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How will the change of leadership in Vietnam affect foreign policy?

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Observers say that despite the uncertainty in Hanoi following the death of long-serving leader Nguyen Phu Trong, China’s relations with Vietnam will remain largely stable.

Mr Trong, 80, who died last week after a long illness, was a prominent figure in Vietnam’s rapid economic growth and fight against corruption. He also spearheaded Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’, which struck a delicate balance in the US-China rivalry.

In a rare visit to the Vietnamese embassy in Beijing last Saturday, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke of their ‘deep friendship’ and praised Trong’s ‘outstanding contribution’ to relations between the two countries and their ruling parties.

The Chinese Communist Party also issued a condolence message hours after Trong’s death was announced, describing him as ‘a good comrade, a good brother and a good friend’. China’s No 4 official, Wang Huning, is leading a delegation to Vietnam to attend Nguyen’s state funeral on Friday (today).

Hanoi stressed the importance of its relations with Beijing, pledging to Chinese Ambassador Pham Sao Mai to ‘stick to the strategic choice and priority of developing friendly cooperation with China’, according to the official Xinhua news agency.

Zhang Mingliang, an expert on Southeast Asian affairs at Jinan University in Guangzhou, said Xi’s embassy visit showed that Beijing was relatively satisfied with the development of bilateral relations during the Trong era.

“Compared to relations during the oil rig crisis in 2014 and [former US President Donald] Trump’s state visit to Vietnam in 2017, Sino-Vietnamese relations have improved significantly since Hanoi adopted the concept of ‘community of shared destiny’ at Beijing’s request last year,” Zhang told the South China Morning Post.

“Compared to the high tensions with the Philippines in the South China Sea, Vietnam and China have managed to get along well without exaggerating their deep differences on regional issues,” he added.

Relations between the communist neighbours have been turbulent in recent decades, with clashes over the disputed Paracel Islands in the 1970s and a brief but bloody border war in 1979.

Zhang noted that relations also hit a low point during the 2014 diplomatic row over China’s placement of a deepwater oil rig near the Paracels, which was seen as a turning point in Hanoi’s relations with Washington.

“Under Trong’s rule, Vietnam has managed to establish at least a superficially friendly relationship with China. But at the same time, Vietnam’s relations with the US and Russia have reached unprecedented levels,” Zhang said.

“The purpose of all this is to keep China in check and ensure that Vietnam enjoys a favourable international environment and relatively stable relations with China, which are largely under Hanoi’s control. This may seem like an impossible task, but Trong’s Vietnam has managed to hedge its bets with the big powers,” he added.

Relations with China

Vietnam’s most influential leader since founding revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh, Trong became general secretary of the ruling party in 2011 and secured a precedent-setting third five-year term in 2021. Trong also served as Vietnam’s president from 2018 to 2020.

Amid speculation that his health was deteriorating, Trong visited Beijing in October 2022, his first overseas trip since suffering a stroke in 2019, and the first foreign leader to meet Xi after securing a third term.

In the past 10 months, despite his illness, Trong has hosted both Xi and US President Joe Biden in Hanoi, and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in June. Hanoi has also elevated Japan, India, South Korea and Australia to its highest level of comprehensive strategic partners.

Carl Thayer, professor emeritus at the University of New South Wales in Australia, told the South China Morning Post that Trong will be remembered for his 2015 trips to the US and Japan, which laid the groundwork for closer ties with the West.

“Hanoi’s relations with Beijing will remain ‘stable and friendly’ because Vietnam will not abandon its foreign policy of ‘peace, cooperation and development’,” Thayer said.

“China plays a special role in Vietnam’s foreign relations. It is Vietnam’s first comprehensive strategic partner and the only major power to be called a comprehensive strategic cooperation partner,” he said.

Analysts also pointed to Trong’s personal bond with Xi and the ties between the two communist parties, which over the years have acted as a counterweight in the turbulent relationship between Hanoi and Beijing.

As Vietnam has expanded its diplomacy and improved its relations with the United States, I think Trong has been able to convince Beijing that Vietnam is truly neutral and independent and that improving relations with Washington would not be to Beijing’s detriment,” said Southeast Asia expert Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington.

“This was possible because of Trong’s resolute communist ideology. He saw the world the way Xi Jinping does,” he added.

Abuza also noted that China has inter-party channels with Vietnam to ensure a constant flow of communication between senior officials, something the United States does not have.

Nguyen Khac Giang, an analyst at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said Trong and Xi had a close relationship because of their shared commitment to Marxism-Leninism.

“This helped stabilise bilateral relations, especially during periods of tension over maritime disputes in the South China Sea, Trong also had a very positive view of China and admired the Chinese Communist Party, but took a pragmatic approach with them on many sensitive issues,” the analyst told the South China Morning Post.

Although Trong’s potential successors, such as President To Lam, may not have the same bond with Xi, “I don’t think this will greatly affect Hanoi’s ability to maintain good relations with China because the inter-party bond remains strong,” Giang said.

He said the bamboo diplomacy approach ‘is working well’ and Trong’s successor is unlikely to change it or its core policies ‘to prove his legitimacy as the rightful heir’, at least in the medium term.

‘No drastic changes in foreign policy’

A day before his death, Trong’s duties were temporarily transferred to Lam. Lam, 66, who became head of state in May, was previously Vietnam’s minister of public security and oversaw the anti-corruption campaign. The so-called ‘furnace of fire’ campaign has led to the dismissal of 40 members of the party’s central committee and dozens of army and police generals since 2016.

The removal of six of the 18 members of the Politburo since December 2022, including three of Vietnam’s top five leaders since March, has raised concerns about uncertainty.

Despite the political turmoil, Abuza said he expects ‘absolutely no change’ in Vietnam’s foreign policy, saying Hanoi will remain ‘scrupulously neutral’ and has deep economic ties with both China and the US and its allies.

Asia

Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets

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Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.

Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.

The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.

The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.

Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.

The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.

Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.

The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.

Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.

The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.

Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.

Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.

Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.

According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.

This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.

The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:

“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”

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Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions

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Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.

Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.

The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.

China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.

Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.

The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.

It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.

However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.

Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.

Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.

On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.

The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.

Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.

Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.

Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.

Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.

According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.

Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.

The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.

A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.

These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).

Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.

Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.

Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.

Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.

Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”

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China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers

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China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.

China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.

In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.

The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.

Financial sector stability

China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.

China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.

“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.

Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.

Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan

Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.

The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.

Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.

Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.

Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.

Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.

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