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Poland’s fanning the flames intensifies turbulence and unease in Central and Eastern Europe

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On September 19, Polish President Nawrocki told France’s LCI television that Poland is increasing defense spending and, together with other NATO members, taking a series of actions to strengthen deterrence. He also hinted that Poland is also discussing a nuclear-sharing plan with France, preparing to bring in France’s nuclear umbrella. France and the United Kingdom are the “only two” nuclear powers among NATO’s European partners, and France previously declared it would provide nuclear protection for Europe.

This is, after the incursion by a mysterious swarm of drones ten days earlier, Poland further responding to potential security threats by hyping nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence. Poland’s series of “overly nervous” moves and taking advantage of the situation to make a splash, even to the point of fanning the flames, will inevitably intensify turbulence and unease in Central and Eastern Europe, reinforce strategic suspicion and mutual deterrence between countries in the region and Russia, and may ultimately backfire on Poland’s own security and development.

According to reports, on the night of September 9, about 20 suspected Russian-made drones broke into Polish airspace. NATO air forces treated it as facing a great enemy and rushed to help Poland resist the incursion. Another NATO member state, Romania, which borders Ukraine, was also intruded by sporadic drones. NATO allies not only used radar to lock in the positions of this batch of drones; the Dutch Air Force’s F-35 fighters also directly took part in the destruction operation. In addition, the German “Patriot” missile system deployed in Poland went on alert; an Italian airborne early warning aircraft and an aerial refueling aircraft from a NATO multinational flight formation also participated in the emergency action. Foreign media said this was the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949 that it opened fire within a member state’s airspace at a potential threat.

On the 10th, Polish Prime Minister Tusk declared that this batch of “threatening” drones “came from Russia,” and pointed out that “this provocation is more dangerous than any previous one.” However, Tusk did not present evidence that the drones set out from Russia. U.S. President Trump also accused Russia on social media of “violating Polish airspace.” The Russian side, however, flatly denied it, saying such accusations with no factual basis have always existed. Russia’s representative to the United Nations, Nebenzya, emphasized that the maximum range of drones used by Russia is 700 kilometers; therefore, they are physically impossible to reach Polish territory. Russia’s only territory bordering Poland is the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, but that area has never been involved in the Russia-Ukraine war.

At the end of 2022, the border area of Poland near Ukraine suffered a missile strike that caused two casualties. The Polish government initially accused Russia of being responsible, but then the Polish President Duda admitted that the missile was very likely from Ukraine’s air defense system. Therefore, Poland and its NATO partners have characterized this incident as a “provocation” rather than an “attack,” so as not to lose room for maneuver.

Observers believe that the swarm of drones that penetrated Polish airspace most likely came from Belarus, which borders Poland. At the time of the incident, Belarus was holding its annual joint exercise with Russia, code-named “West-2025.” The Belarusian Ministry of Defense said on the 10th that during the firefights between Ukraine and Russia, the Belarusian air defense forces continuously tracked drones that deviated from their routes due to the electronic warfare systems of both sides, and some had already been destroyed; the Belarusian side also took the initiative to inform Poland and Lithuania about unidentified drones approaching. If this explanation by Belarus can be confirmed by Poland and Lithuania, then the suspicion that Belarus and Russia deliberately “invaded” Poland via drones can be cleared.

However, in any case, the “drone intrusion” incident activated the tense emotions of the European Union and NATO. On the 10th, European Commission President von der Leyen announced plans to build the EU’s “Eastern Wing Monitoring” mechanism. On the 12th, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who is also the commander of the U.S. European Command, Grynkiewicz, announced that he had ordered the launch of Operation “Eastern Sentinel.” NATO member states such as Denmark, France, the United Kingdom and Germany will contribute to this. The operation “will possess flexibility and acuity, providing more targeted deterrence and defense when and where necessary.”

The launch of Operation “Eastern Sentinel” is equivalent to triggering the Article 4 response mechanism of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely that when a NATO member faces a threat and issues a call for collective consultations, other members are obligated to respond actively. Therefore, this time NATO members reacted one after another in different ways, assisting Poland in strengthening its defense and deterring external threat factors. Although Article 4 still falls short of Article 5, which initiates collective defense, the consultations themselves will also aggravate the tension and confrontational posture on NATO’s eastern flank, intensifying the turbulence and unease in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

There is still no conclusive evidence showing that the “intruding drones” originated in Russia or Belarus, but this does not prevent the Polish government from seizing the opportunity to turn play-acting into reality and, by using force against force, hyping the external threat to raise Poland’s status in the EU and NATO, win more sympathy from the Western camp and rake in more benefits. At this stage when the truth of this incident remains “Rashomon”-like and unclear, Poland keeps crying “the wolf is coming,” and in the early hours of the 12th, on the grounds that the Russia-Belarus joint exercise endangered its own security, announced the closure of the Polish-Belarusian border and land links, thereby cutting off the major economic and trade artery connecting China and Europe — the China-Europe Railway Express, causing the two-way logistics of China-Europe trade to be suddenly and drastically obstructed, harming the interests of both sides.

On September 15, Nawrocki continued to add fuel to the tense situation, signing an order agreeing to the stationing of troops from NATO member states on Polish territory. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that NATO is implementing Operation “Eastern Sentinel,” integrating the military resources of multiple allies and strengthening the defensive posture on Europe’s eastern flank. That day, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sikorski further called for considering the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine. As of the 18th, both France and the United Kingdom had announced the dispatch of fighter jets to Polish airspace to carry out air defense missions.

On September 16, Poland’s air defense forces tested the “Patriot” missile defense system for the first time near the northern town of Ustka. Polish Prime Minister Tusk stated that this air defense drill was part of the “Steel Defender-25” military exercise and also a response to the Russia-Belarus joint exercise.

The Russia-Belarus defensive strategic-level joint exercise “West-2025,” held from September 12 to 16, was the final phase of the two countries’ regular annual training, and the exercise was carried out mainly at training grounds within the two countries and in the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea areas. The two sides mobilized a total of 100,000 military personnel, ten thousand sets of equipment, 333 aircraft and nearly 250 warships to participate. Six countries including Iran and India were also invited to send military personnel to take part in the joint training. Russia especially emphasized that this joint exercise was not aimed at any third country, and also invited U.S. officials and OSCE officials to attend as observers.

Even so, Poland, citing security, closed the border crossings between Poland and Belarus, cut off cross-border rail traffic, and deployed 40,000 troops at the border. On September 16, Poland’s Ministry of the Interior and Administration issued a statement saying that the Polish-Belarusian border would remain closed until further notice, emphasizing that this was based on a high degree of concern for the safety of Polish citizens, especially in connection with the Russia-Belarus joint exercise.

The two Polish government departments made it clear that the border closure was not just to cope with security issues during the (Russia-Belarus) exercise period, but that the border would not reopen until the security situation had fully recovered and the relevant service information had been confirmed. The statement noted that closing the border could cause a series of negative economic consequences, but that the government would strive to ease the difficulties faced by enterprises, and in particular would consult to minimize the economic impact of the closure on suppliers forced to use alternative transit points such as Lithuania.

Historically, the Kingdom of Poland was a major country in Central and Eastern Europe, with an area of 1.15 million square kilometers, including today’s homeland as well as Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Beginning in 1772, after Poland was partitioned by the combined forces of Tsarist Russia, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire, it suffered three further carve-ups by powerful neighbors. Today’s territory of Poland can also be said to be an artificial remaking by the Soviet Union and Russia as a result of World War II and an overall westward shift of territory: its western part is prewar German territory, and its prewar eastern part has become today’s western Ukraine. Therefore, Poland’s tradition of hating and resenting Russia is deeply rooted. At the same time, because mutual massacres between Poles and Ukrainians occurred frequently in history, and even ethnic cleansing of each other during World War II, the positions of Poland’s government and people on the Russia-Ukraine conflict are delicate and complex.

Even so, based on a historical “anti-Russia hysteria,” and even more on the reality of interlinked interests of “when the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold,” Poland, after Russia launched the “special military operation,” took a clear stand on Ukraine’s side, playing the role of the eastern frontline state of the Western camp, especially the EU and NATO, greatly elevating its strategic status and voice. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been unwilling to see European unity and integration, deliberately manufacturing splits and confrontation between old and new Europe, and has repeatedly courted Poland, which has a relatively large population, sufficient size, a special religious tradition, and a key geopolitical position, conferring on it the status of leader of “new Europe,” which has also fueled Poland’s “great-power complex” and its self-positioning as a bridgehead. The sudden outbreak and continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war have given Poland a rare opportunity to exert great-power energy.

In the more than three years since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland has received and relayed countless Western leaders who went to Kyiv to display resolve and aid the war, has also delivered large quantities of military equipment and strategic supplies to Ukraine, and has signed a security cooperation agreement with it. Although Poland is not enthusiastic about Ukraine joining NATO, from a certain point of view Poland is the frontline country most deeply drawn into the Russia-Ukraine war, and thus can hardly avoid “when the city gate catches fire, the pond fish suffer” because of its two neighbors. The previous mistaken Ukrainian missile strike and this “drone intrusion” both belong to the price Poland has paid.

From a theoretical and logical perspective, the EU and NATO, including Poland, have become indirectly entangled with Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield, and there is the possibility of escalation and expansion into a direct military showdown. Moreover, both sides are laying corresponding low-level groundwork. Against this background, whether batches of Russian-made drones broke into Poland from Russia or from Belarus, Russia and Belarus can hardly avoid falling under suspicion. Western observers believe that if the drones did not mistakenly enter due to interference but were precisely delivered, it cannot be ruled out that Russia and Belarus are thereby releasing a deterrent trial balloon, or probing and sounding out the air-defense systems of Poland and NATO’s eastern flank. Therefore Poland and its NATO allies are very nervous.

Seizing on the pretext of safeguarding national security, Poland has made a big deal of it, continuously adding weight to strengthen national defense and collective defense, highlighting its strategic role and status as a barrier on Europe and NATO’s eastern flank, raising its value within the Western camp, and increasing its bargaining chips for grabbing its own interests from EU or NATO members. When Nawrocki visited Germany on September 16, he demanded that Germany pay as much as 1.3 trillion euros in World War II reparations, in exchange for Poland playing a greater role on NATO’s eastern flank. In fact, the issue of German World War II reparations long ago became history in legal terms, but in the more than twenty years since the founding of Poland’s right-wing conservative Law and Justice Party, the governments or ruling coalitions it has led have always demanded huge compensation from Germany and have always been rejected by Germany. However, Nawrocki, who was helped into office by the Law and Justice Party, never forgets to “collect the debt” from Germany, especially at a juncture when a strategic crisis has appeared on NATO’s eastern flank.

After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland’s forward geopolitical weight in “defending Europe” has clearly increased, Germany has also increasingly shaken off the path of peace and returned to the road of strengthening the military, and has actively played the role of vanguard on NATO’s eastern flank. This situation has allowed the Polish government to take the opportunity to strike Germany for a big gain, handling in parallel two matters that have nothing to do with each other, World War II and the Russia-Ukraine war. This operation by Poland has objectively set itself as the hardest-pulling shaft horse on NATO’s war chariot, galloping forward to seize benefits, even at the cost of staking its own long-term interests and harming China-Europe and even China-Poland economic and trade ties; the historical suspension of the China-Europe Railway Express caused by the border closure is the proof.

It is learned that the China–Europe Railway Express is an important main artery of the logistics network connecting China and Europe, and Poland is its key node, undertaking about 30% of the carrying capacity. Ninety percent of the rail lines from China to Europe need to pass through Poland; in particular, ports such as Małaszewicze in Poland have long been the main channels for the China–Europe Railway Express to enter Europe. This closure of border crossings directly led to the interruption of the Polish segment of the China–Europe Railway Express, suspension of the trains, and a large amount of cargo being stranded. This sudden incident will have a serious impact on China’s international trade and logistics industry oriented toward Europe.

Whether by coincidence or as an emergency temporary arrangement, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs, who had just concluded a seven-day tour of Europe at the end of June and beginning of July, once again visited Europe from September 12 to 16, focusing on three Central and Eastern European countries, Austria, Slovenia and Poland. When Wang Yi arrived in Warsaw, it was at the critical moment when the “drone intrusion” incident was fermenting to a peak and the China–Europe Railway Express had been cut off for the first time; therefore, on the 15th he held talks with Polish President Nawrocki and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sikorski, and presided over the fourth meeting of the China–Poland Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee, which attracted much attention.

Afterwards, Chinese official news did not mention whether the high-level China–Poland meetings focused on the interruption of the China–Europe Railway Express, but as one of the major outcomes of Wang Yi’s visit to Poland, the two sides issued the “Joint Document” of the fourth plenary meeting on intergovernmental cooperation. Article 7 of it emphasized: “The two sides exchanged views on the importance of developing an efficient and economically competitive Eurasian transport corridor and the key role played by Poland in it. The two sides recognized the benefits of providing mutually beneficial services in railway, maritime and air freight, as well as strengthening existing and potential transport lines and logistics chains, and are willing to jointly ensure the safe and smooth passage of the China–Europe Railway Express.”

The “drone intrusion” incident suddenly intensified the military tension and indirect confrontation between the European Union and NATO and Russia, and also elevated Poland to the position of a major player, with the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe suddenly tightening. However, by taking the opportunity to cut off the Poland–Belarus border, resulting in the complete interruption of the Polish section of the China–Europe Railway Express, Poland not only made China an innocent victim through no fault of its own, but also caused two-way damage to China–Europe economic and trade cooperation.

The most pressing task is for China to strengthen mediation as soon as possible, ease the geopolitical relations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, and prompt Poland to restore and clear the blockage of the China–Europe Railway Express as soon as possible. In the long run, the geopolitical risks triggered by the prolonged continuation of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as well as the continuously increasing “long-arm jurisdiction” and “secondary sanctions” of the United States and Europe, are increasingly harming the interests of China as an outsider. Therefore, it is also necessary for China to step up efforts to promote talks and persuade toward peace, pushing this intra-European war and confrontation to turn toward dialogue and de-escalation as soon as possible.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France

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The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.

In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.

Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.

Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.

The shadow of 17 October 1961

It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.

Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.

This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.

To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?

Looters on the streets, where are the police?

Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.

While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.

It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.

To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?

The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.

A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges

The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.

The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.

The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.

These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.

The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.

In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.

An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands

Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.

Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.

To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.

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What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?

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By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.

The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.

There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.

For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.

Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.

Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.

There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.

For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.

Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?

Let us give another example from the Turkic world.

On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?

We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?

Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.

In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?

In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?

Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?

How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?

Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?

How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?

Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?

These questions can certainly be multiplied.

Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.

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The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East

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In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.

In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.

Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.

Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.

A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East

On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.

These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.

If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.

Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.

Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.

For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.

The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again

The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.

Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.

The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.

Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.

Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.

Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.

Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.

In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.

In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.

Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.

A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.

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