Middle East
Iranian women: This is not just about hijab
“From the beginning of the revolution we were told that those in power shouldn’t be criticized, but if we had been allowed to criticize, we wouldn’t have so much embezzlement, theft and betrayal.”
These were the words of Azam Taleghani, who was among the most prominent individuals of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and being among the four women representatives of the first parliament after the Revolution, in one of her speeches right before her death in 2019. Azam Taleghani, who was imprisoned under the Shah regime and whose father was a quite influential cleric, has been saying about the parliamentary debates regarding the compulsory hijab “If the same obligation was not given on men, then this cannot be obligated on women either”. Quite interestingly, Taleghani never took off her dark veil called “chador” during her entire political career, or even after that. And her countless applications for presidential candidacy with her dark veil, has ended in the same way as it did with all other women: It was rejected by the Constitutional Council.
What do these women want?
43 years after the revolution made by Taleghani and many other women and men, against the imperialism and its inner collaborator the Shah regime, the Iranian women are once again on the streets at the forefront. This wave of pretests that began after Mahsa Amini was arrested in Tehran and died soon after in custody, is the largest wave of protests ever since the 1979 Revolution. Iranian people are taking on the streets in almost all provinces of the country. So, what are the demands from the streets, what do these women want, to what extent does the Iranian society support these protests and where does imperialism stand in the face of these protests? When the provocative reports from the west and the social media misinformation is combined with harsh internet restrictions, it gets very hard to reach any information from the region. Restrictions and misinformation have reduced the demands of the street protesters down to the issue of compulsory hijab practices.

It is seen that some women do not wear hijab on the streets of Tehran after the protests. (December 5, 2022). PHOTO: Fatemeh Bahrami/AA
‘The main problem is The Constitution’
However, the Iranian women tell that the compulsory hijab practices, that were stereotyped with the Iranian women, have already relaxed in most regions before the protests. According to them hijab is not a problem on its own. A small textile business owner Vida S. (39) stated that the restrictions were mostly ignored before the protests, while driving or in public places such as cafes: “Especially after the protests, most women go out in the streets with their hair unveiled.”
A housewife Sara N. (38) also states that the compulsory hijab does not affect the social life deeply, on its own. However, she thinks that women should be free to wear the outfit they desire, just as men do. A schoolteacher from Tabriz Nasrin N. (42) stated the following on the compulsory hijab, which she defined as a formality and as an artificial practice: “The main problem that affects the social life, are the practices that are caused by the Sharia Law. For example, men can “divorce” their wives as they wish, after paying a one-time allowance called mahr. The same does not apply for women. A woman could not “divorce” her husband because she did not love him. She has to prove there is a heavy misconduct of the man, which allows the woman to get a divorce, such as domestic violence or drug abuse. And even if she gets the divorce, she could not get the child’s custody after the age of 7, if the man is still not keeping the same manners mentioned above. A woman cannot get a passport without her husband’s or her father’s permission. She cannot get an equal share of the inheritance as her male siblings. They cannot be judges, or even witnesses at homicide cases. And even at other trials, a female witness is given half credibility of a male witness.”

Sara (left), Seher (upper right) and Nesrin (lower right)
‘The conditions were already there, hijab just ignited the fire’
Vida tells that the main problem that took all these people to the streets, were economic. Nasrin says “Iranian currency is constantly losing value. Our purchasing power has dropped significantly, people are struggling to survive. The hijab just ignited the protests, in such state of turmoil. It is not just the women, but everyone is taking on the streets. This is a revolutionary movement”. And when I asked one of my Iranian friends, who has not taken off her veil even in Turkiye and whom I know very closely, whether these protests were actually because of hijab or not, she responded “Did you join the Gezi Park protests in 2013 because of just trees?”.
Sahar, whose entire youth was spent in Tehran and was spent with “the fear of going to hell because of her hair”, says hijab is also one of the main issues. Sahar speaks of the difficulties she had 30 years ago when she studies arts in university: “A group of theology students would come to us and call us ‘degenerates’. I was subjected to a lot of discrimination as a woman playing a music instrument. I was not allowed to play in front of men, I needed a license for concerts. Or some of our song lyrics were censored because it had sexual meanings, even if these songs belonged to a famous Islamic cleric…”
‘Women are pushed into two different lifestyles’
Sahar says that women are subjected to severe discrimination because they were only perceived sexually and are pushed into having two different lifestyles one out in the streets, and one at home. Sahar says that women are being treated as “second class citizens”: “Laws are heavily on men’s favor in marriages, in business and in inheritance. However in all developed and developing countries, law are supposed to protect women and children. It is exactly the opposite in Iran. We wish for a new constitution in which we are represented as equals with men; we demand freedom of speech, freedom to criticize and to have universal suffrage in elections that are made free and fair.”
Claiming that religion and politics should be separated, Vida describes her demands as follows: “I do not want to be seen or treated as a terrorist. We want better life conditions as we deserve as the Iranian people”. Sara also has no other expectations other than “a normal life which men and women have same rights”. The obstetrician Delara N. (53) also says she wants live a “normal life”. For her, the way to do this is to “give women all the rights they deserve in social, political and private life that which would be all aspects of a human life”.
‘The fear of the imperialists…’
We asked them about the support messages for the protests in Iran, from the USA and EU. All women we have spoken to have a clear stance against the US and EU. Vida says “The intellect and the culture of the Iranian people are the reason for the imperialist powers’ fears. That is why there is no chance that they would support our development as a nation. We would stay restricted until this problem is resolved and that is exactly what the imperialists want, they do not wish an Iran which has gotten over its internal problems. Therefore, the US and Europe also wants the current government to stay in power, for their own benefits. That is because the internal problems will stay as long as the government stays in power”.
Sara highlights that the globalization has severely damaged a country’s will to take its own decisions not only in Iran but in all countries, and that the Western colonialism is no more legitimized through war but through “problems” such as race or sectarianism, while adding that: “The West does not see any benefits from the consequences of these protests. If they ever knew they would benefit from this, they would put out a much more decisive intervention”.
And according to Nasrin, who said the US and Europe is not content with these protests since they do not desire a peaceful Middle East, the messages of support from the West are just a façade and not quite sincere: “They do not want to subject Iranians. We have already seen the examples of their subjugations from Iraq and Afghanistan”.

Vida says “The intellect and the culture of the Iranian people are the reason for the imperialist powers’ fears.”
The power behind these protests
All the demands that rise out of Iran is neither unexpected when we think about the women influence in universities, academia and the social life despite all the obstacles, nor is it unexpected to find the “great powers” looking for an opportunity whenever there is turmoil in our region … Despite all this, the demands of equality from women and economic demands from the public are balancing out with being an instrument to imperialism.
Just like Taleghani was not a “servant to the US” or a “Western lapdog” or a “traitor”, nether are Sahar, Sara or Vida who were forced to take on streets for the sake of having a normal life. The things that happened, show that those who are benefitting from the Sharia Law, need to finally listen to the women that have suffered from it.
The economic crisis that is deepening by each day and enslaving the population to severe poverty under heavy sanctions from the West, stands as one of the bigger factors behind the protests in Iran. The Iranians know very well about the conditions for these bursts, during which great changes took place. The Iranian clergy was not able to stand against the Shah before its own interests were actually threatened with a land reform and before the merchants connected to the clergy were threatened by the global industries. And this was during when the most radical “reforms” were taking place, including the ban on hijab. The clergy only remembered its authority of inspecting the laws according to the Sharia Law in the land reforms of 1963, since when they first got this right in the first constitution of Iran in 1906 constitution.
Nature will take its course
So, it is “in accordance with the usual situation” when a class a group or an individual to raise their voices when their economic assurances are taken away and when they are suffering through hardships and difficulties. Looking for a “foreign intervention” in such situations, is basically as wrong as rowing against the tide. No country, and especially not the United States, would not export any “revolutions” or “reforms” to Iran, as easy as they did to Arab countries. That is because Iran is one of the two regional powers that has strong state traditions and great cultural accumulations, whose society relies on the concept of anti-imperialism. The Iranian government either finds a new course for this river tide, or “drains the entire river” for now, which will flow even stronger in the next couple years. But sooner or later, that river has to flow towards its riverbed.
Middle East
Ben Gvir reveals plan to expel majority of Gaza population
Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has unveiled a plan aimed at removing the vast majority of the population from Gaza through a process he termed “voluntary migration”.
The right-wing minister’s plan also includes the establishment of a dedicated ministry for the matter.
Dubbed “Disengagement 710″—referencing both Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and the 7 October 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood operation, which many on the Israeli right blame partly on that withdrawal—the plan aims to move 250,000 Gaza residents out of the territory within the first year, 1.11 million within three years, and 1.86 million within seven years.
“Instead of dreaming of peace right now, we need actions of migration. Instead of digging tunnels, it is now time to pack suitcases,” Ben Gvir said.
The minister added that the establishment of a “Ministry of Migration” and its leadership would be among the foremost demands Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) would present to join the next government.
Referring to Rehavam Ze’evi, the assassinated far-right minister who supported the ethnic cleansing and population transfer of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, Ben Gvir said: “It is a pity they did not listen to Gandhi. It is now time to admit it: Gandhi was right!”
The party promises emigrants a “resettlement package” including “travel assistance, initial housing, vocational training, employment, and support for up to 24 months”.
It also pledges that host countries will receive payments based on the number of Gaza residents they accept.
According to the party, Türkiye, Ethiopia, the Congo, and certain unnamed Arab countries are being considered as potential destinations.
Otzma Yehudit states that the proposal requires an initial investment from Israel of 10 billion NIS ($3 billion), followed by co-financing of up to 50 billion NIS ($15.2 billion) depending on the level of international participation.
Ben-Gvir continued:
“At first, I was treated like a daydreaming extremist. Then one day everything changed: President Trump announced publicly that encouraging migration was a solution to the Gaza problem. Suddenly, Ben Gvir’s plan became legitimate. Suddenly, everyone became Ben Gvir.”
The proposal comes a day after Defence Minister Israel Katz stated that plans to facilitate mass migration from Gaza were still under discussion and had only been “frozen” by Trump, who first suggested relocating Gaza’s roughly 2.3 million residents elsewhere in February 2025.
That proposal had led to the establishment of a Defence Ministry directorate tasked with facilitating what officials termed “voluntary migration”.
Katz later abandoned that proposal due to international opposition and the lack of countries willing to accept the migration.
Middle East
Israel sees Türkiye as competitor rather than enemy, diplomat says
Israel does not view Türkiye as an “enemy” but increasingly assesses it as a “competitor”.
A senior Israeli diplomat expressed this view to Ynet on Wednesday against the backdrop of mounting tensions over Syria, Turkish naval activities in the Mediterranean, and the economic, legal, and diplomatic measures Ankara has taken against Israel.
The official stated:
“Türkiye is not an enemy state, but it is certainly a competitor. Türkiye has taken steps against us in the economic, legal, and diplomatic spheres.”
The official noted that Azerbaijan, which maintains close relations with both Israel and Türkiye, had previously served at times as a conduit for conveying messages between the two countries, but that such contacts are steadily diminishing.
“I would say that this has been happening less recently,” the Israeli official said.
Responding to questions regarding reports of increased Turkish naval activity near areas where the Israeli navy operates in the Mediterranean and tensions between the two sides, the official downplayed the likelihood of a military confrontation.
“I do not think the Turks want to open fire, nor do we,” the official said.
The senior Israeli official also addressed his country’s increasingly strained relations with Europe. The official maintained that Tel Aviv has spent the past year and a half fighting against attempts to undermine the Association Agreement, which provides a framework for comprehensive economic and trade relations between Israel and the EU.
The official noted that efforts to move against the agreement, including at the recent meeting of EU ministers, failed due to Israel’s intensive diplomatic activity and the support of friendly European governments.
The official said:
“All attempts failed as a result of intensive efforts and a bloc of friendly countries with close personal ties to foreign ministers and heads of state who opposed the measures other countries sought to advance.”
The official pointed to the recent attempt to draft a joint EU statement criticising Israel’s E1 settlement construction plan in the West Bank.
The official stated that two countries blocked the statement, forcing EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas to issue a statement in her own name rather than on behalf of all member states.
According to media reports, these two countries were Czechia and Slovenia.
“There are double-digit numbers of countries in the European Union standing by Israel during a difficult period,” the Israeli said.
The official also rejected criticism that construction in the E1 corridor between Jerusalem and the Maale Adumim settlement in the West Bank is aimed at preventing a future Palestinian state.
The official described this claim as “ridiculous”, even though Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, a leading proponent of the project, has explicitly stated that preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state is one of the project’s goals.
The E1 project has faced international opposition for years on the grounds that construction activities there could disrupt territorial contiguity between Palestinian areas in the north and south of the West Bank and impede the prospect of establishing a viable Palestinian state.
“I say to European foreign ministers that the argument regarding a Palestinian state is ridiculous,” the official said, arguing that the Palestinian state recognised by certain European nations would geographically already be divided between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, adding:
“What is expected? Are we supposed to accept this imposition and say that we no longer have the right to settle the Land of Israel? Since 1967, every government without exception, including left-wing governments, has built settlements in Judea and Samaria.”
Judea and Samaria is the biblical term Israel uses for the West Bank.
The official described linking Jerusalem to Maale Adumim as an “Israeli consensus” and noted that the E1 project dates back to the government of former prime minister Yitzhak Rabin.
However, the proposal was first introduced before Rabin returned to office in 1990. Although the Rabin government initially supported construction work in the area, the plan was subsequently frozen as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process progressed.
Middle East
Iranian NGO report records 50% drop in terrorist attacks for 2025
The Habilian Association (Families of Iranian Victims of Terrorism), an Iran-based non-governmental organization and think tank, has released its 2025 annual terrorism report documenting terrorist acts against the country and its citizens.
The findings of the report were shared during the Day of Commemoration and Respect for Victims of Terrorism ceremony, co-organized by the Habilian Association and hosted by the Institute for Political and International Studies of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The ceremony was attended by Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Saeed Khatibzadeh, Deputy Head of the Judiciary Dr Seraj, and Habilian Secretary-General Seyed Mohammad Javad Hasheminejad, alongside the families of those who lost their lives in terrorist attacks.
First published in 2019 and now in its fifth edition, the report covers the year 2025 according to Iran’s official Solar Hijri calendar (spanning 21 March 2025 to 20 March 2026). Published in Persian and English, the document provides detailed data examining the activities of non-state terrorist organizations and state-sponsored actors.
“Attacks down by half, fatalities drop 43%”
The report highlighted a significant decline in nationwide terrorism indicators compared to the previous year. The number of recorded terrorist incidents fell by 50%, dropping from 52 in 2024 to 26 in 2025, while the death toll decreased by 43%, falling from 100 to 57.
Comparing three-year trends, the report noted that while terrorist incidents rose by 62.5% in 2024 compared to 2023, 2025 saw a decrease of 18.7% compared to 2023 and 50% compared to 2024. A steady decline in fatalities was also identified. Fatalities in 2025 fell by 64.6% compared to 2023, which included the victims of the Kerman Golzar attack. However, the average fatality rate per attack increased from 1.92 in 2024 to 2.20 in 2025.
The report stated that “Iran has been a victim of terrorist violence for nearly half a century, with 23,000 people killed by terrorism, while countries hostile to Tehran apply a clear double standard by providing terrorist organizations with offices, freedom of movement, and high-level contacts.”
“Terrorist threat almost entirely confined to southeast”
One of the most critical findings of the 2025 report was the narrowing geographic distribution of terrorist acts. While incidents in 2024 spanned six provinces and two countries, all 26 attacks in 2025 took place within Iranian borders and were concentrated in just four provinces.
Sistan and Baluchestan province remained the primary centre of terrorist incidents in the country. The report stated that 84.6% of terrorist attacks (22 operations) and 86% of casualties (49 victims) in 2025 were recorded in this province. Nevertheless, the number of attacks in Sistan and Baluchestan fell 39% year-on-year from 36 to 22, representing a 17% improvement in its share of total nationwide victims. Within the province, the highest number of attacks occurred in Iranshahr, followed by Zahedan.
Elsewhere in the country, three people were killed in two attacks in Kurdistan province, one person was killed in one attack in West Azerbaijan province, and four people died in one attack in Kerman province. Central and southern provinces targeted in previous years, including Tehran, Isfahan, Fars, and Hormozgan, recorded zero terrorist incidents in 2025.
“Security forces comprise over 75% of targets”
The report analyzed the occupational and demographic profile of the victims in detail. Of the 57 people killed, 56 were male and one was female; 49 were Iranian citizens and eight were Pakistani labourers.
Law enforcement personnel formed the largest group by occupation. In 2025, victims of terrorism included 19 police officers (33%), 11 Basij members, eight foreign Pakistani workers, six conscripted soldiers, six civilians, three border guards, three security personnel, and one member of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The report stated: “Security and law enforcement forces accounted for 75.4% of total casualties, a figure that reaches 88% when Pakistani workers are excluded.”
The drop in IRGC fatalities from 27 in 2024 to one in 2025 was attributed to the withdrawal of Iranian military advisers from Syria and Lebanon. The report emphasized that civilians were not selected as direct primary targets, though civilian casualties did occur, including seven-month-old Navid Baluch Shir Mohammadi and a 60-year-old Baluch woman killed in the Zahedan courthouse attack, as well as 16-year-old Mansour Layegh-Jami killed at the Fahraj checkpoint in Kerman.
“Jaish al-Adl persists under a new name”
In its group-based assessment, the report determined that Jaish al-Adl remained the most active and deadliest group in Iran in 2025. Announcing its name as the “People’s Combatants Front” in late 2025, the group carried out 14 attacks resulting in 28 deaths, accounting for 53.8% of attacks and 49.1% of fatalities nationwide. While the group’s operations declined by 48% compared to 2024, its fatality rate per incident increased. The report evaluated the group’s rebranding as “a formal maneuver aimed at evading legal restrictions, escaping terrorist watchlists, and projecting an image of organizational vitality.”
After two years of inactivity, the Kurdish separatist group PJAK carried out three attacks in Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan provinces in July and August 2025, leaving four people dead. The report noted that the group had previously been unable to operate due to the Iran-Iraq security agreement, Iranian strikes against its positions in the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government area, and its expulsion from border regions. The attacks were described either as potential retaliation for an Iranian drone strike in Penjwin or as an effort by the group to assert operational independence amid the disarmament process undertaken by the PKK in Türkiye.
Ansar al-Furqan caused five deaths across two attacks, while the Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) killed eight Pakistani workers in a single attack in Mehrestan. Arab separatist groups in Khuzestan, numbering up to 15, carried out no armed terrorist attacks in 2025 and engaged solely in media propaganda. Unclaimed attacks totaled six incidents resulting in 12 deaths, all of which occurred in Sistan and Baluchestan.
Regarding the removal of Israel and the US from the list of direct terrorist perpetrators compared to the 2024 report, the document cited the withdrawal of military advisers from Syria and Lebanon, two conventional conflicts (the “12-Day War” and the “Ramadan War”), and the classification of assassinations of political, scientific, and military figures during the January events within the framework of conventional warfare.
“Targeted assassinations and armed assaults dominate”
The report also examined tactical shifts among terrorist organizations. In 2025, over 69% of incidents (18 cases) were direct firearm assaults, accounting for 87.7% of fatalities. Unlike 2024, no suicide bombings or “inghimasi”-style raid attacks were recorded in 2025.
Conversely, targeted assassinations of local figures resurged. The targeting of Basij commander Javad Karimkoshteh in front of a mosque in Zahedan, local IRGC member Iraj Shams Eskani in a barbershop in Rask, Shehr-e Deraz police station chief Mahmoud Haghighat in Iranshahr, and tribal leader Mohammadreza Shahouzehi’s convoy in Eshkelabad were characterized as a strategy to weaken local security personnel and community leaders in border districts. The report noted that intelligence operations, including the “Martyrs of Security” drills and the seizure of 25 kilograms of explosives in Chabahar, foiled multiple planned attacks.
Chronology of 2025-2026 terrorist incidents
The monthly breakdown of incidents and details in the report were listed as follows:
- 27 March 2025: Master Sergeant Hossein Teymourpour was killed and two police officers were injured in an attack on a Police Station 12 patrol vehicle in Iranshahr. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 12 April 2025: Eight Pakistani workers had their hands and feet bound and were shot dead at close range during a raid on an auto repair shop in the village of Hizabad-e Pain, Mehrestan county, Sistan and Baluchestan province. Five victims were identified as Delshad, Naeem, Jafar, Danish, and Nasser. The Baluch Nationalist Army (BNA) claimed responsibility.
- 18 April 2025: Jaish al-Adl team leader Vali Mohammad Shahbakhsh was killed during the “Martyrs of Security” operation in the Qurin district of Zahedan; Quds Base Basij member Eshagh Mokhtari was killed during the operation.
- 4 May 2025: Gunfire targeted Police Station 11 patrol vehicles in Iranshahr, wounding four police officers; three attackers were captured. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 17 May 2025: An explosive device planted along a police patrol route in Saravan was defused. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 11 July 2025: Police officers Hossein Jafarniya and Hamidreza Mirshahi, along with conscript Abbas Beyraghifard, were killed in an attack on a police patrol in Chabahar; one attacker was killed. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 21 July 2025: Border Guard Senior Master Sergeant Sina Sattarvand was killed in a clash in the Baneh border area of Kurdistan province. PJAK operatives reportedly carried out the attack.
- 22 July 2025: Captain Mahmoud Motahhari died after gunfire was opened on a patrol vehicle from another car in Saravan. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 25 July 2025: Basij member Meysam Kabiri was killed and one person was injured when PJAK members opened fire on a military outpost in Aglan village, Sardasht county, West Azerbaijan province.
- 26 July 2025: Armed assailants attempting to storm the Zahedan Courthouse using grenades and firearms killed six people: seven-month-old infant Navid Baluch Shir Mohammadi, a 60-year-old Baluch woman, courthouse protection unit Lieutenants Hossein Rafienasab and Hosseinali Nouri, and conscripts Nima Karami and Ahmad Abdollahi; 22 people were injured. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 27 July 2025: Basij commander Javad Karimkoshteh was shot dead while on guard duty at the entrance of a mosque in the Shirabad district of Zahedan. Ansar al-Furqan claimed the assassination.
- 15 August 2025: Sergeant Ramin Sadeghi was killed and one security officer was wounded in an attack on a patrol vehicle in Iranshahr. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 22 August 2025: Five police officers were killed when gunfire targeted two Daman Police Station vehicles on the Iranshahr-Khash road: Master Sergeants Mohammadreza Rahimi and Mohammad Nowrouzi, Sergeant Hasan Tavakkoli, conscript Hadi Rouyaei, and Captain Gholamreza Vahdani. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 6 September 2025: Local IRGC member Iraj Shams Eskani was shot dead in a barbershop in Pishin, Rask county. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 16 September 2025: Younes Sayyad Arbabi and Ebrahim Piri were killed in an attack on a Sib and Suran county police vehicle on the Khash-Zahedan road; critically injured Sib and Suran Police Chief Colonel Ebrahim Fazilati died on 18 September. Jaish al-Adl claimed responsibility.
- 18 September 2025: Local Basij member and community figure Reza Azerkish (Shahlibor) was shot dead in Iranshahr. The attack was unclaimed.
- 2 October 2025: Gunfire targeting a motorcycle police patrol in Qasr-e Qand county wounded one officer and killed a passing civilian. The perpetrators were not identified.
- 1 November 2025: In an ambush on Shahouzehi tribal leader Mohammadreza Shahouzehi’s vehicle at the Eskelabad area along the Khash-Zahedan road, local Sunni Basij members Esmail Shaverzi and Mokhtar Shahouzehi died the same day, while Yaghoub Fard Salarzehi died on 12 November. The attack was unclaimed.
- 1 November 2025: Security officer Mohammad (Javad) Siahani was killed by gunfire from an unplated vehicle on the Iranshahr Bampur-Delgan road.
- 30 November 2025: An attack on an IRGC Quds Base patrol vehicle in the Lar border area of Zahedan killed IRGC serviceman Sajjad Marashi and Basij members Mohammad Bezzi, Alireza Nasirabadi, and Alireza Piri. The attack was claimed by Jaish al-Adl’s new structure, the “People’s Combatants Front.”
- 16 December 2025: A night attack on the Fahraj checkpoint in Kerman province killed police officer Saeed Pourhadi, security personnel Morad Salehi and Isa Barsam, and 16-year-old civilian Mansour Layegh-Jami. Ansar al-Furqan claimed responsibility.
- 16 December 2025: Gunfire was directed at police from two vehicles in Iranshahr; the attackers fled without causing security casualties.
- 7 January 2026: Shehr-e Deraz police station chief Mahmoud Haghighat was shot dead in Iranshahr. The assassination was claimed by the People’s Combatants Front (Jaish al-Adl).
- 9 February 2026: Twenty-year-old Basij member Iman Shahnavazi was wounded in a shooting targeting a vehicle in front of the special forces building on Imam Khomeini Street in Khash county and died several days later. The People’s Combatants Front claimed responsibility.
- 3 March 2026: Conscript Amir Mohammad Karimi was killed and three people were wounded when gunfire struck a patrol vehicle in Zahedan. The People’s Combatants Front claimed responsibility.
- 16 March 2026: Six people were killed when a police patrol vehicle was attacked in Taftan county: police officers Sajjad Batakva, Mohammad Javad Ensaf, Hamidreza Shahraki, and Alireza Pourbagher, conscript Alireza Sergezi, and an unidentified civilian. No group claimed responsibility.
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