Duygu Çağla Bayram

The 1.5 month long general election season in India is long over and, as expected, Prime Minister Modi is in full swing in his third term. As far as America is concerned, the Modi government actually had a very good momentum with the administration of former President Donald Trump rather than the administration of Joe Biden. And the US presidential election is coming up.

In the run-up to the US presidential elections in November, Western countries may be concerned about the prospect of a comeback by former President Trump and his potential to sour relations between the US and its allies, but in India’s diplomatic and security circles, which adheres to the principle of ‘atmanirbhar’ or self-reliance in its defence policy and does not seek alliances with the US, there is a widespread belief that Trump’s return to power would be more conducive to advancing national interests.

Above all, the future Trump administration will almost certainly be less hostile to Russia than the Biden White House. Remember that Trump said last year that if he were elected US president he would end the war in Ukraine ‘in a day’ and cut off aid to Ukrainian President Yushchenko, forcing him to make a deal with Russian President Putin. And it is clear that this would be a move in favour of New Delhi, which, given its territorial and other disputes with China, cannot afford to sever friendly ties with Moscow. As Moscow’s war with Ukraine enters its third year, the gulf between the West and New Delhi over Russia policy is becoming clearer. New Delhi, which sees a catastrophic scenario of a deeply isolated Russia becoming a ‘de facto vassal of China’, clearly has its geopolitical interests at heart and opposes further isolation of the country. It therefore believes that it makes more sense to offer Russia more than one option and to encourage other countries, especially in Asia, to engage with Moscow. After all, Moscow has so far not taken sides in the sensitive border disputes between India and China or in the disputes over the status of Tibet, but there is no guarantee that this will not change if Russia becomes more subservient to Beijing.

And Modi’s government has not only refused to join international sanctions against Moscow, but has also taken advantage of the fall in Russian oil prices by increasing its purchases of crude oil from Russia, some of which it refines and re-exports. This has irritated both the Biden administration and other Western governments. If Trump is re-elected, however, New Delhi may no longer have to worry about the American reaction. After all, if Trump is re-elected, it is predicted that he will revive the dialogue with Putin, which will be beneficial for New Delhi. At the moment, the Ukraine issue is a serious source of friction for New Delhi with both Washington and Moscow. Therefore, if relations between Washington and Moscow improve, the complexity of New Delhi’s cooperation with both strategic partners will be reduced.

From another perspective, given that Trump sought to contain Beijing by expanding military cooperation with New Delhi during his previous presidency, it is likely that Trump will adopt a much tougher stance towards China than Biden. After all, while the Biden administration appears to have continued this policy, there is a natural assumption that this cooperation will accelerate if Trump comes to power. And it is clear that increased American pressure on Beijing would be a strategic boon for India, which has spent a lot of energy and time trying to maintain good relations with China, but has failed to do so and therefore continues to face serious security concerns and problems.

Third, Trump is expected to prioritise trade and investment over human rights and shared democratic values. This will naturally reduce the risk of conflict with the US over India’s human rights record. Compared to Trump, Biden has been more critical of New Delhi’s human rights record. It is clear that the Biden administration sees India as an important democratic partner, but concerns have also been raised about the Modi government’s crackdown on Muslims and media restrictions.

The West, which seems keen to preserve the US-led order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War, may be concerned that Trump’s return would threaten the existing global order, but India, which aspires to a multipolar world without a dominant superpower, would probably welcome it as part of the natural progression towards multipolarity. But there are risks to this view. Although he currently favours a hawkish policy towards Beijing, there is no guarantee against the risk that Trump could reverse course and strike a deal with Beijing if he believes it will benefit American interests.

But whatever happens, whoever the next American president is, India will remain one of the most important partners of Western democracies. And New Delhi, hoping that Donald Trump will take a tough stance against Beijing and see India as a reliable partner for the future, both in the security and economic spheres, will also be watching the potential Trump’s China policy very closely…

The truth is that Trump, despite being the first US president in history to be found guilty of all the charges brought against him – and let’s not forget an unsuccessful assassination attempt – already had the wind behind his supporters’ backs, and it seemed that the Trump wind was already blowing in world politics, while the Harris wind, which came into play after Biden withdrew from the nomination, seems to be complicating things a bit for the US.

By the way, if we look at the issue in the context of Kamala Harris’ Indian origin, some may assume that India is excited about Harris, but if I take into account the recent example of the former Indian-origin Prime Minister of the UK, Rishi Sunak, and how India was first excited and then disappointed, it is much more reasonable and logical to assume that India will think more coolly in terms of mentality.

Yi Shaoxuan
Research Assistant of Center for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University

On October 22-24, 2024, the 16th BRICS leaders’ meeting was held in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan. Russia hosted leaders or representatives of more than 30 countries and six international organizations, including United Nations Secretary-General Guterres. The meeting adopted the Kazan Declaration, whose 134-long entries assess and look forward to the world in the areas of politics and security, economy and finance, culture and humanistic exchanges. South African President Ramaphosa praised the BRICS countries, saying that their historic expansion is a beacon of hope for the Global South. From “beacon of freedom and democracy” to “beacon of hope”, the world landscape has quietly changed.

What makes this BRICS Summit so attractive and appealing?

The Kazan Summit has three special backgrounds. From the perspective of the world pattern, the old order has been shaken, and the world system is in urgent need of a redistribution of institutional power. This is manifested in the following aspects: politically, the old “center-periphery” international order formed after World War II has put the countries of the Global South in an unfavorable position. In terms of security, the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East chaos have become a knot that is hard to untie, while small-scale terrorist attacks occur from time to time. Economically, the United States and the West are engaged in the tactics of “Decoupling” and “friendshoring”, wielding the big stick of tariffs and sanctions to force countries around the world to “pick a side”. The stress of deglobalization has hindered the smooth flow of the global supply chain. When it comes to scientific and cultural communication, the maneuver of “small yards, high fence” has blocked the path of scientific and technological upward mobility of developing countries such as China. In essence, as Deng Xiaoping, China’s second-generation leader, pointed out, peace and development remain the world’s two main themes, but none of the problems have been solved.

From the perspective of the BRICS countries themselves, starting in 2024, the “Brick” have had a “heavier weight” and “higher purity”. This summit is the first summit after the expansion of the BRICS, in the “Grand BRICS year”. In January this year, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Ethiopia officially participated in the BRICS cooperation, the number of BRICS member countries continue to expand. The total population of the expanded BRICS group is about 3.5 billion, accounting for 45% of the world’s population. After the expansion, the share of BRICS in the global economy rose to about 37%, surpassing the G7 and the European Union (14.5%). According to the BRICS Wealth Report released in January of this year, the BRICS group now holds a total of $45 trillion in investable wealth and currently produces about 44% of the world’s crude oil.

From the perspective of the host country, Russia has been at the center of a noisy dispute since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022. This is the first time Russia has hosted a global summit since then. The tremendous scale of the summit manifested that the Russia side had put great emphasis on this event. Against the backdrop of President Putin’s clear statement that he will not attend other important forums and events such as the G20 summit in Brazil, the summit in Kazan is undoubtedly an excellent opportunity to understand and explore Russia’s current strategic considerations and priorities. According to Russian presidential assistant Ushakov, the summit is divided into a large-scale meeting and a small-scale meeting. In the former one, leaders will assess cooperation in the economic and trade spheres and summarize the results of collaboration in culture and humanities; while in the latter one, delegations will study the most pressing issues on the global agenda and exchange views on the topic of BRICS cooperation in the international arena. This includes discussion of a range of acute regional conflicts, including, of course, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. China, India and Brazil have called for the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict through dialog, while the Kremlin has said that it accepts mediation by the three aforementioned countries. In addition, as is the tradition at BRICS summits, each summit is also heavily colored by the host country. The summits have a “BRICS Outreach” program, where the BRICS presidency invites its neighbors to participate in BRICS activities. South Africa invited all African leaders last year, and Russia invited CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries this year. This is a good reference for Russia’s regionalism policy.

What are the noteworthy highlights of the Kazan summit?

The Global South’s attempts to establish a new economic order. With the weaponization of the dollar payment system, the countries of the Global South have suffered from sanctions and differentiated treatment by unfair rules. The established New Development Bank (NDB) is what BRICS offers current and future member countries to make up for the shortcomings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It also achieves that the founders remain equal shareholders and have an equal voice. Host Russia values the launch of the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative (BCBPI), which is not controlled by the United States and is settled in national or neutral currencies, as an alternative to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) financial settlement system. Such move is to safeguard its own financial sovereignty and financial security. In fact, Russia and Iran have already developed and connected similar systems for handling financial messaging. Currently more than 60% of trade between Russia and Iran is conducted in their own currencies. By the end of 2023, Russia’s share of local currency settlements with the BRICS countries jumped to 85% from 26% two years ago. The declaration also proposes to discuss and study the feasibility of establishing a BRICS Clear (BRICS Securities Depository and Clearing Infrastructure) on the basis of voluntary participation by all parties to complement the existing financial market infrastructure. This would pose a constraint on the use of the dollar as a weapon.

The rise of non-Western centers of power. We note the emergence of new centres of power, policy decision-making and economic growth, which can pave the way for a more equitable, just, democratic and balanced multi-polar world order. Chinese President Xi Jinping pointed out at the BRICS+ Leaders Dialogue on 24^th  that the rise of the “Global South” as a group is a distinctive symbol of the world’s great changes. “The common march of the Global South towards modernization is a major event in world history and unprecedented in the course of human civilization.” In fact, the members of BRICS have repeatedly criticized, openly or subtly, the hegemony and power politics of the United States and the West, and have spoken many times of “systemic discrimination”. They want to emphasize their own values rather than be forced to accept the ideas of others; they want to be participants and  makers of rule of justices. Some 30 countries in the Global South have expressed interest in joining the BRICS mechanism. If all these countries were able to participate in BRICS cooperation in some way , the population of the BRICS countries would probably account for more than 65% of the world’s total population. In that case, the BRICS’ international influence would be significantly increased, the realizing of a new, just, rational, and egalitarian international political order will be highly probable.

China-Russia cooperation. China took over the presidency after the SCO summit in July this year and will host the summit next year. Russia, on the other hand, will take over the chairmanship of the SCO Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council in Islamabad. In the past two years, China and Russia take turns to hold the  rotating presidency to in important groups in the Global South, such as the BRICS and the SCO. This situation is of great significance to the construction of a new world order. China and Russia are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The two, if they can form a synergy, will open a breakthrough for the world system change. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a meeting with media leaders of the BRICS countries on the 18th that “Russia-China cooperation is one of the key factors of world stability” and that the two countries “have established a unique relationship”, which is rich in content and trustworthy. In the changes unseen in a century, the further cooperation between China and Russia and their impact on the world system is worth paying attention to.

What is the future direction of BRICS after the Kazan summit?

The BRICS will make it a priority to realize the economic development that the countries of the Global South so desperately need. According to a Russian political scientist quoted by Reference News in China, “the West confuses politics with economics, while in the BRICS cooperation mechanism, people do not discuss the domestic politics of a country.” This is in line with the idea of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) put forward by President Xi Jinping in his address to the 76th United Nations General Assembly in 2021—Staying committed to development as a priority. The right to development is a human right that cannot be ignored. Development is the simplest aspiration and the rightful entitlement of the peoples of the Global South. It should never be realized solely on the premise of the solving of some political problem. Development should come with no political conditions attached.

BRICS is essentially an economic organization, which is what makes it attractive to most countries in the world. The Russian Foreign Ministry said on December 12 that “BRICS has never been a military alliance and will not become one in the future.” ; “It is absurd to compare the BRICS even theoretically with the aggressive military bloc NATO. NATO has done nothing but invasions and destruction of security around the world during the decades of its existence.” According to Dmitry Yegorchenkov, Director of the Institute of Strategic Studies and Forecasts of RUDN University, the BRICS countries do not need a NATO-style alliance. They cooperate in the field of fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and crime. And in the field of security, the interests within the BRICS countries are diverse among themselves and do not always coincide.

BRICS will expand rationally. Although the BRICS countries still welcome new partners on the basis of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanism, the decision to expand will be made more cautiously after the new “Grand BRICS” situation in January this year. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov revealed in June this year, the BRICS countries, with an “overwhelming majority” voted to temporarily suspend the expansion of members, in order to ‘digest’ new members.

The 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan has come to an end, signaling new shifts and dynamics. How BRICS can ensure a steady course with the effective functioning of the mechanism is a question worth pondering. However, there is no doubt that the summit is destined to be an important meeting in the development process of the BRICS organization. In particular, the great unity and cooperation of the Global South will certainly have an important and far-reaching historical impact.

Anil Sooklal, South Africa’s BRICS Sherpa, told a leading Chinese media Guancha.cn that the expanded BRICS is stronger because its share of global GDP in terms of PPP is much bigger than the G7 (about 35.4% vs 29.6%). “Our share of global manufacturing and global trade is over 25%. That’s highly significant for a small group of countries.”

“Population wise, we account for almost 45% of the global population that’s close to half of the global community.”

Well, it seems that the West has reasons to worry.

The rise of the BRICS nations is often seen as a potential threat to the Western-dominated global order. However, this view is both right and wrong.

BRICS is not a cohesive military or economic bloc, and it is far away from a “Global South” equivalent of NATO or the G7. Instead, without positioning itself as a beacon for the world, BRICS operates as a loose coalition with minor influence on global economic policy compared to the G7 .

Militarily, the cooperation among BRICS is minimal. Put aside Russia’s formidable nuclear arsenal, although Russia, China, and India possess aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, they remain primarily regional powers with limited blue-water capabilities compared to the United States.

Internal divisions of BRICS are also notable. While India and China have recently reduced border tensions, genuine mutual trust remains elusive.

Russia is particularly eager for BRICS to help it circumvent Western sanctions, including through a shared payment system. Yet China and the other BRICS members do not share this level of urgency. And only under the geopolitical pressures of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia raised its willingness to align more closely with China in Central Asia and the Far East.

Countries like Brazil, South Africa, and other new BRICS members are comparatively weaker in terms of national power, particularly in heavy industry, and show no inclination to confront the West.

The West perceives BRICS as a “revisionist force” that seeks to reshape the global order. However, the advocacy for a multipolar world is not an attempt to dismantle the existing system but rather to reform it, aiming for a larger voice in international affairs.

Still, there is some validity to Western concerns.

Today’s international system retains remnants of colonialism, and the West continues to benefit from these “colonial dividends.” Historically, civilizations have risen and fallen in cycles at the regional level, yet Western civilization’s recent ascent coincided with technological advances that enabled global colonization and lasting benefits—“colonial dividends”—that, at one time, appeared to be endless.

Most BRICS countries suffered under colonialism, with Russia as the only exception. Although Russia was a colonial power itself, it ultimately found common ground with developing nations due to longstanding antagonism on racial, cultural, and ideological fronts from the West.

The rise of developing nations has shown that Western people are not inherently superior or more industrious; indeed, all of humanity has the capacity to achieve industrial success.

From a global perspective, the rise of developing nations isn’t a zero-sum game. But for the West, it does mean a loss of relative advantage, eroding the economic structure that has sustained high incomes and potentially leading to an absolute decline in living standards.

For the West, the real issue is that the development of BRICS is a natural outcome—there is little they can do to halt developing nations’ technological progress, aside from causing minor disruptions.

Western criticism of BRICS nations’ political systems, economic models, and human rights practices has achieved little and has only fostered resentment among BRICS elites and citizens. Recognizing BRICS’ unique contributions to global economic recovery and poverty alleviation could offer a more constructive approach.

Because BRICS’ development largely follows a natural course, the West may actually benefit by adopting a more hands-off approach. Distrust and confrontation risk losing cooperative opportunities and breeding greater discontent.

The West should feel fortunate that, despite the scars of colonialism, most patriotic political elites of the developing countries remain rational, seeking to reform the international system rather than demand retribution.

Ultimately, the most wise approach of the West could be accepting its relative decline, as no empire lasts forever. Resisting these historical shifts, they would only find that “the more they do, the more mistakes they make.”