Opinion
China and the World from the Perspective of the “September 3rd” Grand Military Parade
On September 3, China held a grand, cutting-edge, and extraordinary military parade in Tiananmen Square to solemnly commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. The event highlighted the great truth that “justice will prevail, peace will prevail, the people will prevail” and declared China’s determination to safeguard world peace and development. This parade attracted global attention and praise, while also provoking sporadic bizarre remarks and even disgraceful retrogressive actions. It can be said that this commemoration and parade of a just war victory demonstrated a strong and powerful China unlike the past, and also reflected the strange and colorful realities of the world.
In 1984, China held a parade in Tiananmen Square to celebrate the 35th anniversary of its founding, ushering in the beginning of Chinese military parades becoming “phenomenal events” of world-class standard. It was the first large-scale parade after the reform and opening up, and for the first time China openly displayed new weapons such as strategic missiles, marking a leap in the modernization of military technology. The troops wore new uniforms, weapons were upgraded, and the achievements of regularized military construction were evident. The call-and-response between the inspecting officer and the soldiers – “Greetings, comrades!” and “Serve the people!” – the forceful and precise triple – stage bayonet drill by the infantry contingent, the heroic spirit of the medical corps and the women’s militia formations, and the iron flow of the armored units were forever etched into the memory of our generation.
For me personally, the 1984 parade was unforgettable also because I personally took part. At the time, as a sophomore, I had the honor to join the student formation of the parade, marching with hundreds of peers from universities in the capital across the Jinshui Bridge. Unlike the soldiers marching in strict unison, we waved our arms enthusiastically, interacting warmly with Chinese and foreign leaders watching from the Tiananmen rostrum. At the front of our formation, some spontaneously held up a banner reading “Hello, Xiaoping,” simply and sincerely expressing the people’s heartfelt gratitude and support for the reform and opening-up, and their love and respect for Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of the reforms.
The 1984 parade coincided with the resounding national slogan “Learn from the women’s volleyball team, rejuvenate China.” At that early stage of transformation, the entire Party, military, and nation were united, focused on economic construction, education, scientific development, and promoting diplomacy in service of reform and opening-up. It sent a clear signal to the world of further modernization and regularization of China’s military and its commitment to peace. A month later, the Chinese government decided to cut the military size by one quarter—1 million personnel—and officially announced this half a year later to build trust with the world. This was epoch-making for military changes in China and worldwide.
This year’s parade was not a National Day celebration centered on displaying national power. It opened with 3,000 university students singing tragic anti-Japanese songs such as “On the Songhua River” and “On the Taihang Mountains,” revealing that the event was a nationwide commemoration marking 80 years since the end of national catastrophe. It was a solemn tribute to 80 years of China’s phoenix-like rebirth. It also announced to the world that China’s anti-fascist war did not begin in 1939 with World War II in Europe, but in 1931, when Japan invaded and occupied Northeast China. The Chinese people fought 14 years of bloody resistance, sacrificing 35 million lives—one tenth of China’s population at the time. This great national sacrifice made an indelible contribution to saving human civilization and safeguarding world peace.
At this parade, 61 foreign heads of state, government leaders, senior representatives, heads of international organizations, and former dignitaries gathered in Beijing to jointly commemorate and honor the World Anti-Fascist War, reinforcing historical friendships forged in blood. The event received significant attention and objective coverage from world media. For example, BBC reporters praised the spirit, professionalism, and world-class equipment of Chinese soldiers during the live broadcast. AFP, instead of using its usual “dark tones” and “imperial filters” when reporting on China’s major events, presented the parade with normal or even bright lighting, showcasing the soldiers’ style.
However, due to the influence of many factors such as changes in international relations, values-based diplomacy, and traditions of military parades, no leaders from major Western countries attended this Chinese grand parade. This is not surprising, because neither the United States nor Europe has ever invited leaders from Eastern front countries, who made outstanding contributions to the anti-fascist war, to their own World War II victory commemorations. Frankly speaking, this tradition itself is a natural extension of the American or European-centric mentality, a great disrespect to Eastern allies in the war of resistance, and even a kind of desecration to the tens of millions of soldiers and civilians who died resisting fascism.
Even more absurd is that in the post-Cold War years, when relations with Russia were good, European countries repeatedly invited Russian leaders to commemorative events such as the Normandy landings. Today, because of the Russia-Ukraine war leading to a rift between Russia and Europe, Western leaders naturally do not want to share the same stage with the Kremlin’s top figure. For reasons of political and social system differences and real contradictions, they also refused to gather in Beijing with leaders from Iran and North Korea. This is understandable. But to criticize China for inviting these leaders to the parade is not only extremely unreasonable and impolite, but also clearly reflects double standards, and even represents a betrayal of historical justice.
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kallas declared that China, by holding the parade together with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, is not only opposing the West but also directly challenging the rules-based international order. Such remarks are a mockery of historical facts. They ignore that Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea were all victims of the fascist Axis powers, ignore the huge sacrifices they made for victory in the anti-fascist war, ignore the crucial contribution of Eastern allies in preventing German fascists and Japanese fascists from joining forces, ignore the immense trauma caused by Japanese invaders in European colonial territories in Asia-Pacific, ignore China’s significant role in tying down Japan’s main forces in the East to relieve pressure on the US-European allied forces, and even ignore the disgraceful history of Britain and the Soviet Union reoccupying neutral Iran in order to fight fascism.
Some people ask: Middle Eastern countries are generally friendly with China and relations have been very close in recent years, so why was it rare for their heads of state or government leaders to attend the “September 3rd” parade? It must be pointed out that for Middle Eastern countries, World War II was generally full of painful memories, as in the case of occupied Iran. At that time, most of them were not yet independent, but rather colonies or semi-colonies of European powers, serving as slaughter grounds crushed by the repeated struggles between fascist Germany-Italy and their former colonial masters. After World War II, Middle Eastern countries gradually achieved national independence. But they had neither historical ties nor emotional bonds with the Eastern front, and in today’s tangled international relations, their identities and circumstances are delicate. Moreover, they have no tradition of commemorating World War II. Therefore, most of them stayed away from the Beijing parade, which is not only understandable but also highlights China’s adherence to its diplomatic principle of non-alignment, non-coercion, equality among countries regardless of size, and mutual respect. It also shows that China and Middle Eastern countries can coexist harmoniously while maintaining differences, acting at their own convenience, and coming together or parting ways as circumstances allow.
The US government’s mentality toward China’s parade is rather complicated, which is not surprising. President Trump, who had repeatedly expressed his eagerness to visit China as soon as possible, failed to do so for well-known reasons and felt regretful. This time he admitted that he had watched the entire Beijing parade by video and exclaimed: “China’s Victory Day parade was wonderful, shocking, and impressive.” Afterwards, Trump posted on social media emphasizing that “America’s great support for China’s war of resistance must not be forgotten. I wish the Chinese leaders and people a great and lasting day of celebration.” But then he also bitterly and darkly claimed that China was “conspiring with Russia and North Korea against the United States.” Such fickle and contradictory behavior explains why he always longed to visit China but never received an official invitation from Beijing.
US Secretary of Defense Hegseth, speaking about the parade, stated that Trump had instructed the Department of Defense to “be prepared,” emphasizing that “it is not because we seek conflict, not because we want conflict with China, Russia, or other countries, but because being prepared can avoid conflict. America’s task is to safeguard its own strategic plans.” According to foreign media reports, immediately after the Chinese parade ended, the Pentagon ordered a large quantity of pizzas and fast food to work overtime analyzing the numerous cutting-edge weapons and equipment China had just displayed for the first time.
At this grand parade, former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama still personally came to Beijing with a “heart of reflection and apology” to witness and commemorate together, which is truly moving and admirable. Unfortunately, Japanese politicians with such a correct view of history are extremely rare and even hard to sustain. This year, the Japanese government spent huge sums lobbying around the world to persuade countries to boycott China’s commemoration and parade, and maliciously attacked this just and legitimate Victory Day commemoration as “anti-Japanese propaganda.” This exposed the fact that Japanese politicians have always lacked an overall, systematic, even verbal reflection and remorse for that inhuman history of aggression. It also further warns the Chinese government and people that, in view of the lessons of external threats since the First Sino-Japanese War, they must maintain strong national defense forces, must maintain strong military deterrence, and must deter any political attempts or ambitions to justify aggression, to condone militarism and fascism, or even to attempt to revive them, whether they come from Europe or Asia.
Looking beyond the reality of the “September 3rd” parade, facing a world still plagued by wars, we should be grateful for the Chinese government’s defensive national defense policy and peaceful diplomacy, which have allowed generations of Chinese people to stay away from war and killing, to enjoy peace and prosperity, and to enjoy the happiness of complete families. The world should be even more grateful that China, though vast, does not bully the weak; though militarily strong, it is not warlike. Although China has territorial and maritime disputes with its neighbors, in nearly half a century it has never sent troops abroad, never threatened any small country with force, including tolerating the illegal occupation of Chinese territory in the South China Sea by some weak countries, without resorting to force, always showing restraint and endurance. A China already quite strong is especially unlike the United States, which is addicted to war, almost fighting every year and everywhere; unlike European countries, which under the NATO framework repeatedly send troops, interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, overthrow other governments, or launch proxy wars. Instead, China wholeheartedly seeks its own development, world peace, and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.
It cannot be denied that China is still a developing country, certainly with various problems and difficulties, certainly not the flawless “ideal state.” But simply by adhering to the path of peace and development, adhering to the principle of self-defense, and committing to never being the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and unconditionally never using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-free zones, this national policy is enough to prove that today’s China is a model for world peace and development, a safe harbor worthy of praise by the peoples of all countries, and a responsible great power.
The Sima Fa says: “Though a nation is great, if it loves war it will perish; though the world is at peace, forgetting war will bring danger.” “Weapons must not be treated as playthings, for if they are, they lose their deterrence; weapons must not be abandoned, for if they are, they invite the enemy.” To sleep on arms awaiting dawn, to hold arms to stop war, to be always prepared to secure long-lasting peace—this is not only a conclusion drawn from historical experience and lessons, but also the practical need and lasting value of holding a grand parade for the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
The Economic Dimension of US–China Rivalry
Economic news plays an important role in understanding the direction of politics and foreign policy. The first signs of rising and declining powers, new alliances, and divisions within existing alliances often appear on the business pages. An article published in the Turkish newspaper Sözcü on October 18, 2026, under the headline “By the Time the US Noticed China’s Move, It Was Too Late: China Had Encircled the World with Banks,” contained important information illustrating the changing global balance of power in recent years. According to the article, four Chinese banks occupied the top four positions on the list of the world’s largest banks. The largest US bank could only rank fifth. The combined assets of China’s four leading banks exceeded $26 trillion.
China’s success in the banking sector, when considered alongside the number of Chinese companies among the world’s top 100 and top 500, the number of Chinese universities in the global top 100 and top 500, the number of patents registered in China, the number of Chinese billionaires, the pace of middle-class expansion in China, and the country’s production, investment, export, and trade capacity, reveals a very simple reality: the tremendous economic success China has achieved through a model defined as socialism with Chinese characteristics. China has become the world’s second-largest economy after the United States. In calculations based on purchasing power parity, it has already surpassed the US.
Let us recall that in 1990, the United States produced 5.4 times as much as China. Today, China has overtaken the US in manufacturing output. According to some experts, China will surpass the US and become the world’s largest economy by the mid-2040s. Today, China is the largest trading partner of approximately 150 countries and runs a trade surplus with 106 countries. In 2025, with a bilateral trade volume of $52.9 billion, China also became Türkiye’s largest trading partner.
China’s economic success is widely referred to around the world as the “Chinese miracle.” There is little the United States can do to counter China’s economic and foreign policy initiatives, advances, and breakthroughs.
During the Cold War, Henry Kissinger, the renowned American political scientist and foreign policy expert who served first as national security adviser and later as secretary of state, advocated a US rapprochement with China against the Soviet Union. In 1971, while serving as the president’s national security adviser, he helped initiate this process through what became known as “ping-pong diplomacy,” of which he was a principal architect. These steps paved the way for a thaw in relations and the eventual normalization of bilateral ties.
Later, some in the United States began to argue that Kissinger’s diplomatic strategy could be reversed to contain China’s rise. In other words, they believed that securing Russia’s support against China, just as Washington had once sought China’s support against the Soviet Union, would serve US interests.
But the world is no longer the same world, the United States is no longer the same United States, and China is no longer the same China. Therefore, such a strategy had no chance of succeeding. Its failure became evident across numerous regions, countries, and fronts. It was evident in Syria, in Ukraine, and in Iran.
US aggression further strengthened the already close relationship between Russia and China. Washington began experiencing growing difficulties with its European allies. Its lawlessness in Venezuela and, above all, its unconditional support for Israeli aggression further intensified already widespread anti-American sentiment around the world.
THE MAIN PILLARS OF US HEGEMONY
As we know, US hegemony rests on three fundamental pillars.
The first is the American economy, its industrial and technological capabilities, and the US dollar.
The second is American military power, including approximately 800 military bases of various sizes around the world, and particularly its air force and navy.
The third is the American cultural industry, the widespread use of the English language, American culture, music, cinema, lifestyle, academia, and think tanks—in short, the instruments of soft power and public diplomacy.
In other words, the United States is a highly influential imperialist power, relying on its navy and the dollar as instruments of hard power, and on its language and culture as instruments of soft power.
We also know that the decline of US economic power inevitably undermines its political influence and soft power. This naturally causes panic, anxiety, and concern in Washington.
The reasons behind America’s growing anxiety are not merely political, military, or diplomatic. More importantly, they are economic.
The United States failed to achieve its desired results through the measures it took against China in the form of trade wars and tariffs. China did not back down. It responded with countermeasures. The trade wars ultimately hurt the United States itself, as well as its European allies. Washington’s policies also failed to deliver the expected results in terms of inflation, employment, exports, and trade.
In short, just as its relative economic decline weakens the United States’ position in foreign policy, China’s economic and technological development strengthens its foreign policy position, international visibility, and global reputation.
Opinion
Notes from Germany: Lux in Tenebris
Scene one: In one of Berlin’s polite neighbourhoods, three or four people with Ukrainian flags stand in front of the Russian House, whose lease has been cancelled. Similar figures can also be seen on the street outside the Russian Embassy, which is protected by iron railings. It is hardly a crowd to be taken seriously, yet its impact on German politics must be taken very seriously indeed. Whether you see clouds in the air or not, the sky is murky and the needle is swinging towards cold. Nobody pays any attention to the small group with Ukrainian flags; the German government, however, mistakes that indifference for a green light for war.
Scene two: Looking from cosmopolitan and chaotic Berlin to small but stark Magdeburg, things change. Beyond mere metaphor, there is a real scene before us: there, members of the AfD and the BSW are beaming at one another. Election results in the state of which the city is the capital are forcing “unity”. It is as if this were the address of hope against war, though not every war: the establishment of a weapons factory in the state by an Israeli company causes stomach ache among AfD members, yet they barely bat an eyelid. A few dozen people, whose numbers rarely change, never fail to applaud generously. The German mainstream media is also attentive; AfD members take care not to slip up.
Scene three: We are back in Berlin. The first taxi driver, as we usually encounter, is Turkish. He says he voted for “Elif”. Is there much talk that she will fail? He says he will withdraw his support. The magic word is “integration”; yet he is angry with the Germans, and the sense of being downtrodden persists. The driver changes, but the theme remains the same: a Yemeni migrant, in his broken German and English, immediately objects upon hearing “the Houthis” and starts listing: Umar ibn al-Khattab, Abu Bakr… Stirred-up regional tensions and the personal backgrounds of migrants are reproduced inside Germany. This pool holds not only dangers for the German state, but opportunities as well. Anyone who wishes can look at the “new Syria”, or at the Turk appointed to head domestic intelligence.
What is the AfD’s crime?
Thinking about what we saw and heard in Berlin and Magdeburg, one is forced to pause and wonder why, aside from “one or two minor things”, the AfD is at odds with the “establishment” at all.
Of course, it is no small matter: the Ukraine crisis and the possibility of a general European war keep Germany on edge. Although the migration issue has lost its former urgency, it still occupies a prominent place in all speeches by AfD members. On these two critical headings, the AfD remains, in part, the black sheep.
I say in part, because there are obvious signs of softening. Ask anyone in the AfD, and almost all agree that there is more than one AfD: there is a “West German” AfD that adopts a pro-NATO, pro-armament, and pro-war stance; and there is an East German AfD that submits a joint peace motion with the BSW. Indeed, according to some, there is also Björn Höcke’s ethno-nationalist (völkisch) AfD. Even the issue of “remigration” has become “nuanced” for a party that wants at least to strike a chord with German big capital: no more new migration, yes, but where should the line be drawn for older migrants? Many regard those who arrived after the 2015 crisis as “illegal”; yet some local AfD politicians are actively campaigning to win the votes of Turks, believing that Turks, just like themselves, are socially conservative. One reveals his enthusiasm by saying, “We want nothing to do with Shariaists, but there are even Turks who eat pork!” Another admits that the question of who will wash the dishes once the migrants leave is the elephant in the room.
Whichever way one looks at it, it is clear that the party in the West, at least, is CDU 2.0 (liberal, market-oriented, conservative), while the party in the East is more “social”. On peace with Russia, for instance, the Saxony-Anhalt branch appears to speak unequivocally. A similar attitude holds for the Russian-speaking German-Russian community in Berlin and, more broadly, in the state of Brandenburg. If we count everyone from the Russians who fled to Germany after the October Revolution, to those who arrived with the Red Army, Soviet citizens who settled in East Berlin, and ethnic Germans who came from the USSR after the counter-revolution, we arrive at a population of nearly 35,000. Local AfD politicians do not seem to look unkindly upon this community either.
Indeed, the AfD’s lack of hostility towards Russia and Russians is cited as proof that it is not fascist. After all, in the 20th century, the nemesis of German imperialism, and of Nazism which inherited its worst traits, was Russia. While one reason for the Nazi invasion of the USSR was a holy war against Bolshevism, another was the cleansing of its own east, its “living space”, of inferior Slavs.
Fine, then, but today, as German imperialism once again sets its sights eastward, if one leg of the stool is hostility towards Russia, the others are Germany’s rearmament, NATO, and relations with the US.
The AfD’s stance on Germany’s rearmament can, at best, be described as “kicking the ball around”. For example, AfD members in Magdeburg say “800 billion euros for rearmament is too much” (how much, for instance, would not be too much?), and are then forced to openly admit that there is no consensus within the party on this issue. A local politician in Berlin voices the fantasy, “Let’s have 20 nuclear bombs and no army”, but adds: “I am in a minority in the party!” In fact, Siegmund Ulrich, the lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, had already blurted out that alongside rearmament, they could use the army to chase away migrants.
Conscription and the improvement of the Bundeswehr’s domestic logistics and infrastructure are also among the policies the AfD advocates. Whenever armament, the militarization of culture, and the strengthening of the army are on the agenda, AfD members join the bandwagon, saying “we are a right-wing party”. The same softening trend is observed regarding the US and NATO. The term “transatlantic right”, popularized by the BSW’s Sevim Dağdelen in a recent article, appears to have been adopted even by some AfD members. The fact that senior AfD figures like Beatrix von Storch have become regulars in Washington, Elon Musk’s attendance at AfD congresses, and the shadow of JD Vance and his patron Peter Thiel over German-Austrian politics complicate the matter further. The Trump administration’s push to bring Germany forward while reducing its NATO commitments in Europe seems to have sparked a modest excitement among AfD members. Their outlook on the EU and NATO is being recalibrated, adapted to this new situation.
Add to this Israel, the untouchable of the “establishment”. For the most “advanced” AfD member, “Jews” and “Muslims” are equally guilty. Even stranger, however, is what was said immediately after the Saxony-Anhalt elections in the debate over the Elbit Systems factory, sparked once again by Ulrich firing the signal flare: the AfD lead candidate stated that they would not oppose factories built for “ammunition production” and tied the now-familiar “remigration” issue to the debate surrounding this Israeli arms company. Although AfD members in Magdeburg express doubts about the Elbit Systems factory, they have found a baffling side road: let us put whether to build the (Israeli) weapons factory to a referendum and ask the people! If the people say yes, they will not object to the weapons factory being built. The AfD member who is “personally opposed” to Elbit building a factory again admits that there is no unity within the party on this matter. Clearly, for a local AfD politician, the way out of an issue that is unpopular, especially in East Germany, lies through the arguments that “there is no unity in the party on that issue” yet “he himself is personally opposed”.
The Israeli influence is embodied in Maximilian Krah, once one of the party’s most prominent faces: sidelined after an aide working for him in the Bundestag was accused of being a “Chinese spy” and after he remarked that “not everyone who wore an SS uniform was automatically a criminal”, this AfD figure somehow suddenly became enamoured of Israel and rushed off to Tel Aviv. He guaranteed that they would continue to bear Germany’s responsibility for the Holocaust, tried to convince Israelis that antisemitism in Europe today comes not from the right but from the left, and added that he was certain the ice between the AfD and Israel would melt.
Speaking of Israel… The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which the AfD regards as a sister party and whose Saxony-Anhalt team visited it to benefit from its experience in government, along with its leader Herbert Kickl, are also among those recently dazzled by the Israeli sun. The Likudization of the European right does not sink in Lake Constance; it marches on.¹
Indeed, this issue of “buyability”, in both senses of the word, is throwing the AfD off balance. An AfD politician explaining his views on Berlin’s housing problem opposes the Left Party’s expropriation proposal with CDU-like ferocity, while listing as his solution the deportation of Ukrainian refugees and, nevertheless, the construction of new housing. Who, then, will build the new housing? The city of Berlin is in debt, and the AfD opposes new debt; it also opposes private investors building it. So what will happen? Cooperation with the CDU in Berlin’s neighbourhoods will presumably bear fruit here in the form of more market and deregulation.
BSW: Over, over, not over
The same indecisiveness exists in the BSW. Of course, the BSW’s situation cannot even be compared to that of the AfD: having barely scraped into parliament in Saxony-Anhalt, falling below the threshold in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, criticized for governing with the old/established parties in Brandenburg and Thuringia, and fracturing from within, the party is fighting a battle for survival.
Precisely for this reason, they see flirting with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt as a kind of leverage. At least the state branch and certain intermediaries are pushing for this. While their similar stances on the Ukraine issue take concrete form in a joint motion, cooperation in the state could, for some, become a model at the federal level as well. The BSW’s lead candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, Claudia Wittig, plays to this with her constant smiling and nodding at AfD members. So do the anti-Americanism and the emphasis on German culture and what is German.
But which German? At the event in Magdeburg, an artist who appears to be close to the left quotes Brecht. Another prominent figure speaks of the German Hegel, of Aufheben, which we might translate as transcending by preserving, elevating by both retaining and negating its content, and of the unbreakable ties between patriotism and internationalism. He mediates with the AfD on behalf of migrants who speak German, pay their taxes in Germany, and obey German laws, pleading with them not to frighten these people by talking of remigration. The AfD member, meanwhile, says the left-right distinction means nothing; another likens Germany to “North Korea”. For whatever reason, while leftists deem it unnecessary to emphasize the left, right-wingers wink at a kind of right-wing international.
In the BSW, everyone is at odds with everyone else; nobody likes anybody. It is impossible to hear anything positive about co-chairs Amira Mohamed Ali or Fabio De Masi, even from people close to the BSW. Some are angry with Sahra Wagenknecht; others think Wittig is inadequate.
In fact, the experiment in Saxony-Anhalt oscillates on a scale between biting off more than one can chew and pure fantasy. Indeed, the party leadership has launched belated salvos against the possibility of being politically (and perhaps even organizationally) swallowed by the AfD. Leaders, led by Sevim Dağdelen, are trying to clarify their position by pointing to the AfD’s ethno-nationalist and transatlantic-right ties, as well as its stance against the welfare state.
But is it enough? Does viewing the AfD simply as a “political rival” allow one to understand this party’s specific historical role? Moreover, could the connection pulling the AfD towards the “establishment”, namely Israel, also be quietly and deeply reaching into the BSW? A journalist well-informed about the BSW reports, for instance, that certain shady characters hovering around the party are making moves to push steadfast anti-Israel figures like Sevim Dağdelen out of the organization by branding them “pro-Hamas”. Some declare the party finished, some think it will know how to rise just as it sank, and some even think the “left” of the Left Party and the “left” of the BSW could break away from their parties and form a new movement…
The (gloomy) sky over Berlin
To kill time, I step into a bookshop. Again to pass the time, I buy a book that catches my eye and begin reading. Its title is Beyond the Wall, by Katja Hoyer. No English-language book has ever told the history of the German Democratic Republic so vividly, someone says in the blurbs on the first page.
The colour palette is as follows: devout German communists rotting in Stalin’s prisons and Gulags; drunken Red Army soldiers on occupied Prussian soil, emboldened by their daily vodka rations, organizing mass rape sessions; the Ulbricht group, yes-men to Stalin and to the Red Army headquarters, the occupation authority in East Germany… and so it goes on. According to the author, Stalin, who met personally with the German delegation 11 times between 1945 and 1952, could not possibly have held these meetings out of any genuine interest in Germany’s political future; this was merely a sign of his distrust of his German comrades!
A complete waste of time. Yet it says something about the German intelligentsia and political class. This colourful history is, in reality, a bleak and putrid narrative of pessimism. In this history, there are no people rolling up their sleeves to leave the devastation of war behind and build a new country. It is a brand of nihilism incapable of understanding why the national anthem of the German Democratic Republic, beginning with “Auferstanden aus Ruinen” (Risen from Ruins), is still sung with longing today in the eastern German states, even by AfD members. One AfD adviser admits that Alice Weidel might say one thing today and something 180 degrees opposite next week. Indifference to Germany’s future has engulfed everything, even, in this context, the AfD.
On the other hand, the nihilism of the intelligentsia appears destined to lose against the hope pumped out by the AfD. The Germans call it Irrlicht; in folktales, a supernatural, even demonic quality is attributed to the false light that appears in marshes. The political nihilism into which Germany has sunk is elevating the AfD, which also feeds on nostalgia for East Germany.
Looking at the false light spread by the AfD, Brecht comes to mind once again. In one of his early plays, combining a critique of bourgeois morality with the biblical metaphor of “Light in Darkness” (Lux in Tenebris), Brecht left his protagonist, the bigoted Paul, standing outside a “brothel” in his neighbourhood to shelter from a storm. This polite gentleman, who had dedicated his life to fighting decay and darkness, suddenly found himself illuminated by the neon lights of the brothel right next to his own world, which he had thought so solid. And inspired by The Threepenny Opera, one might also think that to see the truth, one must look not at those in the light, but at those in the dark. As dark clouds gather once more in the German sky, thinking that optimism might be connected to our eyes adjusting to the dark could set our minds free.
¹ On this side of the lake, journalist Hüseyin Doğru is subjected to EU sanctions on the grounds of supporting the Palestinian resistance. Do not dismiss it as mere sanctions: Doğru cannot even use a credit card, his bank accounts are closed, he cannot pay his bills, and it is even uncertain whether he could return if he left the country. EU legislation practically buries sanctioned individuals alive.
Opinion
The Mecca Defence Agreement, the Ottoman Empire, and the facts
Some who are thoroughly excited by the Mecca Defence Agreement, and certain people who believe Türkiye should take sides in the clashes between the Iranian-backed Houthis and Saudi Arabia, are once again dreaming dreams of conquest with reference to our Ottoman past. Whenever history is discussed, especially Turkish and Ottoman history, they invoke this widely repeated saying: “After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Middle East and the Balkans never knew peace again.”
We know that there are always those who, proceeding from this premise, seek to re-establish the Ottoman Empire. And we do not forget that eminent historians immediately respond to these ignorant figures: “Whoever does not grieve over the collapse of the Ottoman Empire has no heart, and whoever wishes to re-establish it has no mind.”
For the world we live in is neither the world in which the Ottoman Empire rose, nor the world in which it fell. Both times and conditions have changed. More than 40 states now exist across the lands once ruled by the Sublime Porte; when taking into account the countries it temporarily ruled, seized, or held sway over, that number exceeds 50 according to some historians, and 60 or even 70 according to others.
It must be asked dispassionately:
Which of these states, and how many of their citizens, actually want the Ottoman Empire to rise again, or wish for the Turks who would lead this revived, re-established Ottoman Empire to come and govern them as well? For this purpose, how many of these states have come together and said to Türkiye, “Take the lead, revive the Ottoman Empire”?
Is it objectively possible in today’s world to establish such a multilingual, multireligious, multiconfessional, multinational, and multi-identity empire? As the former prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu once suggested, is it objectively plausible for Türkiye to establish and lead an Ottoman Commonwealth of Nations, just as the British established and led the Commonwealth of Nations? Does Türkiye possess such political and economic power, state capacity, and scale?
Do the states that emerged from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire have any such goal, desire, or expectation? Are regional and global conditions, or the balance of power, conducive to such an initiative? Long after the age of empires has drawn to a close, is it a realistic objective to bring the countries born of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse together under the umbrella of a federation or confederation?
How do those who claim such a desire exists in the Islamic world, the Arab world, and the Turkic world explain the rapprochement between the Central Asian Turkic states and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus; the Sunni-Shia and Arab-Persian tensions across the Islamic world; the Abraham Accords; the indifference of Arab states to the Palestinian issue; and the fact that the TRNC is not recognized by a single Muslim country or a single Turkic state other than Türkiye?
Were Türkiye to put forward such an ambition, let alone Greece, Bulgaria, or Serbia, how would Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran react?
These questions could certainly be multiplied.
Yet history books contain ample evidence of how dreams conceived, and commentary made, in ignorance of history, geography, and economics ultimately turn out.
What matters in foreign policy is not indulging in fantasies, but remaining realistic.
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