trump’s Gulf tour was also a policy announcement tour. During a one-hour impromptu speech at the Saudi-American Investment Forum, Trump theatrically condemned previous U.S. administrations for interfering in the Middle East, claiming they “destroyed more countries than they built” and emphasized that the U.S. has “no permanent enemies.” He candidly stated, “some of America’s closest friends today were once countries we fought against.” Using Saudi Arabia’s development model as an example, he emphasized that “self-reliance” is more effective than “external interference.” Analysts believe that the profit-driven Trump has openly abandoned traditional U.S. value-laden interventionist diplomacy and gunboat policies, aiming instead to reshape the Middle East order through a new “mercantilist” approach.

What surprised global opinion even more was that Trump “left out” his staunch ally Israel on this trip, in order to prevent Israel’s petty calculations from interfering with broader U.S. interests, and to avoid deeper entanglement in Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Gaza war quagmire. Previously, Trump had faced backlash from Arab media for his excessive favoritism toward Israel. However, given the unshakable U.S.-Israel alliance and Trump’s close personal ties with Netanyahu, Israel seemed absent from the official visit list, but Trump instinctively did not forget his old friend. He urged Saudi Arabia to quickly join the Abraham Accords to normalize ties with Israel, pushed for Syrian-Israeli reconciliation, and continued to peddle the controversial U.S. argument that Gaza could be taken over.

What truly shocked the world was Trump’s sudden public meeting with Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, urging him to normalize relations with Israel, expel “Palestinian terrorists” from Syria, and take responsibility for establishing prisons in northeastern Syria to detain jihadists. This meeting — attended in person by the Saudi Crown Prince and via video by Türkiye’s President — marked the first U.S.-Syria summit in 25 years. Furthermore, at the urging of the Saudi and Turkish leaders, Trump announced the lifting of decades-long U.S. economic and trade sanctions on Syria, officially ending 46 years of international, especially unilateral American, sanctions.

Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa can be seen as a classic example of “value-free diplomacy” and “turning enemies into friends,” as he completely disregarded Sharaa’s past as a long-wanted “terrorist” leader by the U.S., and ignored the fact that Syria’s new government is still led by the “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” group, which remains listed as a terrorist organization by both the U.N. and the U.S. Trump even publicly praised this former “enemy” to American media while boarding his plane out of Saudi Arabia, calling him a “brave warrior of the past” and now a “sunny, handsome tough guy.” On the 16th, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio met with Syrian Foreign Minister Shibani in Antalya, Türkiye, clearly stating that the U.S. would help build a peaceful, stable, and Iran-free Syria.

In fact, observers familiar with Trump’s foreign policy were not surprised. As early as March 2020, during the later part of his first term, Trump abruptly abandoned the U.S.-backed Kabul government of 20 years to quickly end the Afghanistan war. He signed a withdrawal-for-ceasefire agreement with the Taliban — America’s arch-enemy — showing complete disregard for national dignity and political principles. This led to a “two-government” state in Afghanistan and soon after, Taliban regained power. Trump even shamelessly invited Taliban leaders to the White House and fired National Security Advisor Bolton on the spot for opposing the plan.

Another major outcome of Trump’s current Middle East diplomacy was that, using a “carrot and stick” approach, he forced significant concessions from the three main powers of the “Axis of Resistance”: Yemen’s Houthi forces, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and Iran. Just before Trump’s visit, with Amman mediating, the U.S. and the Houthis reached a ceasefire agreement, under which the Houthis pledged not to attack ships passing through the Red Sea. Meanwhile, Hamas announced the release of the last American hostage as a gift for Trump’s arrival — a gesture that also served as a response to Trump’s administration for not fully following Israel’s lead. On May 15, senior Hamas official Basem Naim told the media that Hamas was in direct negotiations with the United States to reach a ceasefire agreement to end the Gaza conflict… If a permanent ceasefire is achieved, Hamas could hand over control of the Gaza Strip.

Before Trump’s visit, American representatives had already held four rounds of talks with Iran in Oman’s capital Muscat. Both sides described the discussions as having made “constructive” progress. While in Riyadh, Trump once again publicly addressed Tehran, urging its leaders to choose a “new, better path” and reach a new nuclear agreement with Washington. He warned that this opportunity for a diplomatic solution “will not last forever,” and threatened, “If Iran’s leadership rejects this olive branch… we will have no choice but to apply maximum pressure and reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero.”

Perhaps due to the earlier four rounds of talks revealing Trump’s intentions and bottom line, or the painful memory of the extreme pressure campaign from his first term, or the strategic failure of the “Sixth Middle East War,” or Russia’s public statement that it would not intervene in a U.S.-Iran military conflict, or observing Trump’s recent positive interactions with the Houthis and Hamas — a series of intense changes led Iran’s government to swiftly and clearly respond to Trump’s mixed diplomatic tactics.

On May 14, Ali Shamkhani, advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated to NBC that Iran was willing to reach a deal with the U.S. in exchange for lifting economic sanctions. Shamkhani said Iran would promise never to develop nuclear weapons, destroy its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, agree to limit uranium enrichment to levels needed for civilian use, and allow international monitors to supervise the process.

Observers believe this was Iran’s fastest and most flexible compromise stance on the nuclear issue to date. Although Iranian negotiators previously held tough positions, Trump’s successful “harvest tour” in the Gulf, the further strengthening of U.S.-Arab ties, the historic reversal in U.S.-Syria relations, and the disunity among the “Axis of Resistance” members forced Tehran to quickly adjust its diplomatic posture and nuclear stance to avoid deeper isolation and passivity. On May 15, before leaving Doha for the UAE, Trump made it clear that the U.S. and Iran were very close to reaching a nuclear agreement and that Tehran had “to a certain extent” agreed to the terms.

In short, Trump gained substantial results from this Middle East trip. Unexpected developments revealed that his power-based and “transactional” diplomacy is reshaping regional geopolitics. Despite domestic and international challenges, America’s strategic foundation remains stable and strong. The major Gulf oil-producing states, which already invested much of their sovereign wealth in the U.S. market, continue to bet their future wealth preservation, growth, and high-tech development on the United States as their strategic ally. In contrast, their investments in other major economies are negligible — mere “pepper dust” and “drizzle” — highlighting the irreplaceable status of the U.S. as the only current superpower.

At the same time, with the steady collapse of the “Shiite Crescent,” the disintegration of the “Axis of Resistance,” the strengthening of U.S. relations with Arab countries and Türkiye, the expanding normalization under the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel, and the possible significant shift in U.S.-Iran relations this year, it is evident that a new Middle East is brewing and beginning to emerge.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Nikola Mikovic, journalist

The mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse. The long-awaited peace talks between Russia and Ukraine were finally held on May 16 in Istanbul, though they failed to produce a ceasefire or a peace agreement. The question now is: what comes next?

Initially, Russian and Ukrainian representatives were scheduled to meet in the largest Turkish city on May 15. Since the Ukrainian delegation did not appear, the peace talks were postponed to the following day. Such a move could be interpreted as a diplomatic humiliation for Moscow, given that the Russian officials waited the entire day in vain for their Ukrainian counterparts. Kyiv seems to have adopted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy of being notoriously late for important diplomatic meetings. The problem for Ukraine, however, is that this approach did not yield any positive results.

According to reports, the Russian delegation has issued maximalist demands, expecting Kyiv to withdraw its troops from four Ukrainian regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) annexed by the Kremlin in exchange for a ceasefire. Russia has also reportedly threatened to seize Ukraine’s Kharkiv and Sumy regions. In reality, however, Moscow lacks the capacity to seize the town of Vovchansk in the Khariv region, located just 5 kilometers (3 miles) from the Russian border, let alone the entire oblast. Its rhetoric, therefore, seems like a bluff. Fully aware of this, Kyiv rejected any territorial concessions to Russia. 

Prior to the talks, Ukraine, firmly backed by European powers, insisted on an unconditional 30-day ceasefire, while Moscow wanted any potential truce to be result from the negotiations. In other words, the two sides could not even agree on the first steps, which was a clear indication that reaching a deal will be easier said than done. Still, they managed to agree on exchanging 1,000 prisoners of war each, which is the only positive outcome of the Istanbul peace talks. 

Although Russian and Ukrainian delegations are expected to continue negotiations, there is no guarantee that they will reach a peace (or at least a ceasefire) deal anytime soon. Their positions are fundamentally opposed. More importantly, neither side has achieved any of its strategic objectives on the battlefield, which effectively rules out any immediate opportunity for peace. But this is not the first time their peace talks have failed.

Days after Russia launched the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russian and Ukrainian representatives met in Belarus in an attempt to end Moscow’s so-called “special military operation”, as Russian troops were on the outskirts of Kyiv. Ukrainian officials agreed to travel to the neighboring nation even though it is a close ally of Russia and had allowed Russian forces to use Belarusian territory for attacks on their country. Talks, however, concluded without any result.

Later rounds of talks took place in March 2022 on the Belarus–Ukraine border and in Antalya, Türkiye. Since then, Istanbul has become the major platform not only for their peace summits, but also for discussions on the grain deal – a document, signed in July 2022, under which the Kremlin effectively allows its opponent to freely exports grain via the Black Sea route. Although Türkiye undoubtedly played an important role in helping Moscow and Kyiv sign The Black Sea Grain Initiative, the 2022 peace talks in Istanbul failed to end the conflict.

The Istanbul talks in 2025 differ significantly from those held in 2022. At the time, Russia demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops only from the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts, along with a de facto recognition of Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. Now the Kremlin’s demands have grown, as Russia is also calling for the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. More importantly, as a result of the 2022 Istanbul talks, Russia made a “goodwill gesture” by withdrawing its troops from Kyiv, as well as Sumy and Chernihiv regions of Ukraine. This time, however, the Kremlin has shown no willingness to make any serious concessions to Kyiv—at least for now.

Moscow has also demonstrated that negotiations can be conducted without Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Russian leader Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that he does not want to negotiate with the “illegitimate” Zelensky. Therefore, any talks with Ukraine’s president would undermine Putin’s credibility, which is something he wanted to avoid at any cost. 

Zelensky, on the other hand, despite signing a decree in 2022 formally declaring negotiations with Putin to be “impossible,” openly said that he wants to meet with the Russian president. He likely aimed to demonstrate a willingness to end the conflict, while simultaneously portraying Putin as someone who “does not want to negotiate.”

The Ukrainian delegation in Istanbul even requested a meeting between the two leaders. Russia has “taken note” of Kyiv’s ambition. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Putin will agree to meet with Zelensky, at least not before his potential meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. 

In the meantime, the Ukraine war will go on. As Medinsky said, quoting Napoleon, “War and negotiations are always conducted at the same time.” Both sides will, therefore, be preparing for a summer military campaign, although they are expected to continue to create the illusion that reaching a lasting peace deal without defeating the opponent is possible.

Finally, until one of the two sides prevails, Türkiye, as a host country, will remain the winner of the peace talks. On May 8, during a telephone conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Trump offered him to become a mediator between Ukraine and Russia. Three days later Putin, without mentioning Trump’s efforts,  acknowledged the role of Türkiye and its president in organizing the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations.

Türkiye has, therefore, once again solidified its position as an influential player capable of hosting peace negotiations. That is why a new round of Russian-Ukrainian talks will almost certainly take place in Istanbul – sooner rather than later.