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EU faces rapid depletion of gas reserves amid cold winter and reduced LNG imports

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Increased demand due to cold weather and reduced liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports by sea are causing the European Union (EU) to deplete its gas storage reserves at the fastest rate since the energy crisis three years ago.

The Financial Times (FT) cites data from Gas Infrastructure Europe, indicating that gas volumes in the bloc’s storage fields have dropped by approximately 19% between late September and mid-December, the traditional end of the filling season in gas markets. In contrast, the previous two years saw single-digit declines during the same period, supported by milder-than-average winters and reduced industrial demand due to elevated prices.

“Europe has had to rely much more heavily on underground storage this winter than in the past two years to compensate for the decline in liquefied natural gas imports and meet stronger demand,” explained Natasha Fielding, head of European gas pricing at Argus Media.

Europe’s reliance on stored gas reserves is further intensified by increased competition for LNG imports from Asia, where lower prices have attracted buyers. This shift has reduced European imports and necessitated greater use of existing reserves.

Currently, the EU’s gas storage levels stand at 75%, which is slightly above the 10-year average before efforts to reduce dependence on Russian imports. A year ago, storage levels were close to 90% in mid-December.

European gas prices have plummeted by approximately 90% compared to the peak prices of over €300 per megawatt hour during the summer of 2022 energy crisis. However, the rapid depletion of storage this winter raises concerns about the challenges and costs of refilling reserves for the next heating season.

Market dynamics reflect these challenges: traders are already pricing gas for summer delivery at higher rates than for the following winter, signaling rising replenishment costs.

The European Commission mandates that EU countries fill their gas storage facilities to 90% capacity by early November. However, some member states have lower targets, further complicating regional supply strategies.

A substantial portion of Europe’s gas now comes as LNG, which is increasingly influenced by geopolitics. The United States, the EU’s largest LNG supplier, has demanded long-term commitments to purchase U.S. gas or face potential tariffs. Qatar, the third-largest supplier, has threatened to halt shipments if the EU enforces new regulations penalizing companies that fail to meet environmental, human rights, and labor standards.

Additionally, colder weather conditions and the Dunkelflaute—periods when renewable energy generation is minimal—have driven up gas demand for power generation. Anne-Sophie Corbeau, a global energy researcher at Columbia University, reported that industrial gas demand in nine northwest European countries rebounded by 6% year-on-year from January to November 2023.

The rate of gas depletion varies across member states. The Netherlands has seen a 33% drop in stored gas levels since winter began, while France has experienced a 28% decline.

Looking ahead, Russian gas supplies via Ukraine—currently accounting for around 5% of EU imports—are expected to cease at the end of 2024 when the transit agreement expires. While Andreas Guth, secretary-general of Eurogas, suggests there is no immediate concern about this supply interruption, he acknowledges that every marginal volume of gas will impact storage replenishment efforts.

EUROPE

AfD aims to expand influence in European Parliament

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Months after the European Parliament (EP) elections, the right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) is gradually establishing itself in Brussels and even seeking to expand the parliamentary group it leads.

A series of scandals during the European Parliament elections in June had caused the AfD to distance itself from other right-wing European parties, leading to more isolation in Brussels than ever before.

However, becoming the second strongest party in the recent general elections in Germany at the end of February, along with support from Elon Musk and a bilateral meeting with US Vice President JD Vance, has given the AfD international attention and, at least in some eyes, renewed legitimacy.

The AfD’s newfound prestige is particularly noticeable in the EP, where international cooperation is a daily routine. Once a solitary faction forced to form its own group after the EP elections, the party now wants to expand the European of Sovereign Nations (ESN).

Party sources speaking to Euractiv confirmed that the AfD is in talks with at least two potential new members. Greece’s far-right Niki (Victory) party and Spain’s “anti-establishment” SALF party have recently held discussions with the ESN.

A source close to the negotiations said, “We expect SALF leader Alvise Pérez to join as early as April or May.”

Just a few months ago, the AfD had been sidelined by like-minded colleagues in Brussels, citing espionage investigations and “inflammatory statements.”

Ultimately, the AfD was expelled from the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, the former right-wing group led by Marine Le Pen’s National Rally, who feared that their German friends could cost them votes ahead of the European and French elections.

Without its former allies, the Germans struggled to form their own faction in Brussels because most candidates had found places in more established structures.

Together with another group of right-wing groups, the AfD formed the ESN in the EP.

Subsequently, attitudes toward the AfD and ESN softened, particularly with the support of the Trump administration. Even the French felt compelled to approach the AfD again in Brussels, inviting them, along with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group led by Meloni’s party, to cooperate on issues of common interest.

Leaders of the AfD’s sister party in Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ), are also pleased with the end of tensions between the Germans and other right-wing groups.

“I think cooperation is extremely important, and I also think it is extremely important that at some point, perhaps one day, there will be a significant right-wing group in the European Parliament,” said FPÖ MEP Petra Steger to Euractiv on election night in Germany.

The two parties have always been close but recently split into two main groups in the EP: the Patriots for Europe (PfE) and the ESN.

The AfD now wants to stabilize and secure the ESN. “We do not provide information about confidential discussions. But you can be sure that at the end of the legislative period, the parliamentary group will be larger than it is today,” ESN Co-Chair René Aust told Euractiv.

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Calls for German nuclear armament grow louder

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Following some German politicians raising the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), one of the country’s most important newspapers, has launched a campaign advocating for Berlin to possess atomic weapons.

Although Germany renounced nuclear weapons, experts agree that Berlin has the technological capacity to produce its own nuclear weapons in the near future, stating that the necessary technology for uranium enrichment is available at research centers in Jülich and Gronau.

Rainer Moormann, a former employee of the Jülich Research Center, notes that experts believe the construction of a much larger uranium enrichment facility is inevitable, and this would make it possible to produce “the necessary quantity for a few nuclear warheads within three to five years.”

However, delivering nuclear weapons to their targets requires missiles, and Germany is relatively weak in the construction of long-range ballistic missiles.

Nevertheless, it seems possible to produce cruise missiles that could be equipped with nuclear weapons. For example, it is said that Taurus could be used in this way. For this purpose, a maximum period of five years is considered realistic.

The legal and political situation is more challenging. On the one hand, the Federal Republic of Germany ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on May 2, 1975, albeit with a significant delay. Therefore, if the German government wants to start building its own nuclear weapons, it will first have to terminate the treaty.

From a purely legal point of view, this is possible without further ado, but it is likely to have serious political consequences, as other states may follow Germany’s example and try to obtain nuclear bombs for themselves.

The biggest examples in this regard seem to be Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and Poland.

On the other hand, the Two Plus Four Agreement, in which the Federal Republic of Germany confirmed its renunciation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and also accepted the upper limit of 370,000 Bundeswehr military personnel, also constitutes an obstacle to Germany’s nuclear armament.

This treaty cannot be terminated; any changes require the approval of the four allies in World War II and the countries that occupied post-war Germany (US, Britain, France, USSR-Russia).

Ernst-Jörg von Studnitz, one of the former German ambassadors to Russia, recently ruled that the clausula rebus sic stantibus principle of international law could be invoked, according to which treaty provisions can be terminated if the basic conditions under which a treaty was concluded change.

This is the case for Germany because the US nuclear umbrella is no longer considered reliable and there is a possibility of escalating conflict with Russia.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) also embraced the essence of this argument in a widely read editorial on Monday. The newspaper argued that there were “good reasons” to speak of the elimination of the basis of the Two Plus Four Agreement and wrote, “A ‘commitment’ that harms the country cannot continue.”

In the headline of the commentary, FAZ argued that Germany “must loosen its old shackles.”

The political turmoil that would result from the termination of the Two Plus Four Agreement could be enormous. The Federal Republic’s possession of nuclear weapons would not only lead to strong reactions from the four former allies, albeit for different reasons.

For example, a large majority of the public still opposes such a plan. However, the results of various polls fluctuate significantly; moreover, the reluctance to a ‘German bomb’ is decreasing.

A Forsa poll conducted about two weeks ago showed that 64% of the population rejected the Federal Republic’s nuclear armament; the proportion of supporters remained at 31%.

But this rate is four points higher than in 2024.

A survey conducted by the public opinion research institute Civey in the same period also concluded that only 48% of the population explicitly rejected a German nuclear bomb. A year ago, this figure was still 57%.

Also, the proportion of those who support Germany’s acquisition of nuclear weapons rose to 38%.

Both polls show that the proportion of those who support Germany’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is much higher among those living in the former Federal Republic of Germany than among those living in the regions of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).

Two employees of the Helmut Schmidt Federal Armed Forces University in Hamburg, in their article published in FAZ yesterday, argued that the nuclear weapons debate in Germany is “still characterized by moral reflexes and historically transmitted narratives,” probably also taking into account the insufficient public support for increased nuclear armament.

The authors instead call for a “measured reassessment” of the issue. For example, while pointing to the importance of “maintaining state functions even after a nuclear attack,” they write that the current debate should be expanded “to include important aspects of civil defense and social resilience.”

The authors argue that the German people will have to “learn to live with the bomb,” and for this, they point out that “a comprehensive, socio-politically based strategy that integrates the relevant military, political and social dimensions” is needed.

In short, while it is necessary to “persuade its own people” about the necessity of nuclear armament and to bear its consequences, it is emphasized that “traditionally” this task falls to the leading media.

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US officials’ visit to Greenland sparks controversy amid political tensions

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As negotiations to form a new government continue in Greenland, a Danish territory, following recent elections, senior officials from the Trump administration are scheduled to visit the island next week.

According to individuals familiar with the trip who spoke to the Financial Times (FT), US National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, Usha Vance (wife of Vice Presidential candidate J.D. Vance), and the Secretaries of Defense and Energy will be in Greenland from Thursday to Saturday for a “private visit.”

A source familiar with the visit confirmed that Waltz and Energy Secretary Chris Wright will tour the US military installation, Pituffik Space Base, in Greenland.

Danish and Greenlandic officials have indicated they are open to an increased US presence on the island but are not receptive to a takeover of the base.

The FT reported that the visit has caused consternation among Greenlandic and Danish officials. Jens-Frederik Nielsen, the leader of Demokraatit, which won this month’s elections, stated that the timing of the visit, amidst ongoing coalition negotiations and local elections, “once again shows a lack of respect for the people of Greenland.”

Greenland’s outgoing Prime Minister, Múte Egede, added that the visit “cannot in any way be described as a harmless visit by the wife of a politician” and that its “sole purpose is a show of force against us.”

US President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to acquire the Arctic island and has even considered the possibility of using military force to take it over from the NATO ally. Trump’s eldest son, Donald Jr., also visited the island in January for a “private visit.”

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen responded to the new US visit, stating that it “cannot be seen independently of the public statements” made by Trump and other officials.

“As the Kingdom of Denmark, we want to cooperate with the Americans. But this must be a cooperation based on fundamental values such as sovereignty and respect between countries and peoples. We are serious about this issue,” Frederiksen said.

Trump and other US officials have hailed the results of the Greenlandic parliamentary elections, seemingly equating the voters’ preference for pro-independence parties with a desire for ‘Americanization.’ However, a recent poll showed that only 6% of Greenlanders want to join the US, while 85% are opposed.

All leaders of the current parties represented in the island’s parliament also condemned Trump’s behavior as “unacceptable.” Aaja Chemnitz, a Greenlandic member of the Danish parliament, told Danish television that the visit was an “untimely interference” in the island’s politics so soon after the elections.

“Anyone who tries to interfere but is not part of Greenlandic society should stay away. We are going through a particularly challenging period in Greenland’s history because we are very much affected by what is happening abroad,” Chemnitz said.

Martin Lidegaard, a former Danish minister and current opposition MP, said the visit crossed the acceptable line for both Denmark and Greenland.

“It will now be crucial for Denmark and Greenland to act together,” Lidegaard added.

Usha Vance’s office confirmed that she would be traveling with her son and a US delegation “to visit historical sites, learn about Greenlandic heritage, and attend Avannaata Qimussersu, Greenland’s national dog sled race.”

The organization behind the dog sled race told Greenlandic media that it had received a large but undisclosed sum of money from the US consulate in Nuuk, Greenland’s capital.

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