Connect with us

Middle East

Syria after Assad; A look at the future and possible scenarios

Published

on

The rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government by the rebels and its opponents in less than two weeks surprised the region and all Middle East experts. Before the fall of Aleppo, few people imagined that Bashar Assad’s government would fall apart so soon and his opposition forces would take power. Despite the large presence of Iran and Russia, Assad felt minimal security and did not imagine that the foundations of his power would collapse so soon.

But if we look at his rule after 2011 and put the pieces of the puzzle together, the signs of the fall of his rule are evident since the beginning of the civil war.

During the 14 years of civil war and the conflict with ISIS, the Syrian army and the economy of this country were very worn out and they did not have the spirit to continue the war. On the other hand, there were numerous reports that the salaries of the Syrian forces were severely inadequate and sometimes their salaries were not paid on time.

The Syrian economy was torn apart due to the war and double international sanctions, and the living conditions of its citizens were not suitable either. One of the reasons why the people did not show resistance against the successive victories of the rebel forces and sometimes welcomed it was the way of Assad’s governance and the widespread corruption in his government.

On the other hand, the domino fall of the Syrian provinces, the loss of the narrative of the war, widespread corruption, the lack of spirit to continue the war and finally the escape of the president, have many similarities with the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.

But what can be imagined about the upcoming scenarios?

Regarding the scenarios facing Syria, three futures or scenarios can be imagined. Since the fall of Syria is very similar to the fall of Afghanistan in 2021, and on the other hand, insurgent forces have been able to take over the government twice in Afghanistan, the example of Afghanistan can be used to better outline the future scenarios of Syria.

A.—Afghanistan after 2021

One of the scenarios is that the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with a history of being close to al-Qaeda and a limited period of contact with ISIS, will seize all power in Syria and establish a highly repressive and religious government, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

This scenario seems probable due to the intellectual similarities between the writing staff of HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was also initially part of the al-Qaeda network in Syria, which at that time was known as the Nusrat Front. The group was even considered part of ISIS at one point, until it publicly announced that it had severed ties with al-Qaeda and no longer wanted to pursue the cause of global jihad.

In fact, the reconstruction of the identity and brand of this group started from that point. They changed their name from Jabhat Nusrat to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and tried to present a more moderate image. Their goal was to show the international community, especially Western countries, that they face no threat from this group.

This approach may help HTS to play a central role in the Syrian power structure in the near future, similar to the role the Taliban assumed in Afghanistan after 2021.

The possible scenarios

What makes this scenario possible and drives it forward is the history and ideology of the HTS. Ideologically, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is not much different from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As mentioned earlier, this group is a joint product of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The experience of governing this group in Idlib in recent years also strengthens this assumption. Numerous reports have been published about human rights violations under the rule of this group, which have raised serious concerns of many international observers.

These factors, along with the history of the close association of the HTS with extremist jihadi groups and their repressive behavior, increase the possibility that if this group comes to power, it will create a repressive and extremist government structure in Syria.

Blockers

Several factors can block the realization of this scenario or reduce its probability:

1- The presence of nationalist forces

The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces that played a role in overthrowing the Assad regime, can be a serious obstacle against the complete domination of the HTS. These forces have nationalist tendencies.

2- International supervision

Although international supervision has had limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Interference and diplomatic and economic pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the process of gaining power of an extremist government.

3- Resistance of Syrian citizens

A large part of Syrian citizens does not have a good middle ground with absolute theocracy. This issue became evident during the presence of ISIS in the region, when many people directly or indirectly resisted the presence and ideology of this group. This public attitude can make the writing staff of Sham face a challenge in creating a government similar to the Taliban or ISIS.

These factors can change the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and prevent the formation of an extremist government in Syria.

– Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil war between the victorious forces

The presence of several forces that contributed to the fall of the Assad regime strengthens the hypothesis that the Syrian civil war is not over yet and may enter a new phase. It is likely that the battle for control of power will take place between the conquering forces this time.

This scenario has already been observed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Jihadi forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah, after the victory, engaged in internal disputes and started a new war to seize power. These conflicts entered Afghanistan into a long period of instability and violence.

In Syria as well, the ideological diversity and political differences between the victorious forces could be the basis for a new civil war, this time between different groups to dominate the government and strategic areas.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can enhance this scenario and increase its probability of occurrence:

1- The presence of regional powers and their conflicting interests

– Turkey: Considering Turkey’s military presence and its policies towards the border areas, it seems that its role will be decisive in shaping the future of Syria.

– Iran and Russia: These two countries, which have invested a lot on the Assad regime and the political structure of Syria, are unlikely to give up their interests in this country easily.

– Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will try to play a role in the future of Syria, considering their ideological conflict and political interests.

2- Lack of ideological unity among the conquering groups

The diversity of thinking and deep ideological differences between the victorious forces, including the Syrian Democratic Army, the Syrian Democratic Army, and the Kurdish groups, can be the basis for new internal conflicts. The history of past conflicts between these groups, especially between the Kurds and the Syrian opposition, increases the possibility of a new civil war.

3- History of confrontation between victorious groups

Historical rivalries and current tensions between different forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Army and the Syrian Democratic Army, show that the lack of convergence between the conquering groups can lead to new conflicts. This situation, similar to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, strengthens the possibility of conflict between the victorious forces.

These drivers show that the regional competition and lack of internal cohesion between the conquering groups can bring Syria into a new stage of civil war.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can prevent a new civil war between the conquering forces in Syria:

1- Abu Mohammad Jolani’s actions to create unity

The leader of the HTS, Abu Mohammad Jolani, has recently started efforts to forge an alliance between the conquering forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These measures can be a serious obstacle against the occurrence of internal conflicts between different groups and increase the possibility of cooperation and coordination between these forces.

2- Kurds’ readiness to cooperate

Kurdish forces have also announced that they are ready to cooperate with other groups. This process, if properly managed, can prevent the escalation of disputes and internal conflicts and help create a stable political structure.

3- The potential for a common political process

If these efforts for unity and cooperation between different groups go well, we can hope that instead of entering a new war, Syria will enter a stage of political and social reconstruction.

These deterrent factors indicate that, if managed intelligently, the repetition of the Afghanistan scenario of the 1980s in Syria can be avoided.

The last: General elections

The third scenario, which is known as the ideal scenario, is to move towards holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, and powerful groups, by seizing power, prevented the holding of real elections.

Currently, many Syrian citizens wish for elections to be held so that they can vote for the people of their choice and have a voice in political decisions.

However, implementing this option will not be easy, especially considering the current situation in Syria. Several challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions and lack of cohesion between different groups can prevent this scenario from being realized.

Strong and effective international monitoring can be a driving factor for holding democratic elections. This monitoring can help provide the necessary conditions for holding a transparent and fair election and rebuild the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process.

If this scenario is realized, it can be considered as a turning point in the history of Syria and an opportunity to build a better future for this country. According to the mentioned scenarios, it is possible to form other scenarios and future developments will determine which direction Syria will go.

On the other hand, there are concerns that ISIS will take advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum. ISIS cells are still present in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the re-emergence of this group cannot be ruled out.

Another issue is the possibility of forming a new self-governing region in the Middle East. The existing power vacuum gives the Syrian Kurds the opportunity to form an independent region similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Kurds currently rule the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, and they do not want to lose control of their areas in any way.

Turkey does not seem to support this scenario and has particular security concerns about the PKK’s military wing. For this reason, Turkey will probably be one of the barriers to this scenario because he currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian arena.

Finally, the future of Syria will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and future developments can shape the future of this country.

Middle East

UNDP estimates $1.38 billion in building damage across southern Lebanon

Published

on

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research have released a rapid assessment report on building damage in southern Lebanon.

According to Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper, the study relied on satellite imagery and geospatial artificial intelligence (GeoAI) technologies to assess externally visible damage to buildings along the southern border between October 23, 2025, and April 29, 2026.

The report found that a total of 11,095 buildings had been completely destroyed in the areas surveyed. Based on an assumed average apartment size of 150 square metres, these destroyed structures are estimated to correspond theoretically to 17,891 housing units.

The volume of debris generated in the region is estimated at 3,107,756 cubic metres.

In addition to the buildings that were completely destroyed, the assessment identified partial damage to 2,242 buildings and minor damage to 9,311 others.

At the housing-unit level, the report estimates that alongside the approximately 17,891 units that were completely destroyed, around 5,219 homes sustained partial damage and 18,282 suffered minor damage.

The report stressed that these housing figures are not based on direct field surveys but on mathematical modelling using average floor-space assumptions and therefore constitute theoretical estimates.

Preliminary cost of building damage estimated at $1.38 billion

The report calculated reconstruction costs using a standard benchmark value of $450 per square metre. On that basis, the total preliminary cost of building damage was estimated at $1.384 billion.

Geographically, Nabatieh Governorate accounted for the largest share of the damage, estimated at $1.053 billion, while losses in South Governorate were assessed at $331 million.

At the district level, preliminary costs were estimated at $688 million in Bint Jbeil, $333 million in Marjayoun, $315 million in Tyre, $32 million in Nabatieh district and $16 million in Sidon.

The report emphasised that these figures cover only external physical damage to buildings and do not represent the final cost of reconstruction or the total economic losses caused by the war.

In Bint Jbeil district, the highest levels of destruction were recorded in Aitaroun, where 1,658 buildings were destroyed, followed by Bint Jbeil city with 1,076, Ayta al-Shaab with 539, Beit Lif with 371, Yaroun with 242 and Ainata with 227.

In Marjayoun district, 969 destroyed buildings were recorded in Mais al-Jabal, 824 in Taybeh, 285 in Houla, 199 in Markaba, 184 in Blida and 174 in Deir Siryan.

In Nabatieh district, 71 buildings were destroyed in Yahmar al-Shaqif, 69 in Zoutar al-Sharqiya and 37 in Kfar Sir. In Tyre district, 370 buildings were completely destroyed in Burj al-Shamali, 216 in Naqoura, 162 in Abbassiyeh, 80 in Tyre city and 65 in al-Mansouri. In Sidon district, destruction was concentrated mainly in Zirariyeh, where 65 buildings were destroyed, and Arzi, where 62 buildings were levelled.

The report also outlined significant limitations that prevent the findings from being treated as a definitive final assessment.

The study did not cover entire administrative districts but was limited to areas where clear satellite imagery was available.

As a result, the area south of the Litani River constituted the main focus, while only limited data from areas north of the river were included. Some municipalities were fully surveyed, while only selected sections of others could be examined.

For example, all cadastral zones in Bint Jbeil district were surveyed. In Tyre district, 74 of 75 cadastral areas were fully covered, while one was only partially included.

In Marjayoun, 17 of 33 areas were fully surveyed and 21 partially covered. In Nabatieh, only four of 52 areas were fully analysed, while 15 were partially examined. In Sidon, none of the 77 areas underwent a complete survey, with only five areas partially included in the assessment.

The report listed several additional limitations:

Critical infrastructure damage, including roads, bridges, electricity networks, water systems and telecommunications facilities, was not assessed.

Damage to underground shelters, basements and non-visible interior sections of buildings could not be detected.

No clear distinction could be made between residential, commercial and industrial structures.

Buildings with minor damage were excluded from debris-volume and cost calculations.

Structural density, shadows and narrow streets introduced potential margins of error in satellite analysis.

No field visits or on-site inspections were conducted to verify the findings. The assessment was carried out entirely through desk-based analysis of satellite imagery.

Given the scale of destruction and confidence in the methodology employed, no on-site verification procedures were undertaken in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces or the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).

UNDP said the findings should be regarded as preliminary planning data and that the scope of the assessment would be expanded as additional satellite imagery and field information become available.

Officials noted that once excluded categories and infrastructure losses are taken into account, the true cost of the destruction in southern Lebanon is likely to be significantly higher than the estimates contained in the report.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Iran makes Lebanon ceasefire prerequisite for final agreement with US

Published

on

Assessments that efforts to restrain Israel in Lebanon are being shaped less in Beirut or Tel Aviv than in closed-door talks between Iranian and American negotiators resurfaced ahead of negotiations in the Swiss town of Bürgenstock.

Unlike the current approach adopted by the Lebanese government, Iran continues to pursue a strategy of leveraging its influence on the ground to secure diplomatic gains.

The Lebanese government, meanwhile, remains committed to a separate negotiating track that critics say facilitates concessions to Israel at the negotiating table in Washington that could not be achieved on the battlefield.

US Vice President JD Vance, who arrived in Switzerland to participate in the latest round of talks, confirmed that efforts to make the ceasefire in Lebanon permanent would be among the negotiations’ top priorities.

According to CNN, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the matter, the US and Iranian delegations agreed to convene an emergency session on the situation in Lebanon as the first item of discussion, placing the issue at the top of the agenda.

US says it faces difficulties over Israeli withdrawal

According to diplomatic sources cited by Al-Akhbar newspaper, US officials informed the Iranian side that Washington had made intensive efforts to persuade the Israeli government to complete a full withdrawal from Lebanon but had encountered significant difficulties in the process.

US officials requested Iranian support in facilitating Hezbollah’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon as part of efforts to enable an Israeli pullout.

The Iranian delegation responded that Hezbollah was an internal Lebanese matter. While indicating that Tehran did not oppose an agreement by the Lebanese authorities on a timetable providing for a rapid Israeli withdrawal, the delegation outlined what it viewed as its own area of responsibility.

Iranian representatives said both Tehran and Washington had committed to implementing measures aimed at ending the war across the region, including in Lebanon, and argued that the United States should exert pressure on Israel not only to uphold a ceasefire but also to withdraw quickly.

Iran reiterates Lebanon condition for final agreement

An Iranian official also told CNN that ending the conflict in Lebanon was the most important item on the Iranian delegation’s agenda.

During the talks, Vice President Vance said Washington would continue working toward peace between Lebanon and Israel and expressed hope that the temporary ceasefire could be transformed into a permanent agreement capable of delivering long-term stability.

Speaking before the session, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Tehran would not begin negotiations on a final agreement with Washington unless the war in Lebanon was halted, as stipulated in the US-Iran memorandum of understanding.

In a post on X, Baghaei wrote: “It is not possible to move to the negotiation stage for a final agreement unless these provisions are implemented, foremost among them the first clause, which calls for ending the war on all fronts, including Lebanon.”

Military and diplomatic developments ahead of the Bürgenstock talks threatened to undermine the understanding reached between the parties. Following Israeli attacks in Lebanon and what Iran described as an escalation of military tensions in violation of the US-Iran agreement, Tehran announced that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz to traffic.

In a statement, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters said the closure of the strait was only the first step in a series of measures planned by Tehran. Iran’s Foreign Ministry subsequently announced the suspension of the Geneva negotiations with the United States.

Following those developments, reports indicated that Washington intervened and increased pressure on Israel, leading Israeli military commanders to issue definitive orders for a complete halt to military operations in southern Lebanon for the second time within 24 hours.

Israeli media reports said the decision was not taken solely on Tel Aviv’s own initiative and that military operations were curtailed as a result of intense US pressure following Iran’s move in the Strait of Hormuz.

Continue Reading

Middle East

US lifts naval blockade of Iran after ceasefire memorandum signed

Published

on

The United States has lifted its naval blockade of Iran on the orders of President Donald Trump, ending restrictions on vessels entering and leaving Iranian ports.

Announcing the development, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the US military was no longer blocking maritime traffic to Iranian ports and had halted all operations related to enforcing the naval blockade.

The statement added that US warships would remain in the region to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement.

The decision to lift the blockade follows the memorandum of understanding signed by the United States and Iran on June 18, aimed at ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic.

After signing the document in France, where he was attending the G7 summit, Trump sent the agreement to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for approval.

In a statement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said a formal signing ceremony between the two delegations, previously scheduled to take place in Geneva on June 19, would no longer be held.

Negotiations to continue in Switzerland

According to Axios, citing sources familiar with the matter, the signing process for the memorandum of understanding was accelerated in order to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping as quickly as possible.

A planned meeting between US and Iranian representatives in Switzerland has not been cancelled. The talks are expected to focus on launching negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, with US Vice President James David Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf set to take part.

According to CNN, the 14-point memorandum calls for an immediate ceasefire on all fronts, the lifting of the naval blockade, the resumption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of oil sanctions on Iran and the withdrawal of US troops from areas surrounding Iran.

The agreement also includes the allocation of $300 billion for Iran’s economic reconstruction, the release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets and a 60-day negotiation process aimed at reaching a final agreement on the nuclear programme.

In return, the authorities in Tehran pledged not to develop nuclear weapons.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey