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EU pauses China tariffs to seek negotiated trade settlement by October

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The European Union has temporarily refrained from imposing punitive tariffs and other trade defense measures on imports from China. Brussels aims to reach a negotiated settlement with Beijing by October to resolve an intensifying dispute over the bloc’s growing trade deficit with the Asian economic power.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič confirmed this stance on Monday following intensive discussions in Brussels with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

The dispute stems from a significant surge in Chinese exports to the EU, which has coincided with a decline in the export competitiveness of Germany and the wider bloc. According to a study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), this decline is primarily driven by insufficient investment in innovation within Germany.

Conversely, Berlin contends that the German economy has fallen victim to Chinese state subsidies and a heavily undervalued Chinese currency.

While German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently threatened to take decisive action against Beijing, experts warn that the EU would likely emerge defeated from an economic war with China.

Brussels forced onto the defensive

The expanding trade deficit between EU member states and China has long been a source of concern for Brussels, according to a report by German Foreign Policy.

Last year, the bilateral trade deficit reached €360 billion, equivalent to approximately €1 billion per day. This imbalance is driven by the People’s Republic of China’s increasing capability to manufacture high-tech products with high cost-efficiency.

The primary factors behind this competitive edge include state economic planning and economies of scale derived from manufacturing for China’s vast domestic market.

Chinese goods are increasingly competing with European products, demonstrating growing success in direct competition. This trend is particularly evident in sectors such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles.

The EU had previously sought to promote these specific industries through its Green Deal initiative in an effort to secure a leading position for its domestic industrial base in the global market.

Faced with mounting Chinese competition that has put domestic companies on the defensive even within the EU market, Brussels and EU member states are responding with defensive trade measures.

In October 2024, the EU began imposing tariffs ranging from 17% to 35.3% on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles. Other measures are currently being prepared, including restrictions on telecommunications technology from the People’s Republic of China over alleged security risks.

Controversy over China’s trade surplus

These defensive measures remain highly controversial for several reasons. First, China’s trade surplus is by no means an isolated global phenomenon.

Current estimates place China’s trade surplus at slightly under 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP). While this exceeds the EU’s average trade surplus, which stood at 1.9% of economic output last year, it remains significantly lower than Germany’s surplus. According to Federal Ministry of Finance statistics, Germany’s trade surplus is projected to reach 4.6% of GDP in 2025, after peaking at 5.8% in 2024.

Consequently, Germany’s criticism of China’s export surplus appears to rest on a double standard.

Furthermore, a recent analysis casts serious doubt on the assertion that the current weakness in German industry is primarily attributable to the strength of Chinese exports.

The study conducted by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) indicates that only about one-third of the decline in Germany’s market share in third countries can be attributed to Chinese expansion.

According to the IfW, this evidence suggests that Germany’s industrial challenges are largely domestic in origin and cannot be explained solely by the rise of China. The institute concluded that a permanent solution lies in “investments in innovation and new technologies.”

France leads calls for economic sanctions against China

Despite these findings, calls for new restrictions on Chinese imports are growing within the EU, with both high tariffs and import quotas under discussion.

Thus far, France has been the primary advocate for harsh measures, while Spain has recently acted as a brake on such initiatives.

Madrid has been on a collision course with the Trump administration for some time and is attempting to improve its relations with Beijing to establish a strategic balance.

Germany long maintained a cautious stance due to the substantial investments made in China by numerous German corporations, particularly in the automotive and chemical sectors.

However, during the EU summit held in Brussels on June 18–19, Chancellor Friedrich Merz adopted a more confrontational tone.

Merz argued that the primary disadvantage facing German industry is a 30% undervaluation of the Chinese currency. He asserted that this exchange-rate disparity has allowed Chinese companies to “invade” EU markets, calling the situation “unacceptable.”

Merz also reported that he had previously discussed the matter with US President Donald Trump during the G7 summit, noting that Trump was “of the same opinion.”

While the view that the yuan is undervalued is widely held, the 30% figure cited by Merz could be interpreted as a rhetorical declaration of war. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the maximum rate of Chinese currency undervaluation to be 15%.

China unlikely to accept a new “Plaza Accord”

The expectation that the EU can successfully pressure China into revaluing its currency is highly improbable, particularly given Merz’s references to a new “Plaza Accord.”

Under the original Plaza Accord of September 22, 1985, the US, the UK, France, West Germany, and Japan agreed to a coordinated devaluation of the US dollar against the German mark and the Japanese yen. The measure was designed to reduce the US trade deficit.

The Plaza Accord achieved only partial success: while the US trade deficit with West Germany decreased, its deficit with Japan did not. Instead, the agreement triggered a recession in Japan, causing severe, long-term structural damage to its economy.

China is highly unlikely to agree to any modern equivalent that could carry similarly damaging consequences for its own industrial sector. Officials in Beijing indicate that calls for a new Plaza Accord are merely intended to escalate political pressure.

Trade war simulation shows EU unable to defeat China

The implementation of such trade barriers is increasingly viewed by experts as a high-risk strategy.

In mid-June, the Financial Times reported on a desktop simulation of a trade war between the EU and China, conducted by academic experts and think-tank analysts.

The scenario included what is widely considered the EU’s most potent economic leverage: an embargo on lithography equipment produced by the Dutch semiconductor manufacturing supplier ASML, technology on which China remains dependent.

However, in the simulation, China retaliated by threatening an embargo on rare earth elements as well as raw materials that are critical to Europe’s pharmaceutical industry.

Unlike the ASML export ban, these Chinese counter-measures would take effect relatively quickly, inflicting immediate and severe damage on European industry.

The Financial Times noted that the EU failed to exert meaningful leverage over China in the simulation. Ultimately, Brussels was forced to accept minor, symbolic concessions from Beijing to avoid a full-scale economic war that the bloc stood to lose.

While the EU has resolved to secure its own independent access to rare earth elements, establishing these supply chains will take years, if not decades.

October deadline set for resolution

Following talks on Sunday with German State Secretary for Economic Affairs Katherina Reiche, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao held intensive discussions on Monday with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.

Šefčovič subsequently described the negotiations as “constructive” and stated that the objective remains to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

This resolution is expected to be finalized by October. Reiche had previously made similar statements.

The diplomatic pause suggests that Berlin and Brussels, recognizing that they could lose a full-scale trade war, are actively seeking to prevent further escalation of the conflict for the time being.

Europe

UK faces £258bn infrastructure gap as commission urges private funds

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Every adult in Britain would need to pay an extra £590 a year in tax to fund planned public infrastructure investments worth £258 billion.

Sir John Armitt, chair of the private sector-led Public-Private Partnerships Commission, stated that delivering vital projects, such as Thames Water’s long-delayed White Horse reservoir, would require the government to increase infrastructure investment by two-thirds—equivalent to around £25 billion annually until 2030—if financed through public funds.

The crisis surrounding the early release scheme has highlighted the UK’s need for greater prison capacity, while Ofwat has warned that population growth and climate change could leave England facing a shortfall of billions of litres of water per day over the next 25 years.

Armitt, who was the final chair of the National Infrastructure Commission before it was replaced by a new agency, noted that the government’s constrained financial position means its fiscal rules would be “put in jeopardy” if the UK attempted to finance infrastructure spending through additional borrowing.

According to the report, such an approach would add approximately £7 billion to debt interest costs by 2030, £14 billion by 2035, and £23 billion by 2040.

Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves had altered the fiscal rules to treat capital investment differently from day-to-day spending.

However, the required additional borrowing would still increase overall national debt.

Armitt, who recommended the creation of an OBR-style body for infrastructure, said:

“Those who believe that taxpayers and the public sector can close this gap alone have not looked closely enough at the public finances. If debt interest were a government department, it would be the fourth-largest in Whitehall. The UK faces a fundamental choice: do we want to provide the infrastructure that the public expects and the country needs, or do we not?”

A rise in government bond yields over the past two weeks has narrowed the government’s fiscal headroom, intensifying pressure on Reeves’s successor, John Healey, to balance the public books as Prime Minister Andy Burnham targets “growth in every postcode”.

The commission’s report, delivered by consultancy Bradshaw Advisory, also revealed that the UK has the lowest level of investment among G7 nations.

The report argues that reducing the cost and delivery times of infrastructure projects requires a comprehensive overhaul of the UK planning system, along with the elimination of political risk aversion and other regulatory obstacles.

According to the findings, rail projects in the UK take 50% longer than the international average, whilst delivery timelines for nationally significant projects doubled between 2009 and 2019.

To expedite construction and mitigate the threat of bureaucracy, the report proposes the introduction of a “parliamentary approval vote” for critical national infrastructure projects. Armitt characterised the current landscape as an “appalling cycle” of legal challenges.

The commission noted that uncertainty drives up the cost of infrastructure projects by generating “over-engineered designs to withstand any potential legal challenge and repeated consultations”.

Armitt called for greater pragmatism in Whitehall regarding the role of private investors and developers, who are more efficient than the public sector at delivering infrastructure because they must generate a return on their investments.

He also argued that the available capital pool is vastly larger. UK pension funds hold trillions of pounds in assets, yet only a small fraction is allocated to infrastructure projects.

Armitt said infrastructure investors have recently raised concerns that government efforts to increase public control have dampened their appetite for investing in the UK.

Arguing that this shift would deter investors, Armitt pointed to the windfall tax imposed on North Sea oil.

Armitt added that investors, particularly pension funds, “want long-term certainty and confidence”.

A separate Oxford Economics report commissioned last week by transport groups and infrastructure investors revealed that the UK has lagged behind every major economy except Greece on investment over the past 25 years.

Jon Phillips, chief executive of the Global Infrastructure Investor Association, said:

“Private capital is mobile by nature… at a time when the German, French, and Canadian governments are actively seeking to attract international investors, the UK risks losing ground.”

A government spokesperson said they welcomed “ideas to build the infrastructure needed across the UK”:

“Over the course of this Parliament, we have made progress by publishing the 10-year infrastructure strategy, increasing public investment by £120 billion to crowd in private finance, and delivering reforms to planning, major infrastructure, and regulation to give businesses and local leaders the stability they need to make long-term decisions.”

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Wolfgang Streeck links German polycrisis to capitalism and AfD rise

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German sociologist Wolfgang Streeck has examined the link between the conditions driving the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the capitalist crisis, calling on the left to “stop playing games and grow up.”

Writing for New Left Review (NLR), Streeck begins by asking what it means to exist within a “polycrisis.” In his view, under an increasingly “less democratic” capitalism, the countries of the rich world face “a bundle of similar crises that have emerged more or less unnoticed.”

According to Streeck, beneath these developments lies a fiscal crisis that has finally moved to the fore. In this context, “the mounting demands placed on society by the evolution of contemporary capitalism” clash with the shrinking capacity of “democratic politics” to secure the resources required to meet them.

Streeck argues that one consequence of this dynamic is the striking rise of “new-model opposition parties that are critical of the existing order and threaten to unseat the now-ageing ruling parties of the post-war era.”

Contending that nearly all of these problems in Germany stem from a policy of “stealth austerity,” Streeck points out that public investment has been deprived of resources as a result: “Stagnant [economic] growth; under these conditions any structural change assumes a zero-sum character; the deterioration of public infrastructure, including railways, bridges, and roads; a growing housing shortage and rising urban rents; the inability of both cities and rural areas to adapt to the consequences of climate change; the lack of an immigration policy to offset an ageing population alongside a sharp decline in birth rates; the decay of the education system, especially primary schools; the indebtedness of local authorities and their diminished capacity to make necessary investments and provide basic services; rising income and wealth inequality; with those most affected being chronically low-income families, particularly families headed by single mothers; and finally, widespread anxiety about the future, driven in part by fears of cuts to basic state-provided services that are becoming increasingly difficult to finance.”

According to the author, since the 1970s an ever-widening gulf has emerged between the overhead costs of capitalism and the amount that capitalist firms are willing (or can be forced) to contribute toward covering them. The progression operates as follows: these costs arise from the necessary preconditions and consequences of capitalist production, ranging from research and development and the creation of human capital to remedying environmental destruction. Yet they also stem from the need to secure legitimacy for a mode of production in which the extracted surplus value accrues to a small class of capital owners. Every form of the social wage; that is, state top-ups to the market wages of workers, such as social security and health insurance, serves to consolidate this legitimacy. As capitalist development advances and new needs arise among workers and their families, these expenditures (such as childcare facilities or eldercare) expand. At the same time, however, the scope for levying taxes on both the working classes and the classes that profit from them reaches its limits.

Streeck writes that during the neoliberal era, in order to sustain this zero-sum game; that is, to enable both capitalists and workers to carry on, states resorted to borrowing on deregulated global financial markets. Yet as sovereign debt levels escalated, the state faced the risk of losing its “creditworthiness” in the assessment of “the markets”; doubts emerged over its ability to meet interest payments from existing revenues, and even the interest itself had to be financed through borrowing.

In Germany, this development manifests through a “reform” debate conducted “under the watchful eye of the markets,” encompassing restrictions on pensions, sick leave, and labour rights.

Alongside this, the debt tap is opened to appease NATO allies and the arms industry, and perhaps as a last resort to slow down deindustrialisation.

According to Streeck, with the fiscal crisis no longer a slow-moving one, and with no hope of bringing it and the accompanying infrastructure and social welfare crises under control in the foreseeable future, traditional centrist parties have abandoned their conventional approach of “spreading cheer and optimism.”

The same holds true for the standard democratic narrative that those dissatisfied with government policy can vote for another party at the next election; the risk that this will benefit the new “anti-systemic” opposition appears too great.

Streeck writes:

“This paves the way for the formation of a party cartel in which the main parties avoid clashing with one another. In Germany this scenario seems particularly plausible: after all, the CDU and SPD were in power almost uninterruptedly throughout the long years of ‘shadow austerity’, and largely in coalition.”

Consequently, the issue ceases to be the debt crisis, rising rents, crushing living costs, shrinking public services, or growing segments of the population turning to food banks; instead, it becomes “populism,” the AfD, and neofascism.

Streeck points out that centrist parties, or “we democrats,” use this to make closing ranks mandatory once again. The logical extension of this policy is a summons to fight “against the right” and make a final stand for “our democracy,” rather than struggling against the growing power of markets over the public: “And for the sake of this, we are asked to set aside our petty squabbles over who will be subjected first, and who spared until later, to the overt austerity demanded by subsidised capital markets.”

Streeck continues:

“At first glance; from the standpoint of the ruling political class; this certainly has its appeal. Demonstrations by all sensible people against the AfD are far preferable to demonstrations against the rising cost of living; ‘firewalls’ cost far less than insulating the walls of old apartments; reports by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution are far cheaper than nurseries and schools where all children can be accommodated and educated together. Moreover, floating the idea of having a party supported by at least a third of the electorate banned by the Constitutional Court in the name of ‘militant democracy’ guarantees an exciting item on the evening news about the daily exertions of those who run the state.”

Yet Streeck believes that none of this will work, either now or in the long run. Pointing out that the current governing and political class has taken no steps to address the real problems it “wants to hide behind the AfD problem,” the sociologist says: “Even if the party is banned, trains will still not run on time, heat-related deaths will not decline, cities will not become more liveable, rents will not fall, and pensions and jobs will not become more secure.”

Streeck notes that the situation would not change if the AfD were to enter government rather than being politically or physically locked away; nevertheless, he argues that the prevailing political mentality fears giving the AfD the opportunity to fail in the face of the “polycrisis.”

Streeck believes the AfD will not be diminished by the next demonstration or the next broadcast of partisan television news. In his view, as long as the “forces of the state and democracy” exhaust themselves on a secondary battlefield such as “democracy versus populism” to divert attention from the crises unfolding under their own governance, the AfD will have an easy ride.

Reminding readers that an external enemy (Russia) has been added to the internal enemy, Streeck underlines that the two are conflated as far as possible through “conspiracy theories.”

The author notes that the drive to transform a “welfare” state into a “garrison” state and brand the AfD as the “Kremlin’s fifth column” raises the question of how a debt-laden government intends to fund raising defence spending to at least 5% of GDP: “Will it resort to even more austerity or even more borrowing, risking an ultimate rupture with the domestic population, with global financial markets, or with both?”

Arguing that the left, unlike “PR specialists,” must ask certain questions, the German author points to the following:

“How can we make capital pay the bill for the costs it imposes on society and nature? How can we prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion? How will we protect companies that provide quality jobs to people in our country from a global trading system that shows no respect for workers? How can we halt the decline in our population through immigration and better family policies? In a society in transition like ours, how will we ease the debt burden on our local authorities so that they can deliver the public services essential for everyone to lead a good life? And how must ‘our democracy’ be restructured so that it becomes a democracy for all and gives citizens the opportunity to take control of their own lives; so that they are not forced to beg for handouts from a state whose coffers are empty and will remain so for a long time to come?”

Streeck concludes his article by stating: “Playtime is over; the situation is serious, and we urgently need to grow up.”

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AfD’s Siegmund links German rearmament to remigration plans

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Ulrich Siegmund of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), who is expected to become the next state premier of Saxony-Anhalt, has stated that they do not oppose Germany’s rearmament, arguing that arms will be required during the “remigration” process.

The issue specifically concerns a factory in the Saxony-Anhalt town of Sangerhausen. Israeli defence contractor Elbit intends to establish production facilities there, though protests against the plan have been under way for some time.

The company manufactures, among other products, the Hermes combat drone, howitzers, and rocket launchers.

According to Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Mayor Torsten Schweiger, neither drones nor ammunition will be produced in Sangerhausen.

The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) had previously announced its opposition to the state becoming a defence industry hub for Israel.

Following a parliamentary group meeting, Siegmund was asked directly at a press conference about the proposed investment project.

Siegmund replied:

“Our position is very clear. We do not condemn the production of military equipment in general, because during future repatriation and deportation campaigns for migrants, we will naturally require the appropriate tools. This also applies to internal security, our own stability, and national defence. We are aware that such things do not fall from the sky.”

Siegmund also argued that a distinction exists between sending military equipment to foreign wars financed by German taxpayers and the approach they advocate.

AfD has not yet taken a final decision

Siegmund explained that the AfD is monitoring the situation in Sangerhausen and remains in contact with local political representatives.

At the same time, he noted that the economic aspects of a potential factory site should not be ignored. The party also plans to examine closely what is produced in Sangerhausen and under what conditions.

“We want to examine closely: what is produced there, and under what conditions? And do we face the risk of being drawn into foreign conflicts as a result? If so, we view this situation with great scepticism,” Siegmund said.

Siegmund also pointed to conversations he had with citizens during the election campaign. Many people, including local residents in Sangerhausen, welcomed the AfD’s stance.

However, his party has not yet reached a final decision regarding the prospective facility. “A valid decision has not yet been taken because we still do not possess all the information,” the AfD politician said.

Green light for militarisation on grounds of remigration and security

Siegmund’s remarks indicating that weapons are needed for “remigration” drew attention. The term refers to the deportation of people with an immigrant background and was coined by Austrian right-wing activist Martin Sellner. The AfD has adopted the phrase over the past few years.

Years ago, Thuringia AfD leader Björn Höcke spoke of “well-measured cruelty” in the context of deportation procedures.

AfD politicians Kay Gottschalk and Lena Kotré attended an international “Remigration Summit” held in Portugal in late May.

There, Martin Sellner of the Identitarian movement declared their aims to secure “Europe’s ethnocultural continuity”, halt all legal or illegal immigration into Europe, and remove “millions” of non-Western immigrants from the continent.

In a video recorded alongside Sellner, Dutch activist Eva Vlaardingerbroek said: “Nobody comes in, and millions go out.”

In interviews, Kotré and Gottschalk presented the mass deportation of millions of people as a panacea for the housing market, the education system, and society.

Federal Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticised the AfD on Wednesday, stating that the concept of “remigration” amounts to nothing other than “ethnic cleansing based on skin colour and origin”.

Wagenknecht criticises “remigration”

Meanwhile, BSW, which decided unanimously to hold talks with the AfD in Saxony-Anhalt, has publicly announced its “red lines”.

Party founder Sahra Wagenknecht stated that she maintains clear red lines against the AfD, particularly regarding “remigration”.

In an interview with RTL and ntv, Wagenknecht said: “They will feel our strong opposition on this matter. I find it terrible that people are worried and frightened.”

Stating that it is unacceptable for “well-integrated citizens” to be affected, the BSW leader remarked: “And we will not yield on this.” She continued:

“If the AfD is truly serious about frightening people who came to our country, work here, are well integrated, pay taxes, and whose children grow up here; if they intend to tell them, ‘You do not belong here’ or convey the message, ‘We want to expel you’ [we will prevent it].”

Regarding the AfD’s election manifesto equating homosexuality with “sexual deviance”, Wagenknecht replied: “Naturally, we believe every individual should live and love as they wish, and that equality exists here, including legal equality. Anyone questioning this does not live in modern times.”

BSW does not back Siegmund for premier

Wagenknecht also dismissed claims that BSW would elect AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund as state premier in Saxony-Anhalt, stating: “We have always made what we want very clear.”

Wagenknecht argued that Siegmund had given “completely contradictory statements regarding when he wants to be state premier and when he does not”.

“One gets the impression that he himself might feel it is not such a good idea after all,” Wagenknecht said.

The BSW founder called for a “respected figure across party lines” upon whom everyone could agree and who could “bring this country a little closer together”.

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