Opinion
Conflicting alliance
In Russia, the criticism of the economic dogmatism of the ‘financial bloc’ comes from two currents that mostly overlap. The first is Sergey Glazyev, a patriotic who serves on the Eurasian Economic Commission’s Board of Integration and Macroeconomics. Glazyev, whose influence on the Kremlin is constantly speculated (he was one of Putin’s advisers between 2012 and 2019), could take a left-wing stance so much as acted together with the “Left Front” in the 2017 elections. As recently as 20 April 2022, he accused the Central Bank of not knowing the first thing about the credit system and of acting “according to primitive IMF dogmas relying on foreign investment-hungry citizens of the underdeveloped countries.” In many ways, Glazyev is advocating a new New Economic Policy (NEP). A Just Russia’s far-left deputy Mikhail Delyagin and the Communist Party form the second current. They, too, favor nationalizations and a new “Gosplan” in one form or another.

Sergey Glazyev with Putin
But in addition to crossing each other, these two overlapping currents also interact with the “financial bloc.”
The Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance are the two institutions that make up the “financial bloc.” At the very least, it is clear that the Central Bank has made an unmatched effort to overcome the crisis (within capitalism, of course). In actuality, the praise and even admiration given by European, and US financial institutions demonstrated that its efforts had been somewhat successful. But given that the Central Bank, which prior to February 24 was the “regulator” (i.e., policymaker), is now becoming a “technician” (i.e., practitioner), this inflationist praise and achievement should also be seen as an indication of the breakdown of the conventional “financial bloc”. It was no accident that in early June the attack of economists on the Central Bank for failing to depreciate the ruble was prompted by one of most audacious defenders of the “financial bloc”, RBK, a media conglomerate particularly specializing in economic news.
I have often dwelled on the dogmatism of this bloc. However, at least two instances illustrating the extent of dogmatism should be provided. When we look at these examples, we will also see how internal conflicts work and which factors limit them.
Default
First off, the Ministry of Finance, if not the Central Bank, employed every means to prevent saying that Russia had defaulted, including continuing to pay Eurobonds in foreign currency. Moreover, apart from the irresistible temptation of paying off the creditor, the Ministry had a potent ally: PIMCO (Pacific Investment Management Company). According to data from Tinkoff Investment Advisory, as of mid-May, PIMCO had sold CDS as insurance policies to Russia’s $3.1 billion in foreign debt bonds, demonstrating how confident it was that the country would not go into default. Furthermore, PIMCO had invested roughly $1 billion in credit risk premium (CDS) in Russia last year alone (The seller’s promise to pay the buyer the difference between the nominal price and the market price of these bonds in the event that the issuing nation defaults is known as a “bill” or “derivative”). In order to avert a possible loss, PIMCO was forced to advocate “let them pay”. However, neither the voice of money nor PIMCO’s lobbying efforts were able to prevent it from happening. The bond payments had to halt when the US Treasury Department eventually blocked the OFAC license on May 25. The next installments due on June 24 could not be made, which led to what Medvedev called a “political default.”
However, the world did not come to an end because it was seen that the fixation with default was founded, like all obsessions, on an entirely nonsensical justification. As a matter of fact, payments that were unable to be fulfilled were no longer in the news in the days that followed.
Let’s not forget the other performer on the stage, by the way. PIMCO doesn’t appear to lose money. One of the defining characteristics of the neoliberal period, which worships the financial god, is the use of “derivatives” or risk management coupons, etc. These are ways to extract surplus value through speculation, but more crucially, the forces that drive the market are playing in an echo chamber where the house always wins. The CDS committee, established by the huge businesses that market CDS policies, decides if a nation defaults. Naturally, there was no market left after the US Department of Finance blocked the OFAC license. What should poor PIMCO and poor Golden Sachs do when there is no market, no way to ascertain the market price, and to quantify the difference between the nominal price and the nominal price? How would they determine how much to pay? Thus, the CDS committee asked the US Treasury for permission to auction Russian government bonds and was granted it. As a result, the price of the bonds at the auction shot up by 48 to 56 percent. Coincidentally (!), PIMCO and Golden Sachs purchased the majority of them.
As a result, both the asset owners and the asset insurers are now the same. This implies that as long as Russia continues to declare, “I owe my obligation,” modern alchemists will continue to triumph. They will prevail thanks to 340 billion dollars in reserves, even if Russia writes off their debt. In this situation, individuals who own the bond and furthermore sell its derivative may even find the default to be a seductive opportunity. That is nothing meaningful, even if they lose. When compared to PIMCO’s $2.2 trillion trading volume, which is based on data from late 2021, who cares about a few billion dollars?
Leasing
Another example is the leasing problem; this time, the Ministry of Finance had some success in its struggle to keep making payments at the expense of the Treasury. The issue was whether to keep making the leasing payments to foreign firms that have left the Russian market and, thus, failed to fulfill their contractual obligations (at a cost of 350–400 billion rubles annually) by stopping manufacturing, importing, maintaining, and supplying spare parts and, or to declare moratorium. At the end of October, Prime Minister Mishustin authorized Deputy Prime Minister Manturov and Transport Minister Savelyev to make a decision on this matter. Based on the “expert report,” the Ministry of Transport gave an unfavorable judgment, and the Ministry of Finance seconded it. However, the “expert” committee’s members, who wrote the report, were representatives of foreign firms withdrew from the Russian market. It was such out in the open that Mishustin was forced to step in and partially fix the “issue”. Accordingly, payments are to be reduced. But there is still a problem with the availability of maintenance and supply of spare parts for leased vehicles. For this, robust routes with parallel exports through Turkey and -mostly- Iran are needed. As for leasing payments, the final word has not been said yet. It will be had by the representative of the “import substitutionist bloc,” Deputy Prime Minister D. Manturov.

Denis Manturov
This is a crucial example in terms of demonstrating how determined the ministries are to remain in the global capitalist system. The conflict began when Soviet industry, or economic independence, collapsed in the face of low-cost Western goods. Now they have to rebuild all over again. Either they must find other cheap suppliers, like China (but shifting the supply chain is a difficult task and China, which is equally dependent on the global capitalist system, is not very willing to do this). Or, they have to preserve their dependency in a way that keeps the wolf from the door with the hope of that that the crisis will be resolved soon.
Three options
The three options don’t differ significantly from one another, though. The phases of putting these options into action overlap. If we consider those who advocate for rebuilding to be the most radical, they are partnering with the “import substitutionist bloc” to make the gradual transition since they cannot do it again in a short time and must find a cheap supplier. And import substitutionists who wish to move their supply chain to the east cannot do so in a short time; instead, they must rely on the pro-imperialist system’s supporters who barely hold their end up until the issue is fully resolved.
This contradictory transitivity between the parties and this conflicted unity continues in all aspects of economic life. Consider dividends received by large corporations.
The first group, whether from the political “right” (pro-military) or left (popular), wants to fully halt these payments and keep using the profits of large state corporations to finance the budget. Furthermore, they believe that this situation is unavoidable because oil and natural gas revenues will certainly be threatened by sanctions, at which point they will either appeal to the bourgeoisie or the people for funding.
The second group is also aware of this, but they cannot afford to alter the capital structures of these businesses since their political objective is the ascent of the middle bourgeoisie through the exploitation of other classes, particularly the big bourgeoisie. However, this can only be accomplished within the capitalist system, whereas the first group’s radical solution entails closing one of the channels through which the middle bourgeoisie can rise.
This is where the third group enters the picture. In order for the capitalist system to survive, the stock market must continue to run. This can happen only if the giant state corporations that serve as the driving force behind the Russian economy continues to pay dividends, that is, they should keep feeding their local or international big bourgeois. As a result, a solution is found that keeps the conflict peacefully. Dividend payments are somewhat restricted but not entirely stopped. Due to “overlapping interests,” the second group gains the most from this, but also the other two.
Balance
The balance has been established so that under the terms of the sanctions, those who advocate paving the way for the middle bourgeoisie are in an favorable position. But the others are not desperate, though. Why?
1) Politically, the left is not opposed to a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie, as it may lead to the NEP, the golden age for the leftists. What was the NEP? “A tiny retreat for a big leap”, to quote Lenin. It is the first link in the process of rebuilding the USSR, which was on the verge of economic collapse, after the “war communism” era. It is the emergence of the petty and middle bourgeoisie under complete state control while the large bourgeoisie was suppressed. It is perhaps the most democratic period in Russia since the principality of Kyiv. (The latter leads to a secondary contradiction between the dictatorial “pro-military” wing of the first group and the “popular” wing demanding democracy at the most.)
2) Economically, the right, the “financial bloc”, is not against a new rise of the middle bourgeoisie as long as the interests of the big bourgeoisie are safeguarded. Because the big bourgeoisie will swallow the others anyway if these interests are preserved. Moreover, if the concessions envisioned by the second group are realized, they will be swallowed by a more fattened big bourgeoisie, which is particularly appealing.
Conflict and predictability
At the November 16 Cabinet meeting, Putin inquired as to whether the Ministry of Finance had given its approval before approving Denis Manturov’s request to expand the car loan program to include military personnel and partial mobilization conscripts. This was noteworthy because it demonstrates that the powers of the ministries are split by distinct boundaries and how, in the conflicts between them, the approval of the ministry in charge is sought first rather than the president’s. This is not an isolated instance. The likes frequently happen; especially in the conflicts between finance and industry, and between the “military bloc” and others.
It also points out that one of the most meaningless concepts of bourgeois political science, “totalitarianism”, which has become so fashionable these days, actually has no objective foundation because there is nothing like the application of “total” authority at all. Contrarily, the jurisdictions are established with distinct borders. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the president does not meddle in these divided powers. The act of establishing boundaries does not result from a situation in which people gather to discuss the best form of “governance”. Rather, the lines are drawn because the conflict aiming at different political and social objectives continues and rules are set to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control.
For this reason, I have always found absurd the tendency to explain Russia’s state decisions (in any area from militarism to foreign policy, from economic policy to the fate of offshore calculations) with the momentary, unpredictable, surprise decisions of a group of “totalitarian” decision makers. Politics is so determined with clear lines, and the institutions’ authority is so thoroughly defined to avert conflict to lead to war, therefore, few surprises are encountered. As a result, grasping the process only depends on understanding the conflict.
Conflict of authority and temporary retreats
The blocs jealously guard their authority, one another’s meddling is unwanted and repulsed even stingingly.
The “military bloc” and the “financial bloc” came into such a conflict at the end of April. General Secretary of the Security Council “Mr. Siloviki” Patrushev said that they were developing a financial system in which the ruble would be pegged to the currency basket and gold, but Central Bank Governor Nabiullina categorically denied this with almost an off-protocol discourse.
This really is a crucial matter. Suppose that contracts for international trade with Kazakhstan as a “friendly” or even an ally nation can and are made in rubles and tenge, but in any case, a “universal equivalent” (we are forced to use Marxist terminology) is needed by which these sums in rubles or tenge are evaluated. How about this universal equivalent? If “de-dollarisation” in global trade is not (and it is not) just a nice rhetoric, something else must be found. The “finance bloc,” which was still looking for methods to stay within the imperialist system, rejected Patrushev’s plan, which called for this to be a basket of gold and foreign currency, while the “military bloc” withdrew to prevent usurpation. However, this was the inevitable conclusion of the process. The following was reported by RBK on November 19: “One of the sources of RBK claims that even if commerce with Kazakhstan is conducted in national currencies, how many rubles will equal to one tenge is determined by the dollar rate of the tenge. For this reason, banks are collaborating with the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance on a project that will allow some departure from cross-currency calculations.” The “financial bloc” appears determined to avoid even indirectly returning to the gold (or oil) standard, instead attempting to create a “currency basket” that is nothing but a hybrid dollarization. At least for now, the “financial bloc” assures to include banks, the sacred altar of the neoliberalist age, into this process.
Will it be a hit or a miss? It is doable. Does it mean the liquidation of dollarisation? No. It is inevitable that a new (one!) universal equivalent will be found if they are determined on this issue (and the troika’s sanction terror pushes them to determination, even if they don’t want to). It doesn’t matter if this equivalent is the “evergreen” gold or yuan or “oil of the earth,” or sheepskin.
The sword of balance
Fine, but where is the Kremlin in this picture? As with military-political issues, the Kremlin adopts a pragmatic attitude on political-economic matters, but this pragmatism is not unprincipled in the latter ones, just as it was in the former issues. In the political-economic matters, the Kremlin seeks to strengthen the middle bourgeoisie on the account of the big bourgeoisie, just as it is resolved to continue the battle until it achieves its minimal political objectives in the military-political issues (which means removing the Kyiv regime from being a current or potential threat to Russia in one way or another). The Kremlin’s current position therefore aligns with the second group; yet the Kremlin is already a conflicting alliance in its own image, as the blocs’ positions may shift in line with the balance of power, but they will keep doing so peacefully.
An example: At the November 16 meeting I mentioned above, Putin did not hesitate to attack the banks, the holy altar of the “financial bloc”: “Banks simply and cheerfully offer minor loans (…) but then these people become eternal debtors. Banks, with all due respect to these financial organizations, drain the lifeblood of the population. Obviously, it is needed to put an end to this.”
Although the Kremlin’s perspective is entirely discernible empirically, there remains a theoretical issue in the middle of the room. This is a problem I have touched on many times before: Bonapartism as a particular kind of authority in post-Soviet Russia.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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