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Poland’s fanning the flames intensifies turbulence and unease in Central and Eastern Europe

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On September 19, Polish President Nawrocki told France’s LCI television that Poland is increasing defense spending and, together with other NATO members, taking a series of actions to strengthen deterrence. He also hinted that Poland is also discussing a nuclear-sharing plan with France, preparing to bring in France’s nuclear umbrella. France and the United Kingdom are the “only two” nuclear powers among NATO’s European partners, and France previously declared it would provide nuclear protection for Europe.

This is, after the incursion by a mysterious swarm of drones ten days earlier, Poland further responding to potential security threats by hyping nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence. Poland’s series of “overly nervous” moves and taking advantage of the situation to make a splash, even to the point of fanning the flames, will inevitably intensify turbulence and unease in Central and Eastern Europe, reinforce strategic suspicion and mutual deterrence between countries in the region and Russia, and may ultimately backfire on Poland’s own security and development.

According to reports, on the night of September 9, about 20 suspected Russian-made drones broke into Polish airspace. NATO air forces treated it as facing a great enemy and rushed to help Poland resist the incursion. Another NATO member state, Romania, which borders Ukraine, was also intruded by sporadic drones. NATO allies not only used radar to lock in the positions of this batch of drones; the Dutch Air Force’s F-35 fighters also directly took part in the destruction operation. In addition, the German “Patriot” missile system deployed in Poland went on alert; an Italian airborne early warning aircraft and an aerial refueling aircraft from a NATO multinational flight formation also participated in the emergency action. Foreign media said this was the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949 that it opened fire within a member state’s airspace at a potential threat.

On the 10th, Polish Prime Minister Tusk declared that this batch of “threatening” drones “came from Russia,” and pointed out that “this provocation is more dangerous than any previous one.” However, Tusk did not present evidence that the drones set out from Russia. U.S. President Trump also accused Russia on social media of “violating Polish airspace.” The Russian side, however, flatly denied it, saying such accusations with no factual basis have always existed. Russia’s representative to the United Nations, Nebenzya, emphasized that the maximum range of drones used by Russia is 700 kilometers; therefore, they are physically impossible to reach Polish territory. Russia’s only territory bordering Poland is the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, but that area has never been involved in the Russia-Ukraine war.

At the end of 2022, the border area of Poland near Ukraine suffered a missile strike that caused two casualties. The Polish government initially accused Russia of being responsible, but then the Polish President Duda admitted that the missile was very likely from Ukraine’s air defense system. Therefore, Poland and its NATO partners have characterized this incident as a “provocation” rather than an “attack,” so as not to lose room for maneuver.

Observers believe that the swarm of drones that penetrated Polish airspace most likely came from Belarus, which borders Poland. At the time of the incident, Belarus was holding its annual joint exercise with Russia, code-named “West-2025.” The Belarusian Ministry of Defense said on the 10th that during the firefights between Ukraine and Russia, the Belarusian air defense forces continuously tracked drones that deviated from their routes due to the electronic warfare systems of both sides, and some had already been destroyed; the Belarusian side also took the initiative to inform Poland and Lithuania about unidentified drones approaching. If this explanation by Belarus can be confirmed by Poland and Lithuania, then the suspicion that Belarus and Russia deliberately “invaded” Poland via drones can be cleared.

However, in any case, the “drone intrusion” incident activated the tense emotions of the European Union and NATO. On the 10th, European Commission President von der Leyen announced plans to build the EU’s “Eastern Wing Monitoring” mechanism. On the 12th, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who is also the commander of the U.S. European Command, Grynkiewicz, announced that he had ordered the launch of Operation “Eastern Sentinel.” NATO member states such as Denmark, France, the United Kingdom and Germany will contribute to this. The operation “will possess flexibility and acuity, providing more targeted deterrence and defense when and where necessary.”

The launch of Operation “Eastern Sentinel” is equivalent to triggering the Article 4 response mechanism of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely that when a NATO member faces a threat and issues a call for collective consultations, other members are obligated to respond actively. Therefore, this time NATO members reacted one after another in different ways, assisting Poland in strengthening its defense and deterring external threat factors. Although Article 4 still falls short of Article 5, which initiates collective defense, the consultations themselves will also aggravate the tension and confrontational posture on NATO’s eastern flank, intensifying the turbulence and unease in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

There is still no conclusive evidence showing that the “intruding drones” originated in Russia or Belarus, but this does not prevent the Polish government from seizing the opportunity to turn play-acting into reality and, by using force against force, hyping the external threat to raise Poland’s status in the EU and NATO, win more sympathy from the Western camp and rake in more benefits. At this stage when the truth of this incident remains “Rashomon”-like and unclear, Poland keeps crying “the wolf is coming,” and in the early hours of the 12th, on the grounds that the Russia-Belarus joint exercise endangered its own security, announced the closure of the Polish-Belarusian border and land links, thereby cutting off the major economic and trade artery connecting China and Europe — the China-Europe Railway Express, causing the two-way logistics of China-Europe trade to be suddenly and drastically obstructed, harming the interests of both sides.

On September 15, Nawrocki continued to add fuel to the tense situation, signing an order agreeing to the stationing of troops from NATO member states on Polish territory. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that NATO is implementing Operation “Eastern Sentinel,” integrating the military resources of multiple allies and strengthening the defensive posture on Europe’s eastern flank. That day, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sikorski further called for considering the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine. As of the 18th, both France and the United Kingdom had announced the dispatch of fighter jets to Polish airspace to carry out air defense missions.

On September 16, Poland’s air defense forces tested the “Patriot” missile defense system for the first time near the northern town of Ustka. Polish Prime Minister Tusk stated that this air defense drill was part of the “Steel Defender-25” military exercise and also a response to the Russia-Belarus joint exercise.

The Russia-Belarus defensive strategic-level joint exercise “West-2025,” held from September 12 to 16, was the final phase of the two countries’ regular annual training, and the exercise was carried out mainly at training grounds within the two countries and in the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea areas. The two sides mobilized a total of 100,000 military personnel, ten thousand sets of equipment, 333 aircraft and nearly 250 warships to participate. Six countries including Iran and India were also invited to send military personnel to take part in the joint training. Russia especially emphasized that this joint exercise was not aimed at any third country, and also invited U.S. officials and OSCE officials to attend as observers.

Even so, Poland, citing security, closed the border crossings between Poland and Belarus, cut off cross-border rail traffic, and deployed 40,000 troops at the border. On September 16, Poland’s Ministry of the Interior and Administration issued a statement saying that the Polish-Belarusian border would remain closed until further notice, emphasizing that this was based on a high degree of concern for the safety of Polish citizens, especially in connection with the Russia-Belarus joint exercise.

The two Polish government departments made it clear that the border closure was not just to cope with security issues during the (Russia-Belarus) exercise period, but that the border would not reopen until the security situation had fully recovered and the relevant service information had been confirmed. The statement noted that closing the border could cause a series of negative economic consequences, but that the government would strive to ease the difficulties faced by enterprises, and in particular would consult to minimize the economic impact of the closure on suppliers forced to use alternative transit points such as Lithuania.

Historically, the Kingdom of Poland was a major country in Central and Eastern Europe, with an area of 1.15 million square kilometers, including today’s homeland as well as Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Beginning in 1772, after Poland was partitioned by the combined forces of Tsarist Russia, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire, it suffered three further carve-ups by powerful neighbors. Today’s territory of Poland can also be said to be an artificial remaking by the Soviet Union and Russia as a result of World War II and an overall westward shift of territory: its western part is prewar German territory, and its prewar eastern part has become today’s western Ukraine. Therefore, Poland’s tradition of hating and resenting Russia is deeply rooted. At the same time, because mutual massacres between Poles and Ukrainians occurred frequently in history, and even ethnic cleansing of each other during World War II, the positions of Poland’s government and people on the Russia-Ukraine conflict are delicate and complex.

Even so, based on a historical “anti-Russia hysteria,” and even more on the reality of interlinked interests of “when the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold,” Poland, after Russia launched the “special military operation,” took a clear stand on Ukraine’s side, playing the role of the eastern frontline state of the Western camp, especially the EU and NATO, greatly elevating its strategic status and voice. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been unwilling to see European unity and integration, deliberately manufacturing splits and confrontation between old and new Europe, and has repeatedly courted Poland, which has a relatively large population, sufficient size, a special religious tradition, and a key geopolitical position, conferring on it the status of leader of “new Europe,” which has also fueled Poland’s “great-power complex” and its self-positioning as a bridgehead. The sudden outbreak and continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war have given Poland a rare opportunity to exert great-power energy.

In the more than three years since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland has received and relayed countless Western leaders who went to Kyiv to display resolve and aid the war, has also delivered large quantities of military equipment and strategic supplies to Ukraine, and has signed a security cooperation agreement with it. Although Poland is not enthusiastic about Ukraine joining NATO, from a certain point of view Poland is the frontline country most deeply drawn into the Russia-Ukraine war, and thus can hardly avoid “when the city gate catches fire, the pond fish suffer” because of its two neighbors. The previous mistaken Ukrainian missile strike and this “drone intrusion” both belong to the price Poland has paid.

From a theoretical and logical perspective, the EU and NATO, including Poland, have become indirectly entangled with Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield, and there is the possibility of escalation and expansion into a direct military showdown. Moreover, both sides are laying corresponding low-level groundwork. Against this background, whether batches of Russian-made drones broke into Poland from Russia or from Belarus, Russia and Belarus can hardly avoid falling under suspicion. Western observers believe that if the drones did not mistakenly enter due to interference but were precisely delivered, it cannot be ruled out that Russia and Belarus are thereby releasing a deterrent trial balloon, or probing and sounding out the air-defense systems of Poland and NATO’s eastern flank. Therefore Poland and its NATO allies are very nervous.

Seizing on the pretext of safeguarding national security, Poland has made a big deal of it, continuously adding weight to strengthen national defense and collective defense, highlighting its strategic role and status as a barrier on Europe and NATO’s eastern flank, raising its value within the Western camp, and increasing its bargaining chips for grabbing its own interests from EU or NATO members. When Nawrocki visited Germany on September 16, he demanded that Germany pay as much as 1.3 trillion euros in World War II reparations, in exchange for Poland playing a greater role on NATO’s eastern flank. In fact, the issue of German World War II reparations long ago became history in legal terms, but in the more than twenty years since the founding of Poland’s right-wing conservative Law and Justice Party, the governments or ruling coalitions it has led have always demanded huge compensation from Germany and have always been rejected by Germany. However, Nawrocki, who was helped into office by the Law and Justice Party, never forgets to “collect the debt” from Germany, especially at a juncture when a strategic crisis has appeared on NATO’s eastern flank.

After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland’s forward geopolitical weight in “defending Europe” has clearly increased, Germany has also increasingly shaken off the path of peace and returned to the road of strengthening the military, and has actively played the role of vanguard on NATO’s eastern flank. This situation has allowed the Polish government to take the opportunity to strike Germany for a big gain, handling in parallel two matters that have nothing to do with each other, World War II and the Russia-Ukraine war. This operation by Poland has objectively set itself as the hardest-pulling shaft horse on NATO’s war chariot, galloping forward to seize benefits, even at the cost of staking its own long-term interests and harming China-Europe and even China-Poland economic and trade ties; the historical suspension of the China-Europe Railway Express caused by the border closure is the proof.

It is learned that the China–Europe Railway Express is an important main artery of the logistics network connecting China and Europe, and Poland is its key node, undertaking about 30% of the carrying capacity. Ninety percent of the rail lines from China to Europe need to pass through Poland; in particular, ports such as Małaszewicze in Poland have long been the main channels for the China–Europe Railway Express to enter Europe. This closure of border crossings directly led to the interruption of the Polish segment of the China–Europe Railway Express, suspension of the trains, and a large amount of cargo being stranded. This sudden incident will have a serious impact on China’s international trade and logistics industry oriented toward Europe.

Whether by coincidence or as an emergency temporary arrangement, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs, who had just concluded a seven-day tour of Europe at the end of June and beginning of July, once again visited Europe from September 12 to 16, focusing on three Central and Eastern European countries, Austria, Slovenia and Poland. When Wang Yi arrived in Warsaw, it was at the critical moment when the “drone intrusion” incident was fermenting to a peak and the China–Europe Railway Express had been cut off for the first time; therefore, on the 15th he held talks with Polish President Nawrocki and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sikorski, and presided over the fourth meeting of the China–Poland Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee, which attracted much attention.

Afterwards, Chinese official news did not mention whether the high-level China–Poland meetings focused on the interruption of the China–Europe Railway Express, but as one of the major outcomes of Wang Yi’s visit to Poland, the two sides issued the “Joint Document” of the fourth plenary meeting on intergovernmental cooperation. Article 7 of it emphasized: “The two sides exchanged views on the importance of developing an efficient and economically competitive Eurasian transport corridor and the key role played by Poland in it. The two sides recognized the benefits of providing mutually beneficial services in railway, maritime and air freight, as well as strengthening existing and potential transport lines and logistics chains, and are willing to jointly ensure the safe and smooth passage of the China–Europe Railway Express.”

The “drone intrusion” incident suddenly intensified the military tension and indirect confrontation between the European Union and NATO and Russia, and also elevated Poland to the position of a major player, with the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe suddenly tightening. However, by taking the opportunity to cut off the Poland–Belarus border, resulting in the complete interruption of the Polish section of the China–Europe Railway Express, Poland not only made China an innocent victim through no fault of its own, but also caused two-way damage to China–Europe economic and trade cooperation.

The most pressing task is for China to strengthen mediation as soon as possible, ease the geopolitical relations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, and prompt Poland to restore and clear the blockage of the China–Europe Railway Express as soon as possible. In the long run, the geopolitical risks triggered by the prolonged continuation of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as well as the continuously increasing “long-arm jurisdiction” and “secondary sanctions” of the United States and Europe, are increasingly harming the interests of China as an outsider. Therefore, it is also necessary for China to step up efforts to promote talks and persuade toward peace, pushing this intra-European war and confrontation to turn toward dialogue and de-escalation as soon as possible.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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