American journalist Joe Lauria, Editor-in-Chief of Consortium News, spoke to Harici: “Freedom of thought in the US has never been under greater threat.”

Joe Lauria is an experienced investigative journalist specializing in US foreign policy. Since 1990, he has worked for mainstream media organizations such as The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, The Sunday Times (London), The New York Times, and The Washington Post. He currently serves as the editor-in-chief of the independent investigative journalism platform Consortium News. Lauria is the co-author of A Political Odyssey: The Rise of American Militarism and One Man’s Fight to Stop It, written with former US Senator Mike Gravel, and How I Lost By Hillary Clinton. The foreword to the second book was written by Julian Assange. In his journalism career, he has focused on issues such as US military interventions, intelligence operations, and press freedom. Lauria is the recipient of the 2017 Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism and the 2015 I.F. Stone Medal from the Harvard Nieman Foundation.

Joe Lauria answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions in an interview with Harici.

In your 2023 personal reflections, you mentioned Daniel Ellsberg, who risked his freedom to leak the Pentagon Papers. As far as I know, you also closely follow the Julian Assange and Edward Snowden cases. How do you assess the conflict between freedom of expression and national security? In your opinion, can the leaking of classified documents be justified when the public interest is served?

I absolutely believe that leaking classified information is the right thing to do, especially if it will end an unjust war. That’s what Daniel Ellsberg was trying to do by leaking the Pentagon Papers. And this idea of national security, especially in the United States, has very often been used as a kind of sham. It’s a way to protect the interests of powerful people who were involved in a terrible war like Vietnam. And even though they were losing the war, and they knew it, they refused to end that war. The Pentagon Papers were all about that. The government study Ellsberg participated in, which was supposed to be secret, showed that the US knew for years it was losing that war. Politicians and generals kept telling the American people and the world they were going to win. So many people, mostly Vietnamese but also American soldiers, were dying for nothing. But it was very difficult for them to withdraw politically from the war because they would look like failures, not just militarily but politically. And I think we’re seeing a similar situation in Ukraine right now.

But yes, someone who has these documents, like Ellsberg did, like Chelsea Manning did about the Iraq war, and finding a newspaper or an online publisher like WikiLeaks to publish these documents, is absolutely their right to turn the public against the government based not just on a political argument, but on facts that were hidden from the public. The Assange case was particularly dangerous because they went after a publisher. Now, in the US, we have the First Amendment [The First Amendment to the United States Constitution], and that basically allows you to publish any material under the First Amendment. But the Espionage Act contradicts the First Amendment because it says anyone who has unauthorized possession of defense or classified information is in violation of the Espionage Act. Now, Assange was a publisher, so he had First Amendment protection. But he was also technically violating the Espionage Act. So that law needs to be changed. In fact, that’s what he pleaded guilty to, which is why he was freed, because he said, yes, I broke that law, but I don’t believe the law is just. I believed I was protected by the First Amendment. That’s why I published the documents, he said.

So again, a government employee who signs a secrecy agreement, as they all do in intelligence agencies, by law, whether it’s the US Espionage Act or the British Official Secrets Act, they cannot give out the information. And we are living in a time of great repression, not just about classified information, but about any kind of information that goes against powerful interests. They are stopping people from speaking, particularly on social media. The government is using private companies to silence people who criticize Israel, especially right now and about what’s happening in Gaza. And this is even more serious than Daniel Ellsberg because it involves hundreds, maybe thousands of people, students speaking out on campuses. That Turkish woman arrested in Massachusetts, a student who wrote an op-ed, along with four other names, hers was the only name in the article.

When you compare it to the past, how do you assess the current state of freedom of expression in America? Have you seen a similar picture before?

It’s much worse today. Let me give you a quick example of how it was better in the past. It was never great. But I’ll give you an example of how much worse it has become. Fifty years ago, in the 1970s, I can’t remember the exact year, there was a journalist named Seymour Hersh, and he was given classified information or made aware of this attack in My Lai, a village in Vietnam. Where American soldiers killed dozens of innocent women, children, and all the men in a village. This was one of many massacres. But the American people didn’t know about it. It wasn’t in the newspapers. So a whistleblower went to Congress and then to this journalist and gave the information. The information was published, it became a huge scandal. They arrested and prosecuted one soldier, but he got out after a year or two.

My Lai was a civilian massacre in Vietnam in the 1960s. At that time, a whistleblower came forward, and Congress and the press listened to him. He was not punished at all. The journalist Seymour Hersh reported on this incident, got a job at The New York Times, and won a Pulitzer Prize. One of the responsible soldiers, Lieutenant Calley, was tried and imprisoned. Now let’s look at Iraq. The video known as “Collateral Murder” was leaked by Chelsea Manning to WikiLeaks. It showed US helicopter gunships firing on civilians in the streets of Baghdad. Manning was imprisoned for disclosing this information. The journalist who published the video, Julian Assange, has also been deprived of his freedom for years. But none of the soldiers in the video were prosecuted. So, in 50 years, the tables have turned: the whistleblower used to go free, now they go to prison. The journalist used to be rewarded, now they are punished. The soldiers used to be prosecuted, now they are immune. This situation clearly shows how much the American system and culture have regressed. Furthermore, the government’s use of private companies to restrict public speech on social media platforms is ongoing censorship. Freedom of expression on platforms like Twitter and Facebook is under serious pressure.

We are all aware of this now: thanks to social media, people have more of a voice than ever before. This threatens elite and powerful interest groups. In the past, this threat came from powerful, independent media, as in events like Watergate, which brought down Nixon. Today, however, ordinary people have a more effective voice than they ever had before. That’s precisely why there’s an extraordinary effort to silence these voices. But pay attention: This isn’t happening in the Soviet Union or China. It’s happening in the United States of America. Yet this is a country that should be a symbol of democracy and freedom of expression.

My next question is a bit more general but directly related to what you’ve been saying. Based on your book “A Political Odyssey,” how do you explain America’s interventionism that has been ongoing since World War II? What is the fundamental reason for the military-industrial complex, which we’ve been talking about for decades, being constantly fed by war? And do you think this cycle can be broken?

That’s a very big question. Firstly, I think American interventionism dates back much further than just post-World War II, even to the founding of the United States in 1789. In fact, this tendency began to show itself after the victory against Britain in 1787. At that time, the British had forbidden the colonies from crossing the Appalachian Mountains to seize Native American lands. Many American colonists did not want to accept this prohibition. This was one of the reasons for the rebellion—perhaps not the main one, but an important element. After gaining independence, the US engaged in a systematic war of extermination and expansion against indigenous peoples. This was truly a chain of territorial expansion and interventions.

Then came the Mexican-American War in 1846. Large areas within today’s US borders, like California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona, belonged to Mexico at that time; they were seized through war. And of course, in 1898, the rising American Empire replaced the collapsing Spanish Empire. The US defeated the Spanish in places like the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico; it even intervened in Cuba. This marked the beginning of America’s expansion on a global scale. So, this interventionist structure has existed in America from the very beginning.

However, a significant break occurred with World War II. We discuss this topic in detail in the book I co-authored with the late Senator Mike Gravel. In American history, many companies that produced weapons during wartime would return to their former businesses after the war. For example, firms that made sewing machines produced weapons during the war and then went back to making sewing machines. Even after the American Civil War, an army of one million was disbanded, and soldiers returned to their farms. So, the US never had a permanent army or a continuous war industry. But this situation changed radically after World War II. Because the Great Depression of the 1930s had largely ended thanks to the war. The war industry became the fundamental dynamic that pulled the US out of the crisis and made it the world’s largest manufacturing power. This is not the case today—Trump tried to bring it back, but it probably won’t be possible. At the end of the war, there was a strong motivation to sustain the military industry due to the fear that the economic depression would return. This motivation coincided with the US process of global expansion. Permanent military bases were left in the Pacific, Asia, and many parts of the world. Because the US was the only major power not devastated after the war. This effectively gave it the role of a global empire.

At this point, as Eisenhower also warned, we are talking about the beginning of a permanent military-industrial complex and America’s global empire. And we are still living within this structure today. Like all other empires, this structure will eventually collapse. But this collapse will not happen willingly; it will occur with back-and-forth steps, over time, and inevitably. Today, we see BRICS countries coming together to create a counterbalance to US imperial power. This perhaps signals the beginning of the end. It’s no coincidence that Donald Trump praised President McKinley in a recent speech. McKinley was the president during the period when the US fought against the Spanish Empire. Trump similarly carries a kind of “imperial nostalgia.” He wants to revive old power with tariffs, to return America to its 1950s manufacturing capacity. But this will not happen. This, in my opinion, is his pathological dream. The forces Trump represents have realized that US global dominance is nearing its end. Just like the old empires in Europe, America needs to understand that it must now turn its attention to its internal problems. For now, there is no concrete sign in this direction, but in my view, this transformation is inevitable. And we are currently at that very breaking point in history.

Now let’s come to today. Trump and the MAGA movement have repeatedly promised to dismantle the “deep state.” Do you think Trump can genuinely break the influence of the military-industrial complex? After all, he explicitly said so himself. What are your thoughts?

First, it must be said: the deep state denies its own existence. It’s even ridiculed with the claim that this concept is a “conspiracy theory.” But many of those who say this are actually part of those very structures. They don’t want to be seen; they want to remain deep. So, the fact that the “deep state” is now openly discussed, at least in America, is progress in itself. In other countries, these structures were recognized much earlier. In America, this structure was essentially established after World War II. With the National Security Act signed by Truman in 1947, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and then the CIA were established. In 1950, the NSA [National Security Agency], whose existence was kept secret for a long time, emerged. So, the institutional foundations of the deep state were laid during that period. Whether you like Trump or not, one truth must be accepted: The Russiagate scandal was a fabrication from start to finish. It was a lie concocted by the Clinton campaign, and this lie was supported by institutions like the FBI. Leaking false news about your opponent in American politics is common; it’s called “opposition research.” However, when it came to Trump, this turned into a state operation. The FBI saw Trump as unpredictable, outside the system, and dangerous. He was an uncontrollable figure whose actions were uncertain. He was also someone who threatened the system. That’s why they tried to stop him. Trump realized this and developed a personal vendetta, especially against the FBI. Ultimately, Trump was both perceived as a threat to the deep state and was subjected to its interference.

Some noteworthy developments are currently taking place. Trump has appointed Kash Patel, an Indian-American, as FBI Director. Patel says he wants to close the FBI’s Washington headquarters and turn it into just a field office. This also includes a plan to transfer the budget to local law enforcement agencies across the country. If this happens, it would mean a serious shake-up of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s central bureaucratic structure—and that would be a significant signal. Also, during the Trump era, some documents related to the John F. Kennedy assassination were released. These documents brought questions about the CIA’s role back to the fore. These could be seen as signs of a reckoning with the deep state. But despite all this, it’s hard to say for sure. Whether there will be truly lasting change is unknown. The structure we call the deep state has always found a way to survive. Even if Trump leaves, despite the damage done, the system is likely to be rebuilt—unless a fundamental structural transformation occurs. The point we have reached today is a period where intelligence agencies are influential enough to shape not only foreign policy but, at times, domestic policy as well. Therefore, we are at an extremely critical juncture in American history.

It should also be added: some believe Trump might genuinely be fighting against existing power structures. However, there’s another view—that even if Trump and his team dismantle the current deep state, they will establish their own “deep state” in its place. So, this could just be a different version of a power struggle.

Yes, you’re absolutely right. The system will most likely change, but it will be replaced by a structure controlled by Trump instead of the Democrats. There will still be a “deep state,” but in a different form. Because the current structure operates like a power above parties—it’s always there, regardless of who the president is or who controls Congress. There’s a strong example of this: About 10 years ago, the Senate wanted to declassify a report on the CIA’s torture practices following the Iraq invasion. This report revealed that the US had established secret torture centers worldwide after 9/11. Obama also openly admitted this, saying “we tortured some folks.” However, the CIA secretly accessed Senate members’ computers to prevent the report’s publication. This was a huge scandal, not just morally but legally. Because the CIA is prohibited from operating within the US—let alone spying on elected senators, which is a direct violation of the constitutional order. This incident clearly showed how powerful and untouchable intelligence agencies have become. As for Trump—he’s hard to define because we haven’t seen anyone like him before. He took harsh steps against the bureaucracy, weakened many institutions, and dismissed many people. But he often did this with day-to-day decisions, without a plan or long-term strategy. So, it’s uncertain whether he will feel the need to build a “deep state” behind him. However, if he has big goals—like buying Greenland, as he once mentioned—then he might need intelligence and military power, and thus a kind of deep state of his own. Therefore, the answer to the question of whether Trump would create his own deep state is: Yes, that’s quite possible.

Now let’s move from domestic policy to foreign policy. How realistic do you think are the expectations that the Trump administration will end US intervention in foreign wars? Does Trump truly represent a shift? Especially considering the comments many make about a “realist foreign policy” and a move away from the neocon line, how do you view these assessments?

Actually, not really—and that’s the problem. This time, there are no openly interventionist, neocon figures like John Bolton or Mike Pompeo in the Trump administration. However, Marco Rubio is Secretary of State, and figures like General Keith Kellogg are re-emerging. For example, Kellogg was previously dismissed and demoted, but now he’s trying to be influential in Ukraine policies again. Trump says things that sound good. He gives some messages that are anti-interventionist and intuitively correct. This aligns with the rising libertarian tendencies in America. There’s a particular vein that opposes foreign interventions, and Trump sometimes aligns with this. However, there’s still a serious gap between rhetoric and practice.

Trump says he doesn’t like wars and wants to end the war in Ukraine. But the real question is: does he truly understand the fundamental causes of this war? This was the point Vladimir Putin emphasized in his long phone call with Trump—this war won’t end unless the root causes are addressed. In America, however, these causes are hardly ever discussed. The mainstream media doesn’t bring up these deep-rooted reasons. Yet, at the beginning of the 2014 crisis, there was open talk about the unconstitutional change of government in Ukraine and the role of neo-Nazi groups—especially the Azov Battalion—in this process. US and British media had published major stories about these groups. It was stated that although their numbers were small, their influence was very large.

But now this narrative has been erased. Talking about neo-Nazis has almost become taboo. Again, there’s no longer any mention of President Viktor Yanukovych, who was confirmed as democratically elected by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe], being violently overthrown in February 2014. It’s like a chapter erased from history. We, at Consortium News, report on these overlooked fundamental causes. Because we voice these truths ignored by the mainstream media, we have faced censorship and various smear campaigns. Some circles even tried to label us as Russian propagandists—simply for reporting documented facts like the coup and neo-Nazis.

In December 2021, Russia presented some draft treaties to NATO and the US. Their demands were clear: withdrawal of NATO troops from former Warsaw Pact countries and removal of missile systems in Romania and Poland, which are only six minutes away from Moscow. There was concern that these systems could carry nuclear warheads. Russia explicitly stated that if these demands were not negotiated, it would take “technical-military steps”—and this resulted in the invasion of Ukraine. Although Russia’s 2022 attack is often presented as a “beginning,” according to Moscow, it was a continuation of a war that Ukraine started in 2014 with US support. So, does Trump really understand these facts? I don’t know. I don’t think so. He had long talks with Putin, and even his envoy Fred Witkoff went to Moscow several times. The Russians must have explained these issues—including NATO expansion—many times. Moreover, these objections don’t just belong to Putin; his predecessor Boris Yeltsin was also openly against NATO expansion, even their puppet Yeltsin. So, these objections have been part of Russia’s political line for over thirty years.

So, can Trump really end the war in Ukraine? To do that, he first needs to understand the fundamental causes of the war. Because the only way Ukraine can win this war is if NATO directly goes to war with Russia. However, NATO leaders are aware that this could lead to a nuclear catastrophe—so this option is not on the table. This means Ukraine cannot win. In reality, Ukraine has lost the war. The sooner they sit down at the table, the better their terms might be. But they continue to fight. Trump, at this point, remains ineffective. Yet he has the power to end this war. The US provides weapons, intelligence, and funding to the Ukrainian government. In fact, Ukraine has been largely sustained by American taxpayers’ money for eight years. Trump could stop the war by deciding to cut this support. But so far, he isn’t doing it.

The second issue is Gaza, and this is perhaps the worst. Trump is supporting a war crime of the most heinous kind here. Moreover, he completely misunderstands the issue. He’s from New York, like me—he comes from Queens—and he describes Gaza as if it’s a high-crime neighborhood. He talks about stabbings and muggings but never mentions the 2,000-pound bombs dropped on people’s tents, their forced displacement and subsequent bombing, or their starvation. Trump talks about helping the people of Gaza, but he plans to do this by removing them and building new structures in their place, meaning through ethnic cleansing. This doesn’t look like someone who wants to end wars—on the contrary, he’s exhibiting an attitude that condones the most serious human rights violations we’ve witnessed in recent years. Despite talking about non-intervention, he doesn’t practice it. Why? Perhaps he’s lost control. It seems he repeats the opinion of whoever he last spoke to. We often see this approach in his administration. Yet he should listen to realistic thinkers, even his own instincts. But he doesn’t.

You’ve been closely following and reporting on the Middle East for years, and you know the American perspective very well. So, in your opinion, does Trump’s Middle East strategy really fit into an understandable framework? Balances in the region are changing rapidly—the push to overthrow Assad, the genocide unfolding in Gaza, Israel’s increasing aggression… In light of all these developments, do you have a clear view of what kind of strategy Trump is pursuing in the Middle East?

Getting a free plane from Qatar, arranging real estate deals in Gaza and elsewhere when he leaves office—Trump’s Middle East “strategy” basically boils down to this. There are even rumors he has plans to build a tower in Dubai or Abu Dhabi. So, he doesn’t understand the Middle East; he only understands real estate deals. He has no idea about the region’s history. He can’t grasp the Palestinian issue. He still sees Gaza as a high-crime neighborhood in New York. He’s ignorant of fundamental historical facts like the role of Western Europe, especially Britain and France, in the post-Ottoman Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the establishment of Lebanon and Syria. He also doesn’t understand how the US took over regional dominance from Britain after the 1956 Suez Crisis and how it supported Israel as a proxy power. Today, the fact that Arab regimes are abandoning the Palestinians through the Abraham Accords is seen by Trump as “peace.” Yet the result was the catastrophe in Gaza—a process that essentially laid the groundwork for genocide.

No one is taking action except the Yemenis—including your president [referring to Turkey’s president]. He constantly says nice things, but as far as I know, he’s still sending oil to Israel. As for Trump, what primarily motivates him is his personal wealth. He defends Israel because he received $100 million from the Israel lobby, especially from the late wealthy donor Miriam Adelson. Like many American politicians, he instinctively tends to defend Israel no matter what. However, a break is now occurring. More and more people are raising their voices because Israel’s practices of genocide and ethnic cleansing are completely out in the open. They are no longer hidden or concealed. Those making these statements are far-right figures in the Israeli government. These individuals, once considered marginal, Kahanist-line figures [followers of Meir Kahane’s extremist ideology], are now in power. And they are trying to realize the dream of “Greater Israel.” What we are witnessing in Gaza is the most extreme point of this process—literally an attempt at a “final solution.” So, what is Trump doing in the meantime? He’s dreaming of a golf course in Gaza. We’re talking about a situation this pathological.

Kati Piri, a Dutch member of parliament and former rapporteur on Türkiye’s EU accession in the European Parliament, offered a perspective on the current state of EU–Türkiye relations to Harici.

Ahmetcan Uzlaşık/ Brussels

Drawing on her experience in foreign affairs, Kati Piri reflects on the political developments in Türkiye and the EU’s increasingly transactional stance toward Ankara.

In this interview, she discusses the challenges of maintaining a values-based foreign policy, the implications of shifting political dynamics in both Europe and Türkiye, and the future of cooperation on issues such as migration, defense, and the customs union.

Kati Piri also shares her views on broader global developments, including the war in Ukraine, the return of Donald Trump, and the rise, and in her view, recent decline, of far-right populism across Europe.

How do you see the current political developments in Türkiye, especially regarding both Imamoglu’s arrest?

Well, to start with, the political witch-hunt against Imamoglu, which led to his arrest, made us very concerned. Although Türkiye is still not a full autocracy like Russia, Türkiye has turned the page in the wrong direction.

The European Parliament has concluded that Türkiye’s EU accession process is effectively frozen. Given your experience as a former rapporteur, do you think the EU still has a credible and coherent strategy toward Türkiye?

I totally understand why the European Parliament said this. How can you say anything else when the main opposition leader is in prison? We didn’t see any positive developments regarding Türkiye’s accession over the years. So I fully understand that when it comes to a coherent view of the EU as a whole, which is of course much bigger than the EP, that has been lacking for many years.

I don’t know how the EU managed to position itself in a way where many Turkish democrats are very disappointed in how the EU positions itself vis-à-vis the President Erdoğan regime. If you disappoint the people who share European values like rule of law, human rights, etc. in Türkiye, then the EU did something wrong.

I don’t think the EU has a good strategy toward Türkiye. I think Europe is very much driven by very short-term personal interests. And now with the war in Ukraine and general security concerns in Europe, if those who are destroying democracy and freedom at home are seen as partners, that is also a threat to Europe. It’s more of a threat than an ally to Europe. In conclusion, Europe’s strategy toward Türkiye is very short-sighted. It’s unfortunately been the case for many years.

There’s a growing sense that the EU is moving away from the accession model and toward a strategic partnership with Türkiye. Do you see this as a pragmatic adjustment, or an admission of failure?

Look, on the one hand, you can’t talk about a regime that is destroying democracy in Türkiye. In that respect, strategic partnership, I understand it. But also, as Europe, you have a responsibility to your own values.

I don’t have the feeling that we always stand up for those values or the people who defend them in Türkiye. That’s where my main criticism is. I would say since the Syria crisis in 2015, Europe has been pretty silent in my view on the deterioration of democracy in Türkiye. Plus, it lost a lot of credibility among democrats in Türkiye, which I would say is the largest part of the population, and strengthened the current Turkish government by being silent.

I think it is in Europe’s and the people of my country’s interest that Türkiye is a democracy. Europe, in a way, gave up on that and focused on short-term cooperation like migration.

Is this why, for example, the EU leaders visited President Erdoğan in the last couple of months, and Hakan Fidan was invited to EU foreign minister meetings? These resumed in 2024 after a long period. Do you think the EU is trying to keep Türkiye close on transactional matters like migration and security, not as part of accession, but just as a strategic partner?

Look, in general, I always say that even if we don’t agree with the Turkish government, it is important to convey the message. I’m in favor of meetings and discussions, but you need to have your priorities right and raise your concerns.

My criticism is that the EU acts like Imamoglu isn’t in prison. Europe forgets that it not only has values but also tools against Türkiye. Europe is the biggest investor in Türkiye, and it should use this much more smartly than it does now.

Realistically speaking, not what should be, but what do you think is going to happen? Do you think the EU’s shift to the right, where right-wing politicians prefer transactional deals over full accession, will push Türkiye and the EU closer on security or migration cooperation?

Look, I would hope to be close with Türkiye, with a democratic Türkiye. Because that would be, I think, in the interest of both. Right?

I don’t think we should get close with a more autocratic Türkiye, where it’s normal to jail your opponents. That does not make Europe safer in any way, and it doesn’t make Türkiye safer either.

Having said that, we have an extreme right-wing majority in the Dutch parliament and also a very right-wing government, which is very transactional. But still, when I handed in the motion that we cannot start concluding the customs union as long as the verdicts of the European court is respected.

So the Dutch parliament will block any progress on this as long as verdicts of the European court are not respected. In that respect, I still see that it won’t be as easy as some people think to convince all 27 countries to forget about democracy in Türkiye.

Ms. Piri, we are witnessing a global geopolitical realignment: the war in Ukraine, a second Trump term, tensions in the Middle East, and the changing situation in Syria. How do you see EU–Türkiye relations repositioning within today’s Europe, Türkiye, and the broader world order?

Well, I think in general, if you just look at it from a citizen’s point of view, the world has become, in a way, more fragile, and international law is almost out the window.

I don’t want to see again a world carved up by big powers deciding on zones of interest. I think it’s important that when we see positive developments, and let’s be clear, the disappearance of Assad from Syria is, in itself, a positive development, then it is the obligation of the international community to make sure that an inclusive, democratic process gets a chance in Syria.

I don’t think we can expect regime change in Russia anytime soon, which means that’s a clear threat. At least, it’s a clear threat that our citizens feel.

Within NATO, for instance, my country has always relied on our big transatlantic neighbor, the United States. And I think Europe as a whole has come to realize we cannot automatically rely on the Americans anymore.

Now there’s all this discussion: “We need Türkiye because we can’t rely on the Americans. We need them for military cooperation.”

But the values Ukrainians are defending every day are the values of democracy and freedom. We can only fight this with an alliance where everyone agrees on these values. So if we have a Turkish regime destroying democracy at home, that’s not our ally. These are the powers we are fighting against.

Perhaps finally, I’d say it’s very important to watch what is happening with populist, extreme right-wing parties in Europe since Trump’s election. They’re all losing, not only in Europe; we saw it in Canada, Romania etc.. People are seeing the consequences in their daily lives, and they don’t want this.

So you see populist autocratic parties losing across Europe. I cannot imagine that in Türkiye the public isn’t showing similar sentiments.

That’s very interesting, because in Portugal the far-right gained ground recently, and people fear that AfD might even become the first party in Germany in the future. Do you really believe the far-right is losing in Europe?

Let’s see if it stays that way. For now, they are. You saw it in France. You see it in the Netherlands, the far right won the national elections, and they are now declining in the polls.

Yes, it’s worrying what’s happening in Germany, but clearly, AfD did not win the election. So now it’s up to the government to deliver on people’s concerns and make sure they won’t win the next elections.

I think there’s a chance for what we call liberal democrats, I even say this as a social democrat, but you see what I mean. It’s not about ideology. It’s about defending international law, rule of law, and human rights.

This might gain traction again because we’re seeing a moment where the radical right is damaging itself. Trump is damaging the radical right in Europe, and that’s a good thing.

President Erdoğan recently met with Italian Prime Minister Meloni. She never spoke about democracy in Türkiye. He also has good relations with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán and Slovak leader Fico. Do you think this makes EU–Türkiye relations more complicated?

I think it’s true there’s an international pack of autocrats. I would say Netanyahu is also linked to the same group. Of course, that’s not where President Erdoğan is aligning himself. But let’s be honest, it’s all the same tendencies, national conservatism, “family values” in a way that excludes minorities, women, all to gain and retain power. That’s the goal.

To marginalize the democratic part of society. We see this playbook worldwide. It’s time for progressive leaders to work much more closely, internationally, to defend the values our parents and grandparents fought for, which are now under attack.

This is why I was proud of the PES going immediately to Türkiye and standing with the CHP when Imamoglu was arrested. We need to help each other more. I’m sure the general public will turn, and we can win this fight, but we need to stand together.

I’d like to ask about migration. It seems that the EU, including the Netherlands, is shifting rightward on this. Is there a contradiction between people’s concerns about far-right rise and the fact that Brussels and national governments are implementing similar policies?

Let it be clear, I do not agree with the migration policy of my government. I’m in the main opposition party, and I think what they are doing will neither solve the migration problem nor reduce the number of people coming.

We have issues with housing. People are waiting two years before their applications are even reviewed. The idea that making it unattractive for migrants will stop them from coming is not based on facts. I’m very worried about the criminalization of people seeking refuge, and how this narrative has gained traction, including in Germany and my country.

Progressive parties need a clear alternative. Yes, every country has an absorption capacity. But let’s be honest, refugees are not the reason the economy is suffering. The far-right has had too much space to tell people that every problem in their life is caused by refugees. It’s simply not true.

My final question: What is your and your party’s stance on the ongoing trade war, which Trump recently backed off from a bit, and the issue of increased military spending ahead of the upcoming NATO summit in the Netherlands?

When it comes to the trade war, I think this is a very dangerous development.

Trump’s economic philosophy is not supported by any serious economist. It damages free trade globally and will also damage the U.S. long-term. Countries may divest from the U.S., making it a poorer country. Starting a trade war with your biggest allies is crazy. Trump is backed by the richest people who want no rules, they want to make more money at the expense of normal people. Europe must be strong, stand together, negotiate as a bloc, and hit back when necessary.

As for the NATO summit, I see two trends. First, with Russian aggression since the 2022 full-scale invasion, Europe has become less safe. We face daily threats, not tanks in Amsterdam, but cyberattacks, sabotage, Russian ships gathering intelligence. We’re already in a grey zone.

Second, we cannot take for granted that the U.S. will show up if a NATO country is attacked. So Europe must urgently prepare to defend itself, which we cannot do today without the U.S.
This summit is very important. But it won’t be easy to get all NATO countries on board regarding spending and unity. Let’s be honest, Trump’s values are more aligned with President Putin than with mine.

Following the October 7 Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, European and US media outlets began publishing reports that were almost entirely identical to Israeli military statements. Just like in the Ukraine war, not only is taking a different side out of the question, but even expressing neutral opinions has become enough to be labeled as ‘anti-Semite.’ Similar to how displaying Soviet-Russian symbols on the streets is seen as a police matter, Palestinian flags, keffiyehs, pro-Palestinian slogans, graffiti, and banners have become the focus of prosecution or social isolation.

It is clear that Germany and the German media are leading the way in this regard. The “Staatsräson” (“state reason”) formulated during Angela Merkel’s tenure had placed Israel’s existence and security in a position where it was unacceptable to even discuss them within the German state and politics. Indeed, after October 7, both former Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck, a member of the coalition partner Greens, frequently brought this issue to the fore. The German media also enthusiastically embraced the German state mind’s stance on Israel.

Journalist Fabian Goldmann publishes articles on his personal blog exposing how the German media acts like a Federal Foreign Office bureau on Israel. The influence of Israel in the media has progressed so far that the spokesperson for the Israeli army in Germany even published a list of journalists under the headline “10 people spreading hatred of Jews.” Goldmann is one of those on the list.

We met with Goldmann in Berlin and discussed the German media, how the Palestinian issue is covered in the media, journalistic standards, and the future of Germany and the German media.

Let’s first talk about German media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian war in Gaza. As you’ve pointed out several times in your articles, the German media strongly supports Israel over the Palestinians and doesn’t allow critical or alternative voices in favor of the Palestinian cause. What do you think about this coverage? How and why does the German media choose to report on the Gaza war in this way?

We could talk about this for hours, but I’ll try to summarize a few key points. You said they don’t allow Palestinian voices—I wouldn’t say they don’t allow them at all. Occasionally, Palestinian perspectives are included, and there are some decent articles on what’s happening in Gaza.

However, the problem is that 99% of the coverage is really, really bad. We’re used to this in Germany. Right-wing media typically handle topics like Israel, Islam, migration, and refugees in a biased way. But what’s new since October 7 is that even the mainstream media—public broadcasters and traditionally left-wing newspapers like taz, or left-liberal ones like Die Zeit—are doing a terrible job. They’ve always leaned in this direction, but now it’s extreme.

The first sign that something had shifted came immediately after October 7, when all newspapers published unverified stories about babies being burned in ovens, women being raped, and dead bodies mutilated—without credible sources. Even left-wing outlets reported this. At the same time, there were no Palestinian voices. Everything was reported from the perspective of the Israeli army. Israeli army spokespersons were featured on major news shows and talk shows like Tagesschau.

I recently conducted a study on the perspectives shown in Tagesschau. Israeli officials appeared 134 times, while Palestinian officials were featured only four times. That’s about the same screen time as officials from Belgium or Luxembourg, which is absurd given the context.

It’s always been bad—coverage of the wars in Iraq, Syria, or Ukraine was also problematic—but it’s never been this one-sided. The Israeli army’s narrative dominates headlines and lead paragraphs. You usually have to read the fifth or seventh paragraph before the Palestinian perspective appears, if at all.

Even when highly credible organizations like the United Nations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Save the Children, or Oxfam contradict the Israeli narrative—labeling the war as genocide or pointing out that civilians are being targeted instead of just Hamas—the German media still largely adheres to the Israeli army’s version.

After October 7, some British alternative media outlets exposed that Israeli army officials met with UK media executives. Do you have any evidence of similar meetings between Israeli officials and German media groups?

It’s no secret that the Israeli government exerts pressure on German media. Reporters Without Borders recently published a report on press freedom in Germany, based on interviews with about 60 editors and journalists. Many said the Israeli embassy—along with organizations like the Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft (German-Israeli Society)—frequently calls editors-in-chief to complain about coverage.

I’ve also heard of cases where they provided lists of journalists they disapprove of and asked media executives to fire them. Israeli embassy staff often contact German journalists directly. I myself was listed by Arye Sharuz Shalicar, the Israeli army spokesperson in Germany, as one of the “top 10 German anti-Semites or Israel haters.”

If a Russian politician had done something similar, there would’ve been a national uproar, with journalist organizations and editors-in-chief speaking out. But when Israel does it, there’s complete silence. Even the bosses of affected journalists don’t defend them.

A lot of those in charge of German media are affiliated with pro-Israel or pro-transatlantic organizations. Culturally, many German journalists don’t see their role as holding power to account. Instead, they report what politicians do: portraying politics rather than scrutinizing it.

If you watch Al Jazeera, BBC, or even Russia Today, their interviews with politicians are far more critical. German media generally echoes what politicians say, often adopting their agendas; not only on Israel, but also on migration, COVID-19, and Ukraine.

This bias is amplified when it comes to Israel. In Germany, the political spectrum concerning Israel is extremely narrow. Even parties with differing views on sending weapons to Israel don’t challenge the basic pro-Israel stance. There are no parties that support Palestinian resistance.

Another factor is racism. Some studies show that many journalists genuinely believe there’s a cultural war between Israel —representing democracy and liberalism— and Islam —seen as barbaric. Palestinians are often portrayed as terrorists. One Die Zeit headline even claimed there were no Palestinian civilians—an appalling view that suggests Palestinian lives are worth less than European lives.

This issue goes back decades. Studies consistently show that Islam is portrayed negatively in German media and is always linked to terrorism or violence. Migrants are overrepresented in crime stories compared to actual statistics. It all ties into racism, stereotypes, and Islamophobia.

Since October 7, there’s also been a surge in campaigns targeting anyone who speaks out for Palestinian rights—journalists, cultural figures, politicians, Jewish artists, and academics. If you publicly use terms like “apartheid” or “genocide,” you risk losing your job or being labeled antisemitic or Islamist.

There was a journalist named Michael Muhammad who worked for a public broadcaster. He tweeted something like, “What do you expect from Palestinians when they have no other way to fight for freedom?” This triggered a massive campaign against him, and he was fired within two hours without even a proper conversation. That was just the first of many such cases.

Al Jazeera published a solid report a few months ago about Deutsche Welle, exposing its suppression of pro-Palestinian or Israel-critical voices. Many journalists from outlets like Tagesschau or Spiegel write to me privately. They agree with my blog and interviews but don’t dare speak up. They’re considering quitting.

I read about Axel Springer having an unofficial or even written policy requiring employees to be pro-Israel. Is that true?

It’s not unofficial, it’s written in the contract. Axel Springer explicitly requires employees to support Israel and the market economy. Deutsche Welle adopted something similar after a scandal two years ago in which 8–10 Arab-background editors were fired for allegedly promoting antisemitism due to old social media posts. It ended in the company modifying their contracts.

Is there rising antisemitism in Germany post-October 7? How can we measure that?

Official statistics have spiked, including those from the Ministry of the Interior and various NGOs. But these stats have a fundamental flaw: they count anti-Israel positions as antisemitism. For example, pro-Palestinian slogans or clashes with police at demonstrations are recorded as antisemitic incidents.

So, do I think antisemitism has actually increased? Honestly, I don’t know. The statistics are so distorted that they’re no longer reliable. There’s little serious research that separates genuine antisemitism—such as attacks on Jews for being Jewish—from political positions critical of Israel.

You’ve followed the German media for years. How does it compare to media environments in other Western countries?

A big difference is that in Germany, biased reporting on Israel spans the entire political spectrum—from left to right. In the U.S., CNN or NBC are bad, but you also have great outlets like Democracy Now! or The Intercept. In the UK, the BBC is awful, but The Guardian occasionally offers quality reporting. Even in Israel, while the Jerusalem Post is terrible, Haaretz and +972 Magazine provide balanced perspectives.

Germany has no equivalent. There are a few small, independent outlets, but they have tiny readerships. Additionally, while British media still include Palestinian and independent perspectives, German media rely almost exclusively on Israeli sources.

BBC or CNN will at least phrase things like, “Hamas, which is designated a terrorist organization by Western governments.” In contrast, German media simply say, “the terrorist organization Hamas,” fully adopting the government’s viewpoint.

Could you be convicted for saying Hamas isn’t a terrorist organization in Germany?

As a journalist, you have some freedom. For private citizens, I’m not sure of the legal implications—it might be considered a gray area.

Another point—German media do almost no investigative journalism on Gaza. Can you explain this phenomenon?

Yes, this is a huge issue. When Gaza schools are bombed, German media report what Hamas and the Israeli army say, then conclude, “We can’t verify the facts due to the fog of war.” But independent journalists and international NGOs can verify these facts—and often do.

The problem is not just lack of access but lack of effort. In many countries, contradictory reports prompt actual investigation. In Germany, that’s where journalism stops. They simply echo Israeli claims and tell viewers they can’t know what’s true.

What’s your view on the media being called the “fourth estate”? How does it apply in Germany? Is the media powerful in Germany?

Yes, the media are powerful, but the real question is how they use that power. Instead of holding power to account, German media often align with those in power. They are more like PR departments for the government.

Take a Tagesschau segment and compare it with a Foreign Ministry press release, it’s nearly identical. This was true during COVID-19, on Ukraine, on migration policy—and it’s true now with Israel.

Could future clashes between the German government and a possible Trump administration over Israel or Ukraine create space for alternative voices in German media?

I doubt it. Even if Trump tries to expel Palestinians from Gaza and calls it the “Palestinian Riviera Plan,” I think Germany would still support it—just as they’ve supported bombings of hospitals and mass displacement in Gaza.

I can’t recall a time when Germany stood up to the U.S. on any major foreign policy issue. They support Washington at all costs. I don’t see the media or government changing.

From time to time, there are a couple of decent Tagesschau reports. People hoped the International Court of Justice ruling or Amnesty’s report labeling the conflict a genocide would change something. But nothing ever changes. Within weeks, the media went back to talking about “Hamas command centers.”

The only hope I have is that German media are losing relevance. People are turning to TikTok, Instagram, blogs, and independent platforms. They’re organizing protests, forming new coalitions—Palestinians, Jewish activists, intellectuals, and others. That grassroots activism is where change might come from, not the system itself.