Middle East
Syria after Assad; A look at the future and possible scenarios
The rapid fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government by the rebels and its opponents in less than two weeks surprised the region and all Middle East experts. Before the fall of Aleppo, few people imagined that Bashar Assad’s government would fall apart so soon and his opposition forces would take power. Despite the large presence of Iran and Russia, Assad felt minimal security and did not imagine that the foundations of his power would collapse so soon.
But if we look at his rule after 2011 and put the pieces of the puzzle together, the signs of the fall of his rule are evident since the beginning of the civil war.
During the 14 years of civil war and the conflict with ISIS, the Syrian army and the economy of this country were very worn out and they did not have the spirit to continue the war. On the other hand, there were numerous reports that the salaries of the Syrian forces were severely inadequate and sometimes their salaries were not paid on time.
The Syrian economy was torn apart due to the war and double international sanctions, and the living conditions of its citizens were not suitable either. One of the reasons why the people did not show resistance against the successive victories of the rebel forces and sometimes welcomed it was the way of Assad’s governance and the widespread corruption in his government.
On the other hand, the domino fall of the Syrian provinces, the loss of the narrative of the war, widespread corruption, the lack of spirit to continue the war and finally the escape of the president, have many similarities with the fall of Kabul and the Afghan government.
But what can be imagined about the upcoming scenarios?
Regarding the scenarios facing Syria, three futures or scenarios can be imagined. Since the fall of Syria is very similar to the fall of Afghanistan in 2021, and on the other hand, insurgent forces have been able to take over the government twice in Afghanistan, the example of Afghanistan can be used to better outline the future scenarios of Syria.
A.—Afghanistan after 2021
One of the scenarios is that the Syrian Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), with a history of being close to al-Qaeda and a limited period of contact with ISIS, will seize all power in Syria and establish a highly repressive and religious government, similar to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
This scenario seems probable due to the intellectual similarities between the writing staff of HTS and the Taliban. Just as the Taliban had a close relationship with al-Qaeda, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was also initially part of the al-Qaeda network in Syria, which at that time was known as the Nusrat Front. The group was even considered part of ISIS at one point, until it publicly announced that it had severed ties with al-Qaeda and no longer wanted to pursue the cause of global jihad.
In fact, the reconstruction of the identity and brand of this group started from that point. They changed their name from Jabhat Nusrat to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and tried to present a more moderate image. Their goal was to show the international community, especially Western countries, that they face no threat from this group.
This approach may help HTS to play a central role in the Syrian power structure in the near future, similar to the role the Taliban assumed in Afghanistan after 2021.
The possible scenarios
What makes this scenario possible and drives it forward is the history and ideology of the HTS. Ideologically, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is not much different from al-Qaeda and ISIS. As mentioned earlier, this group is a joint product of ISIS and al-Qaeda.
The experience of governing this group in Idlib in recent years also strengthens this assumption. Numerous reports have been published about human rights violations under the rule of this group, which have raised serious concerns of many international observers.
These factors, along with the history of the close association of the HTS with extremist jihadi groups and their repressive behavior, increase the possibility that if this group comes to power, it will create a repressive and extremist government structure in Syria.
Blockers
Several factors can block the realization of this scenario or reduce its probability:
1- The presence of nationalist forces
The Syrian Liberation Army, as one of the main forces that played a role in overthrowing the Assad regime, can be a serious obstacle against the complete domination of the HTS. These forces have nationalist tendencies.
2- International supervision
Although international supervision has had limited effectiveness in recent years, it can still play a deterrent role. Interference and diplomatic and economic pressures from global and regional powers can challenge the process of gaining power of an extremist government.
3- Resistance of Syrian citizens
A large part of Syrian citizens does not have a good middle ground with absolute theocracy. This issue became evident during the presence of ISIS in the region, when many people directly or indirectly resisted the presence and ideology of this group. This public attitude can make the writing staff of Sham face a challenge in creating a government similar to the Taliban or ISIS.
These factors can change the balance of power in favor of more moderate forces and prevent the formation of an extremist government in Syria.
– Afghanistan in the 1980s: Civil war between the victorious forces
The presence of several forces that contributed to the fall of the Assad regime strengthens the hypothesis that the Syrian civil war is not over yet and may enter a new phase. It is likely that the battle for control of power will take place between the conquering forces this time.
This scenario has already been observed in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Jihadi forces that overthrew the government of Dr. Najibullah, after the victory, engaged in internal disputes and started a new war to seize power. These conflicts entered Afghanistan into a long period of instability and violence.
In Syria as well, the ideological diversity and political differences between the victorious forces could be the basis for a new civil war, this time between different groups to dominate the government and strategic areas.
The possible scenarios
Several factors can enhance this scenario and increase its probability of occurrence:
1- The presence of regional powers and their conflicting interests
– Turkey: Considering Turkey’s military presence and its policies towards the border areas, it seems that its role will be decisive in shaping the future of Syria.
– Iran and Russia: These two countries, which have invested a lot on the Assad regime and the political structure of Syria, are unlikely to give up their interests in this country easily.
– Qatar and Saudi Arabia: Arab countries, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, will try to play a role in the future of Syria, considering their ideological conflict and political interests.
2- Lack of ideological unity among the conquering groups
The diversity of thinking and deep ideological differences between the victorious forces, including the Syrian Democratic Army, the Syrian Democratic Army, and the Kurdish groups, can be the basis for new internal conflicts. The history of past conflicts between these groups, especially between the Kurds and the Syrian opposition, increases the possibility of a new civil war.
3- History of confrontation between victorious groups
Historical rivalries and current tensions between different forces, such as the Syrian Democratic Army and the Syrian Democratic Army, show that the lack of convergence between the conquering groups can lead to new conflicts. This situation, similar to the experience of Afghanistan in the 1980s, strengthens the possibility of conflict between the victorious forces.
These drivers show that the regional competition and lack of internal cohesion between the conquering groups can bring Syria into a new stage of civil war.
The possible scenarios
Several factors can prevent a new civil war between the conquering forces in Syria:
1- Abu Mohammad Jolani’s actions to create unity
The leader of the HTS, Abu Mohammad Jolani, has recently started efforts to forge an alliance between the conquering forces and prevent chaos in Syria. These measures can be a serious obstacle against the occurrence of internal conflicts between different groups and increase the possibility of cooperation and coordination between these forces.
2- Kurds’ readiness to cooperate
Kurdish forces have also announced that they are ready to cooperate with other groups. This process, if properly managed, can prevent the escalation of disputes and internal conflicts and help create a stable political structure.
3- The potential for a common political process
If these efforts for unity and cooperation between different groups go well, we can hope that instead of entering a new war, Syria will enter a stage of political and social reconstruction.
These deterrent factors indicate that, if managed intelligently, the repetition of the Afghanistan scenario of the 1980s in Syria can be avoided.
The last: General elections
The third scenario, which is known as the ideal scenario, is to move towards holding general and democratic elections. In Afghanistan, such a process never took place, and powerful groups, by seizing power, prevented the holding of real elections.
Currently, many Syrian citizens wish for elections to be held so that they can vote for the people of their choice and have a voice in political decisions.
However, implementing this option will not be easy, especially considering the current situation in Syria. Several challenges, including humanitarian crises, internal tensions and lack of cohesion between different groups can prevent this scenario from being realized.
Strong and effective international monitoring can be a driving factor for holding democratic elections. This monitoring can help provide the necessary conditions for holding a transparent and fair election and rebuild the trust of Syrian citizens in the political process.
If this scenario is realized, it can be considered as a turning point in the history of Syria and an opportunity to build a better future for this country. According to the mentioned scenarios, it is possible to form other scenarios and future developments will determine which direction Syria will go.
On the other hand, there are concerns that ISIS will take advantage of the resulting chaos and power vacuum. ISIS cells are still present in some areas of Syria, such as Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal, and the possibility of the re-emergence of this group cannot be ruled out.
Another issue is the possibility of forming a new self-governing region in the Middle East. The existing power vacuum gives the Syrian Kurds the opportunity to form an independent region similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan Region. The Kurds currently rule the northern and northeastern parts of Syria, and they do not want to lose control of their areas in any way.
Turkey does not seem to support this scenario and has particular security concerns about the PKK’s military wing. For this reason, Turkey will probably be one of the barriers to this scenario because he currently considers itself the main winner in the Syrian arena.
Finally, the future of Syria will depend on the complex interactions between these factors and groups, and future developments can shape the future of this country.
Middle East
US waives human rights terms on $320m military aid to Egypt
The US State Department stated that it has waived human rights conditions on more than $300 million in military aid to Egypt.
The statement emphasised that this decision was taken in consideration of Cairo’s “helpful role” since the outbreak of the war against Iran.
Egypt began receiving substantial support from the US after signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.
Since the late 1980s, the country has received approximately $1.3 billion annually in US military assistance.
A portion of this aid is subject to conditions related to human rights and democracy, which can be waived on national security grounds.
Withholding funds, including during the administration of former US President Joe Biden, has caused tension between Cairo and Washington in the past.
A letter dated 21 September and addressed to various congressional committees, obtained by Reuters, stated that Secretary of State Marco Rubio “decided to waive the certification requirement under the fiscal year 2025 Foreign Military Financing programme for Egypt of $320 million.”
This waiver was subsequently confirmed by the State Department.
An accompanying memorandum justifying the decision stated that this portion of military aid was “essential for counterterrorism, border security, or non-proliferation programmes, or otherwise important to the national security interests of the United States.”
The memorandum, dated 4 September and bearing Rubio’s signature, stated: “Exercising this waiver authority is critical to the US-Egypt relationship and to US national security priorities, particularly given the helpful role Egypt has played in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury.”
“Operation Epic Fury” is the designation used by the US military for the campaign launched jointly with Israel against Iran in late February.
The State Department memorandum, whose authenticity was confirmed by two sources in Washington familiar with the letter, did not provide detailed information regarding what was termed Egypt’s “helpful role”.
The State Department’s annual decision on military aid to Egypt typically covers funds allocated for the preceding fiscal year, which ends on 30 September.
A State Department spokesperson stated that Rubio waived the certification in the interest of US national security and that the US continues to cooperate with the Egyptian government across a range of issues.
In an emailed statement, the spokesperson said: “This waiver recognizes the importance of maintaining security cooperation with Egypt at a time of significant security challenges in the region.”
The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not immediately comment on the matter.
The spillover effects of the Iran war have imposed a heavy toll on US security partners, including Egypt.
Owing to rising fuel prices and other disruptions, the Egyptian economy is passing through a difficult period.
Under the Biden administration, the US withheld portions of the annual military allocation on multiple occasions over Egypt’s human rights record.
In 2024, following the Hamas-led 7 October attack on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, the Biden administration set aside human rights conditions, disbursing the entire $1.3 billion allocation to Egypt for the first time in its tenure.
Human rights organisations have long accused Egypt, under the administration of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, of widespread human rights abuses, including torture and enforced disappearances.
This week, Egyptian police detained six journalists from a fact-checking and investigative media outlet, accusing them of spreading false information on behalf of the banned Muslim Brotherhood.
Egyptian authorities state that they have taken steps to address human rights issues. Sisi said stability is paramount and that the government supports human rights by working to provide for basic needs.
Middle East
Britain expands curbs on arms exports to Israel over Gaza risks
Britain has significantly broadened its military export restrictions targeting Israel, suspending or rejecting more than 80 licences for items the IDF could use in Gaza.
This figure is nearly triple the number affected when the policy was first introduced in September 2024.
United Kingdom Minister of State for the Middle East Stephen Doughty said that as part of what he described as a “tighter system” for assessing exports to Israel, more than 50 further export applications have been refused since approximately 30 licences were initially suspended.
Under the initial decision taken in September 2024, 30 of roughly 350 licences were suspended after the British government concluded there was a “clear risk” that certain military exports could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza.
The affected equipment included components for military aircraft, drones, naval systems, and targeting gear.
Doughty said additional measures adopted this month established what he termed a “double safeguard” mechanism within the approvals process.
Export applications must now be assessed both against existing international humanitarian law criteria and in light of Britain’s position on the legality of Israel’s presence in the Palestinian territories.
“We have so far suspended or refused more than 80 licences,” Doughty said, adding that he had personally examined each licence.
Despite the wider restrictions, British-origin parts entering the international F-35 fighter jet supply chain continue to be largely exempt.
The UK government argues that preventing British-made components from entering the global F-35 pool could undermine the programme as a whole and have serious consequences for the security of the UK and its allies.
Direct exports of F-35 parts intended specifically for Israel remain suspended.
Doughty defended maintaining the supply of components via the international programme, arguing that halting it could have severe ramifications for the broader European and allied security architecture.
Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Emily Thornberry challenged this position, arguing that the issue was political rather than purely legal.
Thornberry suggested adopting an approach similar to the Dutch model, under which components entering the international supply chain could be flagged as “not intended for aircraft bound for Israel”.
The initial suspension was implemented in September 2024 by then Foreign Secretary David Lammy.
Lammy stressed at the time that the measure did not constitute an arms embargo and applied solely to items assessed as usable in military operations in Gaza.
Since then, the policy has been tightened further under Prime Minister Andy Burnham.
The expanded export restrictions follow the Burnham government’s adoption of a more confrontational policy toward the Israeli government.
Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband drew sustained applause at the Labour Party’s annual conference in Liverpool after delivering a sharp critique of the Netanyahu government’s policies and defending the decision to ban trade with Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
Accusing Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza, Miliband stated that the British government heard public outrage over the conflict, telling delegates: “We hear you. You were right.”
Middle East
Netanyahu holds secret UAE talks with Saudi Arabia and Arab officials
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with representatives of Gulf and Arab nations that lack diplomatic ties with Israel, including Saudi Arabia, during his weekend visit to the United Arab Emirates.
Sources close to the gathering told the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth on Monday that representatives from Morocco, Libya, Jordan, and Qatar also took part in the meeting.
Netanyahu made a unannounced visit to Abu Dhabi on Sunday, where he met with the country’s leader, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.
According to Israeli media, this marked the first time the United Arab Emirates officially confirmed a visit by Netanyahu.
The meeting was arranged by Mossad Director Roman Goffman “at the request of Saudi Arabia, which asked for Israel’s assistance against Houthi attacks in the Red Sea region,” according to Yedioth Ahronoth.
The discussions addressed Iran and the Houthi militia. The newspaper added that the Arab states heard from Israel that “Israel is prepared to assist countries in the region with air defence systems, just as it aided the UAE during the conflict with Iran.”
Conflict in Yemen intensified in September when Ansarullah militiamen launched a rapid offensive that seized Yemen’s entire Red Sea coastline, including the vital maritime corridor of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The Yemeni resistance also imposed a blockade on Saudi Arabia’s energy exports and staged multiple attacks against the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia reportedly sought military assistance from the US to counter Ansarullah.
Washington declined to attack the Houthis directly, but announced that it would provide intelligence and targeting support.
Reporting on the same visit, The Jerusalem Post said Netanyahu spent six hours in the UAE and that the principal subject of his discussions with MBZ was Iran.
Citing sources familiar with the matter, the newspaper added that the trip came “after Netanyahu exerted heavy pressure on the United Arab Emirates to arrange a meeting ahead of the Israeli elections on 27 October.”
Separately, the Associated Press, citing a person with direct knowledge of the meeting, reported that Netanyahu’s visit to the UAE was arranged in part to ask MBZ to deny reports that he had warned the Israeli prime minister of an impending Hamas threat prior to 7 October 2023.
According to Israeli media, Netanyahu’s office denied the AP report, issuing the following statement:
“Fake news. The visit focused solely on strengthening ties between the two countries and on regional issues.”
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