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Syria after Assad; A look at the future and possible scenarios

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The rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government by the rebels and its opponents in less than two weeks surprised the region and all Middle East experts. Before the fall of Aleppo, few people imagined that Bashar Assad’s government would fall apart so soon and his opposition forces would take power. Despite the large presence of Iran and Russia, Assad felt minimal security and did not imagine that the foundations of his power would collapse so soon.

But if we look at his rule after 2011 and put the pieces of the puzzle together, the signs of the fall of his rule are evident since the beginning of the civil war.

During the 14 years of civil war and the conflict with ISIS, the Syrian army and the economy of this country were very worn out and they did not have the spirit to continue the war. On the other hand, there were numerous reports that the salaries of the Syrian forces were severely inadequate and sometimes their salaries were not paid on time.

The Syrian economy was torn apart due to the war and double international sanctions, and the living conditions of its citizens were not suitable either. One of the reasons why the people did not show resistance against the successive victories of the rebel forces and sometimes welcomed it was the way of Assad’s governance and the widespread corruption in his government.

On the other hand, the domino fall of the Syrian provinces, the loss of the narrative of the war, widespread corruption, the lack of spirit to continue the war and finally the escape of the president, have many similarities with the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.

But what can be imagined about the upcoming scenarios?

Regarding the scenarios facing Syria, three futures or scenarios can be imagined. Since the fall of Syria is very similar to the fall of Afghanistan in 2021, and on the other hand, insurgent forces have been able to take over the government twice in Afghanistan, the example of Afghanistan can be used to better outline the future scenarios of Syria.

A.—Afghanistan after 2021

One of the scenarios is that the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with a history of being close to al-Qaeda and a limited period of contact with ISIS, will seize all power in Syria and establish a highly repressive and religious government, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.

This scenario seems probable due to the intellectual similarities between the writing staff of HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was also initially part of the al-Qaeda network in Syria, which at that time was known as the Nusrat Front. The group was even considered part of ISIS at one point, until it publicly announced that it had severed ties with al-Qaeda and no longer wanted to pursue the cause of global jihad.

In fact, the reconstruction of the identity and brand of this group started from that point. They changed their name from Jabhat Nusrat to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and tried to present a more moderate image. Their goal was to show the international community, especially Western countries, that they face no threat from this group.

This approach may help HTS to play a central role in the Syrian power structure in the near future, similar to the role the Taliban assumed in Afghanistan after 2021.

The possible scenarios

What makes this scenario possible and drives it forward is the history and ideology of the HTS. Ideologically, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is not much different from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As mentioned earlier, this group is a joint product of ISIS and al-Qaeda.

The experience of governing this group in Idlib in recent years also strengthens this assumption. Numerous reports have been published about human rights violations under the rule of this group, which have raised serious concerns of many international observers.

These factors, along with the history of the close association of the HTS with extremist jihadi groups and their repressive behavior, increase the possibility that if this group comes to power, it will create a repressive and extremist government structure in Syria.

Blockers

Several factors can block the realization of this scenario or reduce its probability:

1- The presence of nationalist forces

The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces that played a role in overthrowing the Assad regime, can be a serious obstacle against the complete domination of the HTS. These forces have nationalist tendencies.

2- International supervision

Although international supervision has had limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Interference and diplomatic and economic pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the process of gaining power of an extremist government.

3- Resistance of Syrian citizens

A large part of Syrian citizens does not have a good middle ground with absolute theocracy. This issue became evident during the presence of ISIS in the region, when many people directly or indirectly resisted the presence and ideology of this group. This public attitude can make the writing staff of Sham face a challenge in creating a government similar to the Taliban or ISIS.

These factors can change the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and prevent the formation of an extremist government in Syria.

– Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil war between the victorious forces

The presence of several forces that contributed to the fall of the Assad regime strengthens the hypothesis that the Syrian civil war is not over yet and may enter a new phase. It is likely that the battle for control of power will take place between the conquering forces this time.

This scenario has already been observed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Jihadi forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah, after the victory, engaged in internal disputes and started a new war to seize power. These conflicts entered Afghanistan into a long period of instability and violence.

In Syria as well, the ideological diversity and political differences between the victorious forces could be the basis for a new civil war, this time between different groups to dominate the government and strategic areas.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can enhance this scenario and increase its probability of occurrence:

1- The presence of regional powers and their conflicting interests

– Turkey: Considering Turkey’s military presence and its policies towards the border areas, it seems that its role will be decisive in shaping the future of Syria.

– Iran and Russia: These two countries, which have invested a lot on the Assad regime and the political structure of Syria, are unlikely to give up their interests in this country easily.

– Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will try to play a role in the future of Syria, considering their ideological conflict and political interests.

2- Lack of ideological unity among the conquering groups

The diversity of thinking and deep ideological differences between the victorious forces, including the Syrian Democratic Army, the Syrian Democratic Army, and the Kurdish groups, can be the basis for new internal conflicts. The history of past conflicts between these groups, especially between the Kurds and the Syrian opposition, increases the possibility of a new civil war.

3- History of confrontation between victorious groups

Historical rivalries and current tensions between different forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Army and the Syrian Democratic Army, show that the lack of convergence between the conquering groups can lead to new conflicts. This situation, similar to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, strengthens the possibility of conflict between the victorious forces.

These drivers show that the regional competition and lack of internal cohesion between the conquering groups can bring Syria into a new stage of civil war.

The possible scenarios

Several factors can prevent a new civil war between the conquering forces in Syria:

1- Abu Mohammad Jolani’s actions to create unity

The leader of the HTS, Abu Mohammad Jolani, has recently started efforts to forge an alliance between the conquering forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These measures can be a serious obstacle against the occurrence of internal conflicts between different groups and increase the possibility of cooperation and coordination between these forces.

2- Kurds’ readiness to cooperate

Kurdish forces have also announced that they are ready to cooperate with other groups. This process, if properly managed, can prevent the escalation of disputes and internal conflicts and help create a stable political structure.

3- The potential for a common political process

If these efforts for unity and cooperation between different groups go well, we can hope that instead of entering a new war, Syria will enter a stage of political and social reconstruction.

These deterrent factors indicate that, if managed intelligently, the repetition of the Afghanistan scenario of the 1980s in Syria can be avoided.

The last: General elections

The third scenario, which is known as the ideal scenario, is to move towards holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, and powerful groups, by seizing power, prevented the holding of real elections.

Currently, many Syrian citizens wish for elections to be held so that they can vote for the people of their choice and have a voice in political decisions.

However, implementing this option will not be easy, especially considering the current situation in Syria. Several challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions and lack of cohesion between different groups can prevent this scenario from being realized.

Strong and effective international monitoring can be a driving factor for holding democratic elections. This monitoring can help provide the necessary conditions for holding a transparent and fair election and rebuild the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process.

If this scenario is realized, it can be considered as a turning point in the history of Syria and an opportunity to build a better future for this country. According to the mentioned scenarios, it is possible to form other scenarios and future developments will determine which direction Syria will go.

On the other hand, there are concerns that ISIS will take advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum. ISIS cells are still present in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the re-emergence of this group cannot be ruled out.

Another issue is the possibility of forming a new self-governing region in the Middle East. The existing power vacuum gives the Syrian Kurds the opportunity to form an independent region similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Kurds currently rule the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, and they do not want to lose control of their areas in any way.

Turkey does not seem to support this scenario and has particular security concerns about the PKK’s military wing. For this reason, Turkey will probably be one of the barriers to this scenario because he currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian arena.

Finally, the future of Syria will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and future developments can shape the future of this country.

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US and Israel weigh Iran strikes after midterm vote, reports say

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22/10/2026

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The US and Israeli defence ministries have drawn up plans for a fresh assault on Iran, with the envisioned offensive under consideration to launch after the US Congressional midterm elections on 3 November.

Citing sources, The New York Times reported that the blueprint anticipates a brief but intense campaign.

As military units step up their drills, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth discussed prospective strike options with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The list of targets encompasses Iran’s nuclear sites, its energy infrastructure, and its arsenals of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles.

Several officials who spoke to the newspaper argued that a new wave of attacks could deal a heavy blow to the Iranian economy, forcing the leadership in Tehran into concessions.

Conversely, other sources doubt whether a resumption of fighting would prove any more successful than the earlier campaign conducted between February and April.

That previous offensive drove energy prices higher and drained US stockpiles of interceptor missiles.

It remains unclear whether US President Donald Trump will authorise the operation.

Domestic political calculations in Israel could also influence the trajectory of the plans, given that the country faces general elections on 27 October.

While some experts speaking to the newspaper contended that Netanyahu could leverage the threat of war to form a national unity government, others pointed to the opposition’s distrust of the prime minister.

Washington fears regional spillover

The US administration also harbours concerns that the fighting could engulf the wider region. On Wednesday, the US State Department ordered non-essential government personnel and their family members to leave Saudi Arabia following attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis.

A US military build-up, comprising three aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, and special forces units, is slated to be fully deployed to the region by early November.

The targets under review include the deep underground nuclear facility code-named “Pickaxe”. Trump suggested that the high-yield GBU-43/B bomb, known as the “mother of all bombs”, could be deployed against the site, though experts doubt whether the ordnance can destroy a complex buried so deeply.

For its part, Tehran is preparing for a potential escalation, threatening to broaden its target list. Retaliatory options under consideration by Iran reportedly include data centres and subsea internet cables, in addition to shipping and energy facilities.

Mehdi Mohammadi, an adviser to an Iranian negotiator, dismissed US hopes of wrapping up a new campaign within 72 hours as a “fantasy”. Mohammadi warned that Tehran’s response would be more severe and unpredictable.

The Financial Times previously reported that an Israeli strike on Iran set for 10 October had been called off because the US president was unwilling to risk a broader conflict ahead of the Congressional midterms.

According to that report, the Israeli military had prepared a multi-day assault on nuclear sites, Iranian government targets, power plants, and civilian infrastructure on Netanyahu’s orders. The strikes had been designed to exceed the intensity of the campaign begun in February.

Washington seeks to secure an agreement from Tehran covering both the Strait of Hormuz and its nuclear programme.

“It will either be a deal or a strike,” one source told the Financial Times, adding that an operation could get under way in the coming weeks.

Another official who spoke to the paper suggested that Israeli preparations might serve as leverage to squeeze Iran in negotiations.

Axios also reported that the Pentagon had issued orders to prepare for renewed strikes, though the directive contained no specific date and Trump has yet to take a final decision.

The US and Israel launched their offensive against Iran on 28 February. Iran hit back by targeting US and Israeli assets across the region and curbing vessel transit through the Strait of Hormuz.

Although both sides signed a memorandum of understanding in June that provided for a ceasefire and talks to lift the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, reciprocal attacks between the US and Iran have persisted.

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Netanyahu trails Eisenkot in Israeli polls despite Trump backing

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1 day ago

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21/10/2026

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As general elections scheduled for 27 October approach in Israel, the opposition camp led by former Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot continues to lead Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in public opinion polls.

Survey data published in the Israeli press on 19 and 20 October reveal that the governing coalition has failed to catch the opposition, despite explicit backing from US President Donald Trump.

However, the current distribution of votes documents that neither wing can reach a governing majority on its own.

Neither bloc reaches the 61 seats needed to form a government

According to a survey conducted by Channel 13, if an election were held today, Eisenkot’s bloc would win 51 seats, while the Netanyahu coalition would take 50.

A Channel 12 poll indicates that the gap has widened slightly, projecting 55 seats for Eisenkot’s alliance and 51 for the governing bloc. A minimum of 61 seats is required to form a government in the Knesset, Israel’s 120-seat parliament.

A key factor deadlocking the political arithmetic is the refusal by both sides to form a coalition with parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel. This stance stands as the most tangible obstacle to securing a parliamentary majority after the election.

Channel 12 data shows that overall voter turnout is expected to remain at 72%. The inclination to head to the ballot box climbs to 81% among opposition voters, compared with 74% measured among Netanyahu supporters.

The same poll notes that Eisenkot has widened his lead over Netanyahu by two further points in prime ministerial preferences.

Yashar party climbs after Gantz bows out

A survey published on the Walla news site shows that the balance shifted after Benny Gantz decided to withdraw his Blue and White party from the race. Following that move, Eisenkot’s Yashar party increased its projected tally to 23 seats, while Netanyahu’s Likud dropped by one seat to 19.

Eisenkot’s party and the “Zionist Opposition” bloc it anchors have remained atop the polls for several months.

In an earlier message of support, Trump praised Netanyahu as “a great fighting prime minister and an even greater partner for peace.” Public opinion polls document that this diplomatic and political backing has not proved sufficient to tip the preferences of the Israeli electorate in favour of the incumbent government.

Support for Ben Gvir rises among young voters

Although Netanyahu’s alliance trails in overall strength, far-right figures within the coalition appear to be expanding their grassroots base. Gauged interest in the Jewish Power party of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir is climbing, particularly among younger voters.

Speaking to a study conducted by Agam Labs, affiliated with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, an 18-year-old student described his shifting preference: “I used to think he was a bit crazy, but then I actually looked at what he was saying, and it all made sense.”

Another Israeli citizen stated that Ben Gvir’s push to arm West Bank settlers gave them “room to breathe.”

Ben Gvir is known for leading settler incursions into the Al-Aqsa compound and distributing military-grade rifles to tens of thousands of settlers since 7 October 2023.

Criticized for escalating violence against Palestinians, Ben Gvir has called for starving Gaza, maintaining military operations in Lebanon, and bombing Beirut. The far-right minister’s militaristic stances also find a political constituency across several opposition parties in Israel.

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Netanyahu unveils security doctrine and regional alliance map

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2 days ago

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20/10/2026

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Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shared an updated security doctrine with the public ahead of general elections scheduled for 27 October.

Announced by the Prime Minister’s Office on 18 October and shaped with contributions from the National Security Council, the work includes a detailed map classifying Israel’s regional allies, adversaries, and spheres of influence.

The new doctrine aims to eliminate elements defined as threats directly through pre-emptive military interventions rather than containing them, to expand buffer zones, and to establish new regional partnerships.

Al Jazeera points out that this approach has effectively been put into practice during Israel’s recent military operations and strikes against neighbouring countries.

Regional blocs and allies classified on the map

The map presented by Netanyahu classifies not only sovereign states into blocs, but also armed groups, de facto administrations, and territories controlled by various forces.

The terms “alliance” and “friend” used on the map do not imply that formal and binding partnerships have been established with all these entities.

The “Hexagon Alliance” on the Israel-United Arab Emirates (UAE) axis and parties considered “friends” of this bloc are shown in blue and light blue shades.

This group includes Azerbaijan, Greece, southern Cyprus, the Druze in Syria’s As-Suwayda province, eastern Libya under Khalifa Haftar’s control, Ethiopia, Somaliland, Puntland, areas in Yemen held by the UAE-backed former Southern Transitional Council, and territories controlled by the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan.

The “Sunni Diamond Alliance”, formed by Türkiye, Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, alongside peripheral actors, is distinguished by green and light green shades.

This cluster marks Azerbaijan, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, areas in Yemen controlled by the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council, Eritrea, Sudan, the West Bank, Jordan, the Lebanese government, Northern Cyprus, and Somalia. In Libya, both the Tripoli-based western administration and the Haftar-dominated eastern administration are shown as linked to this bloc.

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are defined in red and pink colours. Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq, eastern and southern parts of Lebanon where Hezbollah is active, Ansar Allah-controlled areas in Yemen, and Hamas-administered Gaza find a place within this axis. Russia is marked on the map in pink under “friend” status to this bloc.

Orange and yellow markings are also used around NATO members, alliance partners, and actors with friendly relations with Washington. The lines also illustrate the permeability between blocs.

For instance, Azerbaijan is presented with two-toned stripes as a friend of both the Israel-UAE axis and the Türkiye-led bloc, while India stands out as the only actor classified as a “friend” to all parties.

The map in question was reportedly prepared in May by Marc Saxer and Marcus Schneider for the Germany-based Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which has engaged with Israeli governments since 1978.

Pre-election rhetoric of the “indispensable leader”

Netanyahu is facing voters in a bid to retain power amid ongoing corruption proceedings and continued criticism over his management of the 7 October 2023 attacks and subsequent conflicts.

According to Al Jazeera’s analysis, releasing the security doctrine and map on the eve of elections rests on Netanyahu’s strategy of establishing himself as the only capable leader who can protect Israel.

Backed by electoral support from US President Donald Trump, Netanyahu pointed during his presentation to a potential change of administration in the White House.

Arguing that an administration distant or hostile to Israel could take office in Washington within two years, Netanyahu said his country must expand its network of alliances and become an attractive regional partner because of that possibility.

Mohanad Hage Ali, deputy director for research at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, noted that this presentation, built on rival blocs and security corridors, deepens existential anxieties within society.

According to Hage Ali, this approach reinforces voters’ perceived need for a tough leader, and Netanyahu is attempting to rally support from populations wary of uncertainty through this reassurance.

Fierce backlash from the Israeli opposition

The publication of the document provoked reactions in Israeli domestic politics.

Gadi Eisenkot, leader of the Yashar Party and former chief of general staff, criticised the work as consisting of “two empty pages filled with slogans that have nothing to do with an actual security doctrine”.

Emphasising that the Netanyahu government was responsible for the “gravest failure and disaster in Israel’s history” on 7 October, Eisenkot said subsequent escalating regional clashes had also left every front engulfed in flames.

Eisenkot argued that the document exposes a lingering strategic vacuum, while the prime minister is reviving fears to divert attention from misleading claims in his election pledges.

Yesh Atid leader and former prime minister Yair Lapid also described the text as superficial.

“Even by Netanyahu’s current standards, which are defined by exhaustion and detachment from reality, this document looks as if it was written using a free version of an AI chatbot,” Lapid said.

Lapid added that a text consisting merely of bulleted headings cannot be deemed a doctrine, and that the effort is nothing more than an attempt to cover up the disasters caused by the prime minister.

The buffer zone model

The buffer zone concept featured in the strategy document is based on Israel establishing direct military control over cross-border territories.

Al Jazeera notes that the current occupation conditions in Gaza and southern Lebanon are practical reflections of this policy.

Mohanad Hage Ali warned that a plan based on making military control permanent could bring fresh conflicts and the risk of ethnic cleansing.

Hage Ali also noted that portraying actors such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and Haftar’s forces within the Israel-UAE axis could damage their legitimacy in the Arab world.

Arguing that this choice reflects Netanyahu’s domestic priorities, Hage Ali observed: “What Israelis think becomes more important than the reputation of your allies and the sustainability of these alliances.”

Netanyahu’s proposal for a “hexagon of alliances”, raised at the beginning of the year and covering India, Greece, southern Cyprus, and unspecified Arab, African, and Asian nations, has yet to be formalised.

While international analyses describe the initiative as a diplomatic branding exercise rather than a binding defence pact, observers recall that actors such as India prioritise commercial interests and non-alignment over rigid blocs.

Finally, Hage Ali stated that the presented map will provide propaganda material for the Tehran government and its allies, reinforcing arguments that Israel harbours regional expansion and domination ambitions.

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