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The U.S. pressure on Iran: Bow drawn but not yet fully pulled

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On April 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced to the media at the White House that he had set a final deadline for Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the U.S. If Iran does not abandon its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. will “definitely” take military action, and Israel will be deeply involved and become a “leader” in this. Clearly, “Trump 2.0” has added more military threat to Iran, but overall, this pressure resembles drawing a bow without fully pulling it—extreme pressure that may reignite the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” set seven years ago.

Trump met with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which the U.S. announced it was holding direct negotiations with Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi confirmed on April 8 that indirect high-level talks would take place on April 12 in Oman, but denied any direct talks as claimed by the U.S.

Analysts believe the summit focused not only on bilateral trade tariffs and the Gaza situation, but also on coordinating a unified stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Based on Trump’s statements, Israel is expected to strike Iran if it crosses the nuclear threshold—i.e., acquires actual nuclear weapons—by targeting its nuclear facilities. The U.S. seems to want to keep military action as “Plan B,” exerting heavy pressure through negotiations first and resorting to military means only if talks fail, possibly in coordination with Israel.

Iran, long accustomed to U.S.-Israeli military threats, seems unfazed by this war intimidation. Iranian President Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran “does not seek nuclear weapons,” emphasizing the country’s long-term need for nuclear science and energy. On April 10, Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated on platform X that if external threats persist, Iran may suspend cooperation with the IAEA, expel inspectors, and consider relocating enriched materials to secure domestic sites.

Less than 100 days into “Trump 2.0,” the administration is in full attack mode, waging economic war on all trade partners in the name of “Make America Great Again.” By attempting to open the “Pandora’s box”of disrupting the global trade system, he seeks to force all trading partners back into a corner. While global attention is focused on avoiding U.S. economic coercion and “public robbery,” geopolitical conflicts are momentarily overshadowed.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Trump’s return focuses on two major battlefields: the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East, with the latter’s key goal being the subjugation of Iran—a goal unfulfilled in his first term. Thus, the new U.S. Iran policy under Trump centers on threats and coercion, supplemented by engagement and negotiation, with gradually increasing pressure and strategic encirclement, avoiding military action unless absolutely necessary.

Currently, the Trump administration is “riding the momentum,” fully cooperating with Israel to weaken and dismantle the “Axis of Resistance.” Following actions against Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and resistance forces in Iraq, efforts now focus on resolving the Gaza issue, with military strikes targeting Yemen’s Houthis, while maintaining pressure on Iran to achieve “Middle East peace under Trump”: expanding Arab-Israeli normalization and isolating Iran—the region’s long-standing anti-U.S. and anti-Israel force.

For some time, the Trump administration has unconditionally supported Israel, using transactional strategies like promoting “clearing Gaza” or “taking over Gaza” to pressure Arab states into aiding Israel. It aims to usher in a “post-Hamas era” and reshape the political and geopolitical ecology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it strikes Yemen’s Houthis under the pretense of protecting Red Sea routes and portrays Iran not just as a partner but as the master of the Houthis, seeking justification for continued suppression of Iran.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Trump is displaying a more aggressive war stance than during his first term, publicly declaring “if talks fail, we will strike,” openly supporting Israel in bringing war to the Persian Gulf. The U.S., in collaboration with Israel, is exerting high pressure on Iran, and clearly enjoys three advantages:

First, Iran has suffered major setbacks in over a year of the “Sixth Middle East War,” and its bottom line of avoiding full-scale war has been thoroughly exposed. The “Axis of Resistance” is also scattered and fragmented.

Second, U.S.-Russia relations have drastically reversed. After suffering a strategic diplomatic failure in the Middle East, Russia is now focusing on dividing up Ukraine’s land and mineral resources with the U.S.

Third, although Russia and Iran still maintain good relations, Russia has openly stated that it has no intention of intervening if Iran is attacked.

When Trump first took office in 2017, after half a year of observation and bargaining, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. At that time, I wrote that Trump didn’t withdraw just for the sake of it. Unlike other withdrawal actions rooted in isolationism, America-first ideology, and anti-globalization/multilateralism, Trump’s move was strategic — “retreating in order to advance.” By dismantling the nuclear agreement, he aimed to start anew or add terms, in an attempt to solve the broader Middle East issue in one go and serve America’s core interests and Middle East policy.

On May 21, 2018, the U.S. State Department proposed a complete “Plan B,” not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat but also to bury Iran’s painstaking geopolitical achievements in the Middle East and reshape regional dynamics and U.S.-Iran/Israel-Iran relations. This plan was essentially a replica of the U.S. strategy toward North Korea — a typical “carrot and stick” approach. However, compared to U.S. demands on North Korea, this plan was stricter, more comprehensive, and far-reaching — aiming to resolve historical and current contradictions in the Middle East and return the region to a relatively balanced framework.

Therefore, Trump’s renewed focus on Iran’s nuclear issue is merely a rehash of old issues, and hasn’t yet reached the high-pressure levels or demands of seven years ago. At that time, the U.S. policy toward Iran was a well-prepared, strategic combination — probably now forgotten by many — known as the “Pompeo 12 Conditions.” It is thus worthwhile to revisit this list in evaluating today’s Trump-style Iran policy.

Pompeo’ 12 Conditions

 In his speech at the Heritage Foundation, Pompeo emphasized that Iran must meet 12 demands in exchange for the lifting of all U.S. sanctions and a full restoration of bilateral relations. Otherwise, Iran would face “the most severe sanctions in history.” These 12 conditions fall into categories, urging Iran to completely abandon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, release detained individuals, stop supporting terrorism, and halt interference in the internal affairs and security of regional countries.

The four demands related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were:

-Iran must declare all military nuclear activities to the IAEA and permanently and verifiably abandon them.

-Cease all uranium enrichment, never pursue plutonium reprocessing, and shut down heavy water reactors.

-Allow unconditional IAEA inspections at any site.

-End the development and launch of ballistic missiles, and halt development of nuclear-capable missile systems.

Even from a nuclear non-proliferation standpoint, these conditions go far beyond those in the Iran nuclear deal and aim to completely strip Iran of its ability to acquire nuclear weapons or deliver them via long-range missiles.

The Remaining Eight of the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” and Their Implications

Three of the conditions relate to non-state actors. They require Iran to:

-Immediately cease support for so-called “terrorist organizations” in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad;

-Stop supporting “terrorist forces” such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and surrounding areas, and cease sheltering senior al-Qaeda leaders;

-End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (especially the Quds Force)’s support for “terrorists” and “armed groups” around the world.

The U.S. believes Iran is the patron or ally of various extremist organizations in the Middle East, especially a stumbling block and root cause preventing Palestinian and Arab concessions to Israel. It sees Iran as a troublemaker hindering peace in the region. Thus, resolving the Middle East issue thoroughly must start with Iran.

Four conditions relate to Iran’s relations with regional states:

-Respect Iraq’s sovereignty, allow Iranian-backed Shia militias to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society;

-End military support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels and work toward a political solution for the Yemen conflict;

-Withdraw all Iranian military forces from Syria;

-Cease threats to destroy Israel, missile launches at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, threats to international shipping, and cyberattacks.

Additionally, the U.S. demanded Iran release all “detained” American citizens and those of its allies and partners.

These eight conditions, unrelated to nuclear weapons or missile programs, go far beyond nuclear issues. They show the U.S.’s intent to comprehensively constrain and curb Iran’s military and diplomatic activities in the Middle East and globally. This is a strategic countermeasure against Iran’s regional expansion, which threatens U.S. allies like Israel and Gulf states and intensifies sectarian and ethnic conflicts. It aims to pressure Iran to halt foreign influence and give up the gains it made during its expansion.

As a “reward” for complying with these 12 conditions, the U.S. promised to sign a new nuclear agreement with Iran if it made real, visible, and sustainable changes. It would also lift all sanctions, gradually restore diplomatic and economic ties, allow Iran access to advanced technologies, and support its economic modernization and integration into the global economy.

Clearly, this is the Trump administration’s new Iran strategy—a roadmap to comprehensively resolve the U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israel hostilities and reshape the geopolitical landscape. It includes both the “spiked club” of pressure and the tempting “carrot” of incentives. The aim is to downgrade Iran from a “regional superpower” back to a normal state, as it was before the Islamic Revolution, to eliminate all of the U.S. and its allies’ security concerns.

Iran completely rejected the “Pompeo 12 Conditions,” seeing them as an ultimatum demanding total surrender. To accept them would mean abandoning the grand vision and sacrifices of the Islamic Revolution and returning to a submissive, ordinary state. The Trump administration followed up with more sanctions. But Iran endured until Biden took office—and now again under Trump’s return.

From “Trump 1.0” to “Trump 2.0,” eight years have passed. The nuclear deal hasn’t been revived, and the nuclear crisis hasn’t escalated into war. But the current geopolitical and security landscape is clearly more unfavorable to Iran: it suffered military defeat in the Eastern Mediterranean, lost the strategic western flank of the “Shia Crescent” due to Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Damascus regime.

In Israel’s large-scale raid in October 2024, it successfully opened an aerial corridor from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, launched warning strikes deep into Iranian territory, and exposed Iran’s weak bottom line of lacking will to retaliate symmetrically. Now, as “Trump 2.0” begins, Iraq—the key node of the “Shia Crescent”—faces diplomatic pressure to break away from Iran and rejoin the Arab world. Overall, Iran’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating, while U.S.-Israeli control of Eastern Mediterranean airspace increases the risk of military escalation. The pressure Iran faces now exceeds that of “Trump 1.0.”

Although Pompeo is no longer on the “Trump 1.0 chariot,” the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” reflect the core thinking of Trump’s national security team regarding the Middle East and remain the foundation of U.S. policy toward Iran. Far from being discarded, these conditions may be gradually revived under “Trump 2.0,” tightening the strategic bowstring to pressure Iran toward compromise.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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