Opinion
China’s mediation diplomacy in the Middle East: Willingness, ability and methods

YE Zhangxu
(He is a research assistant at the Center for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University)
Shortly after the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of CPC, which focused on Chinese economic reforms, China once again made new achievements in the field of diplomacy in the Middle East. At the invitation of China, Palestinian factions held a reconciliation dialogue in Beijing from July 21 to 23. After the dialogue, 14 factions including Fatah and Hamas signed the Beijing declaration on ending division and strengthening national unity of Palestine. Compared with last year’s promotion of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, this time it is to promote reconciliation within the Palestinian state, which is of great significance for further resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
It is undeniable that successful mediation diplomacy can further enhance China’s international reputation in this region, but on the other hand, it also highlights China’s proactive diplomatic approach and demonstrates to the outside world China’s willingness, ability, and methods to carry out mediation diplomacy in the Middle East.
How willing is China to engage in mediation diplomacy?
For a long time in the past, China focused on economic construction and its participation in Middle East affairs was far less than that of the United States, Russia, the European Union and other countries or international organizations. The rise of Chinese economy has brought about a rise in diplomacy to a large extent, which means that China’s willingness to participate in Middle East affairs is also increasing. However, Western media often portrays it as China’s strategic ambition in international affairs. In fact, China’s participation in the security governance and conflict management in the Middle East is based on the good intention of equality and mutual benefit.
For China, the starting point of diplomacy is still to safeguard national interests. On the one hand, it is to maintain China’s oil security. Since importing oil from Middle East countries in 1993, China’s demand for oil and gas resources in the Middle East has continued to grow, and will continue to maintain high growth demand for a long time to come. Therefore, promoting peace and stability in the Middle East is to ensure China’s energy security. On the other hand, it is to promote the economic development between China and the Middle East. The Belt and Road Initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 has now covered all countries in the Middle East, and the vast majority of countries also have relevant economic development strategies to cooperate with the BRI. These two aspects can be summarized as security and development, which can also be said to be the important “secret” for China’s rise. As a responsible major country, China deeply understands the demands for security and development in the long-term turbulent Middle East region.
In addition, from the perspective of the broader context of the China-US rivalry, the repeated hyping up of China’s involvement in Middle East affairs by the United States is to fill the “power vacuum of great powers”, while China hopes to implement the Global Security Initiative through a series of effective diplomatic mediation to distinguish itself from the United States’ incitement in this region.
How Capable is China in Conducting Mediation Diplomacy?
Accompanying widespread conflicts are frequent mediations. Previously, both Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as Palestinian factions, have accepted mediation from extra-regional major powers and regional countries, but often without significant progress. The successful cases of Saudi-Iran reconciliation and Palestinian internal reconciliation prove that China can conduct mediation diplomacy independently in the Middle East from both its soft and hard power perspectives.
In terms of hard power, China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and is at the forefront of both military and economic power in the world. However, unlike the US, which emphasizes power and hegemony, China’s foreign policy prioritizes peace and cooperation in both the military and economic spheres. In the military realm, China is not only the second-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping funds but also the country that dispatches the most peacekeeping personnel among the permanent members of the Security Council. In the economic realm, China is almost the largest trading partner of most countries in the Middle East, and has been increasing investment in infrastructure, renewable energy and other sectors in the Middle East through the BRI.
In terms of soft power, although China’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs started relatively late, it has two advantages over Western countries in conducting mediation diplomacy. First, China does not carry the burden of a colonial history in relation to Middle Eastern countries, but rather a history of civilization exchange along the Silk Road from ancient to now. Second, China’s foreign policy has inherited the ancient wisdom of “Harmony Is Most Precious”, which enables China to maintain good relations with all countries in the Middle East and do not take a side in various conflicts.
What are the Successful Methods of China’s Mediation Diplomacy?
Promoting reconciliation between Saudi-Iran, and Palestine factions, where there have been long-standing serious differences, is not easy. Besides good intentions and strong capabilities, China also needs effective methods, some of which I believe are crucial:
First, choosing the right timing. Before the Saudi-Iran talks in Beijing, both countries had a willingness to negotiate and had conducted multiple rounds of contacts under the mediation of relevant countries. China, to some extent, acted in line with the trend. Regarding the Palestinian issue, the Gaza conflict over the past 9 months has caused severe damage to Hamas and other factions, and they are increasingly realizing that the key to solving the problem is the “two-state solution,” which has long been advocated by China to the international community. The premise for achieving the “two-state solution” is internal reconciliation.
Second, fully respecting the parties being mediated. One of China’s core principles in foreign policy is non-interference in internal affairs. On this basis, China advocates promoting peace talks through consultation and dialogue, which contrasts sharply with the US’s usual “hard mediation”. One notable point about “Beijing Declaration” is that past internal Palestinian reconciliation mainly focused on Hamas and Fatah, but this time the declaration was signed by 14 Palestinian political factions. This is very similar to China’s ethnic policy, which is that the attention paid to some ethnic minorities is not ignored because of their small number.
Third, proposing practical solutions. Before conducting mediation diplomacy, China has already proposed Chinese solutions to address Middle Eastern hotspot issues at different levels. At the macro level, there is the concept of a global community of shared future and the “three major global initiatives”. At the specific level, China has proposed a five-point proposal on realizing peace and stability in the Middle East, a four-point proposal for the political settlement of the Syrian issue, and a three-point thought on implementing the “two-state solution” for Palestine and Israel. More importantly, at the signing ceremony of the “Beijing Declaration”, Foreign Minister Wang Yi further proposed a “three-step” Chinese initiative regarding the ongoing Gaza conflict. These initiatives and policies have not only received widespread recognition in the Middle Eastern society but also provided a guideline for China’s participation in Middle Eastern security governance.
As mentioned earlier, the Middle East has always been a focal point for international mediation. The process of promoting reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Palestine factions has not been smooth. Many countries naturally hope to enhance their international status through mediation diplomacy, but willingness is one thing, capability and methods are another, and China possesses all three. After the signing of the “Beijing Declaration”, the international community, especially the Middle East, held a positive evaluation, but we still need to view it cautiously. As many Chinese scholars who research the Middle East issue have pointed out, reconciliation cannot be permanently resolved by a single declaration. It is also worth pondering how to maintain the lasting vitality of the declaration.
Opinion
Is Israel done with ‘the devil it knows’?

As someone who has wanted to bomb Iran for nearly 30 years, it’s not hard to understand that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has his own agenda and is using claims of Iran developing nuclear weapons as a pretext. This demonization campaign has been quite long-running. Even in the 1990s, he persistently made this claim, which had no basis in fact. In fact, US intelligence reports at the time clearly showed this claim to be false. The most recent US intelligence report, published this past March, says the same thing. Despite this, Netanyahu persists with his claims, wildly exaggerating them. One of his latest claims is that Iran will build nuclear weapons and distribute them to terrorists.
Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, conducted with full transparency under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], should be considered a normal state of affairs. Indeed, in 2015, under President Obama’s leadership, the US and the UK supported this agreement, and it was signed. At the time, Iran also stated that it had no nuclear weapons program and welcomed being fully open to inspections.
When Trump took office in 2017, he withdrew from this agreement in 2018—likely due to pressure from the Israel lobby in the US—plunging everything back into uncertainty. Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, on the contrary, pushed Iran to increase its uranium enrichment activities. It is extremely interesting and confusing that Trump, having withdrawn from a previously agreed-upon deal during his first term, would now strive to return to it in a potential second term. It would be naive to think that Trump has learned from the past and wants to correct his mistake.
It is very clear that Israel, under Netanyahu’s leadership, wants to topple the Iranian regime using the nuclear program as a pretext. It is advancing toward this goal step by step, virtually paralyzing opposing forces and preventing them from offering any meaningful response. At this point, it is also moving away from the typical Western approach of preferring “the devil you know.”
The pretext of nuclear bombs instead of weapons of mass destruction
An attempt to bring about regime change in a Middle Eastern state was also made 20 years ago in Iraq. We witnessed the horror created by the Iraq plan, which led to the rise of ISIS and the deaths of millions. At the time, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in his speech at the UN, said, “Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein has used such weapons and has no qualms about using them again against his neighbors and his own people.” In his presentation, Powell used reconnaissance photos, detailed maps and charts, and even recorded phone conversations between high-ranking members of the Iraqi army. The phrase “weapons of mass destruction,” which he repeated 17 times during his hour-long speech, accompanied by information that intelligence officials had assured him was reliable, became the public justification used by the Bush administration to legitimize the invasion of Iraq.
A month and a half after Powell’s UN speech, President Bush ordered airstrikes on Baghdad. In a televised address to the nation, Bush said this was the beginning of a military operation “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.” US forces, along with their internal collaborators in Iraq, overthrew the Saddam Hussein regime within a few weeks, and evidence of Iraq’s so-called “weapons of mass destruction” was nowhere to be found.
The Bush administration used the credibility of Colin Powell—known for his opposition to war, particularly US military interventions in the Middle East—to bring about regime change in Iraq. Powell later described his UN speech as a “major intelligence failure” and a “blot” on his record. Before he died, Powell expressed his regret, admitting that his sources had turned out to be wrong, flawed, and even deliberately misleading.
If Israel succeeds in neutralizing Iran—and perhaps even turning it into an ally in the medium to long term—guess which conventional power in the region will be its next target? Efforts to demonize Türkiye have been underway for a long time, although they are currently on the back burner. A bilateral confrontation in the region would unfold on a very different footing than a trilateral balance; we had better take precautions and fasten our seatbelts.
Middle East
An assault on the Axis of Resistance: The Israeli escalation against Iran and its impact on Palestine and Gaza

Khaled al-Yamani, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Events in the region are accelerating as if we are on the brink of a new political and security earthquake, led by the direct confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Zionist entity, under blatant American complicity. This confrontation, though it appears to be military and security-based, is in essence a major war targeting the entire project of resistance — from Tehran to Gaza.
Latest escalation: Aggressive maneuvers in the name of ‘Israeli security’
The Zionist entity launched an aerial assault targeting military sites deep within Iranian territory. Under recycled pretexts — related to Iran’s nuclear and missile programs — “Israel” continues its strikes, not only against Tehran, but also against its allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen.
But what’s happening isn’t just “preemptive strikes” as Western media claims — it is the continuation of a long war waged by the United States and “Israel” against the Axis of Resistance, aiming to break the balance of deterrence established by Iran and its allies after years of strategic patience and military development.
America and Israel: One goal behind false slogans
This escalation cannot be separated from direct American direction. The Biden administration, though claiming to seek de-escalation, in practice provides full political, military, and intelligence cover for this aggression.
The goal is clear: to dismantle the Axis of Resistance and deprive Iran of any ability to support its allies — first and foremost, the Palestinian resistance factions.
The U.S. administration knows that Iran’s strength does not lie solely in its nuclear program, but in its presence in the regional equation — from Lebanon to Iraq to Palestine. Therefore, striking Iran means breaking the backbone of the Jerusalem Axis.
What does Gaza and Palestine have to do with this?
Any attack on Iran is, by extension, an attack on Gaza. What is plotted in Tehran reflects immediately in the alleys of Khan Younis and the Jabalia refugee camp. The rockets that overwhelmed the Israeli army during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle would not have reached the resistance without decades of accumulated Iranian support.
Now, the Zionist entity — with American backing — seeks to cut off the lifeline to Palestine and destroy the support network Iran has built for the resistance, whether in weapons, knowledge, or training.
Thus, striking Iran is not separate from the ongoing aggression on Gaza; it is a direct extension of it, and part of the suffocating siege aimed at weakening the Palestinian people’s ability to endure and resist.
The Axis of Resistance: Unity of fronts and a shared fate
The new equation imposed by the Axis of Resistance after the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle — and later the “Al-Aqsa Flood” — has become a nightmare for the enemy: the unity of fronts. No longer is Gaza alone, or the southern suburbs alone, or Sanaa alone.
Hence, the Zionist entity is now trying to preempt any emerging united front by striking at the center — Iran — before a full-scale confrontation erupts that could spell the end of “Israel” as we know it.
Conclusion: The battle continues… and Palestine remains the heart
We are facing a pivotal moment in the history of this struggle. The enemy seeks to paralyze the Axis of Resistance at its strategic core and turn the conflict into a fight for survival. Yet the Axis today is stronger than ever.
Despite the wounds, Gaza remains at the heart of this confrontation. The battle is not just being fought in Iranian territory or over the skies of Lebanon and Syria — it is being fought over the future of Palestine, from the river to the sea.
Therefore, it is the duty of all the free people of the world, and all honest journalists, to speak the truth.
If Israel emerges victorious from its ongoing confrontation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the consequences of that victory will not be limited to Tehran or the Axis of Resistance alone. Rather, they will extend to impact the entire regional balance of power — with Türkiye’s role at the center of that shift.
An Israeli victory would, in effect, cement its dominance as an unchallengeable military force in the Middle East, fully backed by the United States. This would open the door to a new phase of political interference and pressure, especially against regional powers that still maintain a degree of independent decision-making — chief among them, Türkiye.
Türkiye, which seeks to maintain an independent and balanced role between East and West, and whose interests are intertwined with Russia, Iran, and Central Asian countries, would come under increasing pressure to reposition itself according to Israeli-American terms. It may find itself facing two options: either submit to the new regional equation, or enter an unwanted political — and possibly security — confrontation.
From this perspective, what is happening in Tehran today is not isolated from what could happen in Ankara tomorrow. If Iran falls as an independent regional power, Türkiye may be next in line.
The assault on Iran is an assault on Palestine. Defending Tehran is defending Jerusalem.
This battle has strategic implications not only for the Palestinian cause and the Axis of Resistance against Zionist-American hegemony, but its outcomes will extend across the entire region — particularly affecting major regional powers such as Türkiye, Iran, and Egypt.
If Iran stands firm and emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will strengthen the role of these countries in resisting Zionist arrogance and domination. One could even say that such a victory may bring an end to Zionist hegemony over the region and, as a result, weaken American influence as well.
It would allow these countries to become more independent and distant from U.S. control, which seeks to turn the peoples of the region into subjects by dividing them into warring sects and identities. Therefore, solidarity among these countries at this moment is one of the key elements of victory — and a potential beginning of liberation from Zionist-American domination.
Opinion
Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.
However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.
The US Can’t Be Bypassed
China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.
However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.
This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.
For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.
Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.
Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.
Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite
Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.
When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.
Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.
Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.
Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.
The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.
Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.
However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.
Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions
Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.
This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.
All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.
Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.
Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.
This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.
But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.
In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.
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