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General winter, West-Russian war and nuclear risk

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NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said a war between Russia and the Alliance is “a real possibility.” In an interview with the Norwegian journalist Anne Lindmo, Stoltenberg told, “I fear that the war in Ukraine will get out of control, and spread into a major war between NATO and Russia,” adding that “such a scenario could be avoided but that the threat was there”. Russia apparently wants to take advantage of imminent winter conditions. At the same time, it becomes clear that on the eve of marking its first year, the war will go on ‘as long as the West endure.’

“We will see whether spring arrives after the end of winter,” a Presidential Security and Foreign Policy Board Member, Prof. Nurşin Güney told Harici, adding that ‘promises not to enlarge NATO were broken. Following the colorful revolutions and similar processes, we see this messy war. The West made mistakes at the start of the Ukraine War. Russia made mistakes in breaching its commitment to protecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity under the Budapest Memorandum.’

So, do these mistakes evolve into a conflict that could lead to nuclear war? How will Europe’s long winter pass? How should the NATO chief’s “concerns” be interpreted?

“Too early to end the war”

To summarize the front-line situation, the Russian army withdrew from certain parts of Donetsk and Kherson. Kerch Bridge was targeted. Russia moved up a gear after the sinking of Moscow, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, and the battleships in Sevastopol were attacked.

Moreover, with the help of its ever-increasing Western-origin weaponry, Ukraine started to attack the inner regions of Russia. In the first week of December, three Russian military air bases hundreds of kilometers away from the Russian-Ukrainian border were hit by Ukraine. Relatedly, US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price was forced to say, “We have not provided Ukraine with weapons to use inside of Russia. We’ve been very clear that these are defensive supplies. The President has made it clear before. We are not enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders; we are not encouraging Ukraine to strike beyond its borders.” Since October, Russia, on the other hand, has started particularly targeting Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure.

With the coming of the dead of winter, attacks targeting civilian infrastructure may have new consequences on the front. “Russia is trying to subvert Ukraine’s determination and capacity to fight by targeting its vital infrastructures,” Prof. Dr. Nurşin Güney commented on the Russian tactical shift.

The West’s limit to fulfilling Ukraine’s winter demands

Viewing the West in two separate clusters, Europe and the USA, Prof. Dr. Nurşin Güney made the following observation based on a recent visit to the USA:

“There is no major disturbance in the USA, and the system works out. The US doesn’t feel like there is a war in Ukraine. Russia is not dependent on the Western market. It can make up for its losses here and has the financial and natural resources necessary to be self-sufficient. More harm will befall the European Union (EU). The general population will be affected. In Europe, there are protests occasionally. There is no indication that the US will change its anti-Russian policy. The United States aims to limit Russia economically and militarily.”

Highlighting how the shale gas revolution helped the USA attain energy self-sufficiency, Güney emphasizes that the exact opposite scenario is seen for the EU. According to Güney, claiming that this war has been going on thanks to the support of the West, “the resilience of Europe and Ukraine” will be crucial to the war’s outcome. Güney stressed that Moscow has not yet utilized its total capacity in this war while stating that he disagrees with the remarks that depict Russia as a “total loser.”

Speaking at the humanitarian aid conference in Paris, Ukrainian Prime Minister Denis Shmihal requested the Patriot and other modern air defense systems be provided to his country to increase their capacity to resist and to protect their energy infrastructure. The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, has asked Europe for six things to help the country get through the winter. On the list are requests to fix energy infrastructure, gas turbines, pistons, and help pay for 2 billion cubic meters of gas. The 6th item is coordinating the “Paris mechanism” in response to what Zelensky called “Russian energy terrorism.” Prime Minister Shmihal requested an urgent budget of $1 billion for infrastructure repairs.

How far can Russia withdraw?

The dialogue mechanisms between Brussels and Moscow became wholly broken as a result of the Ukraine War. The sabotage of the Northern Current hit a fatal blow to the economic relations that developed on the foundation of energy. The main concern now is whether this tension will expand into a Russia-West War or whether Russia will resort to tactical nuclear weapons as part of its defense doctrine.

In fact, within a “special military operation,” Russia had not attacked the civilian infrastructure until recently. However, since the four regions were formally recognized as Russian territory, tensions started to escalate in a different way. According to the Kremlin’s most recent statement, “The Ukrainian side needs to take into account these realities that have developed over all this time. And these realities say that new subjects (the Donetsk and Lugansk republics, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia) have appeared in Russia, and they appeared as a result of the referendum that took place there. Without taking into account these new realities, any kind of progress is impossible” In response to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s withdrawal proposal of the Russian troops from Ukraine, Kremlin spokesman Peskov said, “This is out of the question.”

Since Moscow now regards the four Ukrainian regions as Russian territory, its counteroffensive responses to attacks targeting these regions are changing. Given the crossing of these new red lines by the Ukrainian forces, the strikes reaching into Russia, and “no way of being defeated for Russia as a great power” coalesced, the question of whether tactical nuclear weapons will be used began to be asked more frequently.

Regarding Russia’s limits of “withdrawal” as a significant nuclear power, Prof. Güney commented, “Should loses one party at one point, it can use tactical nuclear weapons. It is not ‘not likely’ to use them. In an effort to avoid losing, these tactical nuclear powers are very possibly to resort. Ultimately realizing that everything was lost, Russia will likely turn to tactical nuclear power”.

Pointing out Russia’s “ability to challenge the status quo,” Güney added that the war has not yet ended, and NATO and Russia do not currently have any intentions to start a new war at this stage. However, as of early December, Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s warnings of a growing risk of a nuclear war threat have sparked discussions over this subject. At the Russian Human Rights Council meeting, Putin said, “If it does not use them first, then it will not be the second to use them either, because in the case of a nuclear strike on our territory, our capabilities will be significantly limited.” Following these words, an interesting analysis came from Israel.

Jerusalem Post analysis: Ukraine should not be given nuclear weapons

The article by national security analyst Ehud Eilam also served in the Israeli army for a while, is entitled “Countries shouldn’t give Ukraine any nuclear weapons.” Having published six books in security studies, Ehud Eliam explains why Ukraine should not be given tactical nuclear weapons by the US, the UK, or another NATO member. According to the Israeli security analyst, it might deter Russia from becoming more aggressive in Ukraine, let alone using nuclear weapons there, but this is extremely dangerous.

In the analysis examining extreme scenarios, it is stated that “Ukraine is quite a new state with a fragile democracy, NATO might not fully understand the Ukrainian decision-making process, and it is not clear how much Zelensky can control the military in regard to nuclear weapons.” Additionally, it is mentioned that the “frustration” in Ukraine might coerce NATO to join the fight by using nuclear weapons against Russia. According to military analyst Ehud Eilam, “The odds of a Russian attack on a NATO member would increase if NATO gives Ukraine nuclear weapons.”

In conclusion, the author warns that giving Ukraine tactical nuclear weapons without endangering NATO will foster a situation where these weapons can spread quickly. If such a step is taken, he writes, many NATO members like Poland might demand to have their own nuclear weapons due to “fear of Russia,” as well as the Arab Gulf States against Iran.

Turkey’s apparent balance policy

Turkey is trying to weather the storm at the helm of a “balance” ship. In a letter, EU High Representative Josep Borrell said, “Turkey’s policy of not joining the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia is a cause for great concern,” adding, “We expect all candidate countries, including Turkey, to comply with the agreed measures against Russia.”

Güney responds to the query of what Turkey’s limit of balance or there is really a limit is as follows:

“Turkey does not believe in sanctions, and so far, no results have been achieved with sanctions. How long have sanctions been imposed on Iran? They are now getting close to producing their own nuclear weapons. In addition, we face sanctions from our ally. Moreover, Israel and the EU also have very close ties. Israel also does not impose sanctions on Russia. Why does Israel not receive inquiries aimed at Turkey? Also, we are not an EU member. We are a candidate member. Such legal liability does not apply to us.”

Provided a step on “written security guarantees” that Russia initially raised, it is likely to sit at a negotiation table. However, it is next to impossible that Russia will send its troops on a Christmas leave, as Kyiv demands, given that Russia is at its strongest in the months of the “general winter,” its steadfast elder commander.

RUSSIA

Russia introduces new gas payment rules amid U.S. sanctions

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In response to U.S. sanctions on Gazprombank, Russia has implemented new regulations for gas payments from foreign buyers, mandating transactions in rubles. These changes were outlined in a presidential decree published yesterday.

Gas payments through special accounts established by Gazprombank in March 2022 will be suspended until the sanctions are lifted.

Foreign buyers can now transfer funds to their ruble accounts in authorized banks for payment or debt settlement. Payments may be conducted in rubles or the currencies specified in contracts.

Gas suppliers can terminate payment obligations by offsetting mutual claims, as per the amendments.

To purchase Russian gas, foreign buyers must transfer the required amount in rubles to the supplier’s account in an authorized bank. Alternatively, buyers may secure a ruble loan from a third party for this purpose.

The addition of Gazprombank to the U.S. sanctions list in November has disrupted the existing payment framework for foreign buyers. The decree, however, does not specify which banks besides Gazprombank are authorized to handle payments for natural gas.

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INTERVIEW

Russian expert: “Kremlin looks forward to Trump’s return to the White House”

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We asked 6 questions to Eduard Galimullin, an expert at the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS) at the HSE (Higher School of Economics) University, one of Russia’s most prestigious educational institutions. In our interview on the impact of the Trump administration on the war in Ukraine, Galimullin drew attention to ‘Trump’s unpredictability’. Galimullin believes that the Kremlin is cautiously optimistic and emphasised that the Kremlin has not yet given a definitive response to actions that violate Russia’s red lines.

The US and the UK have authorised Ukraine to use weapons capable of delivering deep strikes against Russia. This step came on the eve of the change of power in the United States. How do you think this step will affect the course of the war?

I think the temptation to wait for the switch of the U.S. leadership is quite strong. Although the Kremlin says that the U.S. course of containing Russia will remain unchanged no matter who is occupying the White House, I think there is still some hope for Trump’s return. Especially given the intentions to end the conflict that he has publicly voiced.

Therefore, I expect that the Western countries’ authorization for Kyiv to use missiles to strike Russian territory will not fundamentally affect the course of the war. As we can see, Moscow still has various options for a non-nuclear response. The situation on the battlefield will also not change significantly for such a short time.

However, a dramatic escalation is possible if, for example, the use of Western long-range missiles leads to mass civilian casualties. But I don’t think Kiev will be keen to do as much damage to Russia as possible in the shortest possible time. Yes, so far it seems that Trump is rather unlucky for Ukraine. But the paradox is that both Moscow and Kyiv have certain hopes for him. This is because he is unpredictable.

The US and NATO in general are constantly eroding Russia’s ‘red lines’ in Ukraine. How far do you think Russia will show ‘strategic patience’?

Russia has so far taken a rather responsible approach to the issue of using nuclear weapons, unwilling to allow the escalation of the crisis into a conflict between Russia and NATO. However, the U.S. and many European countries interpret this as a weakness, continuing to push the Kremlin to escalate. Yet it should be obvious to an outside observer that military provocations against a nuclear power are extremely dangerous. Diplomatic measures to resolve the conflict are necessary. One can jest at Russia’s “red lines,” but the fact is that when a decisive response is forthcoming, there will be no reason for joking.

We can say that the Ukrainian army is a continuation of the Soviet military tradition. Do you think the process of adapting this army to NATO systems is complete? Or are these modern Western systems being used directly by Western military experts and personnel. Does the Russian side have any precise information or intelligence on this? What is your opinion?

Unfortunately, since I am not a military expert, I cannot provide precise information on this matter. However, the media have already repeatedly leaked information that the Ukrainian army is once again returning to the Soviet military tradition in terms of battlefield planning. I think that this is true. As for Western weapons, it is at least known that Ukrainian soldiers are trained to operate them in Western countries. However, practice has shown that these weapons so far have not had any significant effect on the course of the conflict.

Do you see a risk of the conflict in Ukraine turning into an inter-state war in Europe? ‘We believe that we have the right to use our weapons against the military targets of countries that allow their weapons to be used against our facilities,’ Putin said. Can this be directly interpreted as meaning that Western states could also be targets of Russia?

I think that’s the way it is. The question of to what extent are Western countries involved in the conflict has been raised almost from the very beginning of the conflict. Starting at what point is it possible to claim that the U.S. and Europe are directly involved in the war with Russia? Of course, the most obvious answer is to send ground troops to Ukraine. But so far that has not happened.

North Korean troops are alleged to have participated in the war in favour of Russia. Is it too early to say that the polarisation created by the Ukraine war has triggered a global military bloc? Or is such a trend gaining strength?

I do not think that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, even if its hot stage lasts for a few more years, will divide the world into opposing blocs. We see that even within European countries there is no unity on the issue of confrontation with Russia. On the other hand, it is unlikely that India or Latin American countries will take sides.  In my opinion, the technological rivalry between Washington and Beijing will probably polarize the world into two opposing blocs.

Are there any expectations in Russia from the next Trump administration? Have the conditions put forward by Russia for the start of the dialogue and peace process been met?

I think that definitely, the Kremlin looks forward to Trump’s return to the White House, although it has little hope for a shift in U.S. policy. Trump’s figure is extremely contradictory. On the one hand, he intends to end the conflict as soon as possible. On the other hand, he is unpredictable, and facing the first difficulties in organizing the negotiation process, he may take tough measures to accelerate escalation.

Regarding the conditions for dialogue, Russia’s demands, such as recognition of annexed territories and lifting sanctions, have not been met. These remain major sticking points that complicate any prospect of meaningful negotiations under the current geopolitical climate.

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RUSSIA

What does Russia’s update of its nuclear doctrine mean?

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Russia has updated its nuclear deterrence policy, defining threats to the security of Belarus as a potential justification for the use of nuclear weapons. While experts argue that these changes are largely declaratory, they also suggest that the timing of this update may be linked to U.S. missile support for Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the amendments to the doctrinal document entitled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. The announcement was made during a meeting on 25 September 2024, where Putin revealed the changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine.

In June 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov hinted at the need for an update, citing lessons learned from military operations. The new text, in line with Putin’s directives, introduces significant changes to the conditions under which nuclear weapons can be used:

Nuclear retaliation is now justified in cases where critical threats arise to the security of not only Russia but also Belarus.

The updated doctrine expands the scope of threats to include cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), hypersonic weapons, and other aerospace attack systems. Previously, the scope was limited to ballistic missile attacks.

The doctrine highlights the importance of continuous updates to adapt to evolving security conditions.

When asked whether the publication of this doctrine was connected to the U.S. decision to send ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the idea of coincidence, stating that the document was published “on time.”

Peskov emphasized a critical new provision: If a non-nuclear state attacks Russia with the backing of a nuclear-armed state, it will be treated as a joint nuclear attack. This underscores Russia’s heightened sensitivity to Western support for Ukraine, especially in light of escalating tensions with NATO.

Several experts have weighed in on the implications of the updated nuclear doctrine:

Alexander Yermakov, a specialist at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), noted that the changes largely clarify existing provisions. For instance, the scope of retaliation has expanded to include drones and cruise missiles, whereas previous documents only referred to ballistic missile attacks.

According to Yermakov, the timing of the doctrine could be a strategic response to recent U.S. military aid to Ukraine: “These changes were announced earlier. However, in light of recent developments, they were published to remind of the risks of possible escalation.”

Dmitry Stefanovic, an expert from the Centre for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, highlighted that the new doctrine reflects global nuclear trends.

Stefanovic noted that some countries have increased their arsenals, new nuclear-weapon states have emerged, and the importance of the nuclear factor has increased in recent years.

The expert added that the doctrine contains elements that strengthen nuclear cooperation with Belarus.

“The updated document further clarifies the issue of the ‘nuclear threshold’ – the necessary conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. This is no cause for relief, either for Russia or its rivals. If the risk of direct confrontation with the US and NATO remains, a scenario of rapid nuclear escalation is always possible,” Stefanovic said.

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