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Syria after Assad; A look at the future and possible scenarios

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The rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government by the rebels and its opponents in less than two weeks surprised the region and all Middle East experts. Before the fall of Aleppo, few people imagined that Bashar Assad’s government would fall apart so soon and his opposition forces would take power. Despite the large presence of Iran and Russia, Assad felt minimal security and did not imagine that the foundations of his power would collapse so soon.

But if we look at his rule after 2011 and put the pieces of the puzzle together, the signs of the fall of his rule are evident since the beginning of the civil war.

During the 14 years of civil war and the conflict with ISIS, the Syrian army and the economy of this country were very worn out and they did not have the spirit to continue the war. On the other hand, there were numerous reports that the salaries of the Syrian forces were severely inadequate and sometimes their salaries were not paid on time.

The Syrian economy was torn apart due to the war and double international sanctions, and the living conditions of its citizens were not suitable either. One of the reasons why the people did not show resistance against the successive victories of the rebel forces and sometimes welcomed it was the way of Assad’s governance and the widespread corruption in his government.

On the other hand, the domino fall of the Syrian provinces, the loss of the narrative of the war, widespread corruption, the lack of spirit to continue the war and finally the escape of the president, have many similarities with the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.

But what can be imagined about the upcoming scenarios?

Regarding the scenarios facing Syria, three futures or scenarios can be imagined. Since the fall of Syria is very similar to the fall of Afghanistan in 2021, and on the other hand, insurgent forces have been able to take over the government twice in Afghanistan, the example of Afghanistan can be used to better outline the future scenarios of Syria.

A.—Afghanistan after 2021

One of the scenarios is that the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with a history of being close to al-Qaeda and a limited period of contact with ISIS, will seize all power in Syria and establish a highly repressive and religious government, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

This scenario seems probable due to the intellectual similarities between the writing staff of HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was also initially part of the al-Qaeda network in Syria, which at that time was known as the Nusrat Front. The group was even considered part of ISIS at one point, until it publicly announced that it had severed ties with al-Qaeda and no longer wanted to pursue the cause of global jihad.

In fact, the reconstruction of the identity and brand of this group started from that point. They changed their name from Jabhat Nusrat to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and tried to present a more moderate image. Their goal was to show the international community, especially Western countries, that they face no threat from this group.

This approach may help HTS to play a central role in the Syrian power structure in the near future, similar to the role the Taliban assumed in Afghanistan after 2021.

The possible scenarios

What makes this scenario possible and drives it forward is the history and ideology of the HTS. Ideologically, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is not much different from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As mentioned earlier, this group is a joint product of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The experience of governing this group in Idlib in recent years also strengthens this assumption. Numerous reports have been published about human rights violations under the rule of this group, which have raised serious concerns of many international observers.

These factors, along with the history of the close association of the HTS with extremist jihadi groups and their repressive behavior, increase the possibility that if this group comes to power, it will create a repressive and extremist government structure in Syria.

Blockers

Several factors can block the realization of this scenario or reduce its probability:

1- The presence of nationalist forces

The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces that played a role in overthrowing the Assad regime, can be a serious obstacle against the complete domination of the HTS. These forces have nationalist tendencies.

2- International supervision

Although international supervision has had limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Interference and diplomatic and economic pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the process of gaining power of an extremist government.

3- Resistance of Syrian citizens

A large part of Syrian citizens does not have a good middle ground with absolute theocracy. This issue became evident during the presence of ISIS in the region, when many people directly or indirectly resisted the presence and ideology of this group. This public attitude can make the writing staff of Sham face a challenge in creating a government similar to the Taliban or ISIS.

These factors can change the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and prevent the formation of an extremist government in Syria.

– Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil war between the victorious forces

The presence of several forces that contributed to the fall of the Assad regime strengthens the hypothesis that the Syrian civil war is not over yet and may enter a new phase. It is likely that the battle for control of power will take place between the conquering forces this time.

This scenario has already been observed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Jihadi forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah, after the victory, engaged in internal disputes and started a new war to seize power. These conflicts entered Afghanistan into a long period of instability and violence.

In Syria as well, the ideological diversity and political differences between the victorious forces could be the basis for a new civil war, this time between different groups to dominate the government and strategic areas.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can enhance this scenario and increase its probability of occurrence:

1- The presence of regional powers and their conflicting interests

– Turkey: Considering Turkey’s military presence and its policies towards the border areas, it seems that its role will be decisive in shaping the future of Syria.

– Iran and Russia: These two countries, which have invested a lot on the Assad regime and the political structure of Syria, are unlikely to give up their interests in this country easily.

– Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will try to play a role in the future of Syria, considering their ideological conflict and political interests.

2- Lack of ideological unity among the conquering groups

The diversity of thinking and deep ideological differences between the victorious forces, including the Syrian Democratic Army, the Syrian Democratic Army, and the Kurdish groups, can be the basis for new internal conflicts. The history of past conflicts between these groups, especially between the Kurds and the Syrian opposition, increases the possibility of a new civil war.

3- History of confrontation between victorious groups

Historical rivalries and current tensions between different forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Army and the Syrian Democratic Army, show that the lack of convergence between the conquering groups can lead to new conflicts. This situation, similar to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, strengthens the possibility of conflict between the victorious forces.

These drivers show that the regional competition and lack of internal cohesion between the conquering groups can bring Syria into a new stage of civil war.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can prevent a new civil war between the conquering forces in Syria:

1- Abu Mohammad Jolani’s actions to create unity

The leader of the HTS, Abu Mohammad Jolani, has recently started efforts to forge an alliance between the conquering forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These measures can be a serious obstacle against the occurrence of internal conflicts between different groups and increase the possibility of cooperation and coordination between these forces.

2- Kurds’ readiness to cooperate

Kurdish forces have also announced that they are ready to cooperate with other groups. This process, if properly managed, can prevent the escalation of disputes and internal conflicts and help create a stable political structure.

3- The potential for a common political process

If these efforts for unity and cooperation between different groups go well, we can hope that instead of entering a new war, Syria will enter a stage of political and social reconstruction.

These deterrent factors indicate that, if managed intelligently, the repetition of the Afghanistan scenario of the 1980s in Syria can be avoided.

The last: General elections

The third scenario, which is known as the ideal scenario, is to move towards holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, and powerful groups, by seizing power, prevented the holding of real elections.

Currently, many Syrian citizens wish for elections to be held so that they can vote for the people of their choice and have a voice in political decisions.

However, implementing this option will not be easy, especially considering the current situation in Syria. Several challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions and lack of cohesion between different groups can prevent this scenario from being realized.

Strong and effective international monitoring can be a driving factor for holding democratic elections. This monitoring can help provide the necessary conditions for holding a transparent and fair election and rebuild the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process.

If this scenario is realized, it can be considered as a turning point in the history of Syria and an opportunity to build a better future for this country. According to the mentioned scenarios, it is possible to form other scenarios and future developments will determine which direction Syria will go.

On the other hand, there are concerns that ISIS will take advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum. ISIS cells are still present in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the re-emergence of this group cannot be ruled out.

Another issue is the possibility of forming a new self-governing region in the Middle East. The existing power vacuum gives the Syrian Kurds the opportunity to form an independent region similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Kurds currently rule the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, and they do not want to lose control of their areas in any way.

Turkey does not seem to support this scenario and has particular security concerns about the PKK’s military wing. For this reason, Turkey will probably be one of the barriers to this scenario because he currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian arena.

Finally, the future of Syria will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and future developments can shape the future of this country.

Middle East

Israeli envoy warns red line crossed over Turkish moves in Syria

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Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Yechiel Leiter, stated that Tel Aviv received clear intelligence showing Türkiye planned to expand its military presence in Syria significantly, an action Israel deemed the crossing of a “red line.”

Speaking to The Jerusalem Post, Leiter said: “We are not looking for an escalation or a war with either Türkiye or Syria. But a red line was crossed.”

His remarks follow an Israeli air strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Idlib, Syria, which drew swift criticism from both the Syrian and Turkish governments.

Leiter continued:

“This was seen as a blatant Turkish violation of the understandings. Those who needed access to the intelligence received it. Those who needed to know what was going to happen knew. We made it clear that this was contrary to our understandings, and that is why Israel acted as it did.”

According to Leiter, the failure to heed these warnings led Israel on Tuesday to strike the Abu al-Duhur airbase, where Turkish forces were allegedly expected to arrive.

Syrian officials stated that the airbase was targeted by at least eight strikes, whilst subsequently released satellite imagery revealed damage to the runways.

Leiter stated that the Turkish move contradicted understandings reached during the Biden administration between Israel and the administration of Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, which “froze the existing situation” in the country.

According to Leiter, these understandings were reaffirmed during a meeting held in Paris in January 2026, attended by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, Leiter, then-National Security Council head Gil Reich, and Netanyahu’s military secretary Roman Gofman (now director of Mossad).

Leiter continued:

“This freeze means we do not act as long as the Turks do not act, and they do not force us to withdraw. It is also important to understand: whilst we maintain a security zone of only 78 square miles [approximately 202 square kilometres] in Syria, the Turks have, over the past few years, slowly annexed 3,500 square miles in northern Syria—roughly 5% of the country’s territory.”

According to The Jerusalem Post, with the exception of Tom Barrack, the US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Türkiye, senior US officials did not condemn the Israeli strike in Syria.

“The administration’s policy is that the previously agreed freeze should continue; that is why even Trump did not condemn the strike,” Leiter said.

Despite the tensions, Leiter emphasised Israel’s understanding that Syria is not seeking an escalation or war.

“It is clear to us that the Syrians do not want a confrontation with us. That is why we tell the Turks not to create conflict. There are multiple indications that the move planned by Türkiye was imposed on the Syrians,” the ambassador said.

Leiter argued that this apparent discord was also evident in the conflicting statements issued by Türkiye and Syria following the strike:

“Whilst Syrian Foreign Minister Shaibani acknowledged that a Turkish delegation was in Syria a few days before the strike, the Turks denied this. They need to resolve this matter between themselves.”

Leiter did not rule out a return to direct talks with Syria, as conducted in the past, but said conditions must be suitable.

“Negotiations can be resumed. We want to continue the face-to-face dialogue we previously conducted with the Syrians,” Leiter said.

Leiter added that Israel is not seeking a conflict with Türkiye and remains open to dialogue with Ankara.

“We are certainly open to dialogue with them, but judging by statements from senior officials in the country, they would prefer to wipe Israel off the map,” the Israeli diplomat said.

Alleging that Türkiye hosts Hamas leaders and “channels funds” to Hezbollah and Hamas, Leiter argued that it was inappropriate at this juncture for “Türkiye to begin expanding its influence in Lebanon and Syria.”

Leiter continued:

“Under current conditions, Türkiye cannot be a force that helps bring calm to the region. If only we could return to the state of relations between Jerusalem and Ankara from several decades ago. Back then, we would have been open to Türkiye’s influence in the region. But in an environment where Türkiye funds terrorist organisations, an increase in its regional influence makes no sense.”

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UAE halts trade with Iran after reported ballistic missile attack

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The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has suspended commercial and economic relations with Iran after announcing that Tehran launched two ballistic missiles towards the Gulf state on Tuesday.

The UAE Ministry of Defence stated that air defence systems detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards its territory.

The incident is considered Tehran’s first direct attack targeting the Gulf country since May.

The event prompted emergency telephone alerts to be sent to residents across the UAE.

The Ministry of Defence stated that assessments indicated the missiles targeted maritime traffic, adding that one missile fell into the sea outside UAE territorial waters and the other landed within territorial waters.

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs later announced that “in light of regional tensions that undermine regional and international peace and security, all trade, commercial relations, and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.”

Iran denied any involvement in the missile attacks. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness and undermines ongoing efforts to strengthen trust among regional countries.”

The missile strikes occurred after a period in which the UAE and Tehran had sought to reduce tensions between the two countries.

The bulk of Tehran’s military retaliation targeted neighbouring Gulf states, which Iran accused of facilitating US-Israeli attacks.

The UAE bore the heaviest brunt of Iran’s attacks against US allies in the Gulf, sustaining nearly 3,000 missile and drone strikes.

Exhibiting the most hawkish stance against Tehran among its Gulf neighbours, the UAE responded with dozens of strikes against Iran.

However, tensions between the UAE and Iran eased following a memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran in June.

After the agreement began to unravel in early July, Iran largely redirected its attacks towards Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.

In recent months, the UAE reactivated diplomatic and economic channels with Iran while simultaneously strengthening its military ties with Israel and the US.

Tuesday’s missile strikes threaten to disrupt the atmosphere of normalisation that had returned to the UAE.

While Dubai’s financial district was once again filling with bankers, certain commercial activities between the emirate and Iranian ports had resumed.

Furthermore, several Iranian flights to the UAE had quietly resumed.

UAE authorities had also begun permitting the return of approximately 20,000 Iranians holding UAE residency permits who were outside the country when the war began.

UAE officials have repeatedly emphasised that the country seeks to avoid being drawn further into a broader regional war.

Nevertheless, efforts to de-escalate tensions between the UAE and Iran have come under increasing strain in recent weeks.

This month, the UAE accused Iran of attacking vessels belonging to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company in the Strait of Hormuz.

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US considers land blockade on Iran involving Türkiye and neighbours

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To date, the US has imposed sanctions on thousands of Iranian individuals and legal entities; however, the Tehran administration continues to bypass these restrictions by rapidly establishing new structures to replace those that have been blocked.

In an assessment citing expert opinions published by the Reuters news agency, the current situation was likened to a game of whack-a-mole.

Whack-a-mole is known as a game of agility and reflexes based on the concept of hitting plastic figures with a mallet as they pop up unexpectedly from their holes.

Speaking to the agency, experts outlined other options that Washington could deploy to increase pressure on Tehran and raise the efficacy of sanctions.

Potential measures include restrictions targeting independent Chinese refineries, known as “teapots,” which account for a quarter of China’s oil refining capacity.

China purchases more than 80% of the oil exported by Iran, and these refineries process the vast majority of those shipments. Nevertheless, these facilities have limited ties to the US financial system, rendering them partially protected against secondary sanctions.

Another option on the table is increasing pressure on major Chinese banks. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has applied secondary sanctions to small firms based in China and Hong Kong accused of executing billions of dollars in transactions for Iranian oil.

The agency has also warned two large banks, though it has not yet included them on its sanctions list.

While taking steps against major banks could deter other financial institutions, such actions carry the risk of Beijing enacting retaliatory measures. Washington seeks to avoid such tension ahead of a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in September.

Experts are also evaluating the possibility of enforcing a land blockade with the participation of Iran’s neighbours: Iraq, Türkiye, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia.

The Trump administration holds various leverage mechanisms against such nations, including Pakistan, which is requesting a $10 billion swap line, and Türkiye, which seeks to rejoin the F-35 program. Analysts express, however, that implementing such a blockade on the ground and generating the expected pressure inside Iran would be difficult.

Trump has repeatedly voiced threats to impose secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran; however, the US Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for such measures.

On the other hand, a anti-Russia “crushing” sanctions bill passed by the Senate includes new restrictions on Iran and grants Trump tariff authority.

This bill must also pass a vote in the House of Representatives; however, the text faces opposition from both Democrats and certain Republican lawmakers.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in mid-August that Trump would disclose new measures designed to raise Iran’s economic isolation to an unprecedented level.

Stating that the US President had instructed the re-establishment of the maximum economic pressure policy against Tehran, Bessent said, “We have moved from Epic Fury to Economic Fury.”

Following Bessent’s statements, Bloomberg noted that Tehran has learned to manage the consequences of a naval blockade and thousands of restrictions. According to the agency’s analysts, the principal obstacle facing Washington is the close economic relationship between Iran and China; indeed, Beijing secures more than 90% of Iranian oil exports. Sanctioning the entities facilitating these purchases would directly reduce Tehran’s oil revenues, yet the US is avoiding this step for now.

Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains restricted. On August 11, Iran conveyed its conditions for lifting the blockade in the strait to the US through intermediaries.

Tehran’s conditions included an end to threats and military actions, the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, compensation for damages, and the release of frozen assets.

On August 14, Trump claimed that following the end of the war with Iran, he would declare the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory. Responding to these statements, the Iranian Foreign Ministry warned that the Strait of Hormuz could not be seized “by a tweet, an aircraft carrier, an executive order, or a campaign speech.”

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