Diplomacy
‘Non-Western lingo was used to show that relations with China are considered independent of the West’
The visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Turkey, who met with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and then President Erdoğan in Ankara yesterday, can be seen as an opportunity to put relations back on track after they were strained by the domestic political agenda during the election period. In particular, Wang’s emphasis on the need to encourage more Chinese companies to invest and do business in Turkey seems to have pleased Ankara, which is seeking foreign investment in the midst of an economic crunch.
Indeed, the center of gravity of the meeting was the Central Corridor from Beijing to London, with Turkey at its center. While President Erdoğan expressed his desire to accelerate cooperation in the context of harmonizing the Belt and Road Initiative and the Central Corridor, Wang Yi, who is also a Politburo Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Director of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, stated that “they are ready to enhance mutual strategic trust and deepen cooperation with Turkey”.
The Chinese Foreign Minister emphasized that they support Turkey to play an important role in the regional and international arena and that they oppose any foreign interference in Turkey’s internal affairs.
Chinese media also highlighted President Erdoğan’s telling Wang that they “do not support NATO’s increasing activities in the Asia-Pacific” and emphasizing their commitment to the “one-China” principle.
The Uighur issue, seen as one of the most critical problems in the relations between the two countries, was glossed over with a sentence such as “The situation of Uighur Turks was also discussed on the occasion of the visit”, once again showing that the emphasis and statements made on the ‘Uighur issue’ during the election period were handled in the context of domestic politics.
‘Economy and trade dynamics are catalysts in Turkey-China relations’
Commenting on the visit to Harici, Istanbul Gedik University ASEAN Center Director Dr. Sibel Karabel pointed out the importance of timing conjuncturally and said the following:
“First of all, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the state of Turkey-China relations in the current conjuncture and the extent of economic and trade relations. The strategic partnership of the two countries should also be emphasized in this context. In 1971, diplomatic relations were established and as President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan stated in the meeting, Turkey has been adhering to the ‘one China’ policy since then. In 2010, a strategic partnership was established. In 2015, Turkey officially joined the Belt and Road Initiative with a memorandum of understanding. And mutual commitments have been made to continuously increase the volume of bilateral trade and engagement between the two countries in the regional and global context.”
Stating that economic and commercial dynamics are “the catalyst” in Turkey-China relations, Karabel listed the following data: “When we evaluate the background of the Belt and Road Initiative, a target was set for the mutual trade volume between the two countries to reach 50 billion dollars as of 2015. We are talking about a trade volume of 33 billion dollars. On the other hand, Turkey’s foreign trade deficit against China, which unfortunately increases rapidly every year, especially between 2019 and 2022, is an important issue. In fact, in this context, the Belt and Road initiative is both an initiative that will highlight Turkey’s potential to become a center for transit trade and an initiative that has the caliber that can cure this problem. In other words, the investments made and planned to be made in the Belt and Road initiative have the potential to turn these trade dynamics between Turkey and China a little more in Turkey’s favor.”
Pointing out that Turkey is currently lagging behind this potential, Karabel summarizes the dynamics of the current commercial relationship as follows: “We know that the total investment of Chinese companies in the Belt and Road Initiative between 2013 and 2022 is approximately 1.4 trillion dollars. And in the same period, we see that the investments allocated to Turkey are 5.11 billion dollars. So our share in total investments is around 1.3 percent. And especially when we look at the trade balance between Turkey and China between 2019 and 2022, we see that imports have doubled. In other words, by nature, semi-finished goods are imported from China and processed and re-exported to the European Union countries. This is the dynamic of the trade relationship.”
Central Corridor emphasized
Sibel Karabel noted that the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor were particularly emphasized in the talks, and that Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan drew attention to different energy fields, aviation fields, different sectors, and mentioned “improving the Belt and Road Initiative’s ability to respond to global threats and global challenges”.
Underlining the importance of Wang Yi’s emphasis on “developing strategic mutual trust and deepening cooperation mechanisms”, Karabel said, “Wang Yi even talked about a future-oriented and broad-targeted relationship dynamic in his meeting with President Erdoğan.”
‘A relationship within its own dynamics separate from the West’
On the other hand, drawing attention to President Erdoğan’s emphasis on the ‘One China policy’ and the fact that China’s development is not perceived as a threat by Turkey, Karabel stated that the expression “China’s development is perceived as a threat” is a Western jargon, and that it is a matter of how the West sees China: “The West perceive China’s development as a threat when evaluated from the realist paradigm in the context of the relative balance of power on the global level.”
In this context, Karabel said that Erdoğan’s statement that “they do not see China’s development as a threat” can also be considered as a “tacit reference” to NATO documents and commented as follows “In fact, there is a tacit emphasis here that Turkey’s relations with China are independent from the West and have their own dynamics. This is an important emphasis.”
The importance of the Central Corridor and Turkey increased after the Ukraine crisis
Karabel also touched upon the importance of the Ukraine issue in the bilateral relations and discussed this in the context of Turkey’s growing importance in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor:
“The Belt and Road Initiative is actually a very dynamic initiative and is being pursued under the direction of the National Planning Commission in China. It is not only a matter of combining the plans, projects and infrastructure lines that were declared in 2013 and have been rigidly and rigidly implemented since then, but also the articulation of previous mechanisms and projects into the Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore, the Central Corridor, where Turkey is located, is actually more prominent in the context of Ukraine. As a matter of fact, one of the biggest trademarks of the Central Corridor is that it is more advantageous than the Northern Corridor and the Southern Corridor. On the trade route from China to Europe, it has a cost advantage because it stops at fewer countries. There is also a very serious saving in time. It significantly reduces the number of days of transportation. In fact, before Ukraine, the route that China tended to use more was the Northern route. Now there are more countries on the Southern route. There are countries subject to sanctions etc. So now, after the Ukraine incident, the importance of the Middle Corridor has increased a bit more for China.”
The course of relations with the US, EU and China reflects the new era of Turkish foreign policy
On the other hand, evaluating the visit together with the NATO summit, Karabel points out that events and sectors are intertwined with each other and that this situation reflects the new era of Turkish foreign policy:
“At the NATO summit, the F-16s came to the fore, especially in the Swedish issue, and on the other hand, Turkey’s integration with the European Union and the European Union membership negotiation process were brought back to the agenda. The revival of Turkey’s full membership negotiations with the EU is a step towards revitalizing the almost frozen relationship. Turkey’s relations with the European Union do not only consist of membership negotiations. That is an important part, but there are also acute issues. For example, the Customs Union, modernization of the Customs Union negotiations, visa liberalization. In fact, there are a number of acute mini-sectoral issues. Therefore, on the one hand, there is an effort to revitalize these, and on the other hand, there is an effort to carry out relations with the United States in a way to develop relations on a more common ground, such as the F-16 issue.
On the other hand, as a result of the conjunctural developments in relations with China and Asia, we observe that Turkey’s leverage is actually increasing, especially in issues such as being an epicenter of transportation and turning this structural trade balance in its relations with China more in its favor. These are indeed conjunctural and historical opportunities, important opportunities.”
Diplomacy
India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets
India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.
According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.
Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.
That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.
Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.
India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.
However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.
Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.
According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.
A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.
Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.
Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.
According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.
New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions
Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.
Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.
Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.
Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.
However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.
Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.
Diplomacy
EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor
Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.
According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.
The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.
In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.
The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.
Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.
Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road
The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.
Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.
The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.
During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.
Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact
One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.
The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.
In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.
The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.
By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.
Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.
Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.
China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.
The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.
Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition
In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.
These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.
Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.
The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.
The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.
However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.
The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership
EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.
In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).
The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.
During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.
The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.
That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.
EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
‘America First’ in Africa
The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.
In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.
An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.
Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.
For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.
Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.
Germany in Africa for the energy transition
Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”
The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”
Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.
The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.
Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.
In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.
German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.
Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.
In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.
Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.
Diplomacy
EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts
The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.
German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”
Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.
As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.
The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.
Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.
Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.
Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.
In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.
Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.
As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.
Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.
“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.
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