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EU pauses China tariffs to seek negotiated trade settlement by October

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The European Union has temporarily refrained from imposing punitive tariffs and other trade defense measures on imports from China. Brussels aims to reach a negotiated settlement with Beijing by October to resolve an intensifying dispute over the bloc’s growing trade deficit with the Asian economic power.

EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič confirmed this stance on Monday following intensive discussions in Brussels with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

The dispute stems from a significant surge in Chinese exports to the EU, which has coincided with a decline in the export competitiveness of Germany and the wider bloc. According to a study by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), this decline is primarily driven by insufficient investment in innovation within Germany.

Conversely, Berlin contends that the German economy has fallen victim to Chinese state subsidies and a heavily undervalued Chinese currency.

While German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently threatened to take decisive action against Beijing, experts warn that the EU would likely emerge defeated from an economic war with China.

Brussels forced onto the defensive

The expanding trade deficit between EU member states and China has long been a source of concern for Brussels, according to a report by German Foreign Policy.

Last year, the bilateral trade deficit reached €360 billion, equivalent to approximately €1 billion per day. This imbalance is driven by the People’s Republic of China’s increasing capability to manufacture high-tech products with high cost-efficiency.

The primary factors behind this competitive edge include state economic planning and economies of scale derived from manufacturing for China’s vast domestic market.

Chinese goods are increasingly competing with European products, demonstrating growing success in direct competition. This trend is particularly evident in sectors such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles.

The EU had previously sought to promote these specific industries through its Green Deal initiative in an effort to secure a leading position for its domestic industrial base in the global market.

Faced with mounting Chinese competition that has put domestic companies on the defensive even within the EU market, Brussels and EU member states are responding with defensive trade measures.

In October 2024, the EU began imposing tariffs ranging from 17% to 35.3% on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles. Other measures are currently being prepared, including restrictions on telecommunications technology from the People’s Republic of China over alleged security risks.

Controversy over China’s trade surplus

These defensive measures remain highly controversial for several reasons. First, China’s trade surplus is by no means an isolated global phenomenon.

Current estimates place China’s trade surplus at slightly under 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP). While this exceeds the EU’s average trade surplus, which stood at 1.9% of economic output last year, it remains significantly lower than Germany’s surplus. According to Federal Ministry of Finance statistics, Germany’s trade surplus is projected to reach 4.6% of GDP in 2025, after peaking at 5.8% in 2024.

Consequently, Germany’s criticism of China’s export surplus appears to rest on a double standard.

Furthermore, a recent analysis casts serious doubt on the assertion that the current weakness in German industry is primarily attributable to the strength of Chinese exports.

The study conducted by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) indicates that only about one-third of the decline in Germany’s market share in third countries can be attributed to Chinese expansion.

According to the IfW, this evidence suggests that Germany’s industrial challenges are largely domestic in origin and cannot be explained solely by the rise of China. The institute concluded that a permanent solution lies in “investments in innovation and new technologies.”

France leads calls for economic sanctions against China

Despite these findings, calls for new restrictions on Chinese imports are growing within the EU, with both high tariffs and import quotas under discussion.

Thus far, France has been the primary advocate for harsh measures, while Spain has recently acted as a brake on such initiatives.

Madrid has been on a collision course with the Trump administration for some time and is attempting to improve its relations with Beijing to establish a strategic balance.

Germany long maintained a cautious stance due to the substantial investments made in China by numerous German corporations, particularly in the automotive and chemical sectors.

However, during the EU summit held in Brussels on June 18–19, Chancellor Friedrich Merz adopted a more confrontational tone.

Merz argued that the primary disadvantage facing German industry is a 30% undervaluation of the Chinese currency. He asserted that this exchange-rate disparity has allowed Chinese companies to “invade” EU markets, calling the situation “unacceptable.”

Merz also reported that he had previously discussed the matter with US President Donald Trump during the G7 summit, noting that Trump was “of the same opinion.”

While the view that the yuan is undervalued is widely held, the 30% figure cited by Merz could be interpreted as a rhetorical declaration of war. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates the maximum rate of Chinese currency undervaluation to be 15%.

China unlikely to accept a new “Plaza Accord”

The expectation that the EU can successfully pressure China into revaluing its currency is highly improbable, particularly given Merz’s references to a new “Plaza Accord.”

Under the original Plaza Accord of September 22, 1985, the US, the UK, France, West Germany, and Japan agreed to a coordinated devaluation of the US dollar against the German mark and the Japanese yen. The measure was designed to reduce the US trade deficit.

The Plaza Accord achieved only partial success: while the US trade deficit with West Germany decreased, its deficit with Japan did not. Instead, the agreement triggered a recession in Japan, causing severe, long-term structural damage to its economy.

China is highly unlikely to agree to any modern equivalent that could carry similarly damaging consequences for its own industrial sector. Officials in Beijing indicate that calls for a new Plaza Accord are merely intended to escalate political pressure.

Trade war simulation shows EU unable to defeat China

The implementation of such trade barriers is increasingly viewed by experts as a high-risk strategy.

In mid-June, the Financial Times reported on a desktop simulation of a trade war between the EU and China, conducted by academic experts and think-tank analysts.

The scenario included what is widely considered the EU’s most potent economic leverage: an embargo on lithography equipment produced by the Dutch semiconductor manufacturing supplier ASML, technology on which China remains dependent.

However, in the simulation, China retaliated by threatening an embargo on rare earth elements as well as raw materials that are critical to Europe’s pharmaceutical industry.

Unlike the ASML export ban, these Chinese counter-measures would take effect relatively quickly, inflicting immediate and severe damage on European industry.

The Financial Times noted that the EU failed to exert meaningful leverage over China in the simulation. Ultimately, Brussels was forced to accept minor, symbolic concessions from Beijing to avoid a full-scale economic war that the bloc stood to lose.

While the EU has resolved to secure its own independent access to rare earth elements, establishing these supply chains will take years, if not decades.

October deadline set for resolution

Following talks on Sunday with German State Secretary for Economic Affairs Katherina Reiche, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao held intensive discussions on Monday with EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič.

Šefčovič subsequently described the negotiations as “constructive” and stated that the objective remains to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

This resolution is expected to be finalized by October. Reiche had previously made similar statements.

The diplomatic pause suggests that Berlin and Brussels, recognizing that they could lose a full-scale trade war, are actively seeking to prevent further escalation of the conflict for the time being.

Europe

US secures multi-billion-dollar energy and AI deals at Three Seas summit in Dubrovnik

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A struggle for influence is intensifying between the European Union and the United States in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) emerging as a primary arena for this geopolitical contest.

An analysis published by German Foreign Policy reveals that Western European nations and the EU are increasingly positioning renewable energy as a strategic counterweight to US liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries in the region.

At a 3SI summit convened in late April in the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, representatives from the Trump administration met with officials from the 13 EU member states that comprise the initiative. The parties agreed on a series of new projects spanning energy supply, pipelines, artificial intelligence (AI), and digital infrastructure.

The immediate focus of these talks centred on new natural gas interconnectors for South-Eastern Europe and a massive AI project in Croatia carrying an estimated investment volume of €50 billion.

Originally established to modernise and expand infrastructure between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, the initiative has increasingly transformed into a vehicle for American power projection in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Energy policy remains the critical battleground: whilst the Trump administration seeks to lock in long-term US LNG export markets, the EU is pushing to pivot the region towards renewable energy. Notably, investments targeting renewable energy systems were also approved during the Dubrovnik proceedings.

A brief history of the Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2015 by Polish President Andrzej Duda and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, holding its inaugural summit in Dubrovnik in August 2016. The platform comprises 13 EU member states stretching from the Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) through the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Austria, down to Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.

Albania, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova have subsequently associated themselves with the platform.

The initiative derives its name from its geographical objective: linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas through the territory of its member countries.

The creation of the 3SI was heavily driven by the United States. US strategists drew direct inspiration from an interwar Polish foreign policy concept formulated by Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Piłsudski’s “Intermarium” plan sought to unite Eastern European nations—spanning from the Baltic states to Yugoslavia and Romania—into a geopolitical bloc designed to act as an anti-Soviet bulwark.

In late 2014, the US think tank the Atlantic Council, collaborating with Central Europe Energy Partners (CEEP)—a lobby group representing energy companies in Poland, Lithuania and Romania—published an influential analysis. The report focused on developing a “North-South Corridor” extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas.

The founding documents of the Three Seas Initiative explicitly reference this American strategic blueprint.

Washington has spent years utilising the 3SI to consolidate and expand its influence over the participant states. The cornerstone of this strategy is energy policy, specifically aimed at substituting imports of Russian pipeline gas with US-sourced LNG.

A North-South corridor to bypass the East-West axis

To achieve this geopolitical shift, the Three Seas Initiative seeks to expand the infrastructure of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe by adding robust north-south transport and energy links. Since 1990, infrastructural development in the region had run predominantly on an east-west axis, prioritising integration with Germany at the heart of the EU.

Constructing a north-south network will not only facilitate the distribution of US LNG imported via Adriatic and Baltic ports, but also foster a more autonomous regional infrastructure. By reducing reliance on road and rail networks terminates in Germany, the project threatens a significant dilution of Berlin’s economic and political leverage in the region.

Following the EU’s commitment to phase out Russian gas imports entirely by 2027, the strategic weight of LNG terminals and their corresponding north-south pipelines has steadily grown.

This structural dependency is visible within Germany itself. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, approximately 96% of the LNG imported via German North Sea and Baltic terminals in 2025 originated from the US. This US supply accounts for 10.3% of Germany’s total gas imports.

German-American friction in South-Eastern Europe

The struggle for influence in Eastern Europe, and the decisive role of energy transit within it, was recently illustrated by a leadership crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina surrounding the German diplomat Christian Schmidt, the international community’s High Representative.

Schmidt’s eventual resignation was precipitated by intense political maneuvering between certain Western European nations—led by Germany—and the Trump administration, which has been actively pursuing gas and raw material agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Having successfully pressured Schmidt to step down, the US proposed Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi as his successor. The nomination served to drive a wedge between EU member states, with Germany opposing Washington’s preferred candidate whilst Italy offered its support. President Trump warned that Washington would halt financial assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina if the US plans were thwarted.

The move aligns with a new US strategy for South-Eastern Europe submitted by the Trump administration to Congress in May. The updated policy pivots away from “democracy promotion,” focusing instead on security and securing market access for American corporations.

Historically, Bosnia and Herzegovina has relied on Russian natural gas delivered via the TurkStream pipeline. Washington aims to replace this supply with US LNG imported through a terminal on the Croatian island of Krk.

The proposed infrastructure plans involve constructing a new pipeline extension into Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be built by US engineering firm Bechtel alongside AAFS Infrastructure and Energy. Schmidt had increasingly been viewed by US officials as an obstacle to these plans.

A victory for the Trump administration at the 3SI summit

In late April, Dubrovnik hosted the 10th anniversary summit of the 3SI alongside an aligned Business Forum. The event drew high-level participation, including seven presidents and prime ministers from 3SI member states, numerous cabinet ministers, and senior representatives from the Trump administration.

At the forum, the US successfully leveraged multi-billion-dollar energy and technology projects to entrench its footprint in South-Eastern Europe.

US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright declared in Dubrovnik: “The United States is ushering in a new era of cooperation for Central and Eastern Europe. This partnership is built on our mutual support for an aggressive energy expansion agenda.”

To formalise this initiative, Wright, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Borjana Krišto, signed a memorandum of understanding to launch the “Trump Peace Pipelines Framework”.

The agreement directly advances the “Southern Interconnection” project, which will link Bosnia and Herzegovina’s gas grid to the Croatian network and the Krk island LNG terminal.

At the summit, Polish Climate and Environment Minister Miłosz Motyka also emphasized the region’s commitment to expanding nuclear energy, calling it the “cornerstone of our new security architecture.”

Parallel to these energy agreements, American investors announced plans to build a massive AI and data centre hub in Croatia. The Pantheon Atlas investment group signed a memorandum of understanding with the Croatian firm Končar Group to construct an AI campus.

The total investment is projected at approximately €50 billion—a sum exceeding half of Croatia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).

The gigawatt-scale power capacity required to run the data centre is comparable to the electricity demand of a major metropolitan area like Zagreb. To meet its current power requirements, Croatia relies heavily on natural gas, much of which is imported through the Krk LNG terminal.

Foreign policy implications of the energy transition

The Dubrovnik summit also marked the establishment of a new regional infrastructure fund. The vehicle is designed to finance joint investments in hydrogen production, cross-border transport infrastructure, renewable energy systems and electrical grid expansion, with at least €2 billion earmarked for initial projects.

By comparison, more than €4 billion was invested in natural gas infrastructure within the region between 2016 and 2025.

This gradual shift toward renewable energy introduces a distinct foreign policy dynamic. While LNG supplies are overwhelmingly dominated by imports from the US, the hardware and technology required to deploy renewable energy infrastructure do not carry the same transatlantic dependency. In the vast majority of cases, this technology is manufactured and supplied from within Europe itself.

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Merz and Macron propose gradual EU integration for Western Balkans at Montenegro summit

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German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron called for rapid enlargement at the European Union-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro, acknowledging that the EU itself shares responsibility for the fact that Western Balkan states have not yet integrated into the bloc.

“If we have not accepted a new member in 13 years, this also points to shortcomings on the European Union side. Today, we want to overcome these,” German Chancellor Merz said.

Merz stated that the bloc must demonstrate both its capacity and its political will for enlargement.

The Western Balkans region comprises Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia. All six countries submitted official applications to join the bloc many years ago.

“Membership-lite” model on the agenda

French President Macron emphasized the critical importance of the region for the EU. Pointing to areas such as energy, security, and migration routes, Macron said that Europe’s strategic independence will also be determined in the Western Balkans, rendering the region geopolitically critical.

Merz and Macron attended the summit in the Adriatic coastal town of Tivat with a joint draft proposal designed to bring candidate countries closer to the bloc at a faster pace.

Under the model proposed by the two leaders, candidate countries would be granted observer status in EU institutions. The initiative aims to enable these countries to participate more closely in decision-making processes and to gain privileged access to the EU internal market through gradual integration. These steps are also intended to accelerate the domestic reform process in candidate states.

The joint document noted that “overly bureaucratic and formalistic procedures” must be simplified and the negotiation process accelerated.

To build a “true European union,” the text emphasized that additional incentives should be offered within a performance-based, gradual integration framework. However, both leaders stated that the ultimate goal remains full membership at a faster pace.

Mixed reactions to the summit

Among the candidate nations, Montenegro is at the most advanced stage of the accession process, followed by Albania. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated that Montenegro could be admitted as the 28th member of the bloc by the end of 2028.

The initiative drew varied reactions from Balkan leaders. Montenegrin President Jakov Milatovic described the summit as a “turning point,” saying, “Our meeting offers new hope and fresh energy for all Western Balkan countries.”

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama adopted a more cautious tone, noting that the initiative has “deepened the debate.”

While calling on Merz and Macron to exert greater effort toward rapid enlargement, Rama refrained from predicting a specific accession date for Albania. “It is impossible to predict when Albania will become a member. There are three things in the world that cannot be predicted: God, sex, and the EU,” Rama said.

Officials in Brussels continue to view the close relations that certain candidate countries—particularly Serbia—have developed with Russia with a critical eye. The EU regularly calls on Belgrade to align with sanctions against Russia.

According to observers, North Macedonia, which has been a NATO member since 2020, faces the risk of falling into the sphere of influence of Serbia and China.

Furthermore, high tensions flare periodically among countries in the region, particularly between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as between Serbia and Montenegro.

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, a move that Belgrade has refused to recognize. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 after separating from its state union with Serbia.

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UK government nationalises British Steel to protect jobs and primary production capacity

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The British government has officially taken the steelmaker British Steel into public ownership, 15 years after launching an intervention to prevent the closure of its production facilities in Scunthorpe and the loss of 4,000 jobs.

Prime Minister Keir Starmer stated that the takeover of the plant from its Chinese owner, Jingye Group, was necessary for the national interest, marking one of the final major acts of his premiership after the Steel Industry Nationalisation Act received royal assent.

The Labour government had called an extraordinary session of parliament in April last year to prevent the closure of British Steel, following threats by Jingye Group to pull out without taking action to preserve the blast furnaces in Lincolnshire.

Without this intervention, the UK’s last remaining facility producing primary steel from iron ore would have been forced to cease operations.

The company has since been under the management of government officials, despite opposition from Jingye Group. However, the Chinese company retained its economic equity stake until the nationalisation decision was finalised.

Government officials announced that an independent evaluator will be appointed to determine whether any compensation will be paid.

For its part, Jingye Group maintained in its UK financial reports and on its WeChat social media account that British Steel is a valuable asset deserving of high compensation, even though the group was prepared to halt operations.

According to a report by The Guardian newspaper, Prime Minister Starmer said in a statement on the matter:

“British Steel is part of the fabric of our nation and a cornerstone of Britain’s industrial strength. This decision secures the future of steelmaking in the UK, protects skilled workforces, and preserves our vital national capability. This government will always act in the national interest to support British industry, strengthen our economy, and ensure the sectors we rely on continue to thrive in the future.”

In a statement, the government noted that despite extensive negotiations, no agreement could be reached with Jingye Group that would both secure the future of the company and protect the interests of taxpayers.

Trade unions representing steelworkers welcomed the move to protect employment.

Alasdair McDiarmid, Assistant General Secretary of the Community union, expressed gratitude for the nationalisation decision, noting that it would help protect thousands of jobs and preserve the steelmaking capability upon which the economy and national security depend.

Explaining the grounds for nationalising the Scunthorpe facility, Business Secretary Peter Kyle said, “If this plant were to disappear, we would become dependent on international markets and the supply of other nations for the type of production used in our railways and construction sector.”

When asked by Times Radio whether the blast furnaces would continue primary steel production in the long term, Kyle said: “In the future, this will be a decision to be made by the business itself and the government. However, the core objective of our steel strategy is to transition to green steel. In the long term, primary demand is in this area, and I want this facility to deliver the modern production required by the companies and organisations that purchase steel.”

This nationalisation decision will not be the final challenge for Andy Burnham, who is expected to take over the premiership next week, and the incoming government.

British Steel’s aging blast furnaces must be replaced, and the decarbonisation plan, which involves installing electric arc furnaces to reduce environmental pollution, is projected to cost more than £1 billion.

Gareth Stace, Director General of the industry body UK Steel, emphasised that British Steel is the only British manufacturer producing long products, such as rails and beams, which are critical to the country’s industrial resilience, national security, and future economic growth.

“Bringing British Steel into public ownership is the right step,” Stace said. “The priority for the new government taking office next week must be to implement a long-term plan that will return the company to commercial viability, secure investment in modern low-carbon steel production, and create the competitive business environment needed for the sector to thrive.”

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