Opinion
China’s economy: Policy failure or paradigm shift?

The meetings of the 14th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the 14th National People’s Congress, known as China’s most important annual political event, have begun. They are known in the West as the ‘Two Meetings’ and in China as the ‘liang hui’ because they begin one day apart. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, attended by more than 2,000 delegates from eight parties other than the Communist Party of China and various sectors of society, is, as its name suggests, a consultative body. The National People’s Assembly is the highest legislative body, with around 3,000 delegates from the CCP and other parties.
Delegates elected by the People’s Assemblies from the remotest corners of the country, from provinces and cities to counties and townships, are also important for understanding political participation in China. In his article for The Diplomat, Patrick Meyer of Peking University preferred the term ‘capillary democracy’, while the Chinese media’s coverage of the two sessions in 2023 emphasised that the process was a living example of ‘full-scale democracy’. These concepts, highlighted at a time when US President Joe Biden claimed that autocracy and democracy fronts were at the heart of international alignment, were later followed by the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s report entitled ‘The State of Democracy in America’.
What does the data say about China’s economy?
Coinciding with the 75th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the narrative of this year’s meeting of the two leaders is dominated by the economy. While the Western press declared that the ‘Chinese miracle’ was over, US President Joe Biden likened the Chinese economy to a ‘ticking time bomb’.
There are three interrelated reasons for these assessments in Western capitals. The first and most important is the 5.2 per cent growth rate that the Chinese economy is expected to achieve in 2023. Although this rate is above the global average of 3 per cent and satisfactory for many countries, it is the lowest level for China since the 1990s (excluding the pandemic period).
The performance of China, which has become the world’s second-largest economy and the engine of global growth with an average growth rate of 9% for many years, is thought to have been affected by policies geared towards the property market. It should not be forgotten that stagnation in the property sector, which accounts for a quarter of China’s gross domestic product, is a source of employment for millions of people and increases unemployment rates.
The second reason for the pessimistic picture of the Chinese economy is the declining share of exports in economic growth. According to the 2023 data, China’s exports fell by 4.6 per cent to $3.38 trillion. It is clear that geopolitical tensions are behind this contraction rather than the ‘invisible hand’ that regulates markets.
In order to prevent the rise of China and maintain its hegemonic position in the global system, the United States and its allies have for some time been trying to diversify their supply chains in the name of ‘de-risking’. It is not surprising that by 2023 Mexico will overtake China as the largest exporter to the US for the first time in 20 years.
The third reason for believing that China’s growth will eventually cease to be a ‘model’ is the country’s changing demographics. While this change may not set off alarm bells in the short term, Chinese experts recognise that it is a serious challenge.
While China’s National Bureau of Statistics reports a population decline of 850,000 by 2022, models by the United Nations Population Division suggest that China’s population could fall below 800 million by 2100. Beijing is also concerned about its growing elderly population, with the National Health Commission predicting that the number of people over 60 will rise from 280 million in 2022 to 400 million in 2035.
Geopolitical pressures and new productive forces
Western pundits are analysing policy failure, arguing that China’s high growth rates have come to an end and that the success story based on external demand is eroding. Such a judgement (if not wishful thinking) may be premature. Indeed, the economic policies that China has been pursuing for some time point to a paradigm shift rather than failure.
According to the Chinese leadership, which believes that analysing the economy in terms of short-term growth rates is short-sighted, what is needed is to succeed in changing the means of production and the relations of production in a way that captures the spirit of the times, however painfully. This technology-centred concept, known as the High-Quality Development Plan, was introduced by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2017, then included in the 14th Development Plan in 2021, and finally elaborated at the 20th Party Congress.
As a result of the two current sessions, the concept of ‘new productive forces’ is expected to serve as a guide for China’s journey towards ‘high-quality development’. Based on the fact that traditional intensive labour has been replaced by data and artificial intelligence has transformed production relations, the Beijing administration laid out nine basic tasks at the Central Economic Work Conference in December, with the statement ‘scientific and technological innovation should lead the development of the modern industrial system’ at the top of the list. In short, China will stop devoting most of its resources to the traditional labour-intensive model and talk more about ‘chips’, more ‘bio-manufacturing’, more ‘artificial intelligence’ or ‘humanoid robots’, as we have seen in recent years. In this context, it is worth remembering China’s efforts to close the gap with the US, the leader in this field, by investing $456 billion in R&D by 2023.
It is clear that the changing geopolitical landscape is also affecting China’s focus on the New Development Plan. The trade wars that began under former US President Donald Trump and continued under current President Joe Biden, as well as the rise of global protectionism, have increased the importance of domestic demand for the Beijing government.
By increasing the share of domestic consumption in GDP growth by 43.1% to 82%, China is taking a serious step towards weaning itself off its dependence on external demand, and this share is set to increase as the consumer confidence index rises. It should be added, however, that China has not given up the expectation of exports or foreign investment. In line with the high-quality development model, sales of electric vehicles and solar panels are expected to increase by 30% and 54% respectively by 2022. This model, which relies on the domestic market but does not postpone exports, was announced by the Chinese at the end of 2020 under the name of ‘double circulation’.
In terms of demographic change, which could be a long-term concern for China’s economy, the country aims to increase the number of newborns in the long term while investing in systems such as artificial intelligence, robotics and automation that will help close the employment gap. In China, once known for its one-child policy, the new family planning law makes it easier for a third child to receive state support.
Potential challenges for China
It would be overly optimistic to expect China’s high-level development framework and the notion of new productive forces, which we will discuss more in the future, to be implemented without challenges. For example, China needs to increase the purchasing power of consumers as a prerequisite for its reliance on the domestic market. This requires the expansion of the middle class, currently estimated at 400 million out of a population of 1 billion 400 million.
Aware that China is going through a ‘special period’, Sheng Laiyun, deputy director of the National Bureau of Statistics, said at the announcement of the 2023 data: “The Chinese economy is currently at a critical stage of transforming its development model and optimising its economic structure.”
The extent to which a country as large as China will successfully complete this paradigm shift is one of the most important issues to watch. The success of the process, the speed and the sustainability of the transformation may bring a new version of the debates on the Chinese model, once famous in Turkey, to our agenda.
Opinion
Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.
When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.
It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”
The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction
An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.
The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.
Middle East
An assault on the Axis of Resistance: The Israeli escalation against Iran and its impact on Palestine and Gaza

Khaled al-Yamani, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Events in the region are accelerating as if we are on the brink of a new political and security earthquake, led by the direct confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist entity, under blatant American complicity. This confrontation, though it appears to be military and security-based, is in essence a major war targeting the entire project of resistance — from Tehran to Gaza.
Latest escalation: Aggressive maneuvers in the name of ‘Israeli security’
The Zionist entity launched an aerial assault targeting military sites deep within Iranian territory. Under recycled pretexts — related to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — “Israel” continues its strikes, not only against Tehran, but also against its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
But what’s happening isn’t just “preemptive strikes” as Western media claims — it is the continuation of a long war waged by the United States and “Israel” against the Axis of Resistance, aiming to break the balance of deterrence established by Iran and its allies after years of strategic patience and military development.
America and Israel: One goal behind false slogans
This escalation cannot be separated from direct American direction. The Biden administration, though claiming to seek de-escalation, in practice provides full political, military, and intelligence cover for this aggression.
The goal is clear: to dismantle the Axis of Resistance and deprive Iran of any ability to support its allies — first and foremost, the Palestinian resistance factions.
The U.S. administration knows that Iran’s strength does not lie solely in its nuclear program, but in its presence in the regional equation — from Lebanon to Iraq to Palestine. Therefore, striking Iran means breaking the backbone of the Jerusalem Axis.
What does Gaza and Palestine have to do with this?
Any attack on Iran is, by extension, an attack on Gaza. What is plotted in Tehran reflects immediately in the alleys of Khan Younis and the Jabalia refugee camp. The rockets that overwhelmed the Israeli army during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle would not have reached the resistance without decades of accumulated Iranian support.
Now, the Zionist entity — with American backing — seeks to cut off the lifeline to Palestine and destroy the support network Iran has built for the resistance, whether in weapons, knowledge, or training.
Thus, striking Iran is not separate from the ongoing aggression on Gaza; it is a direct extension of it, and part of the suffocating siege aimed at weakening the Palestinian people’s ability to endure and resist.
The Axis of Resistance: Unity of fronts and a shared fate
The new equation imposed by the Axis of Resistance after the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle — and later the “Al-Aqsa Flood” — has become a nightmare for the enemy: the unity of fronts. No longer is Gaza alone, or the southern suburbs alone, or Sanaa alone.
Hence, the Zionist entity is now trying to preempt any emerging united front by striking at the center — Iran — before a full-scale confrontation erupts that could spell the end of “Israel” as we know it.
Conclusion: The battle continues… and Palestine remains the heart
We are facing a pivotal moment in the history of this struggle. The enemy seeks to paralyze the Axis of Resistance at its strategic core and turn the conflict into a fight for survival. Yet the Axis today is stronger than ever.
Despite the wounds, Gaza remains at the heart of this confrontation. The battle is not just being fought in Iranian territory or over the skies of Lebanon and Syria — it is being fought over the future of Palestine, from the river to the sea.
Therefore, it is the duty of all the free people of the world, and all honest journalists, to speak the truth.
If Israel emerges victorious from its ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of that victory will not be limited to Tehran or the Axis of Resistance alone. Rather, they will extend to impact the entire regional balance of power — with Türkiye’s role at the center of that shift.
An Israeli victory would, in effect, cement its dominance as an unchallengeable military force in the Middle East, fully backed by the United States. This would open the door to a new phase of political interference and pressure, especially against regional powers that still maintain a degree of independent decision-making — chief among them, Türkiye.
Türkiye, which seeks to maintain an independent and balanced role between East and West, and whose interests are intertwined with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, would come under increasing pressure to reposition itself according to Israeli-American terms. It may find itself facing two options: either submit to the new regional equation, or enter an unwanted political — and possibly security — confrontation.
From this perspective, what is happening in Tehran today is not isolated from what could happen in Ankara tomorrow. If Iran falls as an independent regional power, Türkiye may be next in line.
The assault on Iran is an assault on Palestine. Defending Tehran is defending Jerusalem.
This battle has strategic implications not only for the Palestinian cause and the Axis of Resistance against Zionist-American hegemony, but its outcomes will extend across the entire region — particularly affecting major regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.
If Iran stands firm and emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will strengthen the role of these countries in resisting Zionist arrogance and domination. One could even say that such a victory may bring an end to Zionist hegemony over the region and, as a result, weaken American influence as well.
It would allow these countries to become more independent and distant from U.S. control, which seeks to turn the peoples of the region into subjects by dividing them into warring sects and identities. Therefore, solidarity among these countries at this moment is one of the key elements of victory — and a potential beginning of liberation from Zionist-American domination.
Opinion
Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.
However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.
The US Can’t Be Bypassed
China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.
However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.
This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.
For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.
Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.
Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.
Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite
Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.
When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.
Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.
Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.
Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.
The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.
Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.
However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.
Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions
Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.
This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.
All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.
Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.
Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.
This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.
But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.
In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.
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