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Conflicting alliance

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In Russia, the criticism of the economic dogmatism of the ‘financial bloc’ comes from two currents that mostly overlap. The first is Sergey Glazyev, a patriotic who serves on the Eurasian Economic Commission’s Board of Integration and Macroeconomics. Glazyev, whose influence on the Kremlin is constantly speculated (he was one of Putin’s advisers between 2012 and 2019), could take a left-wing stance so much as acted together with the “Left Front” in the 2017 elections. As recently as 20 April 2022, he accused the Central Bank of not knowing the first thing about the credit system and of acting “according to primitive IMF dogmas relying on foreign investment-hungry citizens of the underdeveloped countries.” In many ways, Glazyev is advocating a new New Economic Policy (NEP). A Just Russia’s far-left deputy Mikhail Delyagin and the Communist Party form the second current. They, too, favor nationalizations and a new “Gosplan” in one form or another.

Sergey Glazyev with Putin

But in addition to crossing each other, these two overlapping currents also interact with the “financial bloc.”

The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are the two institutions that make up the “financial bloc.” At the very least, it is clear that the Central Bank has made an unmatched effort to overcome the crisis (within capitalism, of course). In actuality, the praise and even admiration given by European, and US financial institutions demonstrated that its efforts had been somewhat successful. But given that the Central Bank, which prior to February 24 was the “regulator” (i.e., policymaker), is now becoming a “technician” (i.e., practitioner), this inflationist praise and achievement should also be seen as an indication of the breakdown of the conventional “financial bloc”. It was no accident that in early June the attack of economists on the Central Bank for failing to depreciate the ruble was prompted by one of most audacious defenders of the “financial bloc”, RBK, a media conglomerate particularly specializing in economic news.

I have often dwelled on the dogmatism of this bloc. However, at least two instances illustrating the extent of dogmatism should be provided. When we look at these examples, we will also see how internal conflicts work and which factors limit them.

Default

First off, the Ministry of Finance, if not the Central Bank, employed every means to prevent saying that Russia had defaulted, including continuing to pay Eurobonds in foreign currency. Moreover, apart from the irresistible temptation of paying off the creditor, the Ministry had a potent ally: PIMCO (Pacific Investment Management Company). According to data from Tinkoff Investment Advisory, as of mid-May, PIMCO had sold CDS as insurance policies to Russia’s $3.1 billion in foreign debt bonds, demonstrating how confident it was that the country would not go into default. Furthermore, PIMCO had invested roughly $1 billion in credit risk premium (CDS) in Russia last year alone (The seller’s promise to pay the buyer the difference between the nominal price and the market price of these bonds in the event that the issuing nation defaults is known as a “bill” or “derivative”). In order to avert a possible loss, PIMCO was forced to advocate “let them pay”. However, neither the voice of money nor PIMCO’s lobbying efforts were able to prevent it from happening. The bond payments had to halt when the US Treasury Department eventually blocked the OFAC license on May 25. The next installments due on June 24 could not be made, which led to what Medvedev called a “political default.”

However, the world did not come to an end because it was seen that the fixation with default was founded, like all obsessions, on an entirely nonsensical justification. As a matter of fact, payments that were unable to be fulfilled were no longer in the news in the days that followed.

Let’s not forget the other performer on the stage, by the way. PIMCO doesn’t appear to lose money. One of the defining characteristics of the neoliberal period, which worships the financial god, is the use of “derivatives” or risk management coupons, etc. These are ways to extract surplus value through speculation, but more crucially, the forces that drive the market are playing in an echo chamber where the house always wins. The CDS committee, established by the huge businesses that market CDS policies, decides if a nation defaults. Naturally, there was no market left after the US Department of Finance blocked the OFAC license. What should poor PIMCO and poor Golden Sachs do when there is no market, no way to ascertain the market price, and to quantify the difference between the nominal price and the nominal price? How would they determine how much to pay? Thus, the CDS committee asked the US Treasury for permission to auction Russian government bonds and was granted it. As a result, the price of the bonds at the auction shot up by 48 to 56 percent. Coincidentally (!), PIMCO and Golden Sachs purchased the majority of them.

As a result, both the asset owners and the asset insurers are now the same. This implies that as long as Russia continues to declare, “I owe my obligation,” modern alchemists will continue to triumph. They will prevail thanks to 340 billion dollars in reserves, even if Russia writes off their debt. In this situation, individuals who own the bond and furthermore sell its derivative may even find the default to be a seductive opportunity. That is nothing meaningful, even if they lose. When compared to PIMCO’s $2.2 trillion trading volume, which is based on data from late 2021, who cares about a few billion dollars?

Leasing

Another example is the leasing problem; this time, the Ministry of Finance had some success in its struggle to keep making payments at the expense of the Treasury. The issue was whether to keep making the leasing payments to foreign firms that have left the Russian market and, thus, failed to fulfill their contractual obligations (at a cost of 350–400 billion rubles annually) by stopping manufacturing, importing, maintaining, and supplying spare parts and, or to declare moratorium. At the end of October, Prime Minister Mishustin authorized Deputy Prime Minister Manturov and Transport Minister Savelyev to make a decision on this matter. Based on the “expert report,” the Ministry of Transport gave an unfavorable judgment, and the Ministry of Finance seconded it. However, the “expert” committee’s members, who wrote the report, were representatives of foreign firms withdrew from the Russian market. It was such out in the open that Mishustin was forced to step in and partially fix the “issue”. Accordingly, payments are to be reduced. But there is still a problem with the availability of maintenance and supply of spare parts for leased vehicles. For this, robust routes with parallel exports through Turkey and -mostly- Iran are needed. As for leasing payments, the final word has not been said yet. It will be had by the representative of the “import substitutionist bloc,” Deputy Prime Minister D. Manturov.

Denis Manturov

This is a crucial example in terms of demonstrating how determined the ministries are to remain in the global capitalist system. The conflict began when Soviet industry, or economic independence, collapsed in the face of low-cost Western goods. Now they have to rebuild all over again. Either they must find other cheap suppliers, like China (but shifting the supply chain is a difficult task and China, which is equally dependent on the global capitalist system, is not very willing to do this). Or, they have to preserve their dependency in a way that keeps the wolf from the door with the hope of that that the crisis will be resolved soon.

Three options

The three options don’t differ significantly from one another, though. The phases of putting these options into action overlap. If we consider those who advocate for rebuilding to be the most radical, they are partnering with the “import substitutionist bloc” to make the gradual transition since they cannot do it again in a short time and must find a cheap supplier. And import substitutionists who wish to move their supply chain to the east cannot do so in a short time; instead, they must rely on the pro-imperialist system’s supporters who barely hold their end up until the issue is fully resolved.

This contradictory transitivity between the parties and this conflicted unity continues in all aspects of economic life. Consider dividends received by large corporations.

The first group, whether from the political “right” (pro-military) or left (popular), wants to fully halt these payments and keep using the profits of large state corporations to finance the budget. Furthermore, they believe that this situation is unavoidable because oil and natural gas revenues will certainly be threatened by sanctions, at which point they will either appeal to the bourgeoisie or the people for funding.

The second group is also aware of this, but they cannot afford to alter the capital structures of these businesses since their political objective is the ascent of the middle bourgeoisie through the exploitation of other classes, particularly the big bourgeoisie. However, this can only be accomplished within the capitalist system, whereas the first group’s radical solution entails closing one of the channels through which the middle bourgeoisie can rise.

This is where the third group enters the picture. In order for the capitalist system to survive, the stock market must continue to run. This can happen only if the giant state corporations that serve as the driving force behind the Russian economy continues to pay dividends, that is, they should keep feeding their local or international big bourgeois. As a result, a solution is found that keeps the conflict peacefully. Dividend payments are somewhat restricted but not entirely stopped. Due to “overlapping interests,” the second group gains the most from this, but also the other two.

Balance

The balance has been established so that under the terms of the sanctions, those who advocate paving the way for the middle bourgeoisie are in an favorable position. But the others are not desperate, though. Why?

1) Politically, the left is not opposed to a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie, as it may lead to the NEP, the golden age for the leftists. What was the NEP? “A tiny retreat for a big leap”, to quote Lenin. It is the first link in the process of rebuilding the USSR, which was on the verge of economic collapse, after the “war communism” era. It is the emergence of the petty and middle bourgeoisie under complete state control while the large bourgeoisie was suppressed. It is perhaps the most democratic period in Russia since the principality of Kyiv. (The latter leads to a secondary contradiction between the dictatorial “pro-military” wing of the first group and the “popular” wing demanding democracy at the most.)

2) Economically, the right, the “financial bloc”, is not against a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie as long as the interests of the big bourgeoisie are safeguarded. Because the big bourgeoisie will swallow the others anyway if these interests are preserved. Moreover, if the concessions envisioned by the second group are realized, they will be swallowed by a more fattened big bourgeoisie, which is particularly appealing.

Conflict and predictability

At the November 16 Cabinet meeting, Putin inquired as to whether the Ministry of Finance had given its approval before approving Denis Manturov’s request to expand the car loan program to include military personnel and partial mobilization conscripts. This was noteworthy because it demonstrates that the powers of the ministries are split by distinct boundaries and how, in the conflicts between them, the approval of the ministry in charge is sought first rather than the president’s. This is not an isolated instance. The likes frequently happen; especially in the conflicts between finance and industry, and between the “military bloc” and others.

It also points out that one of the most meaningless concepts of bourgeois political science, “totalitarianism”, which has become so fashionable these days, actually has no objective foundation because there is nothing like the application of “total” authority at all. Contrarily, the jurisdictions are established with distinct borders. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the president does not meddle in these divided powers. The act of establishing boundaries does not result from a situation in which people gather to discuss the best form of “governance”. Rather, the lines are drawn because the conflict aiming at different political and social objectives continues and rules are set to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control.

For this reason, I have always found absurd the tendency to explain Russia’s state decisions (in any area from militarism to foreign policy, from economic policy to the fate of offshore calculations) with the momentary, unpredictable, surprise decisions of a group of “totalitarian” decision makers. Politics is so determined with clear lines, and the institutions’ authority is so thoroughly defined to avert conflict to lead to war, therefore, few surprises are encountered. As a result, grasping the process only depends on understanding the conflict.

Conflict of authority and temporary retreats

The blocs jealously guard their authority, one another’s meddling is unwanted and repulsed even stingingly.

The “military bloc” and the “financial bloc” came into such a conflict at the end of April. General Secretary of the Security Council “Mr. Siloviki” Patrushev said that they were developing a financial system in which the ruble would be pegged to the currency basket and gold, but Central Bank Governor Nabiullina categorically denied this with almost an off-protocol discourse.

This really is a crucial matter. Suppose that contracts for international trade with Kazakhstan as a “friendly” or even an ally nation can and are made in rubles and tenge, but in any case, a “universal equivalent” (we are forced to use Marxist terminology) is needed by which these sums in rubles or tenge are evaluated. How about this universal equivalent? If “de-dollarisation” in global trade is not (and it is not) just a nice rhetoric, something else must be found. The “finance bloc,” which was still looking for methods to stay within the imperialist system, rejected Patrushev’s plan, which called for this to be a basket of gold and foreign currency, while the “military bloc” withdrew to prevent usurpation. However, this was the inevitable conclusion of the process. The following was reported by RBK on November 19: “One of the sources of RBK claims that even if commerce with Kazakhstan is conducted in national currencies, how many rubles will equal to one tenge is determined by the dollar rate of the tenge. For this reason, banks are collaborating with the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance on a project that will allow some departure from cross-currency calculations.” The “financial bloc” appears determined to avoid even indirectly returning to the gold (or oil) standard, instead attempting to create a “currency basket” that is nothing but a hybrid dollarization. At least for now, the “financial bloc” assures to include banks, the sacred altar of the neoliberalist age, into this process.

Will it be a hit or a miss? It is doable. Does it mean the liquidation of dollarisation? No. It is inevitable that a new (one!) universal equivalent will be found if they are determined on this issue (and the troika’s sanction terror pushes them to determination, even if they don’t want to). It doesn’t matter if this equivalent is the “evergreen” gold or yuan or “oil of the earth,” or sheepskin.

The sword of balance

Fine, but where is the Kremlin in this picture? As with military-political issues, the Kremlin adopts a pragmatic attitude on political-economic matters, but this pragmatism is not unprincipled in the latter ones, just as it was in the former issues. In the political-economic matters, the Kremlin seeks to strengthen the middle bourgeoisie on the account of the big bourgeoisie, just as it is resolved to continue the battle until it achieves its minimal political objectives in the military-political issues (which means removing the Kyiv regime from being a current or potential threat to Russia in one way or another). The Kremlin’s current position therefore aligns with the second group; yet the Kremlin is already a conflicting alliance in its own image, as the blocs’ positions may shift in line with the balance of power, but they will keep doing so peacefully.

An example: At the November 16 meeting I mentioned above, Putin did not hesitate to attack the banks, the holy altar of the “financial bloc”: “Banks simply and cheerfully offer minor loans (…) but then these people become eternal debtors. Banks, with all due respect to these financial organizations, drain the lifeblood of the population. Obviously, it is needed to put an end to this.”

Although the Kremlin’s perspective is entirely discernible empirically, there remains a theoretical issue in the middle of the room. This is a problem I have touched on many times before: Bonapartism as a particular kind of authority in post-Soviet Russia.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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