Opinion
Conflicting alliance
In Russia, the criticism of the economic dogmatism of the ‘financial bloc’ comes from two currents that mostly overlap. The first is Sergey Glazyev, a patriotic who serves on the Eurasian Economic Commission’s Board of Integration and Macroeconomics. Glazyev, whose influence on the Kremlin is constantly speculated (he was one of Putin’s advisers between 2012 and 2019), could take a left-wing stance so much as acted together with the “Left Front” in the 2017 elections. As recently as 20 April 2022, he accused the Central Bank of not knowing the first thing about the credit system and of acting “according to primitive IMF dogmas relying on foreign investment-hungry citizens of the underdeveloped countries.” In many ways, Glazyev is advocating a new New Economic Policy (NEP). A Just Russia’s far-left deputy Mikhail Delyagin and the Communist Party form the second current. They, too, favor nationalizations and a new “Gosplan” in one form or another.

Sergey Glazyev with Putin
But in addition to crossing each other, these two overlapping currents also interact with the “financial bloc.”
The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are the two institutions that make up the “financial bloc.” At the very least, it is clear that the Central Bank has made an unmatched effort to overcome the crisis (within capitalism, of course). In actuality, the praise and even admiration given by European, and US financial institutions demonstrated that its efforts had been somewhat successful. But given that the Central Bank, which prior to February 24 was the “regulator” (i.e., policymaker), is now becoming a “technician” (i.e., practitioner), this inflationist praise and achievement should also be seen as an indication of the breakdown of the conventional “financial bloc”. It was no accident that in early June the attack of economists on the Central Bank for failing to depreciate the ruble was prompted by one of most audacious defenders of the “financial bloc”, RBK, a media conglomerate particularly specializing in economic news.
I have often dwelled on the dogmatism of this bloc. However, at least two instances illustrating the extent of dogmatism should be provided. When we look at these examples, we will also see how internal conflicts work and which factors limit them.
Default
First off, the Ministry of Finance, if not the Central Bank, employed every means to prevent saying that Russia had defaulted, including continuing to pay Eurobonds in foreign currency. Moreover, apart from the irresistible temptation of paying off the creditor, the Ministry had a potent ally: PIMCO (Pacific Investment Management Company). According to data from Tinkoff Investment Advisory, as of mid-May, PIMCO had sold CDS as insurance policies to Russia’s $3.1 billion in foreign debt bonds, demonstrating how confident it was that the country would not go into default. Furthermore, PIMCO had invested roughly $1 billion in credit risk premium (CDS) in Russia last year alone (The seller’s promise to pay the buyer the difference between the nominal price and the market price of these bonds in the event that the issuing nation defaults is known as a “bill” or “derivative”). In order to avert a possible loss, PIMCO was forced to advocate “let them pay”. However, neither the voice of money nor PIMCO’s lobbying efforts were able to prevent it from happening. The bond payments had to halt when the US Treasury Department eventually blocked the OFAC license on May 25. The next installments due on June 24 could not be made, which led to what Medvedev called a “political default.”
However, the world did not come to an end because it was seen that the fixation with default was founded, like all obsessions, on an entirely nonsensical justification. As a matter of fact, payments that were unable to be fulfilled were no longer in the news in the days that followed.
Let’s not forget the other performer on the stage, by the way. PIMCO doesn’t appear to lose money. One of the defining characteristics of the neoliberal period, which worships the financial god, is the use of “derivatives” or risk management coupons, etc. These are ways to extract surplus value through speculation, but more crucially, the forces that drive the market are playing in an echo chamber where the house always wins. The CDS committee, established by the huge businesses that market CDS policies, decides if a nation defaults. Naturally, there was no market left after the US Department of Finance blocked the OFAC license. What should poor PIMCO and poor Golden Sachs do when there is no market, no way to ascertain the market price, and to quantify the difference between the nominal price and the nominal price? How would they determine how much to pay? Thus, the CDS committee asked the US Treasury for permission to auction Russian government bonds and was granted it. As a result, the price of the bonds at the auction shot up by 48 to 56 percent. Coincidentally (!), PIMCO and Golden Sachs purchased the majority of them.
As a result, both the asset owners and the asset insurers are now the same. This implies that as long as Russia continues to declare, “I owe my obligation,” modern alchemists will continue to triumph. They will prevail thanks to 340 billion dollars in reserves, even if Russia writes off their debt. In this situation, individuals who own the bond and furthermore sell its derivative may even find the default to be a seductive opportunity. That is nothing meaningful, even if they lose. When compared to PIMCO’s $2.2 trillion trading volume, which is based on data from late 2021, who cares about a few billion dollars?
Leasing
Another example is the leasing problem; this time, the Ministry of Finance had some success in its struggle to keep making payments at the expense of the Treasury. The issue was whether to keep making the leasing payments to foreign firms that have left the Russian market and, thus, failed to fulfill their contractual obligations (at a cost of 350–400 billion rubles annually) by stopping manufacturing, importing, maintaining, and supplying spare parts and, or to declare moratorium. At the end of October, Prime Minister Mishustin authorized Deputy Prime Minister Manturov and Transport Minister Savelyev to make a decision on this matter. Based on the “expert report,” the Ministry of Transport gave an unfavorable judgment, and the Ministry of Finance seconded it. However, the “expert” committee’s members, who wrote the report, were representatives of foreign firms withdrew from the Russian market. It was such out in the open that Mishustin was forced to step in and partially fix the “issue”. Accordingly, payments are to be reduced. But there is still a problem with the availability of maintenance and supply of spare parts for leased vehicles. For this, robust routes with parallel exports through Turkey and -mostly- Iran are needed. As for leasing payments, the final word has not been said yet. It will be had by the representative of the “import substitutionist bloc,” Deputy Prime Minister D. Manturov.

Denis Manturov
This is a crucial example in terms of demonstrating how determined the ministries are to remain in the global capitalist system. The conflict began when Soviet industry, or economic independence, collapsed in the face of low-cost Western goods. Now they have to rebuild all over again. Either they must find other cheap suppliers, like China (but shifting the supply chain is a difficult task and China, which is equally dependent on the global capitalist system, is not very willing to do this). Or, they have to preserve their dependency in a way that keeps the wolf from the door with the hope of that that the crisis will be resolved soon.
Three options
The three options don’t differ significantly from one another, though. The phases of putting these options into action overlap. If we consider those who advocate for rebuilding to be the most radical, they are partnering with the “import substitutionist bloc” to make the gradual transition since they cannot do it again in a short time and must find a cheap supplier. And import substitutionists who wish to move their supply chain to the east cannot do so in a short time; instead, they must rely on the pro-imperialist system’s supporters who barely hold their end up until the issue is fully resolved.
This contradictory transitivity between the parties and this conflicted unity continues in all aspects of economic life. Consider dividends received by large corporations.
The first group, whether from the political “right” (pro-military) or left (popular), wants to fully halt these payments and keep using the profits of large state corporations to finance the budget. Furthermore, they believe that this situation is unavoidable because oil and natural gas revenues will certainly be threatened by sanctions, at which point they will either appeal to the bourgeoisie or the people for funding.
The second group is also aware of this, but they cannot afford to alter the capital structures of these businesses since their political objective is the ascent of the middle bourgeoisie through the exploitation of other classes, particularly the big bourgeoisie. However, this can only be accomplished within the capitalist system, whereas the first group’s radical solution entails closing one of the channels through which the middle bourgeoisie can rise.
This is where the third group enters the picture. In order for the capitalist system to survive, the stock market must continue to run. This can happen only if the giant state corporations that serve as the driving force behind the Russian economy continues to pay dividends, that is, they should keep feeding their local or international big bourgeois. As a result, a solution is found that keeps the conflict peacefully. Dividend payments are somewhat restricted but not entirely stopped. Due to “overlapping interests,” the second group gains the most from this, but also the other two.
Balance
The balance has been established so that under the terms of the sanctions, those who advocate paving the way for the middle bourgeoisie are in an favorable position. But the others are not desperate, though. Why?
1) Politically, the left is not opposed to a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie, as it may lead to the NEP, the golden age for the leftists. What was the NEP? “A tiny retreat for a big leap”, to quote Lenin. It is the first link in the process of rebuilding the USSR, which was on the verge of economic collapse, after the “war communism” era. It is the emergence of the petty and middle bourgeoisie under complete state control while the large bourgeoisie was suppressed. It is perhaps the most democratic period in Russia since the principality of Kyiv. (The latter leads to a secondary contradiction between the dictatorial “pro-military” wing of the first group and the “popular” wing demanding democracy at the most.)
2) Economically, the right, the “financial bloc”, is not against a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie as long as the interests of the big bourgeoisie are safeguarded. Because the big bourgeoisie will swallow the others anyway if these interests are preserved. Moreover, if the concessions envisioned by the second group are realized, they will be swallowed by a more fattened big bourgeoisie, which is particularly appealing.
Conflict and predictability
At the November 16 Cabinet meeting, Putin inquired as to whether the Ministry of Finance had given its approval before approving Denis Manturov’s request to expand the car loan program to include military personnel and partial mobilization conscripts. This was noteworthy because it demonstrates that the powers of the ministries are split by distinct boundaries and how, in the conflicts between them, the approval of the ministry in charge is sought first rather than the president’s. This is not an isolated instance. The likes frequently happen; especially in the conflicts between finance and industry, and between the “military bloc” and others.
It also points out that one of the most meaningless concepts of bourgeois political science, “totalitarianism”, which has become so fashionable these days, actually has no objective foundation because there is nothing like the application of “total” authority at all. Contrarily, the jurisdictions are established with distinct borders. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the president does not meddle in these divided powers. The act of establishing boundaries does not result from a situation in which people gather to discuss the best form of “governance”. Rather, the lines are drawn because the conflict aiming at different political and social objectives continues and rules are set to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control.
For this reason, I have always found absurd the tendency to explain Russia’s state decisions (in any area from militarism to foreign policy, from economic policy to the fate of offshore calculations) with the momentary, unpredictable, surprise decisions of a group of “totalitarian” decision makers. Politics is so determined with clear lines, and the institutions’ authority is so thoroughly defined to avert conflict to lead to war, therefore, few surprises are encountered. As a result, grasping the process only depends on understanding the conflict.
Conflict of authority and temporary retreats
The blocs jealously guard their authority, one another’s meddling is unwanted and repulsed even stingingly.
The “military bloc” and the “financial bloc” came into such a conflict at the end of April. General Secretary of the Security Council “Mr. Siloviki” Patrushev said that they were developing a financial system in which the ruble would be pegged to the currency basket and gold, but Central Bank Governor Nabiullina categorically denied this with almost an off-protocol discourse.
This really is a crucial matter. Suppose that contracts for international trade with Kazakhstan as a “friendly” or even an ally nation can and are made in rubles and tenge, but in any case, a “universal equivalent” (we are forced to use Marxist terminology) is needed by which these sums in rubles or tenge are evaluated. How about this universal equivalent? If “de-dollarisation” in global trade is not (and it is not) just a nice rhetoric, something else must be found. The “finance bloc,” which was still looking for methods to stay within the imperialist system, rejected Patrushev’s plan, which called for this to be a basket of gold and foreign currency, while the “military bloc” withdrew to prevent usurpation. However, this was the inevitable conclusion of the process. The following was reported by RBK on November 19: “One of the sources of RBK claims that even if commerce with Kazakhstan is conducted in national currencies, how many rubles will equal to one tenge is determined by the dollar rate of the tenge. For this reason, banks are collaborating with the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance on a project that will allow some departure from cross-currency calculations.” The “financial bloc” appears determined to avoid even indirectly returning to the gold (or oil) standard, instead attempting to create a “currency basket” that is nothing but a hybrid dollarization. At least for now, the “financial bloc” assures to include banks, the sacred altar of the neoliberalist age, into this process.
Will it be a hit or a miss? It is doable. Does it mean the liquidation of dollarisation? No. It is inevitable that a new (one!) universal equivalent will be found if they are determined on this issue (and the troika’s sanction terror pushes them to determination, even if they don’t want to). It doesn’t matter if this equivalent is the “evergreen” gold or yuan or “oil of the earth,” or sheepskin.
The sword of balance
Fine, but where is the Kremlin in this picture? As with military-political issues, the Kremlin adopts a pragmatic attitude on political-economic matters, but this pragmatism is not unprincipled in the latter ones, just as it was in the former issues. In the political-economic matters, the Kremlin seeks to strengthen the middle bourgeoisie on the account of the big bourgeoisie, just as it is resolved to continue the battle until it achieves its minimal political objectives in the military-political issues (which means removing the Kyiv regime from being a current or potential threat to Russia in one way or another). The Kremlin’s current position therefore aligns with the second group; yet the Kremlin is already a conflicting alliance in its own image, as the blocs’ positions may shift in line with the balance of power, but they will keep doing so peacefully.
An example: At the November 16 meeting I mentioned above, Putin did not hesitate to attack the banks, the holy altar of the “financial bloc”: “Banks simply and cheerfully offer minor loans (…) but then these people become eternal debtors. Banks, with all due respect to these financial organizations, drain the lifeblood of the population. Obviously, it is needed to put an end to this.”
Although the Kremlin’s perspective is entirely discernible empirically, there remains a theoretical issue in the middle of the room. This is a problem I have touched on many times before: Bonapartism as a particular kind of authority in post-Soviet Russia.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
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