Retired Vice Admiral Kadir Sağdıç previously served as the Head of the Planning Group for BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group), a multinational naval force established to enhance maritime security and cooperation among the Black Sea littoral states. In 2009, as the Southern Sea Area Commander, he was in charge of the naval command that managed Türkiye’s maritime security in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. We asked Kadir Sağdıç about the developments and potential scenarios concerning the Strait of Hormuz: “Closing Hormuz would benefit the US-Israel.”

‘Not possible from the perspective of international law’

At what stage of a crisis could a scenario to close the Strait of Hormuz be activated? What is the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz? What drills and simulations has the Iranian navy conducted based on this scenario to date?

The Strait of Hormuz, like the Strait of Gibraltar or the Baltic passages, is an international waterway and is not very narrow. In fact, its narrowest point is 30 kilometers wide. It is not like our Turkish Straits; for instance, the Bosphorus is 700 meters wide. Hormuz is 40 times wider, and there are different countries on its opposing shores. There is Oman, Iran, and it is littoral to the United Arab Emirates and also to Qatar. In a place where so many countries are littoral parties in the same region, closing the Strait of Hormuz is not possible under international law.

The Turkish Straits have a special status. Both the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits are very narrow, and both of their coasts belong to the Republic of Türkiye. Although the Black Sea is an international body of water with vast areas of 140 and 300 miles, the 12-mile territorial waters of the two countries [on either side of the Black Sea entrance] do not close off the sea. However, in the Turkish Straits, which include the Sea of Marmara, the Bosphorus, and the Dardanelles, all coasts and the internal waters belong to Türkiye. Therefore, the Turkish Straits have a special status under the Montreux Convention. But the Strait of Hormuz has no such special status. In such a situation, yes, during past crises like the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took the initiative to strike tankers to disrupt traffic. But in doing so, it assumes the risk and must bear the consequences itself. It does not do this by taking refuge in international law.

‘Revenue from China would be cut off’

In military literature, we call it a situation assessment. Before making a decision, we run it through a test. This involves three stages: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Let’s look at the Strait of Hormuz from this perspective. If Iran attempts to close it, what does Iran gain? Would closing Hormuz serve its purpose? That’s what we need to look at. For example, if it succeeds in closing it, it would draw attention to the economy, because petrol and natural gas costs would rise. At a time when the world economy is going through difficulties, it could draw the world’s attention to Hormuz via oil. This could provide a modest benefit, as if to say, “Pay attention to me, protect me, let the crisis de-escalate, and respect my rights. In return, I won’t close the strait.”

But if oil and natural gas prices increase, speculators will be the ones to benefit. You [Iran] cannot benefit in the long run. Eventually, even if the crisis turns into a war, it will subside at the end of the war. Therefore, for a sustained increase in oil prices, cartels like OPEC and others must make a collective decision. Supply in that region doesn’t just come from Iran. There are many players in oil supply, primarily countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait. Therefore, unless OPEC makes a lasting decision, oil prices will not remain high. They will rise during the crisis and then fall. Iran also sends its own supply to the world market through the very strait it would close. It has a major buyer, China, with which it has long-term contracts. It would suffer losses from that as well. This action would not bring gains to Iran, but losses, because it would cut off the revenue coming from China.

‘Closing Hormuz would make Iran a target’

Would an Iranian military action to close the Strait of Hormuz grant the US a “legitimate” right to intervene under international law? Or would the US use this as a pretext to find a “legitimate” justification for an attack on the Iranian navy with an international coalition?

What other harm would closing the Strait of Hormuz cause? Iran would politically broaden its range of adversaries. While its current counterparts are Israel and the United States, if the strait were to be closed, numerous countries affected by this would target Iran, leading to a major political imbalance. In other words, the political pressure on Iran would mount significantly. It would have unnecessarily made more enemies, and its own sales would be disrupted. Iran would have to revise its current agreement with China, saying, “I will close the Strait of Hormuz now, but if I survive the war, I will supply you with this much at this price.” It cannot close the Strait of Hormuz without revising this agreement with China behind the scenes and persuading them.

So, let’s say the decision to close it is made, but is it feasible? Can it be done? Feasibility here means, will your military power—your ships, unmanned aerial vehicles, aircraft, and land batteries—have enough firepower to stop the traffic passing through that strait? When Iran makes a move, the countries whose ships would be hit—and ships from all over the world pass through there—will be affected. It’s not just the littoral oil-producing countries that provide the supply; third-party ships also transit. Therefore, when those ships are damaged, their nations’ forces may also reach the stage of using force as part of self-defense.

The injured parties may not legally target Iranian elements directly. The United Nations Security Council will condemn Iran for the damage caused to third parties and will take measures. This could go as far as the use of force. That is, it won’t just be a condemnation. An international coalition force, under UN resolutions, under Security Council resolutions, would likely intervene against Iran. This would greatly strengthen the hand of the US and Israel. An intervention by just two countries would suddenly become a multinational action under a UN mandate, necessitating the use of force against Iran. In that case, the feasibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz also seems quite low.

Let’s assume you have the feasibility and the power, and you decide to use that military power to close it. You don’t, but let’s say you do. Well, is it worth taking that much risk, losing that many assets, and being on the losing side politically? At a time when Israel and the US are pressuring Iran, is it worth turning a significant part of the world against itself, suffering damage from the coalition forces they would form, and losing additional strength? Can it bear this risk? I think not. Therefore, when we test the logic of Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz, closing it brings no gain. It neither has the operational capability—its forces may not be sufficient to close it against the world—nor is the risk acceptable. Therefore, I assess that if it acts rationally, Iran will not close the Strait of Hormuz.

On the other hand, an attempt by Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz does not, of course, give the US a direct right to intervene. The US would need to evaluate this through United Nations Security Council resolutions. If Iran directly targets a US ship or an American tanker, then of course the US, as the other party, would engage in self-defense and could respond in kind. But we don’t know how Iran would implement this. Furthermore, I have logically assessed that such a decision will not be made.

‘The crisis will remain regional’

In such a scenario, how would the Iranian and Chinese navies react? Would it have an escalating effect on military tensions in other critical waterways around the world, such as the Strait of Malacca? Do you see a risk of a conflict in Hormuz spilling over to the Red Sea via the Houthis and other critical trade routes?

The question of how the Chinese navy would react to tension and escalation in the Strait of Hormuz region is also on the agenda. At this stage, China might react differently in its own vicinity, such as Taiwan and the China Seas. If a crisis develops there, it might launch a military operation. But I see no possibility of the Chinese navy participating in an operation in the Gulf region, in the Strait of Hormuz, or of China taking the initiative to intervene with armed force. There is no such probability. From what we have seen of China at this stage, I assess that it has no such intention in international relations. Increased tension here will have an effect on the Houthis, who have appeared to be aligned with Iran in the last year or two. Perhaps if Iran makes an attempt in the Strait of Hormuz, the Houthis could carry out similar actions in the Red Sea. I assess that a potential escalation in the Strait of Hormuz would increase Houthi activities. As long as the crisis and state of war continue, they might also undertake more advanced actions in the Red Sea.

I do not expect an intervention in other critical waterways, such as the Strait of Malacca, at this stage. However, if events escalate and blocs are formed—pitting the Eurasia “Heartland” [a geopolitical concept for the Eurasian landmass] of China, Russia, Türkiye, and Europe against the Oceania countries—meaning an intervention from the oceans (Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic) by the maritime-focused group led by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada (to which we should also add Korea and Japan)—then tension in the Strait of Malacca via countries like Indonesia and Malaysia could be possible. But this would mean the crisis has escalated to a global scale. This would be a very dangerous situation. I do not assess that it will reach that stage. I assess that this crisis will remain regional.

American journalist Joe Lauria, Editor-in-Chief of Consortium News, spoke to Harici: “Freedom of thought in the US has never been under greater threat.”

Joe Lauria is an experienced investigative journalist specializing in US foreign policy. Since 1990, he has worked for mainstream media organizations such as The Wall Street Journal, The Boston Globe, The Sunday Times (London), The New York Times, and The Washington Post. He currently serves as the editor-in-chief of the independent investigative journalism platform Consortium News. Lauria is the co-author of A Political Odyssey: The Rise of American Militarism and One Man’s Fight to Stop It, written with former US Senator Mike Gravel, and How I Lost By Hillary Clinton. The foreword to the second book was written by Julian Assange. In his journalism career, he has focused on issues such as US military interventions, intelligence operations, and press freedom. Lauria is the recipient of the 2017 Martha Gellhorn Prize for Journalism and the 2015 I.F. Stone Medal from the Harvard Nieman Foundation.

Joe Lauria answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions in an interview with Harici.

In your 2023 personal reflections, you mentioned Daniel Ellsberg, who risked his freedom to leak the Pentagon Papers. As far as I know, you also closely follow the Julian Assange and Edward Snowden cases. How do you assess the conflict between freedom of expression and national security? In your opinion, can the leaking of classified documents be justified when the public interest is served?

I absolutely believe that leaking classified information is the right thing to do, especially if it will end an unjust war. That’s what Daniel Ellsberg was trying to do by leaking the Pentagon Papers. And this idea of national security, especially in the United States, has very often been used as a kind of sham. It’s a way to protect the interests of powerful people who were involved in a terrible war like Vietnam. And even though they were losing the war, and they knew it, they refused to end that war. The Pentagon Papers were all about that. The government study Ellsberg participated in, which was supposed to be secret, showed that the US knew for years it was losing that war. Politicians and generals kept telling the American people and the world they were going to win. So many people, mostly Vietnamese but also American soldiers, were dying for nothing. But it was very difficult for them to withdraw politically from the war because they would look like failures, not just militarily but politically. And I think we’re seeing a similar situation in Ukraine right now.

But yes, someone who has these documents, like Ellsberg did, like Chelsea Manning did about the Iraq war, and finding a newspaper or an online publisher like WikiLeaks to publish these documents, is absolutely their right to turn the public against the government based not just on a political argument, but on facts that were hidden from the public. The Assange case was particularly dangerous because they went after a publisher. Now, in the US, we have the First Amendment [The First Amendment to the United States Constitution], and that basically allows you to publish any material under the First Amendment. But the Espionage Act contradicts the First Amendment because it says anyone who has unauthorized possession of defense or classified information is in violation of the Espionage Act. Now, Assange was a publisher, so he had First Amendment protection. But he was also technically violating the Espionage Act. So that law needs to be changed. In fact, that’s what he pleaded guilty to, which is why he was freed, because he said, yes, I broke that law, but I don’t believe the law is just. I believed I was protected by the First Amendment. That’s why I published the documents, he said.

So again, a government employee who signs a secrecy agreement, as they all do in intelligence agencies, by law, whether it’s the US Espionage Act or the British Official Secrets Act, they cannot give out the information. And we are living in a time of great repression, not just about classified information, but about any kind of information that goes against powerful interests. They are stopping people from speaking, particularly on social media. The government is using private companies to silence people who criticize Israel, especially right now and about what’s happening in Gaza. And this is even more serious than Daniel Ellsberg because it involves hundreds, maybe thousands of people, students speaking out on campuses. That Turkish woman arrested in Massachusetts, a student who wrote an op-ed, along with four other names, hers was the only name in the article.

When you compare it to the past, how do you assess the current state of freedom of expression in America? Have you seen a similar picture before?

It’s much worse today. Let me give you a quick example of how it was better in the past. It was never great. But I’ll give you an example of how much worse it has become. Fifty years ago, in the 1970s, I can’t remember the exact year, there was a journalist named Seymour Hersh, and he was given classified information or made aware of this attack in My Lai, a village in Vietnam. Where American soldiers killed dozens of innocent women, children, and all the men in a village. This was one of many massacres. But the American people didn’t know about it. It wasn’t in the newspapers. So a whistleblower went to Congress and then to this journalist and gave the information. The information was published, it became a huge scandal. They arrested and prosecuted one soldier, but he got out after a year or two.

My Lai was a civilian massacre in Vietnam in the 1960s. At that time, a whistleblower came forward, and Congress and the press listened to him. He was not punished at all. The journalist Seymour Hersh reported on this incident, got a job at The New York Times, and won a Pulitzer Prize. One of the responsible soldiers, Lieutenant Calley, was tried and imprisoned. Now let’s look at Iraq. The video known as “Collateral Murder” was leaked by Chelsea Manning to WikiLeaks. It showed US helicopter gunships firing on civilians in the streets of Baghdad. Manning was imprisoned for disclosing this information. The journalist who published the video, Julian Assange, has also been deprived of his freedom for years. But none of the soldiers in the video were prosecuted. So, in 50 years, the tables have turned: the whistleblower used to go free, now they go to prison. The journalist used to be rewarded, now they are punished. The soldiers used to be prosecuted, now they are immune. This situation clearly shows how much the American system and culture have regressed. Furthermore, the government’s use of private companies to restrict public speech on social media platforms is ongoing censorship. Freedom of expression on platforms like Twitter and Facebook is under serious pressure.

We are all aware of this now: thanks to social media, people have more of a voice than ever before. This threatens elite and powerful interest groups. In the past, this threat came from powerful, independent media, as in events like Watergate, which brought down Nixon. Today, however, ordinary people have a more effective voice than they ever had before. That’s precisely why there’s an extraordinary effort to silence these voices. But pay attention: This isn’t happening in the Soviet Union or China. It’s happening in the United States of America. Yet this is a country that should be a symbol of democracy and freedom of expression.

My next question is a bit more general but directly related to what you’ve been saying. Based on your book “A Political Odyssey,” how do you explain America’s interventionism that has been ongoing since World War II? What is the fundamental reason for the military-industrial complex, which we’ve been talking about for decades, being constantly fed by war? And do you think this cycle can be broken?

That’s a very big question. Firstly, I think American interventionism dates back much further than just post-World War II, even to the founding of the United States in 1789. In fact, this tendency began to show itself after the victory against Britain in 1787. At that time, the British had forbidden the colonies from crossing the Appalachian Mountains to seize Native American lands. Many American colonists did not want to accept this prohibition. This was one of the reasons for the rebellion—perhaps not the main one, but an important element. After gaining independence, the US engaged in a systematic war of extermination and expansion against indigenous peoples. This was truly a chain of territorial expansion and interventions.

Then came the Mexican-American War in 1846. Large areas within today’s US borders, like California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Arizona, belonged to Mexico at that time; they were seized through war. And of course, in 1898, the rising American Empire replaced the collapsing Spanish Empire. The US defeated the Spanish in places like the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico; it even intervened in Cuba. This marked the beginning of America’s expansion on a global scale. So, this interventionist structure has existed in America from the very beginning.

However, a significant break occurred with World War II. We discuss this topic in detail in the book I co-authored with the late Senator Mike Gravel. In American history, many companies that produced weapons during wartime would return to their former businesses after the war. For example, firms that made sewing machines produced weapons during the war and then went back to making sewing machines. Even after the American Civil War, an army of one million was disbanded, and soldiers returned to their farms. So, the US never had a permanent army or a continuous war industry. But this situation changed radically after World War II. Because the Great Depression of the 1930s had largely ended thanks to the war. The war industry became the fundamental dynamic that pulled the US out of the crisis and made it the world’s largest manufacturing power. This is not the case today—Trump tried to bring it back, but it probably won’t be possible. At the end of the war, there was a strong motivation to sustain the military industry due to the fear that the economic depression would return. This motivation coincided with the US process of global expansion. Permanent military bases were left in the Pacific, Asia, and many parts of the world. Because the US was the only major power not devastated after the war. This effectively gave it the role of a global empire.

At this point, as Eisenhower also warned, we are talking about the beginning of a permanent military-industrial complex and America’s global empire. And we are still living within this structure today. Like all other empires, this structure will eventually collapse. But this collapse will not happen willingly; it will occur with back-and-forth steps, over time, and inevitably. Today, we see BRICS countries coming together to create a counterbalance to US imperial power. This perhaps signals the beginning of the end. It’s no coincidence that Donald Trump praised President McKinley in a recent speech. McKinley was the president during the period when the US fought against the Spanish Empire. Trump similarly carries a kind of “imperial nostalgia.” He wants to revive old power with tariffs, to return America to its 1950s manufacturing capacity. But this will not happen. This, in my opinion, is his pathological dream. The forces Trump represents have realized that US global dominance is nearing its end. Just like the old empires in Europe, America needs to understand that it must now turn its attention to its internal problems. For now, there is no concrete sign in this direction, but in my view, this transformation is inevitable. And we are currently at that very breaking point in history.

Now let’s come to today. Trump and the MAGA movement have repeatedly promised to dismantle the “deep state.” Do you think Trump can genuinely break the influence of the military-industrial complex? After all, he explicitly said so himself. What are your thoughts?

First, it must be said: the deep state denies its own existence. It’s even ridiculed with the claim that this concept is a “conspiracy theory.” But many of those who say this are actually part of those very structures. They don’t want to be seen; they want to remain deep. So, the fact that the “deep state” is now openly discussed, at least in America, is progress in itself. In other countries, these structures were recognized much earlier. In America, this structure was essentially established after World War II. With the National Security Act signed by Truman in 1947, the Pentagon, the National Security Council, and then the CIA were established. In 1950, the NSA [National Security Agency], whose existence was kept secret for a long time, emerged. So, the institutional foundations of the deep state were laid during that period. Whether you like Trump or not, one truth must be accepted: The Russiagate scandal was a fabrication from start to finish. It was a lie concocted by the Clinton campaign, and this lie was supported by institutions like the FBI. Leaking false news about your opponent in American politics is common; it’s called “opposition research.” However, when it came to Trump, this turned into a state operation. The FBI saw Trump as unpredictable, outside the system, and dangerous. He was an uncontrollable figure whose actions were uncertain. He was also someone who threatened the system. That’s why they tried to stop him. Trump realized this and developed a personal vendetta, especially against the FBI. Ultimately, Trump was both perceived as a threat to the deep state and was subjected to its interference.

Some noteworthy developments are currently taking place. Trump has appointed Kash Patel, an Indian-American, as FBI Director. Patel says he wants to close the FBI’s Washington headquarters and turn it into just a field office. This also includes a plan to transfer the budget to local law enforcement agencies across the country. If this happens, it would mean a serious shake-up of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s central bureaucratic structure—and that would be a significant signal. Also, during the Trump era, some documents related to the John F. Kennedy assassination were released. These documents brought questions about the CIA’s role back to the fore. These could be seen as signs of a reckoning with the deep state. But despite all this, it’s hard to say for sure. Whether there will be truly lasting change is unknown. The structure we call the deep state has always found a way to survive. Even if Trump leaves, despite the damage done, the system is likely to be rebuilt—unless a fundamental structural transformation occurs. The point we have reached today is a period where intelligence agencies are influential enough to shape not only foreign policy but, at times, domestic policy as well. Therefore, we are at an extremely critical juncture in American history.

It should also be added: some believe Trump might genuinely be fighting against existing power structures. However, there’s another view—that even if Trump and his team dismantle the current deep state, they will establish their own “deep state” in its place. So, this could just be a different version of a power struggle.

Yes, you’re absolutely right. The system will most likely change, but it will be replaced by a structure controlled by Trump instead of the Democrats. There will still be a “deep state,” but in a different form. Because the current structure operates like a power above parties—it’s always there, regardless of who the president is or who controls Congress. There’s a strong example of this: About 10 years ago, the Senate wanted to declassify a report on the CIA’s torture practices following the Iraq invasion. This report revealed that the US had established secret torture centers worldwide after 9/11. Obama also openly admitted this, saying “we tortured some folks.” However, the CIA secretly accessed Senate members’ computers to prevent the report’s publication. This was a huge scandal, not just morally but legally. Because the CIA is prohibited from operating within the US—let alone spying on elected senators, which is a direct violation of the constitutional order. This incident clearly showed how powerful and untouchable intelligence agencies have become. As for Trump—he’s hard to define because we haven’t seen anyone like him before. He took harsh steps against the bureaucracy, weakened many institutions, and dismissed many people. But he often did this with day-to-day decisions, without a plan or long-term strategy. So, it’s uncertain whether he will feel the need to build a “deep state” behind him. However, if he has big goals—like buying Greenland, as he once mentioned—then he might need intelligence and military power, and thus a kind of deep state of his own. Therefore, the answer to the question of whether Trump would create his own deep state is: Yes, that’s quite possible.

Now let’s move from domestic policy to foreign policy. How realistic do you think are the expectations that the Trump administration will end US intervention in foreign wars? Does Trump truly represent a shift? Especially considering the comments many make about a “realist foreign policy” and a move away from the neocon line, how do you view these assessments?

Actually, not really—and that’s the problem. This time, there are no openly interventionist, neocon figures like John Bolton or Mike Pompeo in the Trump administration. However, Marco Rubio is Secretary of State, and figures like General Keith Kellogg are re-emerging. For example, Kellogg was previously dismissed and demoted, but now he’s trying to be influential in Ukraine policies again. Trump says things that sound good. He gives some messages that are anti-interventionist and intuitively correct. This aligns with the rising libertarian tendencies in America. There’s a particular vein that opposes foreign interventions, and Trump sometimes aligns with this. However, there’s still a serious gap between rhetoric and practice.

Trump says he doesn’t like wars and wants to end the war in Ukraine. But the real question is: does he truly understand the fundamental causes of this war? This was the point Vladimir Putin emphasized in his long phone call with Trump—this war won’t end unless the root causes are addressed. In America, however, these causes are hardly ever discussed. The mainstream media doesn’t bring up these deep-rooted reasons. Yet, at the beginning of the 2014 crisis, there was open talk about the unconstitutional change of government in Ukraine and the role of neo-Nazi groups—especially the Azov Battalion—in this process. US and British media had published major stories about these groups. It was stated that although their numbers were small, their influence was very large.

But now this narrative has been erased. Talking about neo-Nazis has almost become taboo. Again, there’s no longer any mention of President Viktor Yanukovych, who was confirmed as democratically elected by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe], being violently overthrown in February 2014. It’s like a chapter erased from history. We, at Consortium News, report on these overlooked fundamental causes. Because we voice these truths ignored by the mainstream media, we have faced censorship and various smear campaigns. Some circles even tried to label us as Russian propagandists—simply for reporting documented facts like the coup and neo-Nazis.

In December 2021, Russia presented some draft treaties to NATO and the US. Their demands were clear: withdrawal of NATO troops from former Warsaw Pact countries and removal of missile systems in Romania and Poland, which are only six minutes away from Moscow. There was concern that these systems could carry nuclear warheads. Russia explicitly stated that if these demands were not negotiated, it would take “technical-military steps”—and this resulted in the invasion of Ukraine. Although Russia’s 2022 attack is often presented as a “beginning,” according to Moscow, it was a continuation of a war that Ukraine started in 2014 with US support. So, does Trump really understand these facts? I don’t know. I don’t think so. He had long talks with Putin, and even his envoy Fred Witkoff went to Moscow several times. The Russians must have explained these issues—including NATO expansion—many times. Moreover, these objections don’t just belong to Putin; his predecessor Boris Yeltsin was also openly against NATO expansion, even their puppet Yeltsin. So, these objections have been part of Russia’s political line for over thirty years.

So, can Trump really end the war in Ukraine? To do that, he first needs to understand the fundamental causes of the war. Because the only way Ukraine can win this war is if NATO directly goes to war with Russia. However, NATO leaders are aware that this could lead to a nuclear catastrophe—so this option is not on the table. This means Ukraine cannot win. In reality, Ukraine has lost the war. The sooner they sit down at the table, the better their terms might be. But they continue to fight. Trump, at this point, remains ineffective. Yet he has the power to end this war. The US provides weapons, intelligence, and funding to the Ukrainian government. In fact, Ukraine has been largely sustained by American taxpayers’ money for eight years. Trump could stop the war by deciding to cut this support. But so far, he isn’t doing it.

The second issue is Gaza, and this is perhaps the worst. Trump is supporting a war crime of the most heinous kind here. Moreover, he completely misunderstands the issue. He’s from New York, like me—he comes from Queens—and he describes Gaza as if it’s a high-crime neighborhood. He talks about stabbings and muggings but never mentions the 2,000-pound bombs dropped on people’s tents, their forced displacement and subsequent bombing, or their starvation. Trump talks about helping the people of Gaza, but he plans to do this by removing them and building new structures in their place, meaning through ethnic cleansing. This doesn’t look like someone who wants to end wars—on the contrary, he’s exhibiting an attitude that condones the most serious human rights violations we’ve witnessed in recent years. Despite talking about non-intervention, he doesn’t practice it. Why? Perhaps he’s lost control. It seems he repeats the opinion of whoever he last spoke to. We often see this approach in his administration. Yet he should listen to realistic thinkers, even his own instincts. But he doesn’t.

You’ve been closely following and reporting on the Middle East for years, and you know the American perspective very well. So, in your opinion, does Trump’s Middle East strategy really fit into an understandable framework? Balances in the region are changing rapidly—the push to overthrow Assad, the genocide unfolding in Gaza, Israel’s increasing aggression… In light of all these developments, do you have a clear view of what kind of strategy Trump is pursuing in the Middle East?

Getting a free plane from Qatar, arranging real estate deals in Gaza and elsewhere when he leaves office—Trump’s Middle East “strategy” basically boils down to this. There are even rumors he has plans to build a tower in Dubai or Abu Dhabi. So, he doesn’t understand the Middle East; he only understands real estate deals. He has no idea about the region’s history. He can’t grasp the Palestinian issue. He still sees Gaza as a high-crime neighborhood in New York. He’s ignorant of fundamental historical facts like the role of Western Europe, especially Britain and France, in the post-Ottoman Middle East, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the establishment of Lebanon and Syria. He also doesn’t understand how the US took over regional dominance from Britain after the 1956 Suez Crisis and how it supported Israel as a proxy power. Today, the fact that Arab regimes are abandoning the Palestinians through the Abraham Accords is seen by Trump as “peace.” Yet the result was the catastrophe in Gaza—a process that essentially laid the groundwork for genocide.

No one is taking action except the Yemenis—including your president [referring to Turkey’s president]. He constantly says nice things, but as far as I know, he’s still sending oil to Israel. As for Trump, what primarily motivates him is his personal wealth. He defends Israel because he received $100 million from the Israel lobby, especially from the late wealthy donor Miriam Adelson. Like many American politicians, he instinctively tends to defend Israel no matter what. However, a break is now occurring. More and more people are raising their voices because Israel’s practices of genocide and ethnic cleansing are completely out in the open. They are no longer hidden or concealed. Those making these statements are far-right figures in the Israeli government. These individuals, once considered marginal, Kahanist-line figures [followers of Meir Kahane’s extremist ideology], are now in power. And they are trying to realize the dream of “Greater Israel.” What we are witnessing in Gaza is the most extreme point of this process—literally an attempt at a “final solution.” So, what is Trump doing in the meantime? He’s dreaming of a golf course in Gaza. We’re talking about a situation this pathological.

Kati Piri, a Dutch member of parliament and former rapporteur on Türkiye’s EU accession in the European Parliament, offered a perspective on the current state of EU–Türkiye relations to Harici.

Ahmetcan Uzlaşık/ Brussels

Drawing on her experience in foreign affairs, Kati Piri reflects on the political developments in Türkiye and the EU’s increasingly transactional stance toward Ankara.

In this interview, she discusses the challenges of maintaining a values-based foreign policy, the implications of shifting political dynamics in both Europe and Türkiye, and the future of cooperation on issues such as migration, defense, and the customs union.

Kati Piri also shares her views on broader global developments, including the war in Ukraine, the return of Donald Trump, and the rise, and in her view, recent decline, of far-right populism across Europe.

How do you see the current political developments in Türkiye, especially regarding both Imamoglu’s arrest?

Well, to start with, the political witch-hunt against Imamoglu, which led to his arrest, made us very concerned. Although Türkiye is still not a full autocracy like Russia, Türkiye has turned the page in the wrong direction.

The European Parliament has concluded that Türkiye’s EU accession process is effectively frozen. Given your experience as a former rapporteur, do you think the EU still has a credible and coherent strategy toward Türkiye?

I totally understand why the European Parliament said this. How can you say anything else when the main opposition leader is in prison? We didn’t see any positive developments regarding Türkiye’s accession over the years. So I fully understand that when it comes to a coherent view of the EU as a whole, which is of course much bigger than the EP, that has been lacking for many years.

I don’t know how the EU managed to position itself in a way where many Turkish democrats are very disappointed in how the EU positions itself vis-à-vis the President Erdoğan regime. If you disappoint the people who share European values like rule of law, human rights, etc. in Türkiye, then the EU did something wrong.

I don’t think the EU has a good strategy toward Türkiye. I think Europe is very much driven by very short-term personal interests. And now with the war in Ukraine and general security concerns in Europe, if those who are destroying democracy and freedom at home are seen as partners, that is also a threat to Europe. It’s more of a threat than an ally to Europe. In conclusion, Europe’s strategy toward Türkiye is very short-sighted. It’s unfortunately been the case for many years.

There’s a growing sense that the EU is moving away from the accession model and toward a strategic partnership with Türkiye. Do you see this as a pragmatic adjustment, or an admission of failure?

Look, on the one hand, you can’t talk about a regime that is destroying democracy in Türkiye. In that respect, strategic partnership, I understand it. But also, as Europe, you have a responsibility to your own values.

I don’t have the feeling that we always stand up for those values or the people who defend them in Türkiye. That’s where my main criticism is. I would say since the Syria crisis in 2015, Europe has been pretty silent in my view on the deterioration of democracy in Türkiye. Plus, it lost a lot of credibility among democrats in Türkiye, which I would say is the largest part of the population, and strengthened the current Turkish government by being silent.

I think it is in Europe’s and the people of my country’s interest that Türkiye is a democracy. Europe, in a way, gave up on that and focused on short-term cooperation like migration.

Is this why, for example, the EU leaders visited President Erdoğan in the last couple of months, and Hakan Fidan was invited to EU foreign minister meetings? These resumed in 2024 after a long period. Do you think the EU is trying to keep Türkiye close on transactional matters like migration and security, not as part of accession, but just as a strategic partner?

Look, in general, I always say that even if we don’t agree with the Turkish government, it is important to convey the message. I’m in favor of meetings and discussions, but you need to have your priorities right and raise your concerns.

My criticism is that the EU acts like Imamoglu isn’t in prison. Europe forgets that it not only has values but also tools against Türkiye. Europe is the biggest investor in Türkiye, and it should use this much more smartly than it does now.

Realistically speaking, not what should be, but what do you think is going to happen? Do you think the EU’s shift to the right, where right-wing politicians prefer transactional deals over full accession, will push Türkiye and the EU closer on security or migration cooperation?

Look, I would hope to be close with Türkiye, with a democratic Türkiye. Because that would be, I think, in the interest of both. Right?

I don’t think we should get close with a more autocratic Türkiye, where it’s normal to jail your opponents. That does not make Europe safer in any way, and it doesn’t make Türkiye safer either.

Having said that, we have an extreme right-wing majority in the Dutch parliament and also a very right-wing government, which is very transactional. But still, when I handed in the motion that we cannot start concluding the customs union as long as the verdicts of the European court is respected.

So the Dutch parliament will block any progress on this as long as verdicts of the European court are not respected. In that respect, I still see that it won’t be as easy as some people think to convince all 27 countries to forget about democracy in Türkiye.

Ms. Piri, we are witnessing a global geopolitical realignment: the war in Ukraine, a second Trump term, tensions in the Middle East, and the changing situation in Syria. How do you see EU–Türkiye relations repositioning within today’s Europe, Türkiye, and the broader world order?

Well, I think in general, if you just look at it from a citizen’s point of view, the world has become, in a way, more fragile, and international law is almost out the window.

I don’t want to see again a world carved up by big powers deciding on zones of interest. I think it’s important that when we see positive developments, and let’s be clear, the disappearance of Assad from Syria is, in itself, a positive development, then it is the obligation of the international community to make sure that an inclusive, democratic process gets a chance in Syria.

I don’t think we can expect regime change in Russia anytime soon, which means that’s a clear threat. At least, it’s a clear threat that our citizens feel.

Within NATO, for instance, my country has always relied on our big transatlantic neighbor, the United States. And I think Europe as a whole has come to realize we cannot automatically rely on the Americans anymore.

Now there’s all this discussion: “We need Türkiye because we can’t rely on the Americans. We need them for military cooperation.”

But the values Ukrainians are defending every day are the values of democracy and freedom. We can only fight this with an alliance where everyone agrees on these values. So if we have a Turkish regime destroying democracy at home, that’s not our ally. These are the powers we are fighting against.

Perhaps finally, I’d say it’s very important to watch what is happening with populist, extreme right-wing parties in Europe since Trump’s election. They’re all losing, not only in Europe; we saw it in Canada, Romania etc.. People are seeing the consequences in their daily lives, and they don’t want this.

So you see populist autocratic parties losing across Europe. I cannot imagine that in Türkiye the public isn’t showing similar sentiments.

That’s very interesting, because in Portugal the far-right gained ground recently, and people fear that AfD might even become the first party in Germany in the future. Do you really believe the far-right is losing in Europe?

Let’s see if it stays that way. For now, they are. You saw it in France. You see it in the Netherlands, the far right won the national elections, and they are now declining in the polls.

Yes, it’s worrying what’s happening in Germany, but clearly, AfD did not win the election. So now it’s up to the government to deliver on people’s concerns and make sure they won’t win the next elections.

I think there’s a chance for what we call liberal democrats, I even say this as a social democrat, but you see what I mean. It’s not about ideology. It’s about defending international law, rule of law, and human rights.

This might gain traction again because we’re seeing a moment where the radical right is damaging itself. Trump is damaging the radical right in Europe, and that’s a good thing.

President Erdoğan recently met with Italian Prime Minister Meloni. She never spoke about democracy in Türkiye. He also has good relations with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán and Slovak leader Fico. Do you think this makes EU–Türkiye relations more complicated?

I think it’s true there’s an international pack of autocrats. I would say Netanyahu is also linked to the same group. Of course, that’s not where President Erdoğan is aligning himself. But let’s be honest, it’s all the same tendencies, national conservatism, “family values” in a way that excludes minorities, women, all to gain and retain power. That’s the goal.

To marginalize the democratic part of society. We see this playbook worldwide. It’s time for progressive leaders to work much more closely, internationally, to defend the values our parents and grandparents fought for, which are now under attack.

This is why I was proud of the PES going immediately to Türkiye and standing with the CHP when Imamoglu was arrested. We need to help each other more. I’m sure the general public will turn, and we can win this fight, but we need to stand together.

I’d like to ask about migration. It seems that the EU, including the Netherlands, is shifting rightward on this. Is there a contradiction between people’s concerns about far-right rise and the fact that Brussels and national governments are implementing similar policies?

Let it be clear, I do not agree with the migration policy of my government. I’m in the main opposition party, and I think what they are doing will neither solve the migration problem nor reduce the number of people coming.

We have issues with housing. People are waiting two years before their applications are even reviewed. The idea that making it unattractive for migrants will stop them from coming is not based on facts. I’m very worried about the criminalization of people seeking refuge, and how this narrative has gained traction, including in Germany and my country.

Progressive parties need a clear alternative. Yes, every country has an absorption capacity. But let’s be honest, refugees are not the reason the economy is suffering. The far-right has had too much space to tell people that every problem in their life is caused by refugees. It’s simply not true.

My final question: What is your and your party’s stance on the ongoing trade war, which Trump recently backed off from a bit, and the issue of increased military spending ahead of the upcoming NATO summit in the Netherlands?

When it comes to the trade war, I think this is a very dangerous development.

Trump’s economic philosophy is not supported by any serious economist. It damages free trade globally and will also damage the U.S. long-term. Countries may divest from the U.S., making it a poorer country. Starting a trade war with your biggest allies is crazy. Trump is backed by the richest people who want no rules, they want to make more money at the expense of normal people. Europe must be strong, stand together, negotiate as a bloc, and hit back when necessary.

As for the NATO summit, I see two trends. First, with Russian aggression since the 2022 full-scale invasion, Europe has become less safe. We face daily threats, not tanks in Amsterdam, but cyberattacks, sabotage, Russian ships gathering intelligence. We’re already in a grey zone.

Second, we cannot take for granted that the U.S. will show up if a NATO country is attacked. So Europe must urgently prepare to defend itself, which we cannot do today without the U.S.
This summit is very important. But it won’t be easy to get all NATO countries on board regarding spending and unity. Let’s be honest, Trump’s values are more aligned with President Putin than with mine.