Opinion
The U.S. pressure on Iran: Bow drawn but not yet fully pulled
On April 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced to the media at the White House that he had set a final deadline for Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the U.S. If Iran does not abandon its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. will “definitely” take military action, and Israel will be deeply involved and become a “leader” in this. Clearly, “Trump 2.0” has added more military threat to Iran, but overall, this pressure resembles drawing a bow without fully pulling it—extreme pressure that may reignite the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” set seven years ago.
Trump met with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which the U.S. announced it was holding direct negotiations with Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi confirmed on April 8 that indirect high-level talks would take place on April 12 in Oman, but denied any direct talks as claimed by the U.S.
Analysts believe the summit focused not only on bilateral trade tariffs and the Gaza situation, but also on coordinating a unified stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Based on Trump’s statements, Israel is expected to strike Iran if it crosses the nuclear threshold—i.e., acquires actual nuclear weapons—by targeting its nuclear facilities. The U.S. seems to want to keep military action as “Plan B,” exerting heavy pressure through negotiations first and resorting to military means only if talks fail, possibly in coordination with Israel.
Iran, long accustomed to U.S.-Israeli military threats, seems unfazed by this war intimidation. Iranian President Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran “does not seek nuclear weapons,” emphasizing the country’s long-term need for nuclear science and energy. On April 10, Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated on platform X that if external threats persist, Iran may suspend cooperation with the IAEA, expel inspectors, and consider relocating enriched materials to secure domestic sites.
Less than 100 days into “Trump 2.0,” the administration is in full attack mode, waging economic war on all trade partners in the name of “Make America Great Again.” By attempting to open the “Pandora’s box”of disrupting the global trade system, he seeks to force all trading partners back into a corner. While global attention is focused on avoiding U.S. economic coercion and “public robbery,” geopolitical conflicts are momentarily overshadowed.
From a geopolitical standpoint, Trump’s return focuses on two major battlefields: the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East, with the latter’s key goal being the subjugation of Iran—a goal unfulfilled in his first term. Thus, the new U.S. Iran policy under Trump centers on threats and coercion, supplemented by engagement and negotiation, with gradually increasing pressure and strategic encirclement, avoiding military action unless absolutely necessary.
Currently, the Trump administration is “riding the momentum,” fully cooperating with Israel to weaken and dismantle the “Axis of Resistance.” Following actions against Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and resistance forces in Iraq, efforts now focus on resolving the Gaza issue, with military strikes targeting Yemen’s Houthis, while maintaining pressure on Iran to achieve “Middle East peace under Trump”: expanding Arab-Israeli normalization and isolating Iran—the region’s long-standing anti-U.S. and anti-Israel force.
For some time, the Trump administration has unconditionally supported Israel, using transactional strategies like promoting “clearing Gaza” or “taking over Gaza” to pressure Arab states into aiding Israel. It aims to usher in a “post-Hamas era” and reshape the political and geopolitical ecology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it strikes Yemen’s Houthis under the pretense of protecting Red Sea routes and portrays Iran not just as a partner but as the master of the Houthis, seeking justification for continued suppression of Iran.
Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Trump is displaying a more aggressive war stance than during his first term, publicly declaring “if talks fail, we will strike,” openly supporting Israel in bringing war to the Persian Gulf. The U.S., in collaboration with Israel, is exerting high pressure on Iran, and clearly enjoys three advantages:
First, Iran has suffered major setbacks in over a year of the “Sixth Middle East War,” and its bottom line of avoiding full-scale war has been thoroughly exposed. The “Axis of Resistance” is also scattered and fragmented.
Second, U.S.-Russia relations have drastically reversed. After suffering a strategic diplomatic failure in the Middle East, Russia is now focusing on dividing up Ukraine’s land and mineral resources with the U.S.
Third, although Russia and Iran still maintain good relations, Russia has openly stated that it has no intention of intervening if Iran is attacked.
When Trump first took office in 2017, after half a year of observation and bargaining, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. At that time, I wrote that Trump didn’t withdraw just for the sake of it. Unlike other withdrawal actions rooted in isolationism, America-first ideology, and anti-globalization/multilateralism, Trump’s move was strategic — “retreating in order to advance.” By dismantling the nuclear agreement, he aimed to start anew or add terms, in an attempt to solve the broader Middle East issue in one go and serve America’s core interests and Middle East policy.
On May 21, 2018, the U.S. State Department proposed a complete “Plan B,” not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat but also to bury Iran’s painstaking geopolitical achievements in the Middle East and reshape regional dynamics and U.S.-Iran/Israel-Iran relations. This plan was essentially a replica of the U.S. strategy toward North Korea — a typical “carrot and stick” approach. However, compared to U.S. demands on North Korea, this plan was stricter, more comprehensive, and far-reaching — aiming to resolve historical and current contradictions in the Middle East and return the region to a relatively balanced framework.
Therefore, Trump’s renewed focus on Iran’s nuclear issue is merely a rehash of old issues, and hasn’t yet reached the high-pressure levels or demands of seven years ago. At that time, the U.S. policy toward Iran was a well-prepared, strategic combination — probably now forgotten by many — known as the “Pompeo 12 Conditions.” It is thus worthwhile to revisit this list in evaluating today’s Trump-style Iran policy.
Pompeo’ 12 Conditions
In his speech at the Heritage Foundation, Pompeo emphasized that Iran must meet 12 demands in exchange for the lifting of all U.S. sanctions and a full restoration of bilateral relations. Otherwise, Iran would face “the most severe sanctions in history.” These 12 conditions fall into categories, urging Iran to completely abandon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, release detained individuals, stop supporting terrorism, and halt interference in the internal affairs and security of regional countries.
The four demands related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were:
-Iran must declare all military nuclear activities to the IAEA and permanently and verifiably abandon them.
-Cease all uranium enrichment, never pursue plutonium reprocessing, and shut down heavy water reactors.
-Allow unconditional IAEA inspections at any site.
-End the development and launch of ballistic missiles, and halt development of nuclear-capable missile systems.
Even from a nuclear non-proliferation standpoint, these conditions go far beyond those in the Iran nuclear deal and aim to completely strip Iran of its ability to acquire nuclear weapons or deliver them via long-range missiles.
The Remaining Eight of the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” and Their Implications
Three of the conditions relate to non-state actors. They require Iran to:
-Immediately cease support for so-called “terrorist organizations” in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad;
-Stop supporting “terrorist forces” such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and surrounding areas, and cease sheltering senior al-Qaeda leaders;
-End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (especially the Quds Force)’s support for “terrorists” and “armed groups” around the world.
The U.S. believes Iran is the patron or ally of various extremist organizations in the Middle East, especially a stumbling block and root cause preventing Palestinian and Arab concessions to Israel. It sees Iran as a troublemaker hindering peace in the region. Thus, resolving the Middle East issue thoroughly must start with Iran.
Four conditions relate to Iran’s relations with regional states:
-Respect Iraq’s sovereignty, allow Iranian-backed Shia militias to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society;
-End military support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels and work toward a political solution for the Yemen conflict;
-Withdraw all Iranian military forces from Syria;
-Cease threats to destroy Israel, missile launches at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, threats to international shipping, and cyberattacks.
Additionally, the U.S. demanded Iran release all “detained” American citizens and those of its allies and partners.
These eight conditions, unrelated to nuclear weapons or missile programs, go far beyond nuclear issues. They show the U.S.’s intent to comprehensively constrain and curb Iran’s military and diplomatic activities in the Middle East and globally. This is a strategic countermeasure against Iran’s regional expansion, which threatens U.S. allies like Israel and Gulf states and intensifies sectarian and ethnic conflicts. It aims to pressure Iran to halt foreign influence and give up the gains it made during its expansion.
As a “reward” for complying with these 12 conditions, the U.S. promised to sign a new nuclear agreement with Iran if it made real, visible, and sustainable changes. It would also lift all sanctions, gradually restore diplomatic and economic ties, allow Iran access to advanced technologies, and support its economic modernization and integration into the global economy.
Clearly, this is the Trump administration’s new Iran strategy—a roadmap to comprehensively resolve the U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israel hostilities and reshape the geopolitical landscape. It includes both the “spiked club” of pressure and the tempting “carrot” of incentives. The aim is to downgrade Iran from a “regional superpower” back to a normal state, as it was before the Islamic Revolution, to eliminate all of the U.S. and its allies’ security concerns.
Iran completely rejected the “Pompeo 12 Conditions,” seeing them as an ultimatum demanding total surrender. To accept them would mean abandoning the grand vision and sacrifices of the Islamic Revolution and returning to a submissive, ordinary state. The Trump administration followed up with more sanctions. But Iran endured until Biden took office—and now again under Trump’s return.
From “Trump 1.0” to “Trump 2.0,” eight years have passed. The nuclear deal hasn’t been revived, and the nuclear crisis hasn’t escalated into war. But the current geopolitical and security landscape is clearly more unfavorable to Iran: it suffered military defeat in the Eastern Mediterranean, lost the strategic western flank of the “Shia Crescent” due to Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Damascus regime.
In Israel’s large-scale raid in October 2024, it successfully opened an aerial corridor from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, launched warning strikes deep into Iranian territory, and exposed Iran’s weak bottom line of lacking will to retaliate symmetrically. Now, as “Trump 2.0” begins, Iraq—the key node of the “Shia Crescent”—faces diplomatic pressure to break away from Iran and rejoin the Arab world. Overall, Iran’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating, while U.S.-Israeli control of Eastern Mediterranean airspace increases the risk of military escalation. The pressure Iran faces now exceeds that of “Trump 1.0.”
Although Pompeo is no longer on the “Trump 1.0 chariot,” the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” reflect the core thinking of Trump’s national security team regarding the Middle East and remain the foundation of U.S. policy toward Iran. Far from being discarded, these conditions may be gradually revived under “Trump 2.0,” tightening the strategic bowstring to pressure Iran toward compromise.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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