A report titled “Foreign Policy Synergy of Russia and the UAE Under Regional Crisis Conditions: Opportunities and Risks”, prepared by the Y. M. Primakov Center for Foreign Policy Cooperation, states that the war in Iran and strikes on Persian Gulf countries have tested the strategic partnership between Russia and the UAE, without shaking its economic foundations.

The author of the report, Andrey Shelkovnikov, an expert at the HSE University Centre for African Studies, assesses that under current conditions, developing alternative logistics routes and jointly participating in the post-war reconstruction of Iran could serve as promising areas of cooperation.

Factors sustaining and straining Moscow-Abu Dhabi ties

According to the author of the report, Russia-UAE relations are experiencing “one of the most dynamic periods in their fifty-year diplomatic history.” UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed visited Moscow in January 2026, marking his second visit in six months and his fifth since the beginning of 2022. Over the past year alone, the two countries signed agreements on trade in services and investment, an economic partnership between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the UAE, and the avoidance of double taxation.

According to data from Economic Development Minister Maksim Reshetnikov, mutual investments exceeded $40 billion in 2024, comprising $17 billion invested by the Emirates in Russia and over $25 billion invested by Russia in the UAE economy. Trade volume in 2025 exceeded $12 billion, reaching roughly four times the pre-pandemic 2019 level ($3.5 billion). The sides aim to double this figure within five years. Non-oil trade grew more than fourfold, supported by exports of Russian agricultural products, technology, and services. The Emirates has also become a major hub for Russian business under sanctions conditions.

The author attributes the political closeness between the two countries to a shared orientation toward a multipolar world order. The UAE joined BRICS in January 2024, obtained dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and is expanding cooperation with the EAEU. The Emirates did not join Western sanctions against Russia and adopted a neutral stance on the Ukraine conflict. Having repeatedly mediated prisoner exchanges in particular, the UAE hosted trilateral security-focused talks between Russia, the US, and Ukraine in Abu Dhabi in early 2026.

However, with the outbreak of hostilities around Iran, a distinct asymmetry emerged in relations between Moscow and Abu Dhabi. The report notes: “While for the UAE, Iran constitutes a fundamental threat to national security, Russia shapes its own position from the perspective of a broader strategic balance that envisages preserving ties both with Tehran and with Arab countries that are Moscow’s strategic partners in the region.”

The US and Israel launched a war against Iran on 28 February 2026. Washington announced the objectives of the war as destroying Iran’s missile capacity and military infrastructure, weakening its naval forces, and preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and numerous senior officials and military personnel were killed in the initial strikes. Tehran responded to these attacks with heavy missile and drone strikes against Israel, American facilities, and the energy infrastructure of Gulf countries, while bringing maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz to an effective standstill. The sides reached a temporary ceasefire in early April through Pakistani mediation and agreed on a 60-day memorandum of understanding in June. Despite this document officially expiring on 18 August, clashes flared up again in early July.

Among the countries in the Gulf region most affected by the strikes, the UAE became the target of more than 2,000 attacks in the very first month of the conflict. Tourist districts, hotels, airports, and oil facilities in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Fujairah were damaged. Amid these developments, the UAE withdrew from OPEC and the OPEC+ group as of 1 May (Abu Dhabi officially justified this decision by its long-term energy strategy). On 18 August, the UAE accused Iran of attempting to launch ballistic missiles at its territory. Following Tehran’s denial of the claims, Abu Dhabi indefinitely suspended all commercial and financial transactions with the Islamic Republic.

Differences of opinion regarding the conflict were also reflected in votes at the United Nations Security Council. While Russia and China abstained on a draft resolution condemning Iran’s attacks on Persian Gulf countries, in April they vetoed a resolution submitted by Bahrain authorising international forces to ensure the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz (the Emirates had participated in drafting both documents). The report states that Arab countries received this stance with mixed feelings: although regional capitals understand Russia’s strategic interests in its relations with Iran, they expect Moscow to exert harsher pressure on Tehran. Shelkovnikov notes that Western claims alleging Russian intelligence support for Iran (which the Russian side denies) further complicate the situation.

An understanding reached between Ukraine and the UAE in the security and defence sphere, including the sharing of counter-drone operational experience, created a new friction point in bilateral ties. The expert assesses: “This rapprochement carries risks for Abu Dhabi’s mediation role between Russia and Ukraine, as it could cast a shadow over the Emirates’ neutrality.” Shelkovnikov also emphasises that Russia could supply air defence systems to Gulf countries to counter ballistic missiles and drones.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy embarked on a tour of Persian Gulf countries in late March 2026, agreeing on long-term defence cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. A memorandum of understanding was signed with Riyadh on 27 March, followed by an intergovernmental agreement with Doha the next day. Announcing on the same day that they had reached an understanding with the Emirates on security matters, Zelenskyy stated that details were being finalised. In late April, the Ukrainian President announced the signing of ten-year agreements dubbed the “Drone Deal” with all three countries. According to Zelenskyy’s statement, these agreements encompass the transfer of experience in defending critical infrastructure against heavy attacks, as well as the joint development and production of unmanned aerial vehicles, air defence systems, and electronic warfare equipment.

What opportunities lie ahead for Russia and the UAE?

The crisis surrounding Iran has made the Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region, which Moscow has advocated since the 1990s, as necessary as it is difficult to implement. The latest version of the periodically updated document was published on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website in July 2026. The draft envisages establishing direct military communication lines, arms control agreements including the creation of demilitarised zones, and commitments by Gulf countries not to open their territory for third parties to attack neighbours.

Heavy Iranian strikes targeting the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states and Iraq exposed the fragility of the security architecture based on bilateral defence agreements with the US. According to the author’s assessment, American bases on the territory of Arab monarchies turned into open targets for Iranian strikes rather than a protective shield. In this picture, although Russia reminds its Middle Eastern partners of its own security initiative, this approach faces various obstacles. Trust in Iran among Arab countries, with the exception of Oman, has been shattered; furthermore, any step by Russia that could be interpreted as support for Tehran is viewed with caution. Nevertheless, despite its harsh rhetoric toward Iran, the UAE does not entirely close the door to dialogue and emphasises that lasting regional security can be achieved not through temporary measures, but through a comprehensive political settlement.

According to Shelkovnikov, Moscow faces several fundamental issues to resolve: convincingly demonstrating to Arab partners that communication channels established with Tehran serve de-escalation rather than supporting military actions, adapting its security concept to changing military realities, and taking into account that the crisis of trust between Iran and Gulf monarchies could endure for decades. The report states: “It would be appropriate for Russia to firmly maintain its non-involvement stance in the conflict and focus on positioning itself as an actor facilitating a political solution.” According to the author, Russia could reinforce this mediation role through concrete steps such as contributing to the opening of humanitarian corridors, taking part in diplomatic efforts to lift the blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, and creating negotiation platforms that take into account the interests of all sides.

The author of the report views the economy as the foremost concrete area where the partnership can demonstrate growth. The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20% of global oil exports passed prior to the war, increased the importance of Russia-UAE coordination in the oil market; indeed, oil prices surged by 50% in March 2026 alone. Although it has not yet reached its full potential, logistics remains a promising domain. Shelkovnikov recalls the memorandum between Rosatom and UAE-based port operator DP World regarding port infrastructure investments, including the development of transit shipping via the Northern Sea Route. Amid the ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz and tensions in the Red Sea, the expert suggests that Russia and the UAE could jointly develop transport corridors in Africa and invest in interconnected port and storage infrastructure. The expert notes: “The potential for cooperation in transport and logistics also exists in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as EAEU transport projects can be integrated with the UAE’s global logistics network.”

Another prominent and vital track is digitalisation. Russian companies, including Yandex, operate in the UAE market; however, Moscow will need to compete here with technological partnerships that the UAE has established with the US and China. Shelkovnikov says: “Expanding technological cooperation could encompass joint projects in big data processing, cybersecurity, financial technologies, and the digital infrastructure of smart cities.”

Over the longer term, following the resolution of the Middle East conflict, the author of the report suggests that Russia and the UAE jointly participate in rebuilding Iranian infrastructure. This step would not only consolidate de-escalation, but also assist in gradually restoring trust between Arab countries and Tehran, which is considered an indispensable condition for a lasting regional security architecture. The report concludes with the observation: “Cooperation in energy, logistics, technology, and humanitarian aid are the core directions capable of sustaining and developing the partnership despite all difficulties created by the current crisis.”