On May 7, while the world focused on the Trump administration’s launch of a trade war, a brief but intense military clash broke out between India and Pakistan on the South Asian subcontinent. That day, the Pakistani military announced it had shot down five Indian fighter jets, destroyed multiple Indian checkpoints, and hit several Indian outposts. India also confirmed that at least three of its jets had “crashed” in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

On May 8, the Pakistani military claimed it had shot down 25 Israeli-made “Harpy” drones and accused India of further “escalating the conflict.” Pakistan’s Ministry of Information said about 50 Indian soldiers were killed near the India-Pakistan Line of Control in Kashmir. On the same day, India accused Pakistan of using drones and missiles to attack Punjab in Indian-controlled Kashmir. In response, the Indian military launched counterattacks and destroyed several targets.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Dar confirmed that after the exchange of fire in the Kashmir region, the national security advisors of both countries had communicated. On the evening of May 8, Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale emphasized to the media that India’s launched “Operation Sindoor” did not target specific military sites, only terrorist facilities in Pakistan and locations clearly linked to cross-border attacks against India. He also stated that India had no intention of escalating the situation. Another positive sign was the reopening of three sluice gates of two upstream hydropower stations on the Chenab River that had been closed by India, which restored water supply to downstream Pakistan.

Observers noted that although military engagement had not completely ceased, the intensity of the exchanges was clearly decreasing. Moreover, India kept sending de-escalation signals. Therefore, this limited conflict between two nuclear powers is expected to gradually end and is unlikely to develop into a fourth Indo-Pakistani war. Analysts pointed out that the traditional India-Pakistan conflict remains unresolved. This round of military posturing triggered by India, apart from serving domestic political agendas, can only exacerbate tensions in South Asia and does not help rebuild neighborly relations or realize India’s dream of becoming a major power.

The India-Pakistan conflict once again escalated from a seemingly minor incident. To some extent, India exaggerated the situation, turning a terrorist attack into the largest air battle between the two South Asian powers in nearly half a century.

On April 22, a terrorist attack occurred in Pahalgam, Indian-controlled Kashmir. Three gunmen went on a rampage, killing 26 civilians. Without conducting a full investigation, the Indian government immediately concluded it was a “Pakistan-sponsored terrorism” incident and declared a series of strong retaliatory measures. Subsequently, India expelled Pakistani diplomats, canceled the bilateral trade agreement, and even cut off water supplies critical for Pakistan’s agriculture and daily life. India’s simplistic and aggressive approach clearly aimed to pin the blame on Pakistan without debate, placing itself in a favorable position in public discourse and paving the way for further actions.

On April 29, Indian Prime Minister Modi, ignoring Pakistan’s repeated denials and calls for an impartial international investigation, publicly authorized the Indian armed forces to respond decisively to the terrorist attack. He claimed that the Indian military had “full operational freedom” to decide on any military response in terms of method, target, and timing. In the face of India’s aggressive stance, Pakistan refused to back down and raised its own level of readiness, even threatening to use nuclear weapons.

In the early hours of May 7, the Indian military launched the first strike of the border clash code-named “Operation Sindoor” bombing multiple targets within Pakistan. India’s press bureau confirmed nine Pakistani targets were hit. Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper reported airstrikes on five cities including Muzaffarabad (capital of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir) and Bahawalpur in Punjab province, with power outages in some cities. Pakistan’s military intelligence reported that multiple regions were hit by Indian missile attacks and its air force had entered full wartime status. Soon after, Pakistan’s national TV quoted military sources saying Pakistan had started retaliation, launching missiles at Indian border camps, outposts, and airbases, and shooting down five Indian fighter jets. As of the early hours of May 8, Pakistan reported 31 deaths and 57 injuries.

According to U.S. media, both sides deployed jets in an unprecedented aerial battle within their own airspace, involving 125 aircraft, with the furthest fire range exceeding 165 km. It was later confirmed that the Indian aircraft shot down by Pakistan included three French-made Rafale fighters, one Russian-made MiG-29, one Su-30MKI, and one Heron drone.

The Rafale is India’s most advanced main fighter, roughly 3.5 generations. Some military enthusiasts believe the Pakistani jets likely involved in the kills were JF-17s equipped with PL-15E air-to-air missiles and LY-80 air defense systems. The Pakistani Air Force now operates over 150 JF-17s, and the PL-15E has a range of up to 145 km. The outcome of this military confrontation shows that, despite being at a general disadvantage, Pakistan achieved high-level results in air combat, gaining the upper hand over India in terms of morale.

Although both sides fought fiercely and India did not gain any advantage—in fact, it even suffered some losses—this local conflict initiated by India seems to have reached a turning point as India was the first to show weakness.

First, the Indian Air Force, which launched the air raids, did not dare to enter Pakistani territory, and Pakistan, with a sense of restraint, also ordered its air force to avoid entering Indian airspace.

Second, India took the initiative to inform Russia, the UK, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the US about the details of “Operation Sindoor”. This not only appeared to be an attempt to form alliances but also showed a desire for mediation and an intention to end things while ahead.

Third, despite multiple aircraft being shot down, India was the first to “blink” and show goodwill, emphasizing to other countries that it had “no intention of escalating” the current situation and was prepared to respond firmly only if Pakistan chose to escalate.

The sudden India-Pakistan conflict added a new wave of anxiety to an already chaotic world, momentarily diverting attention from ongoing hotspots like the U.S. tariff war, the Red Sea crisis, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Iran nuclear issue, and the Russia-Ukraine war. China, the United Nations, the EU, and other countries and international organizations called on both sides to exercise restraint and avoid escalation or expansion of the conflict. Iran and Turkey actively engaged in mediation, while the U.S. government, which usually supports India, maintained an ambiguous stance this time. President Trump expressed confidence that both sides could properly handle the crisis on their own.

This conflict has most likely already passed its peak and is expected to shift toward lower-intensity confrontations or even non-military strategies. However, India’s overreaction, which triggered a major clash, raises questions and deserves analysis.

First, the Pahalgam terror attack carries suspicions of being staged. After the attack, Indian media claimed that the “Resistance Front,” a peripheral group of the Muslim militant organization “Lashkar-e-Taiba” active in Indian-controlled Kashmir, claimed responsibility. Indian security agencies accused several attackers of coming from Pakistan. However, a few days later, the “Resistance Front” officially denied any involvement, stating that the earlier “claim” was fabricated by Indian cyber intelligence through hacking. Pakistani officials accused Indian intelligence of once again “staging” the attack, aiming to tarnish Pakistan’s international image and serve a Hindu fundamentalist political agenda at home.
On May 1, the messaging app Telegram revealed that India’s intelligence agency had orchestrated the attack and framed Pakistan, with the leak attributed to Lieutenant General Rana, head of India’s intelligence service. Rana was later mysteriously dismissed.

Second, India’s refusal to accept the joint investigation proposal is unreasonable. After the Pahalgam attack, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz called for a credible, transparent, and neutral international investigation. India not only firmly rejected this but quickly took a series of retaliatory measures, unilaterally placing the blame on Pakistan. Analysts believe this abnormal behavior indicates India’s intent to obscure the truth and facts in order to justify military actions.

Third, Pakistan currently has nothing to gain from escalating tensions. South Asia experts believe that Pakistan’s political situation has gradually stabilized this year, though its economy remains in difficulty and security has not fundamentally improved. Actively provoking a large-scale military conflict with India would entail enormous risks, so Pakistan has adopted a defensive posture and is unlikely to attack India by sponsoring terrorism.

Fourth, India has a domestic political need to act aggressively against Pakistan. Analysts point out that Modi has consistently promoted Hindu nationalism and marginalized the Muslim population. His political legitimacy relies on the growing influence of Hindu nationalist ideology, which in turn creates a dependency and entanglement between the two. Terror attacks from Pakistani or Muslim backgrounds and strong retaliatory measures reinforce Modi’s nationalistic and religious narrative.

Fifth, India has taken the opportunity to further advance the “Indianization” of the Kashmir region.
After Modi’s re-election in 2019, his government strengthened central control and the “Indianization” process over Indian-controlled Kashmir by stripping it of its special autonomous status, dissolving its legislative assembly, and changing it from an autonomous state to a centrally governed territory. This further suppressed the national and religious identity of the local Muslim population, complicated prospects for resolving the Kashmir issue, and incited the rise of radical, extremist, and even terrorist forces. The Modi government even attempted to legitimize the annexation of Kashmir to the international community by holding a G20 ministerial meeting in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

India and Pakistan have sharply opposing views on the status of Kashmir. India insists that Kashmir is an inseparable part of its inherent territory, while Pakistan stresses that the future of Kashmir should be decided by its people through a referendum based on relevant UN resolutions. This divergence in stance has led to subtle differences in how the two sides shape public opinion and also explains the frequent terrorist attacks in Indian-controlled Kashmir. Modi’s government, by forcefully “Indianizing” Kashmir six years ago, has undoubtedly intensified the existing conflict. It has consistently rejected Pakistan’s proposals for territorial negotiations, instead demanding that Pakistan first address terrorism before any talks on territorial disputes. In doing so, India unilaterally sets the agenda for improving bilateral relations while forcing Pakistan to take responsibility for terrorist attacks unrelated to it—pushing the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue into a dead end.

This round of India-Pakistan conflict, due to their nuclear power status, complex geopolitical context, and fragile internal politics, is unlikely to escalate into a fourth large-scale war. Rather, it has followed the familiar narrative logic and storyline seen in the past. However, through this incident, observers can clearly see that under the Modi administration, India has indeed made significant progress in economic development. Its comprehensive national strength and geopolitical weight have far surpassed Pakistan’s. Furthermore, China, the U.S., Russia, the EU, and even Japan are all competing to win India over in complex geopolitical games, fueling Modi’s sense of superiority to an unprecedented level. This has led India to drift further into the illusion of the “Indian Dream” and the pursuit of great power status, even to the point of losing touch with reality.

A powerful India has not only become “naturally aggressive” toward Pakistan but has also adopted a rigid and confrontational posture in its relations with China. Rather than showing gratitude for China’s support in India’s inclusion in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, India has continuously obstructed China within the organization and in BRICS, manipulating the Kashmir issue through the G20 and even openly competing for leadership among the Global South—bringing India back to the early days of the Non-Aligned Movement after WWII.

In fact, India remains a major South Asian power, a subregional power. Its blind confidence, arrogance, and narcissistic pursuit of a power status beyond its actual capabilities may prove counterproductive. This rash provocation of a rare conflict with Pakistan—and the humiliating defeat in the air battle—might hopefully awaken the Modi government from its self-induced great power fantasy, prompting a return to more realistic foreign and strategic policies, and the adoption of power strategies and goals that match India’s true national strength and position.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

A while ago, when Syria still had a state, I had the opportunity to correspond with a Kurdish nationalist on a social network. I was arguing (and I still hold this view today) that independence under the US umbrella actually meant nothing more than a neocolonial dependency relationship. He, however, had taken the traditional rhetoric of Kurdish nationalism (“it’s a tactic”) up a notch and believed (and probably still does) that the US possessed unique and invincible power, not just in a specific historical period, but throughout history—or at least throughout the history of imperialism. I’m adding the phrase “history of imperialism”; there was no place for imperialism in his words. So, the issue was no longer a matter of “tactics” at a certain stage (and in those circles, that word has always meant a lack of strategy), but had directly become a matter of siding with a superhero in the world order—that is, being on the side of the one who always wins and always will win.

Thus, our correspondence extended to other historical periods before that day, and eventually, we arrived at World War II. And then, an assertion I encountered for the first time genuinely stunned me: he acknowledged that the Soviet peoples had suffered great losses, but this, he claimed, did not mean at all that the Soviet Union had won the war. On the contrary; the US had won the war through its alliance politics, military tactics, and economic superiority, and moreover, had achieved this without suffering great losses, which pointed to an immense political talent, thereby reinforcing the power of the victory.

This is, in the most fundamental sense of the concept, a purely ideological stance, because historical truth has been completely turned on its head.

No one, neither during Soviet history nor today, presents the number of casualties as the measure of victory. That would be an idiotic assertion anyway, because throughout history, there are many victories where the victorious side suffered far greater losses than the defeated armies. That doesn’t mean the defeated actually won. Victory in a war is achieved when one of two conditions—which are actually two different expressions of the same thing—is met:

1. Enemy armies are physically destroyed;
2. The enemy’s will to fight is broken.

The number of casualties gives an idea about the intensity, brutality, savagery, and lawlessness of the war; it indicates its nature. But casualty rates are completely irrelevant to the outcome of the war.

1) Physical annihilation of the enemy

On June 22, 1941, the balance of forces on the western border of the Soviet Union was roughly as follows (I am quoting this based on relatively recent research; older sources show the fascist alliance as overwhelmingly superior in the balance of forces):

Ostensibly, the Red Army was far superior to the enemy in terms of tanks and combat aircraft; in reality, the situation was different. Within the entire tank inventory, the legendary T-34s were still very few (at most 1,200), as were the SU series self-propelled gun systems (at most 300), and moreover, not all of them were at the front line. In contrast, in the fascist alliance, if one doesn’t count the almost dysfunctional Panzer Is and the Czech-made Pz series, which the Germans did not much trust, the number of all tanks and Stug III type self-propelled gun systems was over 2,500. Of the total combat aircraft, only 1,540 were new planes capable of dealing with the enemy, and most of these were destroyed in the first week due to the rapid advance of enemy forces.

In short, the fascist German forces and their allies were far superior in terms of troop numbers, technology, equipment, and materiel.

Another aspect of the balance of forces is this: 3.3 million of the Wehrmacht’s total 4.12 million combat personnel (including the SS) were deployed to the Eastern Front. This constitutes 80 percent of the combat troops. Similarly, 84 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery systems, 67 percent of artillery and mortars, and 80 percent of combat aircraft were on the Eastern Front.

Try to picture this: This war machine had occupied all of Europe; countries not occupied were fascist collaborators. British forces and their allies had been ignominiously chased out of Dunkirk. In Europe, there were only local resistance movements, mostly organized by communists. And the German army, with almost 80 percent of its entire strength, had attacked the Soviet Union.

In Germany alone, a total of nearly 18 million people were mobilized and fought in the ranks of the Wehrmacht. Approximately 5.5 million of them died on the battlefields and in prisoner-of-war camps. Nearly 80 percent of military deaths occurred on the Eastern Front.

In contrast, nearly 35 million people were mobilized in the Red Army throughout the war. Of these, 8.7 million died or went missing. More than 3 million of these were deaths in concentration camps.

Therefore:

While Germany’s civilian losses constituted about 25 percent of its total losses (7.4-8.5 million), the Soviet Union’s civilian losses constituted 60 percent of its total losses. In contrast, about 30 percent of the German army’s total combatants throughout the war were killed in clashes with the Red Army. About 15 percent of the Red Army’s total combatants throughout the war were killed in clashes with fascist armies.

In other words, the Red Army ended the war in a “positive” manner (in Clausewitz’s terms) by destroying 30 percent of the enemy.

2) Breaking the enemy’s will

Starting immediately after the Stalingrad debacle, from the spring of 1943 onwards, a series of secret peace talks were held in Switzerland between fascist German officials and Westerners, primarily Americans. I will not delve into conspiracy theories; presumably, at this stage, no faction in the US, even if inclined, could risk a separate peace. However, for fascist Germany, attempts to narrow the enemy front due to defeats on the Eastern Front were becoming increasingly necessary.

Even after Normandy in June 1944, the center of fascist resistance was the Eastern Front. This is evident from the numbers. Already at the Tehran Conference (November 28 – December 1, 1943), the Soviet Union’s insistence on its allies opening a second front in Europe had weakened because the self-confidence to destroy the enemy single-handedly, albeit at a heavier cost, had been reinforced by the victories gained.

Therefore, the common refrain in Western secondary school textbooks does not reflect reality: (At the Tehran Conference) “The Soviet Union agreed to launch a major offensive against Germany from the east.” (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub., Module 11, World War II.) Yet, by this time, the victory at Kursk had been won, Kyiv had been liberated; there was only one month left to break the Leningrad blockade, and only three months left to cross the USSR borders at every point on the Ukrainian front. In other words, the Red Army was already on the offensive in all directions. Moreover, according to much research, the Normandy landings had not paralyzed the fascist armies, nor did the Red Army’s advance gain extra momentum because of the Normandy landings.

Not even the suicide of their “beloved Führer” on April 30th, nor even the morning of May 8th, had completely broken fascist Germany’s will to resist. Perhaps the most concrete indicator of this is the story of Göring’s surrender to the Americans. It is generally assumed that Göring was immediately arrested; this is not true: he was arrested only the next day, with the definitive fall of Berlin, because the will of the fascist beast was completely broken only at that moment.

3) “History falsifiers”

While working on this article, I had the opportunity to look at 10th and 11th-grade history textbooks in the US and Britain, as well as another high school supplementary textbook in Britain (“Russia and its Rulers”). (This last one is surprisingly objective compared to the others.) There is no information in these about the countries’ losses in the war. The answers to the questions of who destroyed the enemy, who broke its will, and who paid the price for it are somewhat vague, and inevitably, within that vagueness, it is glaringly obvious that the US and Britain are cast in the role of saviors.

Still, when their history books are placed side-by-side with ours [Turkish textbooks], one must admit that their formulations are much more skillful. The creators of the US and British curricula, at least until now, have tried not to appear as captive to anticommunist hysteria as ours, whose every sentence, starting from these lines, is almost entirely wrong: “The USSR was no different from Germany in terms of human rights violations.” (From the 12th-grade “Contemporary Turkish and World History” textbook by the Ministry of National Education [MEB]).

But why this falsification of history?

A few days ago, I came across an interview with Daniel Simić, president of the Republika Srpska journalists’ association. Simić rightly lamented the erasure of history: “Americans are already like that; but for the average Western European reader too, D-Day is the sole and most important event of World War II. The heroism and sacrifices of the Russians and other peoples of the Soviet Union are disregarded… The battles of Stalingrad and Kursk are generally described in the West as ‘events on the Eastern Front’; but every bomb dropped by the Allies on Germany is presented as a heroic act leading to victory against Hitler.”

This is a pustule of mass ignorance. There is such a difference between writing history and making it. Then those lies create narcissistic buffoons, each more ignorant than the last, and one of them comes out and says something like: “We will never forget that Russia helped us win World War II by losing almost 60 million people.” (Trump wrote this on his blog on January 22nd.)

4) Qualitative leap

But there is a difference between the past and today.

A few months ago, they demolished the monument erected in Tallinn in memory of the Red Army and USSR Baltic Fleet soldiers. In the same days, the “reputation” of the Estonian legionnaires in the Waffen-SS 20th Division was being restored. For the aggressive “little instigators” [a Turkish idiom, “küçük enişteler,” referring to minor but troublesome actors, often with a sense of being meddlesome relatives or associates, ed.n.] of the Baltics, this kind of fascist vandalism has now become routine practice.

The Baltics are a miniature Europe.

In many European countries, including Moldova, there are discussions about banning or at least restricting May 9th Victory Day celebrations, associating them with “Kremlin propaganda.” Instead, celebrating May 8th is often proposed; there are also those who want that day to be declared a day of mourning for all “victims” who died between 1939-1945, including the dead of the Wehrmacht and its fascist allies, a “Day of Remembrance and Reconciliation.” Previously, distortions or denials mostly concerned singular events in the war; today, the emphasis is shifting towards completely denying the decisive role of the USSR in the liberation of Europe and the world, and in the defeat of fascist Germany.

This is a qualitative leap in history falsification. The primary reason underlying this was stated by Marshal Zhukov to Marshal Rokossovsky in Berlin in 1945, where the fascist beast was dismembered: “We saved them, and for that, they will never forgive us.” In other words, at least some of them are burning with the desire to take revenge for being saved.

But more important than this is the following: today, it’s as if a new dawn has broken for the flea market [a Turkish idiom, “bit pazarına nur yağıyor,” meaning what was once considered worthless is now being prized, ed.n.], and European leaders are, apparently, studying the experiences of the 1930s and 1940s more closely. Why shouldn’t war be the way out of the crisis? Isn’t suppressing general dissatisfaction through violence and directing aggression towards others a wonderful solution?

But perhaps, we should congratulate them for finally showing sincerity. Declaring Bandera—the leader of a gang of fascist murderers who killed not only Jews, socialists, communists, and Russians, but also citizens of the Polish state, one of the Kyiv regime’s staunchest allies—a hero and howling his slogans in front of his portrait is no small measure of sincerity, indeed.

Who won the war? The Red Army won, the Soviet peoples won, the leadership of the Bolshevik party won, Russian patriots won… But not only them. We won! Because the war against fascism was our war too, the victory was our victory too.

Two days ago (on May 5th), India announced it would conduct a national-level Civil Defense Drill on May 7th, and as May 7th commenced, it began military action. Was this perhaps a time Pakistan didn’t expect? Is an India-Pakistan war imminent?

As the clock struck May 7th in India, around 01:00, Indian missiles were launched in succession “from Indian airspace,” landing in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. In other words, the anticipated attack took place.

India named the operation “Sindoor.” Sindoor traditionally holds significant meanings in Hindu belief and Indian culture, but to touch on it briefly here: It is actually the name of the vermillion powder applied by married Hindu women at their hair parting, symbolizing marital commitment and the husband’s duty to protect his wife. Thus, by naming the operation “Sindoor,” India is conveying the message of protecting its citizens and national honor. Let me reiterate that the April 22nd Pahalgam terrorist attack occurred in a tourist area and targeted civilians.

The Indian Army announced that the operation lasted approximately half an hour, taking place between 01:05 and 01:30 Indian time. The Indian Army’s initial statements, such as “We have launched Operation Sindoor in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir,” were significant: Emphasis was placed on targeting terror infrastructure, that no Pakistani military facilities were targeted, that 9 areas – specifically the terror infrastructure in those 9 areas – were targeted, and that their actions were carried out in a focused, measured, and non-escalatory manner. As someone who followed statements from Indian sources all night, I can confidently say that “India’s statements indicate it does not want war.” So, this is very clear: India does not want war. Perhaps this should have been stated first: An India-Pakistan war has not yet begun. This is not yet war. The events that took place overnight were limited airstrikes, which were already expected by both Pakistan and the entire world. Meanwhile, Pakistan also delivered a limited response during the night. Currently, India is busy briefing the United Nations and foreign ambassadors. It is endeavoring to legitimize the missiles launched overnight and to validate its justifications. So, what will happen now? Will this situation turn into a war? Frankly, it’s hard to predict this yet. But the first thing to note is that both sides will strive to avoid war, as nuclear deterrence is a factor for both.

So, what other options are on the table?

India’s 2019 Balakot retaliatory strike against Pakistan was immediately met with a response, and Pakistan shot down an Indian plane and took its pilot hostage. Therefore, it was clear India did not want to act hastily in terms of timing. In terms of nature and scale, it was trying to plan while also calculating the potential response. But frankly, it launched an attack earlier than even I expected. The Indian army, which had experienced the Pahalgam terrorist attack on April 22nd, began its military action 14 days later, as the clock ticked over into the 15th day. As we said, this was expected; meaning that even if the timing was a bit earlier than anticipated, the military action was not a surprise. Now, mutual airstrikes have occurred, but more importantly, this time India truly wants to inflict a greater punishment on Pakistan, but it wants to do so without triggering a nuclear war, i.e., without waging war. In other words, it wants to continue a controlled escalation somewhat. I don’t believe this confrontation will de-escalate quickly. And this is where “Cold Start” comes into play. Of course, how Pakistan will respond now, and how the international community will approach India, are also very important. But there is another option on the planning table; time will tell its implementation, of course, but it’s important to mention it now:

Cold start: India’s new offensive strategy against Pakistan

Cold Start, first and foremost, marks a departure from the fundamentally defensive military doctrines India has used since its independence in 1947. In India, the idea of Cold Start was fueled by “Operation Parakram,” which India conducted following the 2001 terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament, believed to be backed by Pakistan. This operation revealed operational gaps in India’s offensive capabilities, especially the slowness of troop mobilization along the border. It took almost a month for Indian troops to reach the border, which gave Pakistan enough time to take countermeasures and for the United States to pressure the Indian government to back down.

Announced in 2004, this doctrine is a response to India’s perceived inability to use its conventional superiority to end Pakistan’s “proxy war” in Kashmir. It aims to enable the Indian Army to mobilize rapidly and conduct limited retaliatory strikes against its neighbor without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. We can call this a joint forces operation, operating in conjunction with the Indian Air Force. On this point, the Chief of the Indian Army Staff announced earlier this year that they were in the final stages of establishing Integrated Battle Groups. The doctrine also involves India’s conventional forces conducting pinning offensives (feint attacks) in a conflict situation to prevent a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan.

I can say that this doctrine is still in an experimental stage. At the same time, it’s possible to say that there is political pressure, and more importantly, intense public pressure, to use such a strategy in the current crisis. So, this time, India’s response could be more than just a surgical strike. Indian Prime Minister Modi’s statements about an “unimaginable punishment” also point to this. Let me also reiterate that Modi has given the Indian Armed Forces “full authority.” However, Cold Start, which aims to punish Pakistan with more than a pinpoint operation while keeping the conflict below the nuclear threshold, reveals India’s intention to avoid a full-scale “hot” war, both by its name and its nature.

This is an offensive strategy with surprise timing, rapid execution, limited scope, but a harsher scale. With this strategy, India is actually opening, or wants to open, an escape route for itself from the perceived inevitability of a nuclear conflict with Pakistan. However, the biggest challenge for Cold Start is considered to be the possibility of Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons as a counter-strategy. Therefore, it carries the risk of provoking or escalating a crisis that could cross the nuclear threshold. Considering that both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, the potential for the conflict to spiral out of control is high, the risk is great, and everything hangs by a thread. And how Pakistan will respond is very important. However, I still believe that both countries will do their utmost to avoid entering a hot war. The India-Pakistan war has not yet begun.