OPINION

Conflicting alliance

Published

10.12.2022 18:15

In Russia, the criticism of the economic dogmatism of the ‘financial bloc’ comes from two currents that mostly overlap. The first is Sergey Glazyev, a patriotic who serves on the Eurasian Economic Commission’s Board of Integration and Macroeconomics. Glazyev, whose influence on the Kremlin is constantly speculated (he was one of Putin’s advisers between 2012 and 2019), could take a left-wing stance so much as acted together with the “Left Front” in the 2017 elections. As recently as 20 April 2022, he accused the Central Bank of not knowing the first thing about the credit system and of acting “according to primitive IMF dogmas relying on foreign investment-hungry citizens of the underdeveloped countries.” In many ways, Glazyev is advocating a new New Economic Policy (NEP). A Just Russia’s far-left deputy Mikhail Delyagin and the Communist Party form the second current. They, too, favor nationalizations and a new “Gosplan” in one form or another.

Sergey Glazyev with Putin

But in addition to crossing each other, these two overlapping currents also interact with the “financial bloc.”

The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are the two institutions that make up the “financial bloc.” At the very least, it is clear that the Central Bank has made an unmatched effort to overcome the crisis (within capitalism, of course). In actuality, the praise and even admiration given by European, and US financial institutions demonstrated that its efforts had been somewhat successful. But given that the Central Bank, which prior to February 24 was the “regulator” (i.e., policymaker), is now becoming a “technician” (i.e., practitioner), this inflationist praise and achievement should also be seen as an indication of the breakdown of the conventional “financial bloc”. It was no accident that in early June the attack of economists on the Central Bank for failing to depreciate the ruble was prompted by one of most audacious defenders of the “financial bloc”, RBK, a media conglomerate particularly specializing in economic news.

I have often dwelled on the dogmatism of this bloc. However, at least two instances illustrating the extent of dogmatism should be provided. When we look at these examples, we will also see how internal conflicts work and which factors limit them.

Default

First off, the Ministry of Finance, if not the Central Bank, employed every means to prevent saying that Russia had defaulted, including continuing to pay Eurobonds in foreign currency. Moreover, apart from the irresistible temptation of paying off the creditor, the Ministry had a potent ally: PIMCO (Pacific Investment Management Company). According to data from Tinkoff Investment Advisory, as of mid-May, PIMCO had sold CDS as insurance policies to Russia’s $3.1 billion in foreign debt bonds, demonstrating how confident it was that the country would not go into default. Furthermore, PIMCO had invested roughly $1 billion in credit risk premium (CDS) in Russia last year alone (The seller’s promise to pay the buyer the difference between the nominal price and the market price of these bonds in the event that the issuing nation defaults is known as a “bill” or “derivative”). In order to avert a possible loss, PIMCO was forced to advocate “let them pay”. However, neither the voice of money nor PIMCO’s lobbying efforts were able to prevent it from happening. The bond payments had to halt when the US Treasury Department eventually blocked the OFAC license on May 25. The next installments due on June 24 could not be made, which led to what Medvedev called a “political default.”

However, the world did not come to an end because it was seen that the fixation with default was founded, like all obsessions, on an entirely nonsensical justification. As a matter of fact, payments that were unable to be fulfilled were no longer in the news in the days that followed.

Let’s not forget the other performer on the stage, by the way. PIMCO doesn’t appear to lose money. One of the defining characteristics of the neoliberal period, which worships the financial god, is the use of “derivatives” or risk management coupons, etc. These are ways to extract surplus value through speculation, but more crucially, the forces that drive the market are playing in an echo chamber where the house always wins. The CDS committee, established by the huge businesses that market CDS policies, decides if a nation defaults. Naturally, there was no market left after the US Department of Finance blocked the OFAC license. What should poor PIMCO and poor Golden Sachs do when there is no market, no way to ascertain the market price, and to quantify the difference between the nominal price and the nominal price? How would they determine how much to pay? Thus, the CDS committee asked the US Treasury for permission to auction Russian government bonds and was granted it. As a result, the price of the bonds at the auction shot up by 48 to 56 percent. Coincidentally (!), PIMCO and Golden Sachs purchased the majority of them.

As a result, both the asset owners and the asset insurers are now the same. This implies that as long as Russia continues to declare, “I owe my obligation,” modern alchemists will continue to triumph. They will prevail thanks to 340 billion dollars in reserves, even if Russia writes off their debt. In this situation, individuals who own the bond and furthermore sell its derivative may even find the default to be a seductive opportunity. That is nothing meaningful, even if they lose. When compared to PIMCO’s $2.2 trillion trading volume, which is based on data from late 2021, who cares about a few billion dollars?

Leasing

Another example is the leasing problem; this time, the Ministry of Finance had some success in its struggle to keep making payments at the expense of the Treasury. The issue was whether to keep making the leasing payments to foreign firms that have left the Russian market and, thus, failed to fulfill their contractual obligations (at a cost of 350–400 billion rubles annually) by stopping manufacturing, importing, maintaining, and supplying spare parts and, or to declare moratorium. At the end of October, Prime Minister Mishustin authorized Deputy Prime Minister Manturov and Transport Minister Savelyev to make a decision on this matter. Based on the “expert report,” the Ministry of Transport gave an unfavorable judgment, and the Ministry of Finance seconded it. However, the “expert” committee’s members, who wrote the report, were representatives of foreign firms withdrew from the Russian market. It was such out in the open that Mishustin was forced to step in and partially fix the “issue”. Accordingly, payments are to be reduced. But there is still a problem with the availability of maintenance and supply of spare parts for leased vehicles. For this, robust routes with parallel exports through Turkey and -mostly- Iran are needed. As for leasing payments, the final word has not been said yet. It will be had by the representative of the “import substitutionist bloc,” Deputy Prime Minister D. Manturov.

Denis Manturov

This is a crucial example in terms of demonstrating how determined the ministries are to remain in the global capitalist system. The conflict began when Soviet industry, or economic independence, collapsed in the face of low-cost Western goods. Now they have to rebuild all over again. Either they must find other cheap suppliers, like China (but shifting the supply chain is a difficult task and China, which is equally dependent on the global capitalist system, is not very willing to do this). Or, they have to preserve their dependency in a way that keeps the wolf from the door with the hope of that that the crisis will be resolved soon.

Three options

The three options don’t differ significantly from one another, though. The phases of putting these options into action overlap. If we consider those who advocate for rebuilding to be the most radical, they are partnering with the “import substitutionist bloc” to make the gradual transition since they cannot do it again in a short time and must find a cheap supplier. And import substitutionists who wish to move their supply chain to the east cannot do so in a short time; instead, they must rely on the pro-imperialist system’s supporters who barely hold their end up until the issue is fully resolved.

This contradictory transitivity between the parties and this conflicted unity continues in all aspects of economic life. Consider dividends received by large corporations.

The first group, whether from the political “right” (pro-military) or left (popular), wants to fully halt these payments and keep using the profits of large state corporations to finance the budget. Furthermore, they believe that this situation is unavoidable because oil and natural gas revenues will certainly be threatened by sanctions, at which point they will either appeal to the bourgeoisie or the people for funding.

The second group is also aware of this, but they cannot afford to alter the capital structures of these businesses since their political objective is the ascent of the middle bourgeoisie through the exploitation of other classes, particularly the big bourgeoisie. However, this can only be accomplished within the capitalist system, whereas the first group’s radical solution entails closing one of the channels through which the middle bourgeoisie can rise.

This is where the third group enters the picture. In order for the capitalist system to survive, the stock market must continue to run. This can happen only if the giant state corporations that serve as the driving force behind the Russian economy continues to pay dividends, that is, they should keep feeding their local or international big bourgeois. As a result, a solution is found that keeps the conflict peacefully. Dividend payments are somewhat restricted but not entirely stopped. Due to “overlapping interests,” the second group gains the most from this, but also the other two.

Balance

The balance has been established so that under the terms of the sanctions, those who advocate paving the way for the middle bourgeoisie are in an favorable position. But the others are not desperate, though. Why?

1) Politically, the left is not opposed to a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie, as it may lead to the NEP, the golden age for the leftists. What was the NEP? “A tiny retreat for a big leap”, to quote Lenin. It is the first link in the process of rebuilding the USSR, which was on the verge of economic collapse, after the “war communism” era. It is the emergence of the petty and middle bourgeoisie under complete state control while the large bourgeoisie was suppressed. It is perhaps the most democratic period in Russia since the principality of Kyiv. (The latter leads to a secondary contradiction between the dictatorial “pro-military” wing of the first group and the “popular” wing demanding democracy at the most.)

2) Economically, the right, the “financial bloc”, is not against a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie as long as the interests of the big bourgeoisie are safeguarded. Because the big bourgeoisie will swallow the others anyway if these interests are preserved. Moreover, if the concessions envisioned by the second group are realized, they will be swallowed by a more fattened big bourgeoisie, which is particularly appealing.

Conflict and predictability

At the November 16 Cabinet meeting, Putin inquired as to whether the Ministry of Finance had given its approval before approving Denis Manturov’s request to expand the car loan program to include military personnel and partial mobilization conscripts. This was noteworthy because it demonstrates that the powers of the ministries are split by distinct boundaries and how, in the conflicts between them, the approval of the ministry in charge is sought first rather than the president’s. This is not an isolated instance. The likes frequently happen; especially in the conflicts between finance and industry, and between the “military bloc” and others.

It also points out that one of the most meaningless concepts of bourgeois political science, “totalitarianism”, which has become so fashionable these days, actually has no objective foundation because there is nothing like the application of “total” authority at all. Contrarily, the jurisdictions are established with distinct borders. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the president does not meddle in these divided powers. The act of establishing boundaries does not result from a situation in which people gather to discuss the best form of “governance”. Rather, the lines are drawn because the conflict aiming at different political and social objectives continues and rules are set to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control.

For this reason, I have always found absurd the tendency to explain Russia’s state decisions (in any area from militarism to foreign policy, from economic policy to the fate of offshore calculations) with the momentary, unpredictable, surprise decisions of a group of “totalitarian” decision makers. Politics is so determined with clear lines, and the institutions’ authority is so thoroughly defined to avert conflict to lead to war, therefore, few surprises are encountered. As a result, grasping the process only depends on understanding the conflict.

Conflict of authority and temporary retreats

The blocs jealously guard their authority, one another’s meddling is unwanted and repulsed even stingingly.

The “military bloc” and the “financial bloc” came into such a conflict at the end of April. General Secretary of the Security Council “Mr. Siloviki” Patrushev said that they were developing a financial system in which the ruble would be pegged to the currency basket and gold, but Central Bank Governor Nabiullina categorically denied this with almost an off-protocol discourse.

This really is a crucial matter. Suppose that contracts for international trade with Kazakhstan as a “friendly” or even an ally nation can and are made in rubles and tenge, but in any case, a “universal equivalent” (we are forced to use Marxist terminology) is needed by which these sums in rubles or tenge are evaluated. How about this universal equivalent? If “de-dollarisation” in global trade is not (and it is not) just a nice rhetoric, something else must be found. The “finance bloc,” which was still looking for methods to stay within the imperialist system, rejected Patrushev’s plan, which called for this to be a basket of gold and foreign currency, while the “military bloc” withdrew to prevent usurpation. However, this was the inevitable conclusion of the process. The following was reported by RBK on November 19: “One of the sources of RBK claims that even if commerce with Kazakhstan is conducted in national currencies, how many rubles will equal to one tenge is determined by the dollar rate of the tenge. For this reason, banks are collaborating with the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance on a project that will allow some departure from cross-currency calculations.” The “financial bloc” appears determined to avoid even indirectly returning to the gold (or oil) standard, instead attempting to create a “currency basket” that is nothing but a hybrid dollarization. At least for now, the “financial bloc” assures to include banks, the sacred altar of the neoliberalist age, into this process.

Will it be a hit or a miss? It is doable. Does it mean the liquidation of dollarisation? No. It is inevitable that a new (one!) universal equivalent will be found if they are determined on this issue (and the troika’s sanction terror pushes them to determination, even if they don’t want to). It doesn’t matter if this equivalent is the “evergreen” gold or yuan or “oil of the earth,” or sheepskin.

The sword of balance

Fine, but where is the Kremlin in this picture? As with military-political issues, the Kremlin adopts a pragmatic attitude on political-economic matters, but this pragmatism is not unprincipled in the latter ones, just as it was in the former issues. In the political-economic matters, the Kremlin seeks to strengthen the middle bourgeoisie on the account of the big bourgeoisie, just as it is resolved to continue the battle until it achieves its minimal political objectives in the military-political issues (which means removing the Kyiv regime from being a current or potential threat to Russia in one way or another). The Kremlin’s current position therefore aligns with the second group; yet the Kremlin is already a conflicting alliance in its own image, as the blocs’ positions may shift in line with the balance of power, but they will keep doing so peacefully.

An example: At the November 16 meeting I mentioned above, Putin did not hesitate to attack the banks, the holy altar of the “financial bloc”: “Banks simply and cheerfully offer minor loans (…) but then these people become eternal debtors. Banks, with all due respect to these financial organizations, drain the lifeblood of the population. Obviously, it is needed to put an end to this.”

Although the Kremlin’s perspective is entirely discernible empirically, there remains a theoretical issue in the middle of the room. This is a problem I have touched on many times before: Bonapartism as a particular kind of authority in post-Soviet Russia.

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OPINION

Round 1: Winner Trump

Published

23 hours ago

29/06/2024

Sarp Sinan Hacır

The first debate of the 2024 US election is behind us. After four years, we saw an almost ageless Trump and a very old Biden. Very old… In 2020, there were frequent concerns about his health. However, he managed to stay relatively fresh in the debate and built up the image of “tons of Uncle Joe” against Trump’s aggressive style. The intervening four years have not been kind to Uncle Joe… His disgusted look, as if he had seen his son Hunter’s video archive, his hoarse voice and his 7-8 second pause at the beginning of the debate completely dashed the Democrats’ hopes. The rest of the debate, however, was not so bad. Again, much of what he said was misunderstood, but at least there was no similar pause. In fact, when he did not pause, he spoke even faster than usual, perhaps due to the effect of the drugs…

Don’t answer any questions and win

Trump’s strategy was a little more interesting. In my pre-debate article, I said that Trump would not want to get into the Israel issue. Trump would be afraid of bringing back the leftists who were angry with Biden. That is exactly what happened. But Trump did not answer any question, not just the Israel question. Let me give the following example from the dialogue between the moderators and Trump;

“What would you like to say to citizens who fear that their democratic rights will be taken away because of the events of January 6?”

“Joe’s economic policies have finished off the US. Nobody respects us!”

Most of the debate went like this. Trump muted both Biden and the moderators in his head and went out to say what he had to say. The Republican leader ended the debate without answering almost any question. Of course, as I expected, the new debate rules worked in Trump’s favour. With his own microphone switched off while Biden was speaking, he was unable to interrupt his opponent at all. In contrast to 2020, this gave the impression of a “gentleman who does not interrupt”.

In terms of content, there were no surprises. Trump, of course, talked about the economy, the huge aid packages to Ukraine, the migrant crisis under Biden. When it came to blacks, he said that “the border is so full of holes that blacks and Latinos are both experiencing security problems and losing their jobs to immigrants”. In addition, Trump recalled that Biden used the term “group of deviants” to refer to blacks in the 90s. Biden preferred to stay away from the issue of racism this time because Trump, according to the latest poll, is getting 30 per cent of all black votes in the country. This is an incredible figure for a Republican candidate who has been accused of white supremacy by his opponents. If the polls are correct, Trump will have increased his minority vote in every election he has contested.

Then the issue of Ukraine came up, which was a real kick in the teeth… When Biden mentioned Trump’s known cases, the subject suddenly turned to Ukraine. Trump said: “You’re guilty too. Haven’t you put pressure on Ukraine by using the power of the US for your personal business? You are still killing thousands of people. By the way, the death toll in Ukraine is not accurate. Multiply it by two or even three. Ukraine will lose the war, it has no people left”.

As for Israel, as I said, Trump did not want to talk about it too much. It should be said that this is also a first: reaffirming support for Israel is no longer a very favourable situation for either candidate. Biden is already losing votes because of it. But among non-evangelical conservatives, unconditional support for Israel has become unpopular. That’s why Trump said just one sentence. “Joe, you’re a bad Palestinian, even they don’t like you,” and he closed the subject.

What happens now?

The rest of the debate was characterised by mutual personal attacks and Trump saying 98 times, “Everybody’s making fun of us”. But the real question is: what happens next? Even before Biden left the stage, there was an unprecedented reaction from the Democrats. There was a “king naked” moment, not only in Democrat-dominated social media groups, but also among Democratic opinion leaders;

Biden would lose if he went into the election this way.

So what can be done? The “Biden Withdrawal” debate, which was previously conducted in hushed tones, is now being raised louder. However, the bureaucratic basis for this makes it very difficult. Traditionally, it is not customary to run against an incumbent president. That is why both Kamala Harris, his running mate, and Gavin Newsom, the governor of California and the most popular Democratic candidate, have declined to run, despite widespread rumours. A key date was Super Tuesday in March, when 15 states held their primaries. It should be noted that Biden managed to get 3900 of the 4000 delegates. There is no force that can remove him from the nomination against Biden’s will.

If Biden withdraws, however, new candidate discussions will begin. Although Gavin Newsom said after last night’s debate that “we’ve never been more united behind Biden”, dissent is growing in his party. If Biden withdraws today, there can be no primary. However, the delegates can agree on a new nominee and vice presidential candidate. All Democratic Party experts say that if this happens, there will be major infighting within the party. If Biden withdraws, he can tell the delegates who are supporting him whom he is supporting, but the delegates do not have to comply. Of course, if that is the intention, every day closer to the election means more bureaucratic turmoil for the party. If it happens in the last month, even ballot papers could be changed.

If Biden withdraws, the two potential candidates would be Newsom and Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. However, these names are behind Biden at the moment. In the current situation, as many have said, Trump’s hopes are very high. But there is still a long way to go before the election. So it makes sense to put aside the polls and the memorised commentaries. In any case, the Democratic Party is in for a very painful electoral process.

OPINION

Hakan Fidan’s building of the Turkish axis: China, Russia and the BRICS

Published

6 days ago

24/06/2024

Umur Tugay Yücel

Dr Hakan Fidan, who for many years headed Turkey’s intelligence service, became Turkey’s foreign minister a year ago. Dr Hakan Fidan has never been so much on the world’s agenda in his more than 1 year as Foreign Minister. So what happened to make Minister Fidan the focus of attention from America to Asia, from the Middle East to Latin America? The reason was Fidan’s extensive visit to China and Russia and his participation in the BRICS meeting. As a result of these visits, many questions have been raised both in Turkey and around the world.

First of all, if we take the China visit into consideration, Minister Fidan held critical meetings. Fidan met with Chen Wenqing, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and chairman of the CPC Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and gave a speech entitled “Turkey-China Relations in a Changing World Order” at an important think tank. Minister Fidan then met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and clearly presented Turkey’s views at the press conference:

1) One China principle

2) Support for China’s fight against terrorism

3) High level of economic and cultural cooperation

4) Full support for China’s territorial integrity and political sovereignty

5) Opposition to encirclement of China

6) Full support for the Belt and Road Initiative

7) Western peaceful acceptance of rising powers and new competition

8) Common stance on Gaza and Ukraine

Following these messages, Minister Fidan visited the Chinese cities of Kashgar and Urumqi, important centres of the Turkic world and Islamic civilisation. This visit, the first at such a high level by a former head of intelligence in 12 years, caused a stir in Turkey and around the world. The fact that Fidan spoke and interacted with many Uighur Turks during his visit surprised our Western partners and many in Turkey. There were other surprises too. We all witnessed the cultural vibrancy and prosperity of these cities. The children in Urumqi and Kashgar laughing and using Turkish names is very precious when we think of what is happening in Gaza.

While the impact of Minister Fidan’s surprise visit to China was being discussed, his visit to Russia was also being discussed. Minister Fidan, who travelled to Russia to attend the BRICS+ Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held critical meetings in Russia as well as in China. Just 2-3 days before Turkish Foreign Minister Dr Hakan Fidan, Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Alparslan Bayraktar attended the St Petersburg International Economic Forum. There he met with the head of Gazprom and the Russian Minister of Natural Resources and Environment. Minister Fidan, on the other hand, had important meetings with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu and the Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Narishkyn. However, it was Minister Fidan’s reception by Russian President Vladimir Putin that captured the world’s attention. Two former intelligence officers, Dr Hakan Fidan and Vladimir Putin, sat at the same table and became the focus of the world’s press. These meetings were the crowning glory of exceptionally good relations. The main axis of Turkish-Russian negotiations:

1) Increasing trade between the two countries to $100 billion

2) New investments and joint projects

3) Energy and military cooperation

4) Situation in Azerbaijan and Armenia

5) Syria and Libya

6) Common position on Gaza

7) Ukraine crisis

Just as Minister Fidan did not forget the Uighur Turks in China, he did not forget the Meskhetian Turks in Russia. Minister Fidan, who received the Meskhetian Turks, also met with Turkish-Russian businessmen. In addition to these valuable meetings, I think that Turkey should pay special attention to Chechnya and the Chechens.

The last link in Minister Fidan’s never-ending chain of events was the BRICS meeting. Turkey participated in the expanded format of the BRICS+ Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Russia. However, the BRICS meeting was held with the participation of more than 20 countries. Minister Fidan delivered a speech at this meeting. In his speech in China, Minister Fidan had already stated that BRICS was an important alternative and that Turkey wanted to participate in it. Minister Fidan said that they value cooperation with BRICS and that the diversity within BRICS is an important tool to increase development and stability. During this process, Minister Fidan had interesting meetings. Minister Fidan met separately with Cuba and Belarus, which are sanctioned and considered enemies by the US and Western countries. In addition, while Israel was condemned in the final declaration of the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations was supported by all countries, including India.

Turkey’s participation in the BRICS+ foreign ministers’ meeting under the auspices of Dr Hakan Fidan revealed the changing strategic vision of Turkish policymakers. This is because Turkey’s experiences in Ukraine and Gaza have taught it that the US-based Western civilisational system no longer works. Moreover, the inclusion in the BRICS of regional powers in the Middle East, such as Egypt, Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with which Turkey is in competition, has created a situation that needs to be taken into account. Moreover, today we have Russia building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant, China building Turkey’s bridges and railways, Brazil selling us the first floating oil production platform, which Turkey needs, and South Africa opening the trial against Israel, in which Turkey is involved. Obviously, there is a community of BRICS countries with which Turkey is deepening and strengthening its relations in all fields. Because the BRICS countries are providing the high technologies and huge infrastructure projects that our European-American allies have not been providing for years. Moreover, the fact that a NATO country, a member of the OECD and a country waiting to join the EU was present at the BRICS meeting had a great impact not only in our country but also in the world.

Today it is also clear that reading these events as a shift in Turkey’s axis is not understanding the spirit of the times and is not able to read the future. Because Turkey is building its own axis with these moves. It would be impossible for Turkey, which maintains its relations with the West in this construction process, not to take into account new centres of power and civilisation. After all, the Republic of Turkey is a central country and a civilisation state. If we take into account the Organisation of Turkic States, we can better understand the Turkish axis that Turkey wants to build. Because Turkish leaders do not limit Turkey to geographical definitions. In fact, concepts such as West, East, North or South are insufficient for today’s global system. Definitions such as the division of the world into blocs are outdated ideas from the mindless Cold War mentality. In order to understand today, presenting the world in terms of poles or blocks is a tasteless and unsalted outdated description.

I can easily say that Dr Hakan Fidan’s trip to China, his visit to Russia and his participation in the BRICS meeting have shown the whole world, especially our Western friends, Turkey’s position on China’s rise, Russia’s partnership and the future of BRICS. In fact, for Turkey, China and Russia are not seen as enemies or threats, and BRICS is not anti-Western or hostile. This situation has not confused Turkish foreign policy, on the contrary, it has enlightened those who were confused. It was also understood that Turkey’s travel and participation was not only a message to the West. The main reason for this is that the negotiations are not limited to trade and investment. The lengthy discussions, especially on security, military and intelligence issues, suggest something else. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s invitation to Chinese leader Xi Jinping to visit Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reception of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and Hakan Fidan’s meetings with Chinese and Russian security, military and intelligence elites also provide answers. As a footnote, while Minister Fidan was speaking at the BRICS meeting, the President of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, established on China’s initiative, was received by President Erdoğan and new agreements were signed. In addition, the visit of the Brazilian Foreign Minister to Turkey after the BRICS meeting and his reception by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was of great importance. After this meeting, it was announced in the Brazilian media that Brazilian President Lula would visit Turkey.

In the Turkish foreign policy roadmap drawn up by Dr Hakan Fidan, we must see that the importance of BRICS and BRICS members will continue to grow. The economic flexibility and alternatives offered by BRICS will increase the strategic autonomy of Turkish foreign policy. A multilateral and multifaceted Turkey will be able to act more easily. This will help Ankara to become a more effective and visible regional and global power centre. Our Foreign Minister Dr Hakan Fidan’s statements in China, Russia and at the BRICS meeting show that we are determined in this process. Of course, there was an immediate warning from our American allies. Speaking to Reuters, the US ambassador in Ankara expressed his hope that Turkey would not become a member of BRICS. This clearly showed us that Dr Hakan Fidan was in the right place at the right time.

Obviously, Turkey is in the process of building a Turkish foreign policy on its own axis, no longer a follower but a leader in the emerging multi-centre, multi-civilisation, democratic global system. This process has many economic, commercial, political, cultural, scientific, diplomatic and military aspects. Of course, many difficulties await us in this process. However, it is necessary to see that our Foreign Minister Dr Hakan Fidan has opened a new method and a new way for a just world order. This method and path is the vision of the Ankara-centred Turkey axis.

OPINION

Modi’s new ‘coalition’ cabinet signals policy continuity

Published

1 week ago

20/06/2024

Harici.com.tr

Dr. Duygu Çağla Bayram

The results of India’s election, which came in on the evening of Tuesday 4 June after the votes had been counted, showed that Prime Minister Narendra Modi had surprisingly secured a third term in office. The surprise was not that Modi had secured a third term; that was expected. The surprise was that he did it in such a way that he would need coalition partners to form a third term government. The 73-year-old Modi won three consecutive terms, matching Jawaharlal Nehru’s record as the first prime minister, but despite his party’s “landslide” victories in the first two terms, his third term – despite even greater expectations – fell far short of the 272-seat threshold for a clear majority, leaving Modi and his team frustrated. Although Modi had announced on his X platform on the day of the vote count that “we have won a historic/major victory”, this was not the case. While his party, the BJP, secured 240 seats, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which he leads, retained the right to form a government with 53 seats. However, this will be Modi’s first experience of leading a coalition government. Modi’s party, the BJP, has lost ground and will now have to rely on its partners in the National Democratic Alliance, in particular the Janata Dal (United) Party and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP). Nevertheless, despite the setbacks, the BJP won 36.56 per cent of the national vote, only one per cent less than in the 2019 elections. In any case, it must be said at the outset that these election results in India are important in demonstrating democratic vibrancy against the possibility of the country drifting towards one-party rule.

The fact that the opposition almost doubled its vote share surprised everyone in India, everyone outside India and even the opposition itself. The opposition alliance INDIA, led by Rahul Gandhi’s Congress party, won 232 seats, 99 of which were won by the Congress, a sharp increase from 2019, when the Congress and its allies won only 52 seats in 91 constituencies. Rahul Gandhi, 53, heir to the Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty, appears to have a new chance to revive a party and family name that has long been at the centre of politics in the world’s largest democracy, unlike in 2019, when he suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the BJP and resigned as Congress president, a post he was appointed to in 2017. Like his father Rajiv Gandhi, a commercial pilot who was forced into politics after his mother Indira Gandhi, a former prime minister, was shot dead by two bodyguards, Rahul Gandhi was originally a reluctant politician. The legacy of the assassination of his grandmother Indira Gandhi and father Rajiv Gandhi, both prime ministers, forces Rahul Gandhi and his Italian-born mother Sonia Gandhi, a senior Congress leader, to live under tight security. So it remains to be seen how and whether this opportunity will be used by the Congress or by the opposition, which in general does not seem to show much promise… In fact, the Congress, although doing much better than expected, is second only to the BJP and Rahul Gandhi is not seen as an alternative to Modi as prime minister. It is important to recognise that Modi is a hugely popular, globally recognised, oratorically powerful leader and, more importantly, at the helm of a huge party with resources, connections and influence across Indian society. “If there is one thing missing in my life, it is a good opposition,” Modi told a news channel during the election campaign. So a strong opposition seems to be on the cards, but only time will tell whether it will be a “good opposition” or not.

First, it is clear that the surprise election results – in an equation where the Congress and Rahul Gandhi mobilise in the name of secularism, equality, inclusiveness and liberal democracy – are an indication of dissatisfaction with the BJP on economic grounds such as unemployment and inflation, and also on grounds such as Hindu nationalist divisive harsh rhetoric. As a result, much has been written, drawn and said in this short time about Modi’s third term, i.e. the policies of the new government he will form with his coalition partners. There have been views that it will have an impact on domestic and foreign policy, and views that it will not. My view is that it will not have a direct impact, but there is a possibility of a very limited indirect constraint. We need some time to observe this. However, it is not very difficult to draw conclusions and make predictions, even if we look at the new cabinet. In the coalition government announced by Modi on Monday, you can see that the old guard of his party is at the top of the list and their important positions remain unchanged. The first thing I have to say is that 7 of the 71 ministers are women, two of them in the senior cabinet. This is still low for India, which has made efforts to bring women into politics… And the first thing to say about the previous sentence is that this is a clear signal of political continuity. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Home Minister Amit Shah, Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman and Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar remain in their posts. All of them are BJP loyalists and all of them are names whose frequencies are very much in tune with Modi. Meanwhile, BJP president Jagat Prakash Nadda has been appointed health minister.

However, I would like to devote a separate section to Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, who is considered by many in the country to be a “jewel” whose popularity stems from the fact that he has made diplomacy an issue of interest to the common man. Although, as the election results show, foreign policy and diplomacy still do not hold much sway with Indians, I have to say that at least public awareness has begun to emerge. Jaishankar’s books The Indian Way and Why Bharat Matters have put forward a new diplomacy for India. At this point, much of the credit for replacing India’s old tradition of “non-alignment” with the formula of “multilateralism” goes to Jaishankar. The diplomatic rhetoric of Modi and his top aides is taking on a new tone, replacing earlier leftist, anti-colonialist references to ‘non-alignment’ with other terms such as ‘strategic autonomy’ and references to ‘Bharat’ instead of ‘India’. And, more importantly, Jaishankar’s “India is not Western, but it cannot be anti-Western” approach is receiving more praise. He was able to convince Prime Minister Modi, who was once banned from entering the US, that New Delhi could work with Washington, and over the past decade India has built a relationship with America that was once unimaginable. Jaishankar is a pragmatist: no rising power in the last 150 years has succeeded without the West, so India should work with it… I wrote a more detailed assessment of Jaishankar’s worldview in Harici about four months ago. Anyone interested can take a look.

Speaking of the Foreign Secretary, let us turn to foreign policy. The first thing to say is this: A BJP emboldened by the election results is likely to be more modest about its Hindu nationalist ideology and more pragmatic with its coalition partners. But when it comes to India’s foreign policy, strong nationalism is extremely popular beyond the BJP faithful, and it is difficult to see exactly where Modi’s worldview diverges from Hindu nationalism. Another problem: Elections in India are never fought primarily on foreign policy, but their results have consequences. That is, they can influence the policy-making process, the ideology and the worldview of the government in power. In the current situation, the question is whether the coalition partners will force the BJP to return to some semblance of normal parliamentary order, or whether they will instead exercise their power through direct negotiations with the BJP. If normal parliamentary order is restored, the BJP could face new and sustained scrutiny, for example, over controversial national security initiatives such as the Agnipath plan for military recruitment and major defence procurement deals with the US and other foreign suppliers. Budget and procurement decisions, for example, were largely avoided even during Modi’s first two terms and often became the focus of serious political wrangling over allegations of corruption or mismanagement. So Indian ministers and bureaucrats responsible for signing big deals, such as bold investments in defence or the ambitious trade and investment agreements needed to advance Modi’s ambitious agenda on the world stage, may need to think twice.

But foreign policy and national security are unlikely to be priorities for Modi’s coalition government; the BJP’s coalition partners are much more interested in regional and livelihood issues. The coalition leaders have also been given smaller ministries such as heavy industries, food processing and fisheries. The civil aviation ministry, however, belongs to 36-year-old Kinjarapu Ram Mohan Naidu of the TDP, the BJP’s biggest ally. The TDP, originally from Andhra Pradesh, is led by veteran politician Chandrababu Naidu, who began his political career in the Congress. And the next largest party, Bihar’s Janata Dal (United), is led by Nitish Kumar, who has a history of switching allegiance to the BJP to suit his own interests; he was one of the founding members of the opposition alliance that ran against Modi in this year’s elections, but switched sides just weeks before the polls. The point is that the BJP’s dominance in the cabinet far outweighs the need for policy continuity in a coalition government, but at the same time Modi is likely to have to build more consensus in this parliament. Incidentally, unlike the last two governments formed after the BJP won a majority, there are no Muslim MPs in the third term.

All in all, after a decade of stability and predictable politics, India seems to be drifting back into the uncertainty of coalition politics, but it can be predicted that this will be a minor uncertainty. Although the country has been ruled by the NDA coalition for the past 10 years, the ruling party has had an absolute majority on its own. The current NDA alliance will be different from previous ones as the BJP is limited to 240 seats. However, it is important to recognise that the significant reform agenda pursued by the Modi government, as well as the ambitious foreign policy outlook of the last decade, may encourage more parties to volunteer to support it, thus providing greater stability to the government. In the meantime, however, the victory of at least three independent candidates with separatist ideologies should not be overlooked. Two of them, Amritpal Singh and Sarabjeet Singh Khalsa, open supporters of the Khalistan ideology, won from Punjab, while the third, Kashmiri separatist Abdul Rashid Sheikh, popularly known as Engineer Rashid, was elected from Jammu and Kashmir. Amritpal Singh and Engineer Rashid won the elections from jails where they were detained for anti-India activities. The last time a separatist voice entered the Indian parliament was in 1999, when Simranjit Singh Mann was elected from Sangrur in Punjab. In short, the third victory of the Modi-led coalition is a parliamentary record in India, but the current situation calls for more compromise and responsible politics. It is worth noting that Mahatma Gandhi, who first introduced coalition politics in India’s pre-independence era, attributed his success to humility and courtesy.

Finally, India’s election results cannot be viewed through the prism of China and America, with whom India has a bipolar relationship:

One of the short-term consequences of Modi’s relative loss of power may be related to India’s troubled relationship with China. The long-awaited return of China’s ambassador to New Delhi in May seemed to signal that Beijing and New Delhi were ready to resume normalised relations after the Indian elections. Perhaps anticipating another landslide victory for Modi, China may have preferred to strike a deal to reduce bilateral tensions during his five-year term. At the same time, expecting a solid victory, Modi could have used his unchallenged political standing at home to gain an advantageous position in negotiations with Beijing. But if China now perceives that Modi is in a difficult political position, it may rethink its negotiating calculations and take a tougher line. Modi, in turn, may postpone any overtures to Beijing to avoid criticism from his domestic political rivals. In short, the difficult India-China relationship will continue to be difficult and the focus for India will continue to be on China.

India’s election results may also affect American and Western perceptions of India and Modi. In today’s murky world, America positions New Delhi as a natural strategic partner and counterweight to authoritarian China because of India’s democratic credentials. This is unlikely to change, at least under current circumstances. However, there already seems to be a section in the West that is stressing that the unpredictability of the Indian elections and the fact that Modi and the BJP, whose authoritarian tendencies have imposed increasingly serious political commitments on India, have been punished by the Indian electorate is proof that Indian democracy is alive and kicking, that it reduces the risk of the country sliding into autocracy and that it promises to change India for the better. While this is a typical case of “I change my mind when the facts change”, the China factor will remain the common denominator, at least for the foreseeable future.