OPINION
Obligation for a structural change in Russia: How to exit from the oil-gas economy?
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Hazal YalınBy analyzing the past, present, and future of Russia’s two major export commodities, I will discuss the impacts of the current developments on the budget and the inevitable need for changes in its economic strategy in this article.
First of all, one of the key notions below, “distant nations,” needs some background. Whether or not they are members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), all former Soviet countries are still regarded as close foreign countries. The rest of the world is likewise distant foreign countries. Here, we only do calculations and charts for distant foreign countries. After leaving China out, European countries constituted its overwhelming majority. Therefore, the conclusion will reflect the impacts of Western sanctions on Russia’s two primary exports and sources of budgetary income (oil and natural gas).
Let me state something upfront for the sake of the reader who is not a fan of lengthy writings. Using 2021 as a baseline, Russia will lose 35% – 40% of its oil and petroleum product exports and 50% of its natural gas exports this year. However, this is only part of Russia’s financial setback. Before the onset of the deep crisis in the first half of 2022, rising energy prices had significantly boosted the country’s income. However, the situation has now reversed, with oil and petroleum products discounted by nearly half their market price.
Natural gas
We’ll begin by explaining how the graph below was drawn, which data was utilized how and why, and how estimations were made.
In order to avoid “misjudgments, speculations, and inconsistencies,” the Federal Customs Administration (FCA) has not released information since April. Hence there is currently no official data for 2022. Gas exports to Europe (in transit via Ukraine) are projected to reach 30 bcm in 2023. At 80% capacity, gas is plummeted through Blue Stream, which equals a maximum of 16 bcm through this line. The largest volume that can be plummeted to China is between 23 and 24 bcm.
It was not disclosed how much natural gas Turkey purchased from Russia last year. However, on July 18, Yuri Ushakov, an advisor to Putin, reported that 12.8 bcm of gas (7.1 Blue Stream, 5.7 Turk Stream) had plummeted in the year’s first half. In addition, the export amounts to China and Europe (excluding “close countries” like the Baltic) are known. Based on these statistics, I estimated the gas export to Turkey at 21.70 bcm. This figure matches what Kommersant reported to the Turkish Customs Administration: 21.50 bcm.
Data from Gazprom and the FTS do not quite match. Gazprom’s export figures are always greater than FTA’s. This also held true in the year 2021. Novak reported on December 28 that Gazprom had exported 185.1 bcm to distant countries. However, according to FTS, total exports to distant countries were 170 bcm. I derived figures on the graph from Gazprom statistics. Additionally, I referred to the Central Bank’s yearly average natural gas prices. Like the FTA, the Central Bank did not integrate the averages of 2022 and afterward into its statistics. Therefore, I utilized the calculations provided by the RIA based on the ICE data as the average natural gas price in 2022: $1260.8 per mcm.
I picked two sets of prices for 2023. First, the price on December 31, 2022, is $844.3, assuming it remains relatively stable throughout the year. If scenario two plays out, temperatures in Europe will remain above seasonal norms this winter and spring, the wind will continue its record-setting speed, Brussels will strike a long-term oil deal with Qatar, relations with Algeria will improve, and the United States will replace the monopoly profit with reasonable prices. Although not all of them are realistic, I would predict that costs can be cut in half if all take place.
For 2023, I have assumed a decline in exports of 30% and a total decrease to 70-75 bcm. If this occurs, European countries will import more than twice as much natural gas from the United States as they did from Russia this year.
Novak said on December 28 that gas exports totaled 100.9 bcm last year. It is a record low. In 1990, it was 110 bcm. On January 16, Miller reported that 15.5 bcm of gas was sold to China. However, Neftegaz announced on January 2 that this figure might be appraised as 18.2 bcm due to an increase in contractual obligations. The graph relies on this second figure.
Miller also said annual gas shipments to China will reach 48 bcm by 2025. But the graph shows that even in this case, the demand from the East cannot make up for the European market loss (at least for now).
I have omitted liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the charts. This export may increase partially. Nearly 16 million tons of LNG were sent to Asia in 2022, and Europe received 15.7 million tons in total. This amount is approximately equal to 44 bcm of gas. Although this figure is not inconsequential, it is not anticipated to increase beyond this level in 2023 owing to the challenges of insurance-reinsurance in transport and tankers other than dependency on Western technology. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the rise in LNG exports would come close to replacing the 180-200 bcm of the potential capacity of the Russia-Europe pipelines before NATO destroyed Nord Stream 1 and 2.
Even by an optimistic prediction, the total demand of China, Belarus, and Turkey in 2023 would only amount to 60 bcm, less than a quarter of Gazprom’s entire supply capacity. So, this is the picture based on the most optimistic estimates: In 2021, Russia globally sold almost 240 bcm of natural gas. By 2023, however, it will only be able to ship a maximum of 45 bcm LNG and export 30 bcm via pipeline to “unfriendly” countries and 60 bcm to neutral countries.
Oil
Let’s look at oil.
I will prepare the chart for the same time frame (2013-2023); however, I will be excluding the data from China, Turkey, and India. For these three reasons:
1) There are gaps in the dataset. On the bright side, it is at least evident that China had been a reliable purchaser (between 70-72 million tons) until 2022.
2) At least as of 2020, Turkish and Russian sources contradict in terms of figures for Turkey’s purchases.
3) Prior to 2022, India was not a huge market for Russian exports, but after that year, it became one of the most important hubs for Russian oil. The share of Russian oil export to India rocketed from 1% on February 24 to 18% in May. India, Turkey, Singapore, and even the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dilute Russian oil before being sold to obfuscate its origin. It is unclear, however, how they would act after Russia’s counter-sanctions go into effect on February 1. Thus, qualifying the data of these three countries will not provide useful insights.
Nevertheless, we may get insights from the figures of crude oil exports and the total income of the annual average oil price.
Like natural gas, I have completed the chart relying on the data of “distant countries” and my own estimates. Similar to natural gas, I predicted a range of $40 to $60 for the barrel price of Ural oil in 2023. These predictions align with the scenarios the Central Bank announced in May. Considering the $60 maximum price, the likely range for the price of Ural oil is between these two extremes. To “distant countries,” I projected 200 million tons of oil exports in 2023. As a result, Russia will lose 90% of its crude oil exports to Europe due to the sanctions, which may cost the country $40 to $70 billion.
I will not go into technical details of the implementation of the sanctions and embargo. Still, it’s important to know that in its broadest sense (including both land and sea traffic), it will be implemented over the course of 6-8 months. This is why the European market has not been totally lost: Bruegel, a European think tank, has shown that 75% of Russia’s oil and petroleum product exports to Europe are sent offshore, while just 25% are transported via pipeline. Germany and Poland, two main consumers, have reduced their purchases, while the Hungarian government has blocked a full ban. Orbán has ensured that the oil pipelines of Slovakia and the Czech Republic from Russia, in addition to those of Hungary, will remain open.
However, the insurance and reinsurance restrictions directly impact exports to India and China. Unless a stable solution to this issue is found (a partial solution is already available; the Russian National Reinsurance Company carries out the reinsurance), overall exports may fall further. Similar to natural gas, compensating the European market with Asia cannot happen in one day.
My estimations for potential losses are in line with these predictions as well. AlfaBank reported an expected loss of $50 billion; for Reuters, it is $40 billion to $54 billion, and for Energy Aspects, $60 billion. Increasing the amount of oil exported may improve the situation, which is feasible if the methods to circumvent the sanctions are broadened. A significant increase in the $40-$60 range for the sale of Ural oil appears unlikely.
These two charts depict a very critical scenario for 2023: Excluding petroleum products and LNG, we may expect Russia’s oil and natural gas income to be between $89.3 and $149.4 billion. This means a revenue drop of between $106 and $166 billion compared to the previous year.
Budget
Budget revenues determined by the 2022 budget law were 25 trillion rubles, but roughly extra 2.5 trillion rubles actually went into the treasury last year. Yet budget expenditures were above this increase; during the year-end press conference, Finance Minister Siluanov said that “around 30 trillion rubles” had been spent. Despite a significant discount in Ural oil (shown in the third chart), oil prices were much higher than in the previous year, and natural gas revenues were at a record level until December 5. And these are the reasons for the increase in income. The greater rise in expense was owing to, in addition to the direct (military expenditures) effect of the Ukrainian operation, the increase in government subsidies to belligerent individuals and their families, and most usually low-income people. The budget, traditionally having a surplus, ran a deficit for the first time in April and was covered for the rest of the year by Gazprom and Rosneft.
The Ministry of Finance had predicted that the price of Ural oil per barrel would be $70.1 in 2023, $67.5 in 2024, and $65.25 in 2025. However, at least for this year, it is quite unlikely that the forecast will come true. In any case, Ural oil was nearly always sold at a discount, but the price difference was generally little more than a few dollars. However, huge price differences appeared after February 24, and the average discount is roughly 30 percent from that date to the end of the year. The discount rate was relatively stable between July and October at about 20-25 percent, but it spiked sharply once the maximum price was published on December 5. Since December 30, it has fluctuated daily between 45-55% as of January 20. In addition, it is still cheaper than $60, the price cap. In contrast, the last year’s price average of Ural oil was $76.09.
The situation with natural gas is similar. According to the explanatory note in the draft budget for 2023–2025 and the official forecast for the 2024–2025 planning period, natural gas exports (total of distant and close countries) fell by 31% in 2023 compared to the previous year, landing at 142 bcm, and will average 125 bcm annually for the next two years. However, these figures should be considered too optimistic because total exports via pipelines may decrease to 90–93 bcm this year if natural gas exports to distant countries reach 70–75 bcm as expected.
According to the most reasonable estimates of the Ministry of Finance, in 2023, if the price of Ural oil per barrel stays at $50 and daily output does not surpass 10 million barrels, the government would get at least $2.1 trillion less in oil and gas revenue in 2023, and the deficit will rise to $5 trillion, instead of the anticipated $2.9 trillion (2 percent of GDP). (In addition to crude oil, other petroleum products, natural gas, coal, etc., will impact this deficit.)
Suppose Ural oil prices remain at about $62-$63 per barrel. In that case, the Ministry of Finance intends to sell yuan from the National Wealth Fund and issue bonds to cover the deficit without raising the tax burden on the bourgeoisie. Alternatively, the government decides to seize “excessive profit” on carbon and fertilizer (this is the Kremlin’s optimal solution; I looked into it further when analyzing Putin’s September 7 speech at the Eastern Economic Forum), to increase the share of the budget in the dividends of state companies (this is the “financial bloc’s” optimal solution), and to issue a new tax regulation, if it fails, or the discounted oil price drops further. The Kremlin sees raising the tax burden on the great bourgeoisie as the best way to ensure that the welfare of the people remains stable or, if feasible, is elevated by state aid. In contrast, the “fiscal bloc” would rather burden the public by increasing indirect taxes. In other words, the bourgeoisie or the people must contribute to cover the budget deficit. As a result, the “conflicting alliance” between “the potent and the impotent” continues.
Conclusion
These are, of course, just estimates anyway. But one thing is clear enough: The traditional economic paradigm (oil and gas economies) is rapidly becoming obsolete. A structural shift in the economy is inevitable. This can be done in two ways: Medium and large private capital shifts from unproductive trade or the production of raw materials for export to industrial output for the domestic market, or the state expands its role as an economic regulator.
While the first way may help in the consolidation of capitalism but given the comprador nature of private capital in Russia, it is unrealistic to assume that it will serve as the primary means. It will continue to be an alternative for the bourgeoisie is eager to fill in the lacuna created by the foreign money leaving Russia. The local bourgeoisie is flexing its muscles to seize closed and closing foreign financial and industrial institutions, so one of the reasons why the ruble has depreciated in the past month is the demand for foreign currencies for purchases. Yet, the comprador nature of capital still prevails. In the first three quarters of last year, the financial-bloc-backed bourgeoisie managed to invest abroad 2.5 trillion rubles, or 10 percent of the budget’s income. On the other hand, taking the first way for structural shift results in the bourgeoisie’s political power being consolidated and empowered, posing a challenge to Bonapartism. Finally, the greatest exporter of raw materials, the state sees no gain in income through the first way, exacerbating the structural problem. Thus, the state must serve as the driving force of structural change.
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“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?
Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.
But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.
In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.
These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.
This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.
The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.
The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.
This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.
The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.
Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.
OPINION
Türkiye’s “soft severance of diplomatic relations” with Israel has limited impact on the Middle East
Published
3 days agoon
18/11/2024By
Ma XiaolinOn November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.
Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.
Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.
Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.
Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.
However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.
Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.
Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.
Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.
In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.
After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”
It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.
The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.
Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.
With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.
Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.
Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Our people have endured decades of oppression, during which their rights were virtually destroyed and forgotten. In the post-Oslo period, when the Palestinian leadership opted for negotiations, settlement expansion accelerated while the foundations of national independence eroded under partition, isolation and prolonged blockades. Today, the occupation seeks to complete the historic Nakba by exploiting the Palestinian uprising that began on 7 October in response to escalating Zionist extremism, attempts at Judaisation and efforts to marginalise and eradicate the Palestinian entity. This existential challenge, backed by a broad coalition with regional and international dimensions that do not serve the interests of our people, obliges us to unite our efforts around common principles. Despite these barbaric attacks, limited resources and the imbalance of power with the enemy, we stand in solidarity with the resistance and determination of the Palestinian people. If these efforts are coordinated, we can put counter-pressure on the occupation, deepen its political and legal isolation and worsen its economic crisis. This will be an opportunity to force the occupation and its allies to stop the aggression and strengthen the ongoing struggle of our people.
Today, the Palestinian people are facing one of the heaviest Zionist attacks on the Gaza Strip, which reaches the dimensions of genocide and ethnic cleansing. According to unofficial statistics, the number of Palestinian martyrs since the beginning of the war has exceeded 186,000, and the environmental and health destruction caused by the attacks has directly contributed to this number. This scenario could, God forbid, be repeated in the West Bank, with radical settlers attacking Palestinian towns and villages through the occupation army or with the official support of the occupation government.
Historically, the Palestinians have paid the heaviest price for the Western approach to the Eastern question. The consequences of this approach have been disastrous for us: It not only led to the seizure of our land by the Zionist movement, but also paved the way for the establishment of a settler state. In this war, the Arab and Islamic countries acted with great responsibility, rejecting the international categorisation of the resistance as terrorism and insisting on presenting it as a national liberation movement.
Arab and Islamic countries have played a strong role in supporting our cause in international forums, with a growing regional awareness of a common destiny and the need for common security against a common enemy. This solidarity is a very important step in supporting our cause through the work of the Ministerial Committee of the Arab-Islamic Summit convened in Riyadh, which is expected to be an international framework for shaping a solution to the Palestinian issue in accordance with the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people.
Internationally, unlike in previous crises, we have seen clear international positions condemning the genocide and crimes against humanity committed against our people, reflected in firm positions at the United Nations. We appreciate these positions of the nations and peoples of the world and see the path to the establishment of a Palestinian state based on international legitimacy as the result of more than a century of Palestinian struggle and the revival of their rights, which have historical and political roots. Since 1922, the foundations of a Palestinian state have been laid, and despite British and Zionist conspiracies, Palestine retains its political primacy on the world map.
Today, more than 150 countries recognise the State of Palestine on the basis of international resolutions such as the General Assembly Settlement Plan (Resolution 181), the Algiers Declaration declaring the State of Palestine in 1988, and Security Council resolutions on the illegality of settlements outside the 1967 borders. The most recent resolution demands that Israel end its ‘illegal presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ within 12 months of the General Assembly’s request to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s policies and practices in Palestine. The resolution was adopted with overwhelming support – 24 votes in favour, 14 against and 43 abstentions – demonstrating the gains made by the Palestinian cause and highlighting the growing political isolation of the occupying state.
Despite the obstacles to sovereignty posed by the occupation, the Palestinian state remains a legal reality. We see current international efforts to revive these historic and entrenched rights, against the post-World War II trend of international powers favouring the establishment of a Zionist political entity at our expense.
These forward-looking initiatives, called the ‘International Alliance for the Realisation of the Two-State Solution’, include direct steps to organise the establishment of a Palestinian state, rather than merely negotiating its right to exist. This is an important step for regional security and international peace, a necessary way to stabilise the global system and prevent the spread of geopolitical conflicts, sometimes with a religious or cultural dimension.
Diplomatic and political efforts to achieve Palestinian statehood must be compatible with efforts to end the war, protect civilians, facilitate humanitarian aid and address the consequences of the aggression through compensation and reconstruction. At the same time, Palestinian efforts to meet the conditions for a sovereign state consistent with the principles of regional security and global peace should be intensified.
In the midst of these efforts, it is clear that the Palestinian forces will respond sincerely to these initiatives and are willing to overcome differences over governance, elections and the so-called ‘day after’ issues. Palestinian behaviour shows that these disputes are now a thing of the past and that focusing on the future enhances the ability to build and govern the Palestinian state on the basis of national spirit and solidarity.
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