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INTERVIEW

‘NATO mission to be extended to the Middle East and Africa’

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Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jonathan M. Winer spoke to Harici: The NATO declaration emphasised the extension of NATO’s mission to the Middle East and Africa and the action plan to implement it.

While the world is preoccupied with the upcoming elections in the United States and the recent incident in which former Republican President Donald Trump was targeted by an assassin, reports from the United States say that Trump is now officially the presidential candidate for the November 2024 elections. Many are debating whether the attack will have any impact on the campaigns of Trump and his Democratic rival Biden. The two leaders have many differences in foreign policy and approaches to NATO, nuclear talks with Iran, the presence of US troops abroad, relations with Russia and activities in the Middle East.

Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jonathan M. Winer answered Dr Esra Karahindiba’s questions on global developments for Harici.

Jonathan M. Winer served as the United States Special Envoy to Libya, Assistant Secretary of State for International Law, and Advisor to Senator John Kerry. With expertise in migration, US foreign policy, counter-terrorism, governance, economics and energy, he is currently a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute.

Let’s start with the attack against former President Donald Trump? He was injured and critics say that the reason of the attack is Biden’s campaign portraying Trump as a candidate who should never become president again. How would it be reflected on both candidates campaigns and ballots?

It is completely inappropriate to politicize the attack on Donald Trump by what appears on the basis of the facts known so far to be the isolated acts of a lone gunman. Any suggestion that anyone but the shooter was responsible for it is reckless and wrong.

Can you share your insights on the most significant outcomes of the recent NATO summit and their implications for US foreign policy? How do you evaluate the fact that there is no message about Israel in the final declaration of the NATO Summit? Israel’s threat of war against Lebanon and the possibility that Syria in a wider scale, will naturally have negative broader impacts in the instability of the region. Will a new stance be taken regarding Israel’s actions?

Three things stand out in the NATO Communique issued at the NATO summit. First, united resolve to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine. NATO is not giving up to seek some settlement with Russia, but digging in, with commitments to deliver sophisticated air defense systems promptly and to include Ukraine in NATO in the near-term – though it appears, not until after the war has ended. Second, explicit warnings to China and to Iran that their continuing support for Russia’s continuing assault on Ukraine will have consequences. Third, expansion of NATO’s mission to include the Middle East and Africa, including the first phase of an action plan to implement it. The Middle East and Africa initiative is the first concrete response by NATO to the systematic influence operation in this region that Russian has been building out for the past five years. It will likely take years before we know whether this southern initiative will meaningfully challenge the current dynamics in which Russia’s rewards to dictators and strongmen have overwhelmed the legacy of influence previously retained by France and other former European colonial powers. 

The NATO Communique is a consensus document reflecting consensus strategic choices. Weak statements by NATO regarding Israel and Hamas and Gaza would not have been helpful to securing a cease-fire or humanitarian objectives. It would have been hard to achieve unanimity on what to say about this complex conflict. So it is not surprising that they did not address it.

To discuss Israel without discussing Iran’s role also would mischaracterize the overall dynamics of the conflict, which include Iranian involvement in Gaza, in Lebanon, in Syria, and in Yemen, including providing military support for attacks on global shipping by the Houthis in the Red Sea. I doubt NATO will wade into taking formal positions on this interrelated set of geopolitical conflicts anytime soon. It has enough on its plate.

Britain’s new Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that the UK allows Ukraine to target Russian territory with the weapons given. What is your comment on other NATO countries giving Ukraine the authority to hit targets within Russia’s borders with Western weapons? Simultaneously, Ukraine targeted Russia’s nuclear early warning radar with unmanned aerial vehicles. Is it fair to say that this is a new phase in the conflict?

Ukraine’s leaders have long stressed that Ukraine is at grave risk if it is prevented from attacking military targets in Russia that are being used against Ukraine. NATO policy has now evolved to move beyond past constraints that limited Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. This evolution is a military and strategic necessity. 

But hitting Russian soil with directly NATO members’ weapons will count as an attack and a defense from Ukraine’s side. Won’t this action make Russia’a argument that this is a proxy war of the NATO?

Russia is already arguing – falsely – that Ukraine is fighting a proxy war for NATO. It’s an audacious falsehood, given Russia’s initiation of the war two and a half years ago and its continued targeting of civilian populations. Russian propaganda should not determine decisions made by Ukraine or by NATO.

Trump’s criticisms of NATO are well known. As the presidential elections approach, the status of NATO under the Trump administration is being discussed. What is your prediction about the budget transferred to NATO and Ukraine’s desire to become a NATO member if Trump wins?

Trump’s four years in office was marked by capricious in-the-moment decisions to say yes to requests from authoritarian leaders in other states which were contrary to the advice of his own senior advisors on national security, generating push-back from within the government by both political appointees and career professionals. Given that dynamic, how Trump’s recurrently expressed hostility towards NATO and towards Ukraine would play out within the US government, within NATO, and globally, should Trump return to office, is unknowable. 

By increasing its defense spendings, Türkiye is reached to the 2% target in NATO first time ever. Also, Ankara’s diplomatic power cannot be denied regarding its role in Russia-Ukraine talks. How do you see Ankara’s position in the organization as Türkiye prepares to host the 2026 NATO Summit?

Türkiye’s geographic location makes its continued support for Ukrainian resistance to Russia’s war against Ukraine essential for NATO, even as it also acts as a broker with Russia, as reflected in the all-too-brief Black Sea Grain deal.  Ankara will continue to be an influential actor, so long as it avoids taking any position seen as fundamentally undermining NATO and its goal of defending Ukraine. The deal ultimately reached to enable Sweden to join NATO reflects the tough, nationalist (and one could say hard-ball) approach taken by Turkish President Erdogan, and also his pragmatism.  

Türkiye’s anti-terror struggle in Syria with YPG is still an unsolved issue. This is according to Türkiye unfortunate that NATO allies underminers NATO borders’, Türkiye’s borders’ security. Then how do you see NATO members’ undermining Ankara’s key issues?

NATO operates by consensus, but NATO member countries do not have total agreement on any number of security issues. There is an extensive history here, including the need to combat the Islamic State a decade ago, that is relevant to this issue. The US and Türkiye have ongoing bilateral opportunities to work through issues on which they do not see eye-to-eye, and this goes on independently of multilateral discussions involving NATO members generally.  

Presidential elections took place in Iran. New President Massoud Pezeshkian wants to revive nuclear talks. What is the US’s approach to the new Iranian President? When you consider it in terms of Biden and Trump policies, which leader will be closer to dialogue with Pezeshkian? What are your expectations?

In important respects, in the area of its foreign policy, including with Iran, the Biden Administration has continued the policies of the Obama Administration from the 2009-2016 period. It has never abandoned the goal of containing Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon through a negotiated settlement. By contrast, Trump has little regard for diplomacy generally, and diplomacy with Iran specifically.

You also served as the Special Envoy to Libya. Considering the point reached in Libya today, that is, the actual division, intransigence and interventions of third countries, can you say that the NATO operation that overthrew Gaddafi was “absolutely right”?

The goal of the NATO operation was to support the Libyan people who had engaged in an uprising against a dictator known for erratic and vindictive behavior, who had previously imprisoned and slaughtered political dissidents. Indeed, he literally ordered the very bones of political opponents ground into dust at Abu Salim prison.

NATO played no role in initiating the Libyan uprising, it supported it weeks later, with an air campaign after cities throughout Libya rebelled against Gaddafi. Such campaigns always have consequences. But blaming NATO for what has happened to Libya is misplaced. Libya’s own political class has failed them, just as Lebanon’s political class, for example, has failed Lebanon.  The past decade of interventions by regional actors and by Russia have merely taken advantage of and exacerbated the internal divisions that had already impaired Libya’s ability to govern itself after Gaddafi’s death. 

The US experienced a great shock when its ambassador was killed in Libya. And Libya was not at the forefront of the agenda for many years. It pursued a policy through his European partners, and European states could not come to an agreement on Libya for a long time. Now, does the US have a clear, understandable and targeted Libya policy? How do you evaluate the United Nations’ Libya policy, which has not been successful so far? Do you see a political reconciliation possible in Libya?

After our Ambassador was murdered by terrorists in Benghazi along with three other Americans, the Obama Administration paused for about a year to evaluate the situation, and then appointed both a new Ambassador and a Special Envoy – the position I held, charged with the goal of doing what we could to try to help stabilize the country. We sought to do this by working closely with a range of countries to help Libyans reach an agreement on an interim unity government in a process sponsored by the United Nations. We did that with the strong personal involvement of Secretary of State Kerry, National Security Advisor Rice, Vice President Biden, and President Obama, among others. That effort, in which we worked to achieve alignment with many other countries as well as the Libyans, resulted in a new government and the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement, which remains the foundational document for the government that still remains in place in Libya, including the House of Representatives and the High State Council.  During the Trump years, the US became less involved, reflecting Trump’s general disdain for diplomacy, other than deals brokered by his son-in-law and consistent with his personal interest. Over the past three years, the Biden Administration has had its hands full in dealing with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the situation in Gaza, and managing the US competition with China, among other issues, and so has had more limited ability to focus fully on Libya.

Except for the brief period when President Trump responded to entreaties by Egypt and the UAE to back Khalifa Hifter’s failed effort to take Tripoli by force, with the help of Russian “mercenaries” backed by Russian President Putin, US policy towards Libya has been consistent. Today, as was true a decade ago, the US wants Libya’s political class to enable free and fair elections in Libya, for both the parliament and the President, and then to abide by the results to form a unified, inclusive government that meets the needs of the Libyan people.

For political reconciliation to take place, Libya’s political leaders need to accept the idea that there will be more for everyone in an inclusive government that bring stability, and that their people deserve to share in the benefits of Libya’s national resources on an equal and inclusive basis. 

Securing such elections and the formation of an inclusive and unified Libyan government have been made harder by the presence of foreign military forces in Libya, especially the rapidly-growing Russian military presence, which it is using to project force to a range of dictators in Africa, as I have described in some detail in my recent writing for the Middle East Institute.

The US is not unrivaled in the Middle East today as it used to be decades ago. Powerful regional countries can oppose the Washington when their own interests are harmed. It seems that other global powers such as Russia and China have also become a significant power in the region. How do you evaluate this new multipolar future of the Middle East?

The Middle East has long been among the most complicated regions in the world, with clashes of interests among many competing groups, religions, forces, ideologies, nationalities, tribes, and other identities. Regional powers, post-colonial powers, local forces and political groups have always competed for influence. The US role has at no time been without such competition and rivals, as reflected 45 years ago when OPEC decided to raise oil prices in a move that was visibly against US interests.

For any non-Middle Eastern country to have sustained influence in the Middle East, it has to offer benefits to not only to the relevant local leaders, but to their people. The US has many strengths and much to offer, but the US cannot succeed without maintaining partnerships with those who share common interests with the United States. To do that, takes focus and attention, and deep engagement that seeks to build enduring relationships to achieve common goals. 

Due to Russia’s cynical support of dictators and warlords in Africa, western interests and Russian interests in the region are currently close to a zero-sum game. But what Russia is doing there, especially in Africa, will ultimately backfire, as the people of those countries find themselves unhappy with having their lives dictated to them by unelected juntas and strongmen backed by Russian pretorian guards. The US should be working on helping elements of civil society to empower a new generation of people with tools that will enable them to build better options, and ultimately better societies. It can be a long slog, but in the end, people demand opportunity and freedom, just as they require food, shelter, health care, and other necessities. Major foreign powers can either be on the side of the people, against them, or absent. The US needs to be both present, and visibly on the right side of these aspirations, just as Russia is present, and visibly on the wrong side of them.

African countries have been colonised until a very near history. Their sources have been exploited by Western countries. The poor people could not get benefit from their own lands and natural richness. Maybe those countries did not have a chance but to try a cooperation with Russia. What would be your comment?

The evidence is not that African juntas, strongmen, and coup leaders are now partnering with Russia in order to improve the lives of their poor, but instead, to get military support to maintain power. In any case, typically involving significant corruption as well. Moreover, Russia has been trolling for African partners for some 60 years now, going back to the 1950s. I can’t think of a single case in which it has gone well for the underlying populations until Russia is eventually pushed out, as took place when Sadat severed relations with the Soviets from Egypt in 1981.  

One of the topics which is discussed most recently is the complete withdrawal of the US from Iraq. In my interviews with both Northern Iraqi officials and Baghdad authorities, I recognized that current politicians want the United States to stay. In fact, analysts in the US states that, far from withdrawing, the US would increase its military presence in Iraq and Syria. What is the final strategy on this?

As near as I can tell, there is no final decision on the future role of the US in Iraq. For the US to stay in Baghdad and/or Northern Iraq, the respective parts of the Iraqi government would have to want a continued US presence in those locations, and secure continued agreement by the US that is in its mutual interest to stay. Whether such agreements will be possible and in the interests of all of the relevant parties is interconnected with Iranian and Kurdish relationships with Iran and its Revolutionary Guards, including Iranian malign activities in both Iraq and Syria. There are legitimate arguments that the US should stay, and others that it should depart. But there is no good reason to make a decision now, ahead of US presidential elections at a time of great regional uncertainty and multiple plausible scenarios for trouble.

What would be the scenerious of the US presence in Iraq if Biden wins or if Trump wins?

I do not think the scenarios are very different based on which administration is President. I have little to say on this topic at this time beyond my previous answer.

INTERVIEW

German economist: Militarization of industry is a path to disaster

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Lucas Zeise, a German economist and co-founder of Financial Times Deutschland, shared his views on the militarization of industry in a recent interview. Zeise said, “If more and more is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of the road to disaster.”

Born in 1944, Lucas Zeise is a financial journalist with a background in philosophy and economics. His career includes positions with the Japanese Ministry of Economics, the German aluminum industry, the Frankfurt-based Börsen-Zeitung, and the Financial Times Deutschland, which he co-founded. Until 2017, he served as editor-in-chief of UZ, the weekly newspaper of the German Communist Party (DKP). He currently writes a regular column for Junge Welt and contributes articles to various publications.

Lucas Zeise answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions about the debate on German industry and economy and global developments.

Tunç Akkoç: First of all, is deindustrialization a reality?

Lucas Zeise: Yes, I think so, but of course it is a long-lasting reality. Deindustrialization is a process that coincides with capitalist development in general. Industry has been the main surplus-value-producing element of capitalism in all countries, and in some of the more developed countries, notably Britain, deindustrialization has reached a more advanced level. Since Britain was the first fully developed capitalist country, this process started earlier.

Economists often refer to this process as the tertiary sector, i.e. the service sector in general. In capitalist countries, the share of services in the economy is steadily increasing. This is a general trend that can be observed everywhere, and is particularly related to the fact that developed countries are gradually shifting their industries to other regions, especially South-East Asia, by exporting capital. While industrialization is taking place in these regions, the process of deindustrialization in developed countries has accelerated.

In addition, the process of financialization has also accelerated and the financial sector has become stronger. However, the finance sector is a service sector, not an industry. Nevertheless, all these service sectors depend on industry remaining strong. When we analyze the UK, we can see that the country has experienced a relative decline compared to other regions. For example, Germany had overtaken the UK in the industrialization process and even surpassed it before the First World War. Likewise, the US has also overtaken the UK in terms of industrialization.

This is a long-term trend. However, two major industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, have managed to resist this process for a long time. The recent economic shocks, however, have accelerated Germany’s deindustrialization process, which has brought about an inevitable crisis. This is the essence of the whole issue.

Tunç Akkoç: Some influential figures in the European Union, such as Mario Draghi, have argued that Germany should move away from the car industry and invest in new technologies such as artificial intelligence. What do you think about such proposals for structural change?

Lucas Zeise: I think such proposals for structural change will happen spontaneously on the one hand. I mean, this process is already going on naturally. China has already overtaken Germany in the car industry. Therefore, Mario Draghi’s advice on this issue is actually a cheap suggestion. It is easy to suggest something like this and then say ‘Great job!'”

On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to steer the economy in this way. It is not enough to say, ‘OK, now we are investing heavily in artificial intelligence and we will get ahead in this field.’ Moreover, it is debatable whether artificial intelligence is really a great revolution or just a passing fad. Artificial intelligence can actually be considered as a sub-branch of the semiconductor industry, i.e. microelectronics.

Of course, the development of microelectronics is important and all countries are making state-sponsored investments in this field. The European Union and Germany are already encouraging this. However, this is not something that is unique to Germany or something that makes Germany different from others. While it is possible to make great progress in this area, this alone is not the final solution to a problem.

Tunç Akkoç: In general, how do you assess Germany’s future energy supply strategy?

Lucas Zeise: Obviously, I am not an expert in this field, so it is difficult for me to give a really good assessment. But it seems very clear to me that all states have to pay attention to such a central sector of the economy.

Germany was already in a different position in that it did not have its own oil companies. This has become a historical tradition. As for natural gas, there used to be two big centers: one centered around BASF, the other around Ruhrgas. These two structures were interconnected and worked well for a while. Over time, however, this system changed and other areas of the energy sector, especially electricity generation, were restructured.

However, this does not change the fact that the energy sector must be guided by the state. Energy policy should be managed by the state in a holistic manner. Developing a common energy policy in the European Union already seems unlikely. However, such a policy should have been mandatory for such a large common market.

At this point, if we look at the example of Turkey, the energy sector there is handled, managed and coordinated in a relatively centralized manner. In Germany, and at the EU level in general, there is a major deficiency in this respect. The state does not really take enough ownership of the energy issue.

Tunç Akkoç: On the other hand, German industry is increasingly turning to the defense industry. Some see in the militarization of the economy the potential for a kind of ‘re-industrialization’. After the war in Ukraine, more and more German companies are breaking the taboo on supplying the defense industry and entering the military equipment sector. How should we assess this development?

Lucas Zeise: On the one hand, this is clearly a sign of the collapse of the still developing and relatively well-functioning global economy. If more and more of it is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this activity is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of a road to disaster.

It is also clear that there is competition for the best defense tenders in the international arena. That is why everyone feels that it needs to enter this field strongly. Nobody just wants to buy aircraft from the US, but wants to build their own defense industry. Germany was already taking part in this process. Although not always at the forefront, tank production in particular has long been strong. This sector was progressing steadily, albeit at a slow pace.

However, this development seems to herald an impending catastrophe. It shows that everyone is preparing for war. This is very similar to the atmosphere before the First World War.

Tunç Akkoç: Elections are approaching in Germany. Do you think that after these elections, Germany’s economic policies will change with a new political order?

Lucas Zeise: More likely no, I don’t think so. I think that economic issues have become a bit more prominent, but if we look back, I remember that in the German Bundestag elections in 1969, one of the main debates in the election campaign was whether the German Mark (D-Mark) should appreciate against the US Dollar. So, a very specific and economically critical issue for Germany at that time was at the center of the election campaign. This debate was directly related to the position Germany should take vis-à-vis the US and Europe.

Today such a debate is missing. The issues that really need to be addressed —energy policy, deindustrialization— are being dealt with in a strangely distorted way. The only thing that everyone seems to agree on is the Agenda 2010 program that Gerhard Schröder launched in 2002 or 2003. This program meant lowering wages, reducing social benefits and increasing profit-making opportunities for companies.

But this approach was already wrong at the time. Schröder’s move enabled some big companies to make a big leap forward and strengthened German capital, especially in the European domestic market. This had certain advantages, but repeating it now would only worsen the situation.

That’s why I think the debate is being conducted in the wrong way and not particularly along party lines. On the contrary, there seems to be a consensus among most political actors on this issue.

Tunç Akkoç: How do you assess the first actions of the Trump administration and what will be the impact on international relations and the global economy?

Lucas Zeise: In my opinion, there is not a new wave of deregulation (liberalization). The US government’s more aggressive stance towards other great powers, or as Trump calls them, ‘shitholes’, or small states, ruthlessly suppressing and crushing them, is not deregulation. It is, in fact, a further intensification of the rivalry between the capitalist states, which are essentially allies, by any means necessary. We can see this situation clearly.

This is not deregulation; it is more like what happened during the Ronald Reagan era. At that time, the US tried to revitalize its rivalry, not with China, but especially with Japan and Western Europe. Reagan’s ruthless behavior towards his own allies was aimed at strengthening the US global position. Today, I think it has become even harsher, so much so that the President of the US can stand up and say, ‘Oh Denmark, you have to give us Greenland, or else we will buy it.’ They even imply that they can intervene directly if necessary.

This kind of behavior is actually a continuation of the past US policies towards Panama. Panama was detached from Colombia and made independent because the US wanted to build a canal there. In other words, this imperialist behavior towards weak countries is already a tradition. But the behavior towards medium-sized states such as Germany, Britain, France or Japan is becoming more and more brutal. I see this as the result of an intensifying and ever more bitter rivalry.

The US in particular is less and less reluctant to use its military power more recklessly, and this is becoming more and more prominent. This is not a new era; it is a further advance of neoliberalism and laissez-faire. The so-called ‘rules-based economic policy’ rhetoric has been completely discarded.

Tunç Akkoç: We see both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic comments about the Chinese economy. When government bonds lose value, pessimists sound the alarm; when exports break records, optimists raise their voices. Does China have the intention or the power to ‘share’ the world with the US?

Lucas Zeise: I completely agree with you; the overly optimistic comments are as exaggerated as the overly pessimistic ones. If I try to think from the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders, their tradition has been to position China as the largest economic power and to take the first place in the capitalist world.

In the present situation, if I am the second most powerful country, naturally my goal is to equalize with the first. And I have to do this because there is almost no scenario in which the US will accept this and say, ‘OK, we can live in peace with China.’ For a while it seemed as if there was this understanding, that we were working well with China and we were happy with that. But this is clearly no longer possible.

The official US policy is based on not allowing China to become an equal power. They want to continue to set the rules and, if necessary, to violate them according to their own interests. Therefore, China is forced to act like an imperial power.

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INTERVIEW

Head of Roscongress: Local currencies are used to bypass sanctions

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Alexander Stuglev, the Head of  Roscongress Foundation, spoke to Harici: “For easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS can be used.”

With the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow has increasingly turned to business diplomacy and international trade cooperation as strategic tools to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. Central to this effort is Roscongress Foundation, Russia’s premier organization for fostering global economic dialogue and partnerships. Established to enhance Russia’s business ties internationally, Roscongress serves as a bridge connecting Russian enterprises with global markets through high-profile forums such as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). The organization plays a critical role in reshaping Russia’s economic development by emphasizing collaboration with emerging economies, strengthening ties with traditional partners, and exploring new trade opportunities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Roscongress was organized a meeting in Istanbul and Alexander Stuglev, the Head of  Roscongress Foundation, replied the questions of Harici.

As we understand, Roscongress is the main tool for business diplomacy and to eliminate the impacts of Western sanctions. Can you tell us more about the organization?

Yes, you have noticed correctly, Roscongress was established in 2007 as a non-financial development institution that deals with the organization and holding of major international economic and political events in Russia in the interests of attracting investments to the Russian Federation and developing the economy of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, while organizing events we, of course, proceed from the fact that in addition to interaction between Russia and businessmen from a particular country, direct connections can also be established with third countries, that we are also welcoming.

Could you tell us more about the opportunities and risks you see in Turkish-Russian relations in business sector?

Undoubtedly, to some extent, sanctions affect the development of Russian-Turkish relations and, in general, business relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, today, all those who use these turbulences in a pragmatic way to build their business projects in Russia are winning, occupying the vacated niches from Western countries, developing their own business. And from the point of view of easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) can be used.

First of all, there are always risks out there, marketing risks included. Secondly, in addition to the fact that Turkish companies have occupied the niches vacated by Western companies, we see a general change in the structure of the Russian economy with a greater focus on creating products and services within Russia.

Tourism for example; the number of tourist trips that have now emerged in Russia is many times higher than there were before COVID, about 83 million trips are made by Russian citizens annually within Russia.  And this requires the infrastructure development.

Taking into account the large number of support programs from the Russian state for companies that are developing tourism infrastructure, there are great chances, for foreign companies as well, if they organize a Russian legal entity in the format of an LTD and get the opportunity to develop their projects. This is one of the possibilities.

Creative industry, computer IT security, IT products; in all those areas we can cooperate completely freely. These are such cross-border industries, where, I think, it’s very difficult to be a subject for sanctions.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin set a goal of increasing bilateral trade volume to $100 billion. Do you see an expansion or a contraction in the Turkish-Russian trade volume in 2025?

Firstly, this is practically 100% growth to what we have now.As for the forecast for 2025-2026, the main thing is,first: in my opinion, the construction of transport and logistics projects.There is the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea for example.Second; this is cooperation in the field of energy. Thirdly, this is cooperation in the field of chemistry (creation of chemical products) from supplied raw materials, from oil and gas.This is a promising area of pharmaceuticals, supplies of medical equipment, as well as medical services in Türkiye.Undoubtedly, the development of tourism is very promising but also creative industry, IT industry, Cybersecurity.These are the areas that, in my opinion, will develop in the near future. Of course, traditional cooperation in the field of metallurgy.Traditional cooperation in the field of agriculture and food supplies will grow for sure.

What challenges do sanctions pose to bilateral relations?

The first is an axis from the sanctions regime, including through payment in national currencies and using digital currencies. The second is business, thanks to its capabilities, will find a solution to any restrictions. I do not want to go into details now, do not want to disclose the details of the opportunities that companies can use to maintain a normal trade balance.

Anti-colonial movements in Africa seem to have opened up space for Russia in both diplomatic and commercial terms. How do you assess the situation there?

This is an anti-colonialist movement not only in relation to France, but also in relation to other countries. This is also a movement in relation to proposals that are unfair to Africa, for example, on the green transition, because it will destroy African business and will give great advantages to global companies. In my opinion, it is necessary to proceed from the interests of African countries, which, in fact, Russia always does. This is the advantage of our economy and politics.

We work in a ‘win-win’ mode. In the same way, the Turkish side can work in Africa. In the same way, Chinese investors have been actively working in Africa to this day in the form of the prospects of this market. But based on common interests, on the one hand there is a creation of profitable enterprises. On the other hand – the development of the African economy.  Only this will provide an opportunity for further mutual growth. If we simply export material resources from the colonies as a consumer and do not give anything in return, nothing good will come for sure.

After the fall of Assad government, does Russia have any interest in doing business in the reconstruction of Syria?

I am sure that Russian companies will take part in this process, just like other international companies. Now a period of political stabilization will pass and a period of certain growth will begin. The main thing is that extremist movements and non-constructive movements in relation to Syria and the Syrian people do not prevail in politics.  I believe that politics and economics will improve in the near future.

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INTERVIEW

‘Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis’

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From January 9 to 11, the World Festival of the Antifascist International took place in Caracas, Venezuela. More than 2,000 national and international guests from more than 100 countries, as well as other Venezuelan cities, attended the event. Among them were representatives of social movements, political parties, cultural and popular organizations, intellectuals, indigenous peoples, youth, students, workers, parliamentarians, communicators and other personalities. The mega activity was carried out within the framework of the Inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, who on January 10, was sworn in as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the period 2025-2031, and also served as an example of international support for the continuity of the Bolivarian Revolution under the leadership of Maduro. Another important event that surrounded the Festival was the Inauguration of Donald Trump this January 20.

The Italian-Argentine philosopher Rocco Carbone, who has delved into the discursivities and political and cultural processes of Latin America, was born in Cosenza, Calabria, in southern Italy, but has lived for more than 20 years in the Argentine capital, Buenos Aires. Carbone studied at the Università degli Studi della Calabria. He received his doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Zürich, Switzerland, and currently teaches at the National University of General Sarmiento (UNGS) and is part of the prestigious world of Argentine scientific research center CONICET.

In addition to the aforementioned International Fascist Festival, Carbone participated in other activities carried out in Caracas within the framework of the Inauguration of President Nicolás Maduro, such as the January 9 March; the Swearing-in on January 10; and, the III World Communication Congress of the University of Communications (LAUICOM) held on January 11, among others. In that sense, Harici was able to talk with the Italian-Argentine philosopher about what fascism is, who is Argentine with Javier Milei as its president, and what is coming for Latin America and the world with the arrival of Trump to the White House.

Venezuela has just celebrated the International World Anti-Fascite Festival. Can you give us a definition of what fascism is and how it is expressed today?

The first thing I would tell you is that fascism is never something new, fascism is always old. With this I want to tell you that I am a little reluctant to talk about neofascism, but rather the word fascism convinces me more. I know that, at least in Argentina, where I have lived for more than 20 years, and also in the rest of Latin America this is a difficult word. It is a difficult word from political theory, from political action, for different reasons. But, without a doubt, when we say fascism we are referring to the Italian experience, to the German experience of the 20th century, which were experiences that extended more or less between the 20s, 30s and 40s. But if one theorizes this word a little, in the 20th century we see fascism in different places, that is, fascism in the 20th century was an international force. We find fascism, for example, in Great Britain, where in the 1920s and 1930s there was the British Union of Fascists, led by Oswald Mosley, a guy who had trained with Lord Keynes, the key to economics who was part of a brain of the Blackmore Group.

For example, in old China in the 1930s, within the Kuomintang of the Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Sun Yat-sen, there also existed a dual power apparatus called the Blue Shirt Association, which was an apparatus fascist type military politician. If we think about Our America, for example, in Cuba governed by Gerardo Machado y Morales, the greatest fact against that political experience is that he persecuted a great militant who was part of the student movement and the Cuban labor movement, Julio Antonio Mella. Being an avid writer, in some of his texts, which we can read today because they have been preserved, Mella called Machado Morales “the tropical Mussolini”, that is, Mella identified Machado as a fascist. Then Mella had to exile himself from Cuba and went to live in Mexico and Machado had him murdered.

And if we think about Argentina in the 1930s, the so-called “Infamous Decade”, there was an Argentine fascist party recognized by the Italian fascist party that had a mass experience, especially in the city of Córdoba, where it was led by a relatively important Argentine Thomist philosopher, Nimio Juan Manuel de Anquí.

And why do I say all this? Because everything that is in history, everything that is in the political history of the world and in the political history of Latin America, at some later point, that history can be reactivated again. And it seems to me that this is happening today in Our America with different expressions of politics that if we call it right or extreme right or extreme right, we say absolutely nothing, because that is an insufficient descriptive expression.

So it seems to me that using these categories says nothing, for example, about the Venezuelan opposition, about Milei, about Bolsonaro. And it seems to me that this word, fascism, has indeed been reactivated. Now you ask me to give a definition of fascism, and I believe that we can think of fascism in many ways, we can think of it in relation to statehood, but we can think of it as political power without necessarily linking it to the nation-state.

Regarding Javier Milei, you have just released a book about the type of fascism that the Argentine president characterizes. Tell us a little about that.

Yes, the book is precisely called “Flamethrower: Milei and Psychotizing Fascism.” Fascism is a psychotizing power because it is a power that tends to drive the citizen, the free organizations of the people, the political parties, and politics crazy… Fascism is a power that discursively, but also politically, when it makes policy, always says two things at the same time and these things contradict each other.

In the case of Milei we can see it clearly, for example, when he was in the middle of the presidential campaign, Milei said that the current Minister of Economy, his Minister of Economy, Luis Caputo, was a criminal and a thief, because he had requested a loan from the IMF for 45 billion dollars, which became an enormous Argentine external debt. But then, when Milei won the presidential election, he chose Caputo as economy minister and now praises him.

Well, there we effectively see a power that narratively says two things at the same time that deny each other. That is why I say that it is a psychotizing power, that is, a power that tends to drive the citizens crazy. And, from my point of view, that psychotizing style basically tends to at least inhibit the popular response to fascism. That is the psychotizing element, the permanent contradictory element, that activates fascist power. We also see it in the permanent development of policies.

In the case of Milei, before becoming president he was briefly a deputy, and when he was a parliamentarian he voted in favor of the elimination, for example, of a tax that is the Income tax (also called the tax on great wealth). Milei voted against that entry, because for him, the Argentine State is a kind of evildoer, it is a kind of thief. The State is a kind of criminal because it taxes the citizens. However, now that he is president he is reinstating the income tax. Once again we see a contradictory policy that balances between a denial and an affirmation.

I believe that in this way we can understand fascism: as a kind of latent political force that is present in the life of people, as a kind of small person (a dwarf) that is – to a greater or lesser extent – in each one. of us and that, appropriately stimulated, grows again.

This January 20, the White House has a new tenant. What can we expect from Trump’s international policy towards Venezuela and Latin America?

Klara Zetkin in her 1923 text: “Fight against fascism. And how to defeat it”, argues that fascism is “a tool of capitalism in crisis.” In that sense, Trump is the head of state who represents the maximum expression of capitalism, and when capitalism is in crisis (in fact, Trump feels that the United States is in crisis, is in danger) to surf that crisis and stay afloat, capitalism expands. a much more radical tool than capitalism itself: fascism. It seems to me that this is a great definition to understand what we are talking about when we talk about fascism, because as we said before, that word activates historical comparisons, which can confuse us or divert us a little. And it seems to me that if, on the contrary, we connect it with the rationality of capitalism, especially the capitalism in crisis that we are experiencing in the 21st century, that is, a capitalism that has many dimensions, there is a productive capitalism, analog capitalism, there is another platform capitalism, financial or digital, there is another type of capitalism, specifically in Latin America, the narco capitalism.

And capitalism at this moment is going through a transition phase, because there is a dispute for the hegemony of capitalism between the old US imperialism and new emerging countries, such as the BRICS. I am referring to Russia, I am thinking of China, India, Iran, which are disputing that hegemony, that leadership. 

And so, because capitalism is closely linked to imperialism, the United States feels the pressure of that crisis. Trump has expressed it several times, for him American power is in crisis, in decline. So in different places in the Western world, forms of fascism are activated so that capitalism stays afloat, stays alive and reaffirms itself in this moment of transition from one hegemony to another hegemony, which we still do not know what it will be. Let’s say, this neo-hegemony or hegemonism is still uncertain, but it seems to me that the world is moving towards it, therefore, it seems to me that we must effectively understand it under that paradigm: fascism as a tool of capitalism in crisis.

As to how Trump’s arrival at the White House may affect Venezuela, this is also a bit uncertain. But the obvious thing is that the Trump administration needs an antagonist. If Israel and Gaza reach a prolonged peace agreement, beyond the circumstantial ceasefire, and if Trump manages to end the war in Ukraine. The United States will exert greater pressure and interference against Venezuela. Trump is acting psychotically against the Chinese government, his main enemy in the fight to maintain global hegemony. That is why thinking about a “reasonable capitalism” is nonsense, which is why people must unite and organize.

What do we do?

Imagining and organizing a new world, alternative to the power schemes of powers that do not fight to achieve something but rather covet everything that exists is the task of participation and struggle for the forces of emancipation that vibrate in the ideas of social justice. and egalitarianism. National and popular forces with the Latin American perspective of the great Homeland. Because, what is a town, after all? It is not a fixed or eternal idea but an idea that names and summons the possibility of being constituted in each historical stage. That idea indicates less a large number, a large conglomerate, or a conspicuous number of people mobilized than a fluctuating community experiencing an epiphany. A revelation of power, of knowledge, of beauty, of shared knowledge. A social bond, a hug. An experience: a constitutive part of what one is and without which one cannot be, nor continue to be. From Our America it must still be possible to imagine and organize an emancipatory action – spliced ​​with the dimensions of multipolarity and the BRICS – constituted around a popular slogan: Make Antifascism Great Again, on the 80th anniversary of the subordination of archaeological fascism at the hands of the revolution.

Notes

“Flamethrower. Milei and psychotizing fascism” (2024) by Rocco Carbone. In this essay, the Italian-Argentine philosopher maintains that “fascism is a highly psychotizing or maddening political power. And this characteristic is expressed very well in Milei, because Every time Milei speaks he says two things that clash with each other, for example: First he said: ‘Pope Francis is the representative of the evil one on earth’ and then, when he makes a trip to Rome and visits the Vatican, he says: “The Pope is the most important Argentine in history.” In this text, Rocco invites us to resist and combat this political power because “fascism does not imply an idea different from our own, but the death of all ideas.” And he concludes that “Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis,” a thought previously postulated (1923) by the feminist and German communist deputy Klara Zetkin (1857-1933) in the text “Fight against fascism. And how to beat it.”

In “Mafia capital: The hidden logics of power” (2019) the philosopher maintains that: “Organized crime (now nationalized) has a very broad advantage over Argentine democracy and its laws.” In his text, Rocco reviews Latin American history and the recent radicalization of neoliberal governments. It also describes the development of the Mafia, from its origins and how: “in just two generations it stopped being a regional and rural organization to become another, made up of modern, cosmopolitan and refined businessmen, with doctorates, capable of expressing themselves and doing things.” His work has been published in many languages.

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