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Revisiting the Bandung spirit in a multipolar world

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Fang Xuting, Research Assistant at Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University

How China articulates its diplomatic discourse?

From April 18 to 24, 1955, government delegations from 29 Asian and African countries and regions convened in Bandung, Indonesia, for a historic Afro-Asian Conference. On the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, against the backdrop of a rapidly transforming global order marked by the rise of the “Global South” and the restructuring of traditional international power dynamics, revisiting the memory of the conference and the enduring “Bandung Spirit” acquires new strategic significance. For contemporary China, it offers fresh value in advancing multilateral diplomacy, deepening South-South cooperation, and contributing to the reconfiguration of the international order.

Historical context of the Bandung Conference

In the 1950s, during the intensification of the Cold War, the two ideological blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly competed for influence in the Third World. Leaders of newly emerging states in Asia and Africa sought self-determination, while anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements gained momentum. The colonial system began to unravel. Independent nations in Asia and Africa became bolder in asserting neutrality in international affairs and grew increasingly active in United Nations forums in the early 1950s. For example, India repeatedly spoke on behalf of Asian and Arab countries, calling for a ceasefire and peaceful resolution to the Korean War. It openly criticized American military policy, showing no fear of power politics.

At the Bogor Conference held in late 1954, five countries—India, Indonesia, Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and Pakistan—issued a joint communiqué to formally initiate the first Asian-African Conference in 1955. Based on the principle of “independent governments,” thirty countries, including China, were invited to participate.

From the perspective of China’s diplomatic transition, the Bandung Conference represented a significant moment when the newly founded People’s Republic of China moved away from a revolutionary foreign policy and toward one based on state diplomacy. It symbolized a departure from the binary Cold War alignment toward an independent foreign policy grounded in peaceful coexistence. In fact, even before the conference—particularly following the Korean War (1950–1953)—China had already shown interest in moderating its foreign policy to present a more peaceful image to its Asian and African neighbors.

Although China’s participation in the Korean War was only a part of the broader conflict, its role was militarily decisive. The war’s outcomes significantly influenced the trajectory of socialist movements and national liberation struggles in Asia. The emergence of socialist states in both Asia and Europe enabled a geopolitical counterbalance to Western powers. For a considerable period, the bipolar confrontation between East and West maintained a strategic equilibrium, as Western powers led by the United States were no longer facing only the socialist bloc in Europe, but an alliance of socialist countries in both Europe and Asia.

Moreover, the war marked the first direct military confrontation between China and a major Western power since the founding of the People’s Republic. Through tenacious combat, China compelled the United States to return to the negotiating table, rescued the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crisis, defended its own national borders, solidified the Sino-Soviet alliance, and elevated its international standing. China emphasized the war’s just cause—”resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea; safeguarding the homeland”—and linked its narrative to global anti-imperialist struggles, resonating strongly with the anti-colonial aspirations of newly emerging Asian and African nations. These rhetorical and ideological alignments laid a strong foundation for China’s solidarity with the Third World.

Lastly, China’s diplomatic and military engagement during the Korean War, including the Panmunjom negotiations, provided valuable experience in dealing with the West—an experience that would later prove instrumental in Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic success at the Bandung Conference.

On April 18, 1955, the Bandung Conference officially commenced. By the evening of April 24, the final plenary session unanimously adopted the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference—the first joint statement in history issued collectively by 29 Asian and African countries. The communiqué included the Ten Principles of Bandung, which addressed issues related to anti-colonialism and national independence, adopted resolutions promoting global peace and cooperation, and reaffirmed the common aspiration of the Asian and African peoples to oppose aggression and uphold world peace.

The historical value of the Bandung spirit and China’s contributions

The Bandung Conference was the largest and most representative intercontinental summit of its time, covering the widest geographic area and population. It embodied the collective will of Asian and African nations to oppose imperialism and colonialism, safeguard national independence, and promote peace and development. The spirit of Bandung—seeking common ground while reserving differences, peaceful coexistence, solidarity, cooperation, and joint struggle—has since become a cherished intellectual legacy in world history. It had a profound impact on how developing countries later approached international relations. As a staunch supporter and active participant, China contributed significantly to the formation of the Bandung Spirit by offering Chinese wisdom and diplomatic experience.

1- The integration of China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence

The concluding section of the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference included a declaration on promoting world peace and cooperation, which was adopted unanimously based on a Chinese proposal. This declaration outlined ten principles for conducting international relations, such as respect for fundamental human rights and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; recognition of the equality of all races and nations, large or small; and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The Ten Principles of Bandung fully incorporated all elements of Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and further developed them.

2- China’s consistent anti-imperialist and anti-colonial position

China’s leadership, reflecting on the historical context of the 1950s characterized by “war and revolution,” defined the newly founded People’s Republic as a socialist nation that had suffered colonial aggression and attained national independence. This identity guided its foreign policy during the Bandung era. At meetings leading up to the conference, Zhou Enlai articulated a typology of countries within the capitalist bloc, arguing that China should isolate the United States, win over the intermediate states, and unite with the most oppressed nations. Accordingly, China’s primary objective in attending the Bandung Conference was to break its international isolation and fully support the just struggle for national liberation in Asia and Africa—thereby playing a foundational role in shaping the Bandung Spirit.

3- China’s introduction of the “seeking common ground while reserving differences” diplomatic approach

Given the diverse ideological orientations of participating nations and the anti-communist propaganda led by the United States and its allies, many delegations were wary of China. Some even argued that both colonialism and communism should be condemned. Faced with this challenge, Zhou Enlai offered a conciliatory and inclusive response: “There are disagreements among us, but acknowledging such differences is, in itself, a form of agreement”. China deliberately adopted a “non-argumentative” approach, avoiding revolutionary or ideological rhetoric in response to accusations. This enabled the conference to proceed smoothly.

During the conference, China adhered to the principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences and signed the Treaty on Dual Nationality with Indonesia. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sunario praised the agreement as one reached “in the spirit of goodwill and tolerance between two Asian nations,” a spirit that, in his view, had guided the Bandung Conference itself.

The contemporary relevance of the Bandung spirit and its inheritance by China

Over the past 70 years, the global landscape has undergone profound transformations. The colonial system has collapsed, the bipolar Cold War confrontation has become a thing of the past, and economic globalization has deepened. Peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit have become the dominant themes of the era. However, the essential contradictions in the international community have not fundamentally changed. The unjust and unequal political and economic order persists, and tensions among civilizations, ideologies, political systems, and development models continue to exist.

Currently, three key characteristics define the global landscape. First, in the security domain, great power rivalry, bloc confrontation, regional conflicts, and domestic unrest interact and reinforce one another, shaping the international security order. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 may signal the end of the post-Cold War era and the beginning of what scholars have termed a “post-post-Cold War era,” marked by increasing global instability.

Second, in the ideological domain, the West’s narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” clashes with the Global South’s advocacy for “multiple modernities.” While the United States promotes value-based diplomacy and exclusionary alliances such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, Global South countries prioritize development rights and sovereign equality, rejecting the binary logic of alignment. Meanwhile, algorithmic amplification on social media has intensified information warfare, turning global public opinion into a new arena of great power soft power competition.

Third, in the economic domain, the rise of the Global South and the emergence of new forms of South-South cooperation have reshaped the global development landscape. Compared with the past, southern countries now possess greater material capacity, developmental experience, and institutional platforms. Their structural power has grown significantly, allowing them to play increasingly influential roles in today’s global transformations.

As a participant in the Bandung Conference and a key leader of the Global South, China must inherit and advance the Bandung Spirit by aligning it with the characteristics of the new era in order to effectively articulate its own diplomatic discourse in an increasingly multipolar world.

1- Using “peaceful coexistence” to mitigate bloc confrontation

China must continue to oppose Cold War thinking and promote a “comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” approach to security. At the conceptual level, China’s proposed Global Security Initiative aligns with many of the Global South’s concerns. As such, it can serve as a guiding framework for forming a Global South Security Perspective. In practice, China should strengthen both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy among Global South nations. Two typical forms of multilateralism have emerged:

First, multilateral cooperation among major Global South powers, with BRICS as a typical example. In the context of intensifying great power competition, BRICS expansion—particularly the inclusion of Middle Eastern states—signals that the mechanism may play a greater role in security governance. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS should be used to coordinate security interests and counter the exclusivity of Indo-Pacific strategies.

Second, cooperation between Global South powers and entire regional groupings. Examples include China’s engagement with Africa, Arab states, and Pacific island nations. Forums such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum provide platforms for de-escalating regional hotspots and rejecting bloc-based confrontation.

2- Offsetting value-based diplomacy with the principle of “seeking common ground while reserving differences”

The concept of seeking common ground while reserving differences, first proposed by Zhou Enlai at Bandung, emphasized resisting ideological dogmatism in favor of pragmatic cooperation. Today, China must challenge the “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative by emphasizing the principle of sovereign equality and the right of all nations to choose their own development paths. The principle of mutual respect and inclusiveness should guide international relations, supporting a model that emphasizes dialogue among civilizations and reciprocal learning among systems.

China must oppose unilateralism, zero-sum thinking, and hegemonic practices, while promoting a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation. It should also accelerate the construction of a Global South discourse system that prioritizes development rights. On international platforms such as the UN Human Rights Council, China must resist the politicization of human rights by Western powers. Moreover, international communication should be strengthened through platforms such as CGTN and TikTok, using effective Belt and Road cooperation cases to counter perception warfare.

3- Driving development paradigm transformation through South-South cooperation

From the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to the Bandung Spirit and the emergence of new South-South cooperation, the core has always been respect for the diversity of development paths and partnerships grounded in equality, solidarity, and mutual benefit. The goal is to overcome poverty and underdevelopment, build a just global order, and realize unity in diversity.

China must deepen the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly in Asia and Africa, focusing on infrastructure and capacity cooperation. According to the Outlook on the High-Quality Development of the Belt and Road Initiative for the Next Decade, China should prioritize “small but beautiful” livelihood projects, thereby fulfilling the Bandung ideal of economic mutual assistance.

China must innovate in South-South cooperation models. Traditional international development paradigms—largely shaped by the modernization experiences of developed Western countries—tend to flow unidirectionally, compelling recipient nations to conform institutionally to Western norms. In contrast, China should continue promoting the co-modernization model it has pursued with Africa. This approach emphasizes mutual interaction and shared agency, stimulating local initiative through bottom-up consultation, joint construction, and co-sharing, and thereby fostering more equal and sustainable development partnerships.

China must serve as a model of modernization. The new practices of Chinese-style modernization not only provide a solid foundation for China’s leadership in Global South development, but also offer alternative development paths to other Global South countries. With China–Africa co-modernization as a key strategic focus, China can help pioneer a new paradigm of international modernization cooperation.

In 1955, by seizing the opportunity presented by the Bandung Conference, the People’s Republic of China successfully broke through Western isolation and blockade, presenting itself as a trustworthy partner for the Third World. Seventy years later, China should once again draw upon the Bandung experience, integrating the Bandung Spirit with the practice of diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era. In doing so, China will help construct a more just and reasonable international order and contribute to world peace and development. This is not only a tribute to history, but also a response to present challenges and an exploration of the future.

Diplomacy

India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets

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India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.

According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.

Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.

That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.

Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.

India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.

However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.

Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.

According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.

A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.

Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.

Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.

According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.

New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.

Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.

Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.

Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.

However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.

Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.

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EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor

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Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.

According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.

The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.

In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.

The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.

Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.

Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road

The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.

Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.

The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.

During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.

Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact

One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.

The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.

In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.

The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.

By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.

Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.

Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.

China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.

The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.

Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition

In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.

These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.

Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.

The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.

The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.

However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.

The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership

EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.

In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).

The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.

During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.

The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.

That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.

EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

‘America First’ in Africa

The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.

In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.

An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.

For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.

Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.

Germany in Africa for the energy transition

Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”

The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”

Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.

The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.

Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.

German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.

Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.

In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.

Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.

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EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts

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The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.

German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”

Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.

As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.

The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.

Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.

Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.

In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.

Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.

As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.

Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.

“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.

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