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INTERVIEW

‘Fascism seeks both western and non-western models’

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After more than 40 years of neoliberal era, with the signs that the neoliberal era is drawing to a close and the ideology of ‘globalisation’ giving way to ‘protectionist’ practices, we are witnessing a much more heated discussion of fascism and National Socialism that swept Europe between the two wars in the 20th century. This is due not only to the inadequacy of liberal ideology when tested against new economic and geopolitical realities, but also to the re-emergence of (proto)fascist movements and ideas that have become widespread in Europe, the USA and, as seen in the case of India, in the ‘Global South.’

Of course, it can be argued that fascism/nazism has never actually declined in the USA and continental Europe. In the Cold War, the ‘old’ German Nazis and Italian fascists were at the service of the USA in the war against communism. In addition, some critical elements of fascism actually continued the line of thought of ‘conservative liberalism/aristocratic reaction’ that had flourished in the last quarter of the 19th century: Social Darwinism, hostility to progress, anti-democratism/anti-communism/mass hatred, racism and imperialism… Thus, fascism/nazism after the Second World War was at best dormant.

In his books (here and here) Ishay Landa of the History Department of the Open University of Israel traces the liberal elements in 20th century fascism and sheds light on a side of fascism that has not been much discussed: the hostility to mass culture and mass consumption. Landa argues that fascism/nazism is both ‘western’ and ‘hostile to western values’, which is precisely why, according to him, it is necessary to focus on the social and ideological function of fascism instead of debating this issue. In this respect, contemporary neo fascist movements both resemble and differ from classical fascism. Instead of abstract models, a concrete social-historical analysis is essential for understanding fascist movements today.

In your book, The Apprentice’s Sorcerer: Liberal Tradition and Fascism, you say that there are certain continuities between the 19th century liberal tradition and fascism. These include social Darwinism, imperialism and colonial wars. A common view is that fascism/nazism is a break with western traditions of thought. In what ways do you disagree with this view and in what ways should fascism/nazism be considered ‘western’? Do you think revolts against Reason and ‘common man’ are also a ‘western’ line of thought? 

Both fascism and National Socialism are political ideologies that first emerged in the West, were thought out and fought for by westerners, and, if only for that reason, cannot be seriously considered as fully breaking with western traditions. Indeed, as stated in the question, they emerged in the context of what were largely western political and ideological processes, such as social Darwinism, racism, the sanctification of competition between individuals and nations, and so on and so forth.

That said, it is important to bear in mind two “complications” concerning fascism and its relation to the western tradition: the first is mostly a post-Second-World-war phenomenon, which has to do with apologetic efforts to shift the blame away from the West: because fascism and Nazism proved so disastrous and horrifying, some commentators, instead of dealing with the contradictions of western thought and society, claimed that they represented aberrations and deviations from western norms and traditions. German historians thus often claimed that Germany departed from the West in its Nazi period. Some even insisted that the horrors of the Holocaust were the result of the Nazis being swayed by the example of Bolshevism, as when Ernst Nolte notoriously and vacuously spoke of Auschwitz as an “Asiatic deed.” Some opponents of Nazism, too, found it so repellent and outlandish that they were driven to conceptualize it as an alien force, invading Western culture from without. This was done, for instance, by author Klaus Mann, who described the Nazis as “Persians,” alluding to the armies invading ancient Greece, threatening to obliterate its glorious civilization. While political thinker Hannah Arendt insisted that Nazism “owes nothing to any part of the Western tradition.” 

A second complication is more intimately related to fascist and Nazi ideology itself.  While often celebrating themselves as the last bulwark of the West —or the Abendland— against Bolshevism, fascists were also deeply hostile to intellectual and political currents that were associated with the West, such as democracy, the Enlightenment, feminism, universalism, etc. Hence, fascist thinkers often looked for non-Western models to counter what they considered decadent, egalitarian, and effeminate about the West. We find this in an important proto-fascist thinker as Nietzsche, who sought inspiration in such a text as the Laws of Manu, one of the most authoritative codes of Hinduism in India, where a caste order was defended. And later many fascist ideologues flirted with “Eastern” models, notably Julius Evola, the Italian hardcore fascist, or Savitri Devi, the French-born Greek fascist and Nazi sympathizer, who embraced Indian traditions. It should be noted, however, that these people were driven to “the East” to resolve the internal dilemmas of their own societies, and that this by-pass was largely “orientalist,” that is superficial and manipulative, ransacking Eastern traditions for motifs that seemed useful for their own reactionary purposes.

With regards to the revolts against Reason and the “common man,” these were simultaneously both Western and anti-Western — since their objects of hatred, such as democracy, rationalism, and mass society, were also important features of western modernity. In general, I would not lay great stress on deciding whether fascism was Western or not, as much as look at its social and ideological function, wherever it becomes a force. We see today neo-fascist models adopted in non-Western countries, such as India, but this is possible because the goals, of defeating modernity and its egalitarian implications, remain very similar.

You emphasize that hardcore anti-Semitism of Nazism embedded in the thought of revolt against ‘mass culture’, ‘leveling of man’ which are manifestations of ‘Jewishness’ in the German Right and Zivilisationskritik. Are ‘Jews’ and, let’s say, ‘colored people’ or ‘migrants’ interchangeable? 

There are strong parallels but also, I think, important differences. Jews were seen by many reactionaries in the 19th and 20th centuries as the prime beneficiaries, and indeed as the hidden masterminds of secular, democratic modernity. Hence fighting “Jewish influence” was so central to the fascist worldview. “The Jew” was conceived as posing a mortal threat to European, racial, and national distinctiveness, to what we now call “identity politics” in its right-wing variants. This, of course, brings to mind the celebration of supposedly Christian, European, often expressly “white” traditions of the far-Right today, its ferocious racism and xenophobia, its opposition to immigration, especially from non-Western countries. But there is also a difference, in that Jews were seen as a universalistic force, allegedly bent on imposing a horizontal, grey, unanimous, mass civilization and eradicating all national and racial differences. By comparison, immigrants today are mostly seen as resisting assimilation, remaining stubbornly non-Europeans, preserving their own ethnic and religious characteristics. So the struggle against them is arguably less chiliastic in nature — as Marine le Pen could put it, “I’m opposed to wearing headscarves in public places.  That’s not France. […] The people who come to France, why would they want to change France, to live in France the same way they lived back home?” For that reason, at least rhetorically, immigrants who are willing to renounce their own culture, might be absorbed into France. As Le Pen assured her interviewer: “people who behave need not worry. Foreigners in France who hold a job, who respect our laws, our codes, have absolutely nothing to worry about.” For many European antisemites, however, Jews were racially unassimilable. As the influential 19th century Austrian antisemite Georg Ritter von Schönerer famously declared, even if converted to Catholicism, Jews remained racial aliens: “Religion changes not a trace: in the blood lies the disgrace.” Schönerer was a figure much admired by Hitler. For the Nazis, hence, Jews were targets not just of exclusion or even expulsion but also, ultimately, of extermination. 

It seems the ‘bourgeois laziness’ and massification triggered the ‘aristocratic’ reaction of the European intelligentsia. In one of his pro-Nazi writings, Martin Heidegger, glorifies masculinity, heroism, hardness, danger, courage, and daring. German writers like Oswald Spengler, liked to cite the saying, “God vomits out the lukewarm.” What do you think, recent revival of Spengler’s ‘Decline of the West’ analysis and Heidegger’s ‘meta-ontology’ in certain circles in Europe? Is it possible to say, neoliberal anti-democratic tendencies have created a fertile ground for a new Right in the West? 

This is an imminent danger, indeed often a sad reality, as we already witness a new Right prospering across national borders, and not just in the West. The forces of reaction, often drawing on fascist and other conservative ideologues (think of Jordan Peterson, or Steve Bannon, or the Heideggerian Russian Aleksandr Dugin), but also selectively drawing, and indeed mostly distorting, religious traditions, are mobilizing to fight against modernity and seeking to create authoritarian alternatives, where hierarchies between ethnic groups (a polite way of speaking of races, essentially), and between the genders are firmly reestablished.

Canadian author Margaret Atwood brilliantly captured the danger of these reactionary dystopias in her 1985 novel The Handmaid’s Tale recently becoming a successful TV show. It recounts the near future of a Unted States of America where a theological chauvinist order is brutally enforced, and it is highly significant that in contemporary Israel, protesters against the clerical-fascist government let by Netanyahu have used the imagery of that novel. Indeed, Israel also illustrates the seemingly strange, but nevertheless quite real convergence of neoliberalism with authoritarianism, since a vital impetus for the anti-democratic onslaught of Netanyahu’s government has been the extremist thought of a libertarian think tank called Kohelet Policy Forum, that espouses a complete destruction of workers’ organizations and a totalitarian “free market.”

What do you think about recent calls for ‘less consumption’ and growing debates about ‘overpopulation’? According to your research, it seems that those calls perfectly fit for any overt or covert fascist agenda. Can we say that the world is ripe for a new era of fascism?

Anti-consumerism and the attack on the masses’ material standard of living is a much-overlooked component of the fascist worldview.

Fascist leaders and intellectuals recoiled with great distaste from the masses’ “base” material aspirations, transforming them from frugal workers into spoiled contenders for higher incomes and greater comforts. The same consumerism was also seen as weakening the willingness of the workers to fight and die for their countries. “We fascists,” exclaimed Mussolini “reject any static concept of material or moral happiness. Our happiness is in the struggle.” Goebbels similarly avowed that “National Socialism and fascism have in common above all the contempt for a comfortable and therefore pleasant life.”

It is instructive and alarming that the rhetoric of the new Right is suffused in such anti-consumerism, whether we are dealing with ideologues of the German AfD such as Götz Kubitschek, to Nietzschean-inspired US American alt-Righters, or to successful politicians such Marine Le Pen or Giorgia Meloni. Le Pen argued that “Globalization means using slaves to manufacture products that are then sold to the unemployed!,” and Meloni asserted in a widely watched speech, that we will “defend our freedom because we will never be slaves and simple consumers at the mercy of financial speculators. That is our mission.” Unfortunately, the left today has to a significant extent renounced its belief in material progress, and acquiesces in the view that there’s simply not enough to go around and we need to turn to some form or other of “degrowth.” Once material scarcity is perceived as inevitable, then a universal struggle for dwindling resources appears natural, and fear-mongering demagogues can present themselves as national saviors of their own —strictly delimited— constituencies. This right-wing surge will be very difficult to counter on an abiding basis, unless an alternative vision of social and material progress coupled with equality and international cooperation, can be compellingly defended.

INTERVIEW

What’s behind assassination attempt on Fico?

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Ján Pšenica, Ambassador of Slovakia to Ankara spoke to Harici: “Being an EU and NATO member is of essence for Slovakia. I cannot imagine that we were not a member of those entities which provide us with basic anchor on a political map, in international economy domain and also security.”

Answering our questions, Ambassador Pšenica assessed the socio-economic and international circumstances that led to the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Fico and the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on Slovakia.

What is the latest update about the Prime Minister Fico’s health condition?

Fortunately, there are good news. Prime Minister Fico was released from the hospital at the end of May his treatment and recovery continue at home in Bratislava.

What is the latest information about the assassination of Prime Minister Fico? The Minister of Internal Affairs said that the suspect was not a “lone wolf” and that there might be someone behind him. Do you have information about the suspect’s political connections?

The relevant Slovak authorities are continuing in a comprehensive investigation, which also includes an examination of the attacker’s psychological profile and condition. All relevant aspects as well as possibilities are being carefully investigated. It certainly will take some time before the authorities will present their findings and conclusions.

Can we say that Fico’s assassination has a connection with the tense political environment in Europe after the Ukrainian war? In particular, voices against the war are branded as “pro-Putin” and silenced in many countries. Keeping in mind Prime Minister Fico’s views on the war, would it be an exaggeration to think that the bullets were actually fired at everyone who wanted to end the war through diplomatic means? Or Do the majority of public opinion go for internal reasons?

 Usually the simplest interpretation works the best, but on the other side, overly simplistic explanations can lead to wrong conclusions or assumptions. It is not only the unlawful Russian aggression against Ukraine. We all remember well the COVID period and different sorts of restrictions and measures which authorities had to implement, including in Slovakia and in Türkiye. Yet, the COVID cost us a lot: many people, including our friends or family members died, our social and societal interactions weakened, economies suffered too, so the disease had overall clearly negative impact on our health and mental condition. Then the aggression started and increased our uncertainty about future. People are asking themselves: What will be the impact of the war and of the current international situation on my life? Will I be able to adapt on new situations? Will I be able to maintain my current living standard? Is there a possibility how I could help others? Are my representatives able to make the right decisions? – although I do not know which they should be… Is the war going to expand on our territory? If so, will there be someone helping us? And so on. And of course, some people perceive situations only within their families or small communities, whereas other perceive situations in wider context that exceeds the boundaries of their own states. Therefore, I do not want to speculate and will wait for investigation findings and conclusions.

Commenting on the assassination attempt against Prime Minister Fico, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service said that the globalist elites were turning to open political terror against their opponents. How do you evaluate this comment?

Frankly, I do not know what the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service publicly said and would not comment on it. But I think that everyone should ask himself/herself what is the purpose of a secret service speaking publicly….

How do you evaluate the effects of the current geopolitical fragmentation on your country? Previously, Prime Minister Fico had evaluated Ukraine as “not a sovereign state, but under the control of the USA”. What is your opinion about the USA and the EU continuing the war in Ukraine “to the last soldier” and continuing military aid?

Being an EU and NATO member is of essence for Slovakia. I cannot imagine that we were not a member of those entities which provide us with basic anchor on a political map, in international economy domain and also security. If we were not a member, the level of challenges we would have to address ourselves and alone would be much more difficult.

Now, on our relations with Ukraine. We are neighbours so relations between of our nations go back to history. Similarly, as Türkiye, we support independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, its democracy and prosperity. Already in 2014, we set up a reverse gas flow to be able to cover part of Ukraine gas demand if necessary. Since February 2022 to nowadays, Slovakia´s assistance to Ukraine has reached approximately 1% GDP. In the past, our assistance included also military equipment, such as fighter jets Mig-29s and surface-to-air missile system S-300. Current Slovak government does not provide any military aid from our active military storages anymore and focuses mainly on humanitarian and developments assistance. However, commercial contracts, including those in weapons and ammunition fields are still in force and being implemented. Slovakia recently also set up a reverse electricity flow so our neighbour does not experience large blackouts despite fierce Russian attacks against electricity generation and distribution infrastructure.

Since February 2022, approximately 2 million of refugees from Ukraine came to Slovakia and around 130 000 found a shelter in my country. Many Slovak citizens, including my family have been helping Ukrainians in Slovakia.

In April 2024, a joint meeting of the Governments of Slovakia and Ukraine under the leadership of the two Prime Ministers – Robert Fico and Denys Shmygal – took place in Slovakia. A new phase in relations between the two countries was launched. Three main common projects have been agreed on: 1) Direct railway connection between Kyiv and Košice; 2) Modernization of the Vyšné Nemecké border crossing point.; 3) Reconstruction of the electricity transmission network Mukačevo – Veľké Kapušany. The two Governments also adopted a road map of joint activities.

The war against Ukraine is fundamental violation of international law that brought countless of human tragedies. Slovakia has been contributing to international effort to help Ukraine as much as it can and 1% GDP speaks for itself. Similarly, as Türkiye, we consider crucial that a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace, based on the core principles of the UN Charter, is achieved as soon as possible.

On 15 and 6 June 2024, a Summit on peace in Ukraine took place in Bürgenstock in Switzerland. Slovakia was represented by its Foreign Minister Juraj Blanár. However, originally it was the Prime Minister Robert Fico who had planned to attend the event. Unfortunately, the assassination attempt prevented him from participating. But his will to attend is yet another confirmation that my country, in addition to helping Ukraine, cares about achieving a peace that would be just and in line with the core UN principles.

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INTERVIEW

“The British may not like the Americans, but they have no choice but to stand behind them”

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On July 4, the United Kingdom will hold snap elections to elect a new parliament and a new government. Decades of economic stagnation in the United Kingdom have been accompanied by a political and social crisis exacerbated by the Brexit process and the rise of geopolitical tensions that began with its inclusion in the holy alliance against Russia.

On the other hand, there is something “unique” about British imperialism. London has long been the nerve center of global financial flows. In the aftermath of the 2008-9 financial crisis, the Gulf countries’ ties with British finance capital came to the fore, while in the 2010s a similar issue arose with China, with London becoming the most important focal point of the global renminbi trade in the West.

At the center of all these financial flows is the famous City of London, or simply The City, also known as the “Square Mile” in reference to its small size. The City, which has its own separate administrative and legal structure, is somehow involved in all the conspiracy theories about finance in the world, as it has always had a dark side.

Tony Norfield, author of The City: London and the Global Power of Finance (Verso, 2017), which focuses on the role of finance in the functioning of the City of London and British imperialism, strongly emphasizes that finance is an integral part of the capitalist world system and that it would be absurd to attempt to separate the two.

However, the City of London and finance also point to the specific nature of British imperialism, with the financial sector in particular playing a critical role in both British GDP and investment structure.

Norfield does not think it is possible for London to pursue a policy independent of Washington. In his view, even if the British wanted to do so, they are too weak to act separately from the US. The rise of China and the pivot of Asia and Latin America towards China, as well as Russia’s victory in Ukraine, are inevitable, Norfield believes, despite all British efforts to the contrary. Norfield writes about his thoughts on current affairs on his personal blog “Economics of Imperialism.”

Let me start with Britain’s role in global finance. The City of London is not well known in Turkey. But especially in the 2010s, City officials have developed deep ties with the AKP government. For example, Public-Private Partnership projects, which are often criticized in Turkey, were approved through Britain and the City of London in the same decade; even the legislation was taken from Britain. Can you tell us a little bit about what distinguishes the City of London from other financial centers and the importance of the City for British imperialism?

Yes, it’s a big topic, of course, but one thing you might remember is that in the middle of the financial crisis in 2008, there was a lot of discussion about interest rate swaps and the sheer volume of them. You know, if you look at how much they are technically involved in terms of hundreds or even thousands of billions of dollars worth of swaps.

What many people overlook is that the legal basis for these interest rate swaps is actually in English law. This may seem strange because not many swaps are done with people in Britain, but it reflects the fact that the British influence on finance is quite large. And this is really based on historical factors because the growth of the British empire, especially in the 19th century, even before that, meant that all kinds of commercial, maritime, transportation, insurance and trade relations, most of these were dominated by the British.

The British, for example, in an earlier period, were the biggest slave traders. So basically they played a very big role in international trade, partly because of their imperial ambitions. In the case of India, for example, they more or less closed down the Indian shipbuilding industry and the Indian shipping industry. Indians were able to build ships, sail ships and go from port to port. But what the British did was that they prevented ships from docking in colonial India unless it was a British port. So a large part of the shipping and shipbuilding industry in India closed down and was instead dominated by the British.

In insurance, marine insurance, Lloyd’s of London I think is the biggest marine insurance company in the world. And of course Lloyds is made up of wealthy individuals who are members. But it still reflects this historical factor, it’s a historical factor that continues today.

The multiple connections that the British have actually go back much further than the Americans. Even though the US is the largest economic power, obviously much larger than Britain, it is quite clear that the connections on which financial and business transactions can be built are very strong in the case of Britain and are actually more widespread than they are for the US.

So what happened? There are actually two phases. First, in the 19th century the City of London was a major financial center for the world economy, as I said, finance, shipping, insurance, insurance in general and trade, basically trade. One historian put it quite nicely and said that England was not the workshop of the world, it was the warehouse of the world. In other words, a lot of goods came in and were sent out again.

So Britain has a long history of being a kind of trading center and financial relationships were built on that basis. So, again, maritime insurance, trade, finance and things like that, and this was very important for the British.

So, even though the British economy in the 19th century had a deficit in commodities, the money that it made from insurance and the investment income from all its investments overseas meant that its current account was actually about 5% of GDP. So it had a huge deficit in trade but a huge surplus in investment income and various financial incomes, including insurance.

This was hit by the First World War of 1914-1918. As you know, this damaged world trade and meant that Britain was in a weaker economic position. In the inter-war period they tried to remedy this. Although they used the empire as a basis for doing that, it didn’t go very well.

Then, in the post-war period, the British were in a much weaker economic position, but they used their relationship with the US to continue to strengthen their financial dimension. So in the period immediately after the war, for example in the 1950s, you saw that trade financing was predominantly in British Pounds, not in US Dollars. Again, this seems a bit unusual because of the dominant economic position of the US, but that’s what happened. There was also, especially during the 1960s, the growth of the euro markets. The center of the euro markets was largely in London. The City of London was attracting foreign banks to come to London where they could do these transactions. This was because of the low regulations that existed in the City of London to circumvent local laws in the US that restricted the amount of interest that could be paid on a bank deposit.

European markets, for example, have very different regulations and the Bank of England and the City of London have much less regulation. So most of the big boom in international finance through the euro markets took place in London.

And despite the relative weakness of the UK economy, which was never in very good shape during this whole period, British finance used the US dollar, but it acted as a kind of financial trading instrument. So even today you see that the City of London, or the UK more generally, is not like that.

The City itself is a relatively small area. There’s also Canary Wharf and some other places within London. So geographically it’s not exactly a city, but the City of London, even after Brexit and despite the weakness of the British economy, is still the largest foreign exchange trading center in the world. It’s also one of the biggest financial derivatives trading venues between banks and their clients, like interest rate swaps and things like that.

The banks in the UK, not all of them are British banks of course, but the banks in the UK had the largest international links compared to other countries. And this again was creating stress. I emphasize how big the City is despite the relative weakness of the UK economy, certainly compared to the US, but also compared to a number of European countries.

And you know, they had a big role in setting regulations for the bank, for international agreements, for all sorts of things, because of this accumulation of expertise and because of this role that they played as an allied partner and accomplice with the US. That gave them a lot more freedom and influence than they would have had on their own as the British economy.

The City has a separate administrative structure alongside the British state apparatus. We hear some people in Turkey, some people close to the government, talk about London barons, London bankers trying to interfere in our domestic politics. Because the City of London is a kind of, you know, dark place, an ominous place for foreigners.

I think a lot of the discussion about this on the internet is completely wrong. The City of London has been given all sorts of privileges in terms of financial regulation, but it’s not as if it’s a separate power in its own right. This has been the policy of every government. It has been a deliberate policy of Conservative governments and Labour governments, particularly since the 1970s. To stimulate the financial sector, loosen regulations and allow the city to expand massively.

In 1979, exchange controls were relaxed. From 1986 or 87, I can’t remember, the so-called big boom happened. Then governments did not say, no, this is a bad idea, let’s change it. No, they continued it and they did more and more.

And under the Labor government in 1997, one of the biggest supporters of City was Gordon Brown, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer. He even ridiculously praised Lehman Brothers, as I mentioned in my book on the City. This was just a year or so before everything went to hell. This was a consistent British government policy.

So, okay, even though the Bank of England is a different institution, different governments, different policies, etc., it is completely wrong to portray the City as some kind of demon that sits indoors. This is a deliberate, precise and consistent part of British policy. And that’s because they make a lot of money out of it, or the British economy does.

And again, this was looking at the period when a former Labour government was in power. And they were actually praising all these jobs, big bonuses and a lot of tax revenues from tax revenues.

This is something that ironically the Brexit policy has messed up because it has been a factor in reducing the economic benefits for the City.

We’ll come to that. Okay, but I read an article in Politico yesterday and it said that the City has already won the elections because both Labour and the Conservatives have guaranteed how the City will function. But again, in your book you emphasize that all capitalist corporations carry out important financial operations. Where do you think the particular anger towards financial activities comes from? Could it be that the masses, especially the non-proletarian masses, are confronted with the capitalist structure, with the financial sector as one of its 1001 faces?

In general, there is a public opinion that looks at banks, the city, finance and things like that as a negative for the economy of the country. And this was a little bit less. During the boom years, so to speak, when everything looked ridiculously great, stock prices were soaring, all sorts of financial indicators looked good, there was a more popular view against the greed of bankers, that sort of thing. And of course, even young people earning millions of pounds, let alone big executives, were dealing with this sort of thing. It was an easy focus of resentment.

Then the financial crisis of 2008 and the bailout of the banks and things like that became a big thing and there was widespread dislike and hatred of bankers, that sort of thing. But what none of them could deny was that finance was an important factor for the British economy in terms of tax revenue, news and that sort of thing.

So there is a popular view against banking and finance, and it is very common among left radical people. But it’s a very simplistic view. Maybe I should not say that, but I think it’s a stupid view because it ignores the fact that the financial sector is a necessary element added to the functioning of capitalism.

As you mentioned, I talk about this in my book and I even give an example, let’s take Apple. Apple is a huge technical marvel of a company in the US. It also owns one of the biggest bond trading companies, right? It’s funny, I always thought Apple was all about consumer technology and stuff like that. No, they have a huge amount of financial derivatives deals.

It’s involved in a lot of bonds and it’s got a company called Braeburn. Right? Braeburn is a kind of Apple and it’s based in Nevada and a lot of people don’t know about it. They know about iPods and iPhones and Macs and things like that, but they do not really know about Braeburn.

Every big company, not just Apple, every big company has to have a finance arm in terms of dealing with currency risk, interest rate risk transactions and everything else. So you can not escape that. Every single company does it, technically an industrial company, a commercial company or whatever, has to do it. And this is a necessary, inevitable factor of capitalist markets.

So if you don’t like finance but you want capitalist markets, then there is a contradiction. In your view, these things inevitably arise from capitalist markets. So you can’t get around that. You have to do something about capitalist markets, if you don’t like capitalist finance. Otherwise you are on the losing side.

Yes, but related to the previous question, in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and during the Brexit debate, attention was simultaneously drawn to the City of London’s evasion of EU regulations and to the hyperinflation of the financial sector in the UK and the relative decline in the competitiveness of the so-called productive sectors. Was this debate purely populist or was it an extension of real material class interests for Britain? I mean, there is some debate about industrial capital versus finance capital and so on.

I think this is again a misguided, ill-informed debate. Let me put it this way, there is no great distinction between an honest and wonderful industrial capitalist and an evil finance capitalist, because all these necessary links are there where you find, for example, an oil company like British Petroleum, BP, right? Yes, they do.

They will have a big treasury trading department because they deal with the ups and downs of oil prices, cash flows and all kinds of things. So every big industrial company necessarily has a financial aspect. True, technically they produce things or they are engaged in other things, but they have to do them.

But at the moment most of the world’s production takes place in a number of countries, particularly in Asia, where wages are relatively low and production costs are lower. And that means that the richer countries are focusing on having a monopoly position in the narrower industrial areas – specialized engineering and so on. Or they get involved in commercial power.

Let’s go back to Apple. They get everybody else to produce for them. And they rely on licensing and commercial monopolization to make their big profits. So they do not produce a lot. They outsource all the production elsewhere, but they still make a big profit because they can make big mark-ups.

So everybody else produces for them and they raise prices. It’s an extreme case, but it’s similar to what most of the rich capitalist countries do. So you see that in all these countries in general the share of manufacturing and industry is declining and instead the services sector is growing.

I mean, of course you need a service sector, don’t you? You cannot live in an economy with only manufacturing, mining or industry. But what happens is that the trading power of the rich countries is an important way for them to siphon value from the rest of the world. This is part of their parasitism on the world economy.

The financial dimension is also an important part of it. So this commercial parasitism and financial parasitism is an important part of the infrastructure of the rich powers that run the world economy. You know, they have a problem when the financial sector goes crazy and explodes, but when the post-crisis period comes and they want to do something else, they try to re-impose it in a different way.

Right now they are having even bigger problems with Russia, China and a number of countries trying to build something different. On top of all this, there is the parasitic system of domination over the world economy that the US, the British and other western powers have been in charge of for decades.

So you disagree with the claim that there is no capitalism anymore and that we are living in a new feudal world order?

No, that’s absurd. It is basically, if you want to call it that, imperialist capitalism, and in many ways a much more parasitic and corrupt capitalism.

You know, rather than having the good old 19th century concept of, you know, I’m a greedy capitalist, but at least I’m investing and producing and things like that. Right? No, what they are doing is they’re setting up a commercial monopolized system to control things and, you know, in the financial commercial sense, it means benefiting their producers as long as they still own them. But even if they don’t own the producers and they outsource the production to you, they want to make sure that the financial links and the commercial links are run by them and that all the big price increases happen for their benefit. That’s what happens, isn’t it?

Yes, I see. Now let’s talk a little bit about the Brexit discussions and this is also relevant. With Brexit, some of the Thatcherite Tory economists said that they wanted to make the UK a new Singapore, and you criticized that very harshly in one of your articles. But don’t you think that complaints about bureaucracy in the EU, Brussels’ attempts to regulate financial institutions, and Tory criticism of a move away from the free market, all of these things represent a bifurcation with capitalist institutions and ideas on the continent?

It’s always been a problem for the British because for a long time Europe seemed to be the main growth area of the world economy, not anymore but for a while it was. With the growth of the European economy and the growth of the EU, there was a big debate in Britain about whether to join the EU or not. Throughout the 1960s there was a lot of internal British debate: Should we join? Should we not join?

And they found that their previous imperial connections were not doing them much good economically. Most of Australia and New Zealand, for example, was one long railroad. The Canadian connections were not as strong. So basically it looked like Germany, France, Italy, Spain. These European countries were growing. Maybe we should have joined them.

The problem was, if the British did that, then would they still have a dominant position? That was always the problem and that was always the calculation they had to make.

In the early 1970s they finally decided: Yes, we have to do this. So they joined the European Economic Community. It made a lot of economic sense for them, but they were using their ties with other Europeans to put economic pressure on their own industries, which were in decline, and to have a competitive whip to improve them and put them in better shape, whereas before they had strong ties with the old empire, the Commonwealth, which gave them a privileged position, but it meant that they were no longer competitive in the rest of the world.

So the Conservative government in the early 1970s and the Labour governments afterwards tried to make the British economy more competitive so that it could compete a little bit more with the Europeans. But they had a big problem, even in the European context, of how to maintain your dominant position when you are no longer so dominant economically.

And they were very concerned about losing their political power. So that was why they didn’t want to join the European Union; or they joined the EU, but they didn’t want to join the new order of creating a single currency and having the euro, because that would be a step too far and it would mean that they would lose their influence. So they didn’t like to do that.

They were also afraid that it would weaken the City’s position and instead give more direct power to, for example, Germany, to the European Central Bank and things like that. So they didn’t like that and they wanted to step back from doing it.

There was always this tension, they wanted to have the connections. In fact, the City of London was doing most of the euro-related business in Europe, and the Europeans didn’t like that very much because the size of Frankfurt or Paris as an alternative financial center was relatively weak to do that compared to the size and power of the British financial system dealing with European finance.

You also mentioned in your Singapore article that during the Brexit debate some Londoners, particularly hedge funds and venture capital, were trying to separate the UK from the EU. But other institutions, some banks and pension funds, and asset managers were in favor of staying. How do you explain this phenomenon?

Brexit was a very stupid economic idea, completely stupid except in a few narrow dimensions. And that’s why you saw that the big companies didn’t make a big deal out of Brexit, because just over half of the population was in favor of Brexit. So they didn’t want to make a big deal out of it and piss off half of their customers. They didn’t want to talk too much about it.

But in the financial sector, for example, or in the business world, the people who were really in favor of Brexit were either hedge funds or venture capitalists, people like that who thought they could benefit from less regulation, lower wages and that sort of thing. So they had a more Brexit-oriented perspective. They also appealed to a more nationalist version which, frankly, most of the British working class supported. So it was British nationalism against a so-called European power that they didn’t like. We were going to be free, we were going to be able to do separate things and that sort of thing. It was a rather silly nationalist view and it actually undermined the social welfare aspects of the British working class. But the British working class generally supported this nationalist, anti-European view.

I’m not saying that Europeans are great progressives and that’s a negative thing from that perspective, but it was certainly a bit stupid from an economic point of view, and it opened the way for a more reactionary perspective that could be implemented by whatever government, in this case a Conservative government rather than a Labour government, because the trade unions, for example, were generally a bit more pro-European because they saw more positive social welfare events in Europe than were likely to happen outside Europe, outside the EU. So this was a reality.

And it was also an anti-immigration against EU migrants, undermining our living conditions and, you know, trying to get British welfare benefits and that kind of thing. That was the anti-immigration aspect of populism, it was anti-European stuff, which led to the British working class, not everybody but most of them, having an anti-EU view, which was the fuel for the Brexit view, which was linked to the anti-EU Nigel Farage type, UKIP type view.

But economically it’s a stupid thing, economically Brexit was a bad mistake. You know, you see the way the European Union is going, it’s not very progressive, it’s also dominated by the US and it’s doing stupid things.

So my position, to be honest, was to abstain. I thought that the European Union was bad and I thought that the great British alternative was bad. I mean, you know, I wouldn’t say that one was better than the other, but, you know, it was clearly absurd to have the view that there was a great British alternative.

Throughout 2010, the UK and the City of London became a hub for Chinese financial flows and in particular the renminbi. In turn, the UK joined the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, attracting Chinese investment to Britain despite the crisis. Did Brexit have anything to do with these developments, or was it just a coincidence? Does China still see Britain as a gateway to the western hemisphere?

The British expected more positive economic growth from Asia, whereas the European dimension of growth looked rather weak by comparison. But at the same time they were afraid of Asia’s growing economic power. So it was a bit of a mixed view. So, yes, for a while they wanted more Asian engagement in the economy, but at the same time they were afraid of a larger Chinese dimension and then they easily bought into the American paranoia about China. And that always undermined how much the British could embrace the Asian perspective. So, you know, they. Basically they wanted to be involved in Asia but as long as it could keep Western power in place, which they had a big role in. So that was the angle they were trying to push. And that led to this absurd “Singapore on the Thames” alternative, which went nowhere and looked silly.

But the British are in the middle of nowhere in this respect, frankly, they are not strong enough to implement some kind of independent view. As far as the Americans are concerned, they are number two or three on the list. The Europeans don’t like them very much, but they are stuck. They look a bit stupid, frankly.

But they will always, you know, try to strengthen their great international position. We are not Americans. We are not as aggressive and imperialistic as the Americans… But they are doing a lot of what the Americans are doing.

Today the European Union also announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. According to news reports, Germany, Sweden and Hungary opposed the new tariffs, while France and Spain in particular pushed for new tariffs. So how realistic do you think Europe’s decoupling from China, or “de-risking” as it is officially called, is?

First, it cannot be done. Secondly, whether from a British perspective or a European perspective, it is an attempt to prop up a very weak European economy.

But we can say that many German companies are completely against this idea of decoupling. And decoupling from China cannot be done. Basically, it cannot be done. And it’s stupid to try to do it.

And it’s not only China. They are worried about Korea, they are worried about India, they are worried about basically all kinds of things where they cannot compete with Asia. That’s the bottom line. You know, they cannot compete with the growing power of the Asian economy. So they want to do these kinds of things but basically they cannot compete. That’s the whole thing.

And they’re going to pick China in particular, because China is a big economy that continues to grow, a stronger, competitive economy. So they will claim that Huawei is doing all this bad spying, whereas the great Google, the great Amazon and all these kinds of things don’t spy as much as the Chinese do. It’s just ridiculous.

And they just want more western, American based power rather than Chinese risk, which they don’t like, which is not an independent power.

Lately we have been hearing a lot of talk in the western media about China’s overcapacity. Before it was about China dragging emerging economies into debt. Do you think there is any truth in all this? Does China’s great economic power aim to make countries, especially in Asia and Latin America, dependent? Or accusations of dumping from the EU?

This is absurd. You know, many African countries, for example, are choosing China as a more progressive alternative, a productive alternative to western domination. That’s it and it works for them, doesn’t it?

Who is going to build these things? I mean bridges, roads, railroads, power stations, etc. It’s not going to be the fucking Brits, Europeans and Americans. It’s going to be the Chinese. So it’s not a debt trap. And frankly this whole debt trap hoax is nonsense and has been proven not to be true. But basically they want to argue that.

Of course, I’m not claiming that every Chinese investment is great and every European investment is completely terrible, that’s not true. But to say that China is a debt trap and everything else is good is nonsense. There is all sorts of evidence that this is nonsense and that they cannot compete. But they don’t have as much control as they did when the Anglo-American view of the wonders of Western power was dominant. And that’s the point. And they are worried about losing that. That’s basically the issue.

You said this in one of your articles. In the past years, the BRICS countries have done some things outside the western financial system. It is also argued that the sanctions policy of western imperialism, led by the US, has failed and accelerated this process. But unlike Russia, China is still cautious about relations with the US, given the tensions between the other members of the bloc. What are the prospects for BRICS as an alternative?

Basically very good. And this is the way to go. It’s a good idea to build something more productive and different than the Western-US-Anglo type of domination that many Asian countries, Latin American countries and African countries have suffered and know they have suffered in previous decades.

There will be all kinds of conflicts and grievances and all the rest, but this is a more productive alternative than what was offered to them by the British, Americans and Europeans.

So this is the way to go and they are doing it in all kinds of ways. This will continue. The Americans will complain, the British will complain, the Europeans will complain, but it is a good thing that they are trying to build an alternative productive economy that is not dominated by parasitism, by the parasites of the western world. Basically, they are trying to get out of this trap and it is working. It’s better for them. And they see it every time. One of them now sees that there is an alternative to this nonsense and they don’t want it anymore, so they are trying to build an alternative. And that’s it.

There might be a mess here and there, whatever. It may not always work exactly. Yes, but to build an alternative to these things; that’s what they have to do and they are doing it.

Turkey, Asia and other countries should join in. Not the western nonsense that is trying to dominate them instead.

Finally, let’s talk about the ongoing occupation of Gaza, the war in Ukraine and Britain’s role in all this. Britain has been actively supporting Israel since October 7th. In addition, London has established a very close financial and political relationship with reactionary Arab regimes that have overt or covert relations with Israel. Given the financial infrastructure of British imperialism, what can you say about the role of the British government in the Middle East at the moment? As far as Ukraine is concerned, Britain seems to be pursuing a tougher anti-Russian policy than the US in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, as well as in the South Caucasus. It has established deep relations with Poland, the Baltic states, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Is Britain trying to create a cordon sanitaire against Russia?

The British, of course, are strong allies with the Americans and they see any real challenge to American power as a problem for them. It’s kind of like, you know, being the great helper who wants to be a great alternative or not an alternative but has their own thing. It doesn’t exactly suit them but they can’t do anything else. They want to be bullies but they are dependent on the Americans. That’s the real issue. They want to pretend that they have alternatives, but they don’t. They need to depend on the Americans to increase their power.

So they are more anti-Russian when it comes to Ukraine than the Americans are when it comes to Ukraine. They are more against what the Russians are doing than the Americans are. But this policy will lose because Russia will win.

But instead they want to strengthen something else because they are worried about losing their power, the power of the Americans and the West in general. And something else is being built that is not the power of the Americans and the West. That’s why they don’t like it.

That’s how all these things should be looked at. That is the key point. Anything that happens today is about whether there will be western power, mainly American power, and the British have their own point of view or European power or whatever, and instead there will be an alternative built by other countries.

The British don’t like it, the Americans don’t like it and they try to argue how terrible it is. But these other countries are obviously trying to build a better alternative. That’s what we are trying to build.

What about the Middle East connections and the Gaza war going on in the Middle East in Palestine?

Yes, the British have a reactionary role in this. They have a terrible role in this. But you know, there is no way they can be a progressive force in Palestine, in Gaza, in the Middle East, in West Asia. It will always play a reactionary role. They realize that now with their policy of supporting Israel in every way, it depends on supporting the Americans.

But it has to fail. I hope so, but it’s not something that they are really going to back down or try to do something different. All their policies are reactionary and stupid and they will fail.

So you still think that the UK will act as a kind of lapdog of American imperialism around the world?

Yes, because that’s basically their only option. They want to be independent, they want to be a great alternative. They don’t like the Yanks. They want to be something different but they can’t be because they are too weak. So they want  British stuff. But the British don’t do anything for anybody, they don’t build anything and they are not an alternative for any other country. So basically they support the reaction, not the alternative. That’s how it works.

So they have to support the reaction in the Middle East and in the rest of the world and that’s what they are doing.

I think the basic idea is that the Europeans are losing. They may not like the Americans very much and they want to be different from the Americans, but it turns out that they are not that different. The Americans, one of them, is trying to ruin you too. Okay, I’m British, but that’s basically what they’re doing. So if you want to build something different you have to look elsewhere.

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INTERVIEW

‘BRICS has achieved a lot including ASEAN’

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Pornchai Danvivathana, Secretary General of the Asia Cooperation Dialogue spoke to Harici: “BRICS  has achieved a lot including ASEAN, where I came from. Because I came from Thailand.”

With 35 members, the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) is known as Asia’s most widely participatory dialogue and consultative forum.

The ACD, an international organisation established in 2002 to promote cooperation among Asian countries and help integrate different regional organisations such as ASEAN, SAARC and the Gulf Cooperation Council, has six pillars of cooperation: “connectivity”, “science, technology and innovation”, “education and human resource development”, “food, energy and water security relationship”, “culture and tourism”, “promoting inclusive and sustainable development”.

Dr. Pornchai Danvivathana, Secretary General of the ACD, answered our questions on cooperation mechanisms in the Global South, connectivity among international organisations, and the competition between Asian and Western organisations.

You are the first international organization to cover the whole of Asia. The rapid rise of Asia in social, economic, technological, etc. fields has turned the world’s attention to this geography. How do you evaluate the cooperation platforms in Asia? Can more initiative organizations be established in the region?

I think it’s on the rise because  in terms of  interdependence,  when one needs  others, in especially, to tackle transboundary issues or new challenges, I think, this is the platform for dialogue and also to promote diplomacy as the theme of Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

Some regional organizations such as ASEAN and the Gulf Cooperation Organization are often in the middle of the US-China rivalry. Do you agree with this assessment? How should regional organizations be positioned in the context of multipolarity and multilateralism?

Well, whether you define it as rivalry or not, I would like to look at it as competition which is always every corner of the world. When we have cooperation, of course, we do have competition at the same time. This is not a bad idea because if you would like to look in the aspect of economy, you could see for yourself that we promote competitiveness and also we consider comparative advantage as part of factors that could help promote competition with others. In that case, I think whichever country would like to contribute or to be involved with others, I see it as positive sign; because if we would like to promote partnership, it starts from scratch. You cannot expect  any  huge contribution without anything in return.

Comparisons are often made between organizations based in Asia and the Global South, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, and Western-based organizations such as the G20 and the European Union. Can these organizations be alternatives to each other? Is cooperation between Western and Eastern-based international organizations possible?

Yes, it is also possible. In fact, I’m a lawyer by training. If you look into the UN Charter which promotes regional arrangements as an a mechanism or instrument to promote peace and security, then sub-regional or regional mechanisms like ASEAN, BRICS, ACD (Asia Cooperation Diaologue) could play a very vital role in promoting peace and security including diplomacy as Türkiye has been pushing forward.

How do you evaluate Turkey’s Asia Anew Initiative? How can this initiative be utilized more actively?

I personally and officially welcome this approach since the beginning because it’s a kind of approach that some or many countries has been focusing on. Look, the building blocks for countries in Asia to promote cooperation and also partnership. And the ACD is one among others. When ACD itself has been serving as a platform for dialogue to promote cooperation on non-political issues. So, I do believe that the approach of Türkiye is complement and supplement to the vision and also values of the ACD.

How would you evaluate China’s Belt and Road initiative in terms of connectivity in Asia? On the one hand, it is criticized because it’s causing some debts to the countries which are involved. On the other hand, it’s very productive. So, it’s a little bit complicated. Please give a detailed take on this.

In fact, this kind of question was the question that media in China asked me last year.  My reaction to that is as follows: First and foremost, connectivity is one of the prioritized areas of the ACD. When it comes to connectivity the Belt and Road Initiative is one that help narrow the Missing link. We cannot deny that. ACD vision also mentioned about the Belt and Road initiative, however, it happens that some might see it in a negative way. As Secretary General, I think that the best way to look at it is to look at the overall picture and for advantage or disadvantage that some countries may have been facing as regard to the Belt and Road Initiative. It’s for the countries to concern, to discuss with China to how this can be settled. It’s not for me to question or to  comment  on it but  as far as the ACD is concerned, the Belt and Road Initiative has been recognized as one of the mechanism that helps make connectivity within the ACD  work in a positive way.

The rivalry between China and India is being discussed recently as two huge powers in Asian world. Do you think this rivalry is actually heping be more productive regarding the other countries’ contribution in this cumulative economy? Or are they taking more than their fair share?

I’m aware of bilateral conflicts between or among countries, not only in Asia but also elsewhere. It happens all the time. Some may call it rivalry, some may call it conflict. But the ACD is a window of opportunity for member countries of 35, all together to discuss and pave the way to avoid conflicts and also to reduce rivalry in whichever way. So far, since 2002 up to now, we have been proven that it’s a useful platform. So, with regard to bilateral relations, that could be set aside as far as the ACD is concerned.  That is why we discuss anything but politics. We are a non-political platform.

A very well-known economist based in London, Timothy Ash, told me “What did BRICS achieve?” in an interview. There is an approach claiming that the eastern economical alliances can never compete with the western ones. What do you think about BRICS and what do you think about this western approach?

It depends on your perspective and how you look at issues and where you stand. That is my first point. And secondly, in my view nothing is impossible. If you talk about East-West cooperation or inter-regional cooperation, I think that is what the ACD is for. Because we promote regional, sub-regional and also international cooperation within the ACD context. And we try to offer ourselves as again a window of opportunity for countries of 35 to explore the way forward and work together.

What would be your response if I ask you what has BRICS achieve up to now?

Well, I think, it has achieved a lot including ASEAN, where I came from. Because I came from Thailand. Yes, it might take some time or a lot of time but over the years we have established not only cooperation but also people to people connectivity or understanding. That’s what I would like to underline. We cannot do without public diplomacy and this is one of the rational that might help ACD sustain.

I’m sure you are aware of Zangezur Corridor which is trying to be built in Azerbaijan’s Karabakh connecting the road and railway to Türkiye. It is going to connect a new trade logistic route. How do you think Zangezur Corridor can contribute to regional peace and Asia’s economic growth?

No doubt about it. Because, for me, myself, without consulting my member states, I would say that connectivity should not be limited only within the ACD but also beyond.  As we would like to promote not only institutional connectivity but also people to people. And when it comes to people, it goes beyond. In my understanding, connectivity knows no borders. But how to make sure that it fits the requirements of each and every country, that’s another issue. I respect, of course, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each and every nation that is why it has to be discussed and also explored.

Regarding Zangezur Corridor, you say that it should be respectful to Armenia’s border and territorial integrity. Is that right?

This is something that we need to be mindful of, but of course as a diplomat, I think nothing is carved on stone. We can discuss and explore and of course, come to a solution which is amicable or acceptable to all.

Lastly, do you want to say any word about the Türkiye’s growing initiative to be influential on Asia, especially Turkic world?

Not only that I appreciate the Asia Anew initiative but also I personally and officially appreciate how Türkiye decided to serve as ACD share for 2 years, especially when we are moving forward in the positive direction, however we faced Covid-19.

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