Erkin Öncan — Journalist
While not currently a major topic in the Turkish press, a debate concerning alleged “Russian agents” has been ongoing in Azerbaijan for some time. Media outlets close to the government, in particular, have been discussing a supposed group of “Russian agents.” It is even claimed that this “agent group” was the primary reason for the closure of the “Russian House,” which was officially shut down due to “lack of legal registration.”
Notably, this group allegedly includes high-ranking figures such as former Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov; Ramiz Makhdiyev, a close associate of Haydar Aliyev known as the “grey cardinal”; former Head of National Security Eldar Makhmudov; former Minister of Culture Abulfas Garayev; and former Minister of Youth and Sports Azad Rahimov. [Note: Grey Cardinal is a term used for people who have great power and influence behind the scenes, but are not very visible in public].
What happened?
Earlier this month, the pro-government Azerbaijani news agency Qafqazinfo reported that “a network serving Moscow’s interests has been identified in the country” and that “the activities of Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian House) in Baku have been suspended.”
Other pro-government media outlets quickly disseminated the news, asserting that the individuals in question received instructions from Russian intelligence and attempted to influence socio-political processes in Azerbaijan through a network of agents.
Although Qafqazinfo presented the news with the caveat, “However, the information reaching Qafqazinfo leaves no doubt that such a structure really exists,” there has been no official statement confirming the launch of any investigation into the matter.
Another press organization, however, reported the veracity of the “spy group” allegations with these statements:
“The fact that these people are no longer on duty does not mean that the relations have disappeared. There are still those who go to the representative of Russian intelligence and receive instructions, send false messages to our society, and try to create division.”
Political scientist Natig Miri, speaking to Crossmedia.az, claimed that Russia’s “spy network” strategy is not unique to Azerbaijan but is employed in “almost all embassies and consulates”:
Natig Miri said, “However, it is not limited to political elites. There are also such people among the leaders of non-governmental organizations, media outlets and political scientists. In a sense, they are trying to ‘wash Russia’s hands’. In Azerbaijan, it is imperative to identify, expose and remove such persons from their positions in the government and society.”
“The man who writes has no mind”
The accused individuals have vehemently denied the allegations. Mammadyarov responded to the claims by stating, “Some people have a stomach ache. The man who writes has no mouth.” Mammadyarov further questioned, “I was educated in Ukraine, Russia and the US. Does this mean that they should call me an agent of these countries?”
The crash of AZAL’s Embraer 190 aircraft on December 25 near Aktau, Kazakhstan, during a Baku-Grozni flight, reignited tensions between the two countries.
Azerbaijani officials had confirmed the claim that the plane was attacked by the Russian “Pantsir-S” air defense system in the incident, which resulted in the deaths of 38 people. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin apologized to Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev for the incident, it highlighted how relations, which have fluctuated in the post-Soviet period, could escalate into open tension.
Due to historical ties and geopolitical dynamics, Azerbaijan’s relationship with Russia is constantly evolving, sometimes strained but difficult to sever completely. Relations between the two countries are founded on pragmatism and a balance of interests.
However, two significant issues distinguish Azerbaijan, a former Soviet country, from its peers: Russia’s position in the Karabakh Crisis and relations with Israel.
In certain respects, the same alignment found in every former Soviet country also applies to Azerbaijan. A significant portion of the nationalist and liberal sectors in Azerbaijan, similar to Georgia and Ukraine, are inclined to shed the Soviet past and establish closer ties with the West. This makes it easier for these forces to align with Western-backed political groups.
On the other hand, the Karabakh crisis, which has persisted since the 1990s and was “recently” resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor, has resulted in a prolonged Russian military presence in the region. Although the Azerbaijani government has not voiced any serious objections to Russia’s political and military presence, this presence has consistently been a source of unease for the government’s electoral base, namely the nationalist/conservative segments of the country.
In other words, regarding Russian relations, the Azerbaijani government has consistently allowed its electorate and affiliated media outlets to express sentiments that it cannot officially voice due to its current balancing strategy. This serves the dual purpose of appeasing domestic politics and sending an unofficial message. This dichotomy is often observable in Turkey’s foreign policy as well.
Relations with Israel
Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel, or rather, Israel’s interest in Azerbaijan, is naturally linked to Azerbaijan’s geographical location in the South Caucasus, its proximity to Russia and Iran, and its oil reserves.
The fact that Azerbaijan represents, to put it mildly, “an alternative” to Russia and Iran in the region is a well-known fact, even if it is not often explicitly stated.
However, this relationship does not entirely sever Baku’s dependence on Russia, even though it irritates Moscow and Tehran. In the first six months of 2024, the volume of trade between the two countries more than doubled, increasing 2.5 times to exceed $8.3 billion.
Azerbaijan’s share in foreign trade volume with Russia in 2024 is 10.1%, its share in exports is 4.4%, its share in exports of non-oil/gas products is 34.6%, and its share in imports is 17.2%.
While the media discussed “Russian agents” in Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev, on February 11, approved an agreement signed in late 2024 to expand the North-South corridor linking Iran and Russia through Azerbaijan. The 2024 bilateral agreement provides for the modernization of road and rail infrastructure to accommodate growing trade volumes.
In another meeting held three days ago in the Iranian capital, Tehran, Azerbaijani, Russian, and Iranian officials reportedly agreed on a plan to construct the Rasht-Astara railway on Iranian territory.
Russian companies remain active in Azerbaijan’s energy and infrastructure projects, while Baku provides Moscow with a transit corridor for the transportation of gas and oil. Simultaneously, however, Azerbaijan aims to reduce its dependence on Russia by developing alternative routes through projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.
From the perspective of both Russia and Azerbaijan, the current relationship is characterized by a partnership of interests. Considering the figures, it can be inferred that the discussions regarding “Russian influence” in Azerbaijan are primarily directed at domestic public opinion rather than Russia for the time being, and that the “Russian agent” accusations against senior officials reflect internal political calculations.