Opinion
Poland’s fanning the flames intensifies turbulence and unease in Central and Eastern Europe
On September 19, Polish President Nawrocki told France’s LCI television that Poland is increasing defense spending and, together with other NATO members, taking a series of actions to strengthen deterrence. He also hinted that Poland is also discussing a nuclear-sharing plan with France, preparing to bring in France’s nuclear umbrella. France and the United Kingdom are the “only two” nuclear powers among NATO’s European partners, and France previously declared it would provide nuclear protection for Europe.
This is, after the incursion by a mysterious swarm of drones ten days earlier, Poland further responding to potential security threats by hyping nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence. Poland’s series of “overly nervous” moves and taking advantage of the situation to make a splash, even to the point of fanning the flames, will inevitably intensify turbulence and unease in Central and Eastern Europe, reinforce strategic suspicion and mutual deterrence between countries in the region and Russia, and may ultimately backfire on Poland’s own security and development.
According to reports, on the night of September 9, about 20 suspected Russian-made drones broke into Polish airspace. NATO air forces treated it as facing a great enemy and rushed to help Poland resist the incursion. Another NATO member state, Romania, which borders Ukraine, was also intruded by sporadic drones. NATO allies not only used radar to lock in the positions of this batch of drones; the Dutch Air Force’s F-35 fighters also directly took part in the destruction operation. In addition, the German “Patriot” missile system deployed in Poland went on alert; an Italian airborne early warning aircraft and an aerial refueling aircraft from a NATO multinational flight formation also participated in the emergency action. Foreign media said this was the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949 that it opened fire within a member state’s airspace at a potential threat.
On the 10th, Polish Prime Minister Tusk declared that this batch of “threatening” drones “came from Russia,” and pointed out that “this provocation is more dangerous than any previous one.” However, Tusk did not present evidence that the drones set out from Russia. U.S. President Trump also accused Russia on social media of “violating Polish airspace.” The Russian side, however, flatly denied it, saying such accusations with no factual basis have always existed. Russia’s representative to the United Nations, Nebenzya, emphasized that the maximum range of drones used by Russia is 700 kilometers; therefore, they are physically impossible to reach Polish territory. Russia’s only territory bordering Poland is the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, but that area has never been involved in the Russia-Ukraine war.
At the end of 2022, the border area of Poland near Ukraine suffered a missile strike that caused two casualties. The Polish government initially accused Russia of being responsible, but then the Polish President Duda admitted that the missile was very likely from Ukraine’s air defense system. Therefore, Poland and its NATO partners have characterized this incident as a “provocation” rather than an “attack,” so as not to lose room for maneuver.
Observers believe that the swarm of drones that penetrated Polish airspace most likely came from Belarus, which borders Poland. At the time of the incident, Belarus was holding its annual joint exercise with Russia, code-named “West-2025.” The Belarusian Ministry of Defense said on the 10th that during the firefights between Ukraine and Russia, the Belarusian air defense forces continuously tracked drones that deviated from their routes due to the electronic warfare systems of both sides, and some had already been destroyed; the Belarusian side also took the initiative to inform Poland and Lithuania about unidentified drones approaching. If this explanation by Belarus can be confirmed by Poland and Lithuania, then the suspicion that Belarus and Russia deliberately “invaded” Poland via drones can be cleared.
However, in any case, the “drone intrusion” incident activated the tense emotions of the European Union and NATO. On the 10th, European Commission President von der Leyen announced plans to build the EU’s “Eastern Wing Monitoring” mechanism. On the 12th, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who is also the commander of the U.S. European Command, Grynkiewicz, announced that he had ordered the launch of Operation “Eastern Sentinel.” NATO member states such as Denmark, France, the United Kingdom and Germany will contribute to this. The operation “will possess flexibility and acuity, providing more targeted deterrence and defense when and where necessary.”
The launch of Operation “Eastern Sentinel” is equivalent to triggering the Article 4 response mechanism of the North Atlantic Treaty, namely that when a NATO member faces a threat and issues a call for collective consultations, other members are obligated to respond actively. Therefore, this time NATO members reacted one after another in different ways, assisting Poland in strengthening its defense and deterring external threat factors. Although Article 4 still falls short of Article 5, which initiates collective defense, the consultations themselves will also aggravate the tension and confrontational posture on NATO’s eastern flank, intensifying the turbulence and unease in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
There is still no conclusive evidence showing that the “intruding drones” originated in Russia or Belarus, but this does not prevent the Polish government from seizing the opportunity to turn play-acting into reality and, by using force against force, hyping the external threat to raise Poland’s status in the EU and NATO, win more sympathy from the Western camp and rake in more benefits. At this stage when the truth of this incident remains “Rashomon”-like and unclear, Poland keeps crying “the wolf is coming,” and in the early hours of the 12th, on the grounds that the Russia-Belarus joint exercise endangered its own security, announced the closure of the Polish-Belarusian border and land links, thereby cutting off the major economic and trade artery connecting China and Europe — the China-Europe Railway Express, causing the two-way logistics of China-Europe trade to be suddenly and drastically obstructed, harming the interests of both sides.
On September 15, Nawrocki continued to add fuel to the tense situation, signing an order agreeing to the stationing of troops from NATO member states on Polish territory. The UK Ministry of Defence stated that NATO is implementing Operation “Eastern Sentinel,” integrating the military resources of multiple allies and strengthening the defensive posture on Europe’s eastern flank. That day, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sikorski further called for considering the establishment of a no-fly zone over Ukraine. As of the 18th, both France and the United Kingdom had announced the dispatch of fighter jets to Polish airspace to carry out air defense missions.
On September 16, Poland’s air defense forces tested the “Patriot” missile defense system for the first time near the northern town of Ustka. Polish Prime Minister Tusk stated that this air defense drill was part of the “Steel Defender-25” military exercise and also a response to the Russia-Belarus joint exercise.
The Russia-Belarus defensive strategic-level joint exercise “West-2025,” held from September 12 to 16, was the final phase of the two countries’ regular annual training, and the exercise was carried out mainly at training grounds within the two countries and in the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea areas. The two sides mobilized a total of 100,000 military personnel, ten thousand sets of equipment, 333 aircraft and nearly 250 warships to participate. Six countries including Iran and India were also invited to send military personnel to take part in the joint training. Russia especially emphasized that this joint exercise was not aimed at any third country, and also invited U.S. officials and OSCE officials to attend as observers.
Even so, Poland, citing security, closed the border crossings between Poland and Belarus, cut off cross-border rail traffic, and deployed 40,000 troops at the border. On September 16, Poland’s Ministry of the Interior and Administration issued a statement saying that the Polish-Belarusian border would remain closed until further notice, emphasizing that this was based on a high degree of concern for the safety of Polish citizens, especially in connection with the Russia-Belarus joint exercise.
The two Polish government departments made it clear that the border closure was not just to cope with security issues during the (Russia-Belarus) exercise period, but that the border would not reopen until the security situation had fully recovered and the relevant service information had been confirmed. The statement noted that closing the border could cause a series of negative economic consequences, but that the government would strive to ease the difficulties faced by enterprises, and in particular would consult to minimize the economic impact of the closure on suppliers forced to use alternative transit points such as Lithuania.
Historically, the Kingdom of Poland was a major country in Central and Eastern Europe, with an area of 1.15 million square kilometers, including today’s homeland as well as Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania. Beginning in 1772, after Poland was partitioned by the combined forces of Tsarist Russia, the Kingdom of Prussia and the Austrian Empire, it suffered three further carve-ups by powerful neighbors. Today’s territory of Poland can also be said to be an artificial remaking by the Soviet Union and Russia as a result of World War II and an overall westward shift of territory: its western part is prewar German territory, and its prewar eastern part has become today’s western Ukraine. Therefore, Poland’s tradition of hating and resenting Russia is deeply rooted. At the same time, because mutual massacres between Poles and Ukrainians occurred frequently in history, and even ethnic cleansing of each other during World War II, the positions of Poland’s government and people on the Russia-Ukraine conflict are delicate and complex.
Even so, based on a historical “anti-Russia hysteria,” and even more on the reality of interlinked interests of “when the lips are gone, the teeth feel cold,” Poland, after Russia launched the “special military operation,” took a clear stand on Ukraine’s side, playing the role of the eastern frontline state of the Western camp, especially the EU and NATO, greatly elevating its strategic status and voice. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been unwilling to see European unity and integration, deliberately manufacturing splits and confrontation between old and new Europe, and has repeatedly courted Poland, which has a relatively large population, sufficient size, a special religious tradition, and a key geopolitical position, conferring on it the status of leader of “new Europe,” which has also fueled Poland’s “great-power complex” and its self-positioning as a bridgehead. The sudden outbreak and continuation of the Russia-Ukraine war have given Poland a rare opportunity to exert great-power energy.
In the more than three years since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland has received and relayed countless Western leaders who went to Kyiv to display resolve and aid the war, has also delivered large quantities of military equipment and strategic supplies to Ukraine, and has signed a security cooperation agreement with it. Although Poland is not enthusiastic about Ukraine joining NATO, from a certain point of view Poland is the frontline country most deeply drawn into the Russia-Ukraine war, and thus can hardly avoid “when the city gate catches fire, the pond fish suffer” because of its two neighbors. The previous mistaken Ukrainian missile strike and this “drone intrusion” both belong to the price Poland has paid.
From a theoretical and logical perspective, the EU and NATO, including Poland, have become indirectly entangled with Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield, and there is the possibility of escalation and expansion into a direct military showdown. Moreover, both sides are laying corresponding low-level groundwork. Against this background, whether batches of Russian-made drones broke into Poland from Russia or from Belarus, Russia and Belarus can hardly avoid falling under suspicion. Western observers believe that if the drones did not mistakenly enter due to interference but were precisely delivered, it cannot be ruled out that Russia and Belarus are thereby releasing a deterrent trial balloon, or probing and sounding out the air-defense systems of Poland and NATO’s eastern flank. Therefore Poland and its NATO allies are very nervous.
Seizing on the pretext of safeguarding national security, Poland has made a big deal of it, continuously adding weight to strengthen national defense and collective defense, highlighting its strategic role and status as a barrier on Europe and NATO’s eastern flank, raising its value within the Western camp, and increasing its bargaining chips for grabbing its own interests from EU or NATO members. When Nawrocki visited Germany on September 16, he demanded that Germany pay as much as 1.3 trillion euros in World War II reparations, in exchange for Poland playing a greater role on NATO’s eastern flank. In fact, the issue of German World War II reparations long ago became history in legal terms, but in the more than twenty years since the founding of Poland’s right-wing conservative Law and Justice Party, the governments or ruling coalitions it has led have always demanded huge compensation from Germany and have always been rejected by Germany. However, Nawrocki, who was helped into office by the Law and Justice Party, never forgets to “collect the debt” from Germany, especially at a juncture when a strategic crisis has appeared on NATO’s eastern flank.
After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Poland’s forward geopolitical weight in “defending Europe” has clearly increased, Germany has also increasingly shaken off the path of peace and returned to the road of strengthening the military, and has actively played the role of vanguard on NATO’s eastern flank. This situation has allowed the Polish government to take the opportunity to strike Germany for a big gain, handling in parallel two matters that have nothing to do with each other, World War II and the Russia-Ukraine war. This operation by Poland has objectively set itself as the hardest-pulling shaft horse on NATO’s war chariot, galloping forward to seize benefits, even at the cost of staking its own long-term interests and harming China-Europe and even China-Poland economic and trade ties; the historical suspension of the China-Europe Railway Express caused by the border closure is the proof.
It is learned that the China–Europe Railway Express is an important main artery of the logistics network connecting China and Europe, and Poland is its key node, undertaking about 30% of the carrying capacity. Ninety percent of the rail lines from China to Europe need to pass through Poland; in particular, ports such as Małaszewicze in Poland have long been the main channels for the China–Europe Railway Express to enter Europe. This closure of border crossings directly led to the interruption of the Polish segment of the China–Europe Railway Express, suspension of the trains, and a large amount of cargo being stranded. This sudden incident will have a serious impact on China’s international trade and logistics industry oriented toward Europe.
Whether by coincidence or as an emergency temporary arrangement, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and minister of foreign affairs, who had just concluded a seven-day tour of Europe at the end of June and beginning of July, once again visited Europe from September 12 to 16, focusing on three Central and Eastern European countries, Austria, Slovenia and Poland. When Wang Yi arrived in Warsaw, it was at the critical moment when the “drone intrusion” incident was fermenting to a peak and the China–Europe Railway Express had been cut off for the first time; therefore, on the 15th he held talks with Polish President Nawrocki and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sikorski, and presided over the fourth meeting of the China–Poland Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee, which attracted much attention.
Afterwards, Chinese official news did not mention whether the high-level China–Poland meetings focused on the interruption of the China–Europe Railway Express, but as one of the major outcomes of Wang Yi’s visit to Poland, the two sides issued the “Joint Document” of the fourth plenary meeting on intergovernmental cooperation. Article 7 of it emphasized: “The two sides exchanged views on the importance of developing an efficient and economically competitive Eurasian transport corridor and the key role played by Poland in it. The two sides recognized the benefits of providing mutually beneficial services in railway, maritime and air freight, as well as strengthening existing and potential transport lines and logistics chains, and are willing to jointly ensure the safe and smooth passage of the China–Europe Railway Express.”
The “drone intrusion” incident suddenly intensified the military tension and indirect confrontation between the European Union and NATO and Russia, and also elevated Poland to the position of a major player, with the security situation in Central and Eastern Europe suddenly tightening. However, by taking the opportunity to cut off the Poland–Belarus border, resulting in the complete interruption of the Polish section of the China–Europe Railway Express, Poland not only made China an innocent victim through no fault of its own, but also caused two-way damage to China–Europe economic and trade cooperation.
The most pressing task is for China to strengthen mediation as soon as possible, ease the geopolitical relations between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, and prompt Poland to restore and clear the blockage of the China–Europe Railway Express as soon as possible. In the long run, the geopolitical risks triggered by the prolonged continuation of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, as well as the continuously increasing “long-arm jurisdiction” and “secondary sanctions” of the United States and Europe, are increasingly harming the interests of China as an outsider. Therefore, it is also necessary for China to step up efforts to promote talks and persuade toward peace, pushing this intra-European war and confrontation to turn toward dialogue and de-escalation as soon as possible.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
The caption and the guest list: What the West’s SCO coverage cannot explain about Türkiye
Thomas Karat, behavioral analyst
The photograph that Western agencies distributed from Bishkek arrived with its meaning already fixed. Above an image of the Kyrgyz president escorting China’s Xi Jinping past an honor guard, the caption read COUNTER US POWER. The image itself showed a familiar diplomatic ritual, two heads of state walking a red carpet. The caption supplied what the image did not: an adversary, a purpose, and the direction in which a Western audience was meant to orient its concern. The gap between the neutral picture and the loaded words is a useful place to begin, because it is where the framing of the entire summit was decided before a single line of analysis was written.
On Sept. 1 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization marked its twenty-fifth anniversary in the Kyrgyz capital, with ten member states, more than a dozen heads of government, and the secretary-general of the United Nations among the guests. Most European and North American outlets carried a single Agence France-Presse dispatch, which described the bloc as one that seeks to be a counterinfluence to the West. France 24 reported that the Russian and Chinese leaders had traveled to Central Asia to counter Western influence. British coverage of an earlier session of the same body called it a secretive summit of an “axis of upheaval.” In each formulation the West occupies the grammatical center of a meeting it did not attend. The organization is assigned no purpose that can be stated without reference to Washington and Brussels. It is defined entirely as a reaction to them.
Türkiye is the hole in the caption
The framing meets its first and largest obstacle in the guest list, and specifically in the presence of a NATO member at the table. Türkiye holds the status of dialogue partner in the organization, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has attended its summits in person. A Western reader told that the SCO is an axis assembled against his alliance is not encouraged to ask why a founding member of that alliance keeps a seat in it. The same AFP dispatch that calls the bloc a counterinfluence to the West records, several paragraphs below its lead, that the organization now counts fifteen dialogue partners including Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Türkiye belongs to NATO. Saudi Arabia and Qatar host the forward headquarters of United States Central Command and the largest American air base in the region. An organization built to oppose the West does not assemble this membership, and a caption that calls it one survives only for readers who do not reach the paragraph that contradicts it.
Türkiye’s position is the part of the picture that Western coverage is least equipped to interpret, because the prevailing map allows for only two teams. Ankara is not choosing the SCO over NATO. It is doing something the two-team model cannot represent, treating the organization as a venue to be worked, neither joining it nor shunning it. A state that keeps its treaty commitments in the Atlantic while cultivating standing in a Eurasian security forum is hedging against a future in which the Atlantic order no longer sets the terms alone. That behavior is legible from Istanbul and largely illegible from the outlets that produced the Bishkek caption, which is why their account of the summit reads, from this vantage, as a description of a world that has already begun to pass.
The vocabulary and its tell
The language of the coverage repays close attention. The recurring terms are “counter,” “against,” “anti-Western,” and “axis,” a vocabulary of opposition that grants the bloc no content of its own. The word “axis” carries the heaviest freight. It imports the moral architecture of the Second World War, and more recently of the “axis of evil,” and lays it over a trade-and-security forum whose membership includes a NATO government. The transfer is performed a few lines from the facts that make it untenable, and the proximity is the tell.
There is a structural habit worth naming as well. The AFP copy notes that the organization’s founding declaration describes it as not an alliance directed against other states, and then, in the following sentence, observes that the Russian and Chinese leaders have delivered anti-Western speeches at past summits. The self-description is admitted and immediately withdrawn. The skepticism applied here is selective. When a NATO communiqué describes the alliance as defensive, the same wire services do not append a reminder of its record of offensive operations. The doubt switches on for adversaries and off for partners, a selection that rests on assumption and not on evidence. Coverage outside the Western agency system handles the same material with a cooler hand. Al Jazeera quoted a regional analyst describing the SCO simply as not a coherent anti-Western alliance, a plain and accurate line that appears in no Western headline, because it does not fit the caption.
A bloc that grew in proportion to the pressure
The organization’s history explains more than its rhetoric does. It began in 1996 as a border-demarcation arrangement among China, Russia and three Central Asian republics, a technical body concerned with the settlement of frontier lines. It gained momentum in close proportion to the pressure applied to its members from the West. India and Pakistan acceded in 2017. Iran was admitted after years of sanctions had made membership useful to Tehran and to the bloc alike. The roster of dialogue partners expanded toward fifteen as American secondary sanctions and tariffs demonstrated to a widening circle of governments the value of a forum beyond Washington’s reach. At Bishkek the rotating chairmanship passed to Pakistan, another long-standing American security partner. The pattern is consistent: the organization has grown less by recruitment than by the steady conversion of states that Western policy has pressed toward the exits.
Iran offers the sharpest illustration. President Masoud Pezeshkian took his seat in Bishkek six months into a war with the United States. A week before the summit, the U.S. Treasury announced a sanctions campaign it named Operation Economic Outcast, extending secondary sanctions to five further sectors of the Iranian economy, aviation, digital assets, gold, shipping and technology, and warning in a separate alert that any party of any nationality paying Iran for passage through the Strait of Hormuz risked U.S. penalty. Secondary sanctions do not fall on the target alone. They fall on any government or firm that trades with the target, which makes them an instruction directed at the sovereign decisions of other states, enforced by the threat of exclusion from the dollar system. China, the largest purchaser of Iranian oil, responded that it would firmly defend its interests. A measure aimed at Tehran functions as a demand issued to Beijing, and Beijing traveled to Bishkek. India provides a second instance. Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a scheduled bilateral with President Vladimir Putin days after Washington imposed a 50 percent tariff on Indian goods over New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. The instrument intended to discipline India accompanied it to the very table it was meant to keep it from.
The divisions are real, and they are the point
An accurate account of the summit requires equal candor about the organization’s limits, and candor here is what separates analysis from a mirror image of the framing under examination. The SCO is not a unified bloc. Russia and China compete for influence across the same Central Asian ground. India and China share a contested and periodically violent border, which is why Modi and Xi appeared on the same platform but arranged no formal bilateral. India and Pakistan hold membership in the same body while remaining adversaries. A proposed development bank has been discussed for years without becoming a functioning institution. The 40 percent of humanity the organization claims to encompass is a measure of scale, not of common purpose.
These divisions do not rescue the Western frame. They sharpen the judgment it obscures. Agreement among these governments does not exist, and it is not what makes the summit notable. What makes it notable is the preference of states that distrust one another to manage their disputes inside a structure the United States does not control. The arbitration of one it does control is the option they declined. That preference is a heavier comment on the standing of the American-led order than any declaration could produce. It requires no alliance and no shared ideology. It requires only that a critical mass of states has concluded that the Western order is something to work around, and that the working-around now proceeds openly, at the level of heads of state, beneath a caption instructing Western readers to see a hostile axis where a hedging one stands.
The shrinking center
The phrase that recurs whenever Western officials describe global opinion is “the international community.” Bishkek is a reminder of how much that phrase conceals. The community it invokes is a specific and diminishing set of capitals that grew accustomed, during the brief period of unchallenged American primacy after 1991, to mistaking its own consensus for the consensus of humanity. The summit in the Kyrgyz capital assembled a NATO member, a Western-courted partner in India, the Gulf security clients of the United States, and the two most heavily sanctioned states on earth, and it did so under the observation of the United Nations secretary-general. No description of that room as an anti-Western axis can be reconciled with its composition. The description persists because it serves the audience it is written for, offering a shrinking center the reassurance that it remains the fixed point around which the world still turns.
From Ankara, and from the wider vantage of states that have watched the post-1991 order lose its monopoly, the reassurance reads as a lagging indicator. The two men in the photograph were walking to lunch. The power that could not prevent the lunch, could not hold its Indian partner at a distance from Moscow, could not isolate the state it is fighting, and could not keep the head of the United Nations from attending, is nonetheless assured by its own press that the summit was organized around opposition to it. The more accurate reading is the one Türkiye’s own conduct already reflects. The world is not arranging itself against the West so much as arranging itself without waiting for it, and the caption over the photograph is the last place that development will be admitted.
Opinion
In Bishkek, the ‘new order’ gathers to see whether it can become real
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
Ten heads of states and governments, a cast of partners spanning half of Eurasia meet in the Kyrgyz capital promising a world beyond Western dominance. The summit’s quiet battles over money, media and the club’s own contradictions will matter more than its communiqué.
BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan: This is a city that understands great powers. Soviet engineers drew its street grid. Its economy runs substantially on money earned by Kyrgyz workers in Russia. And when the Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds its annual summit here Aug. 31st to Sept. 1st 2026 the mountain-ringed capital will become, for 48 hours, the seat of this era’s most consequential open question: What does the world look like after Western dominance?
What will the world look like beyond Western dominance?
The participant list alone is enough to illustrate the scale of the stakes. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will lead the SCO’s ten full members, representing roughly 40 percent of humanity. They include India and Pakistan, Belarus, and the four Central Asian republics, led by Kazakhstan and its President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, alongside dialogue partners whose presence stretches from Cairo to the Gulf and all the way to Ankara.
No Western institution has ever had to accommodate such a company under one roof. No American administration has had to watch it from the outside.
On paper, the agenda is deliberately unremarkable: counterterrorism cooperation through the organization’s Tashkent-based coordinating body, Afghanistan’s instability, trade facilitation, energy, digital development and the ritual invocation of the “Shanghai Spirit” mutual trust, mutual benefit, respect among civilizations. The organizing principle, as ever, is consensus, which is another way of saying nothing said in the plenary hall will offend anyone.
The real summit will happen in the margins, in three conversations the final declaration will not be recorded.
The first is about money and how to move it where Washington cannot reach it
No communiqué will use the word “sanctions.” Yet diplomats from three member states, speaking on the condition of anonymity to describe preparatory talks, said the financial file has consumed more negotiating time than any other: the long-delayed SCO Development Bank, given fresh impetus at last year’s Tianjin summit; the expansion of local-currency trade; the stitching together of national payment systems that would let members settle accounts without touching the Belgium-based SWIFT network and therefore without touching U.S. financial law.
The urgency is not abstract. Russia’s central bank operates under sweeping penalties. Iran has been locked out of the dollar system for a generation. Even India, a Western partner, buys Russian oil in non-dollar currencies to keep its options open. Tariffs and secondary sanctions have turned “financial inclusiveness,” in the organization’s diplomatese, into the summer’s quiet rallying cry.
The obstacles are equally concrete. The development bank has been discussed for more than a decade without being built, partly because every founding member wants it capitalized, headquartered and denominated on its own terms. “Nobody in that room is against de-dollarization,” said one economist who advises a member-state government. “Everybody in that room is against a bank China controls.”
The second conversation is about the United States absent, and everywhere
The months before the summit have seen a burst of American diplomacy conducted largely through intermediaries: reported contacts between the CIA director and Russian intelligence; a Pakistani army chief’s travels to Tehran; Gulf foreign ministers, and on one reading the Jordanian monarch, carrying messages to Beijing. Washington describes the traffic as routine management of a complicated world. In the capitals gathering in Bishkek, it is read as something more evidence that the superpower wants deals.
“Diplomacy by intermediary is either sophistication or exhaustion,” said a European ambassador in Beijing, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity. “The Americans say the first. This summit will spend two days staging the second.”
The calendar sharpens the drama. U.S. midterm elections fall ten weeks after the leaders leave Bishkek, and a president who has staked his brand on ending wars and winning trade disputes has delivered a durable settlement of neither. Advisors openly worry that losing the House would hand the opposition subpoena power and the machinery of impeachment. Analysts expect the summit’s choreography to be calibrated accordingly: handshakes and family photos projecting an alternative order, measured carefully enough not to hand Washington an enemy at the worst possible moment.
Yet the “declining America” narrative has limits that the summit’s own design reveals. India attends in large part to ensure the organization does not become a Chinese-Russian instrument; it has blocked anti-Western language before and is expected to again. The Central Asian states hedge between Russian security, Chinese financing and Western markets. And every member’s sanctions-resistance project is, in the end, a measure of how much the dollar world still matters.
The third conversation is the one an Egyptian started
Among the more concrete proposals at Tianjin came not from a head of state but from Dr Ahmed Moustafa, an Egyptian scholar and specialist in Asian and Eurasian Affairs, who directs the Cairo-based Asia Center for Studies and Translation, attending as his country an SCO dialogue partner continues testing the club’s outer circle. His argument: the organization’s deepest deficit is neither military nor financial but informational.
The West’s real advantage runs through its media platforms and professional networks, which shape the aspirations of the very youth the organization claims to speak for. His proposal, a standing, professionally sponsored mechanism binding member-state think tanks and media, and a professional social platform for the region’s young people, “similar to or stronger than LinkedIn” circulated this summer in summit working groups.
The idea matters less as a business plan than as a diagnosis that Beijing and Moscow have reached by harder roads. For all its demographic weight, the information environment in which the organization’s citizens actually live is dominated by Western platforms and Western languages. Member states have answered with firewalls, copycat apps and an annual media forum. What they have not produced is a digital ecosystem anyone would choose.
Skeptics see a structural reason: professional networks create value through the free flow of information precisely what several member governments are professionally committed to restricting. “You can build a LinkedIn for the Shanghai Spirit,” one diplomat joked. “Good luck making anyone network in it.”
The last conversation is with itself
The family photo will not show the feuds beneath it: India and China, India and Pakistan, Iran which left Tianjin with expressions of sympathy and no security guarantees after its war with Israel and a host government whose national strategy is to be courted by all sides at once. A quarter-century after the organization’s founding, its signature achievement remains the summit itself: proof that rivals can meet, not yet proof that they can build.
“Bishkek will be perfectly staged,” said a veteran analyst of Eurasian institutions. “The question is whether anything survives the motorcades.”
When the leaders fly home over Bishkek on the first of September, they will leave behind banners, a communiqué and a claim: that a new order is not merely desired but operational.
The quieter truth of this summit is that an order cannot be declared into existence. It has to be built payment system by payment system, platform by platform, in the unphotographed rooms where the Shanghai Spirit is tested against arithmetic.
Opinion
What did the Israeli attack in Syria reveal?
Following Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Syria on August 18, relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv have reportedly broken down. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Sheybani announced in the wake of the attack that all communication with Israel had been severed. “We anticipate that talks regarding a security agreement with Israel will resume in the near future. At present, we do not trust Israel. Our priority is the cessation of attacks against our sovereign territory,” he stated.
The minister’s utter helplessness reverberates through his words.
The post-Assad regime in Damascus ascended to power on the back of American and Israeli support. Consequently, the United States and Israel stand as the primary arbiters of Syria’s destiny. It is precisely for this reason that the Damascus administration has abandoned all claims to its rights over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights—virtually resigning itself to the occupation and striking it from the agenda. Upon seizing power, it pledged immediate fealty to Washington: “We will pose no security threat to Israel, and we shall thwart anyone who attempts to do so.” It operated under the delusion that it could forge a functional relationship with Israel—led by Netanyahu, a perpetrator of genocide and a convicted war criminal—by appeasing it through concessions. It was gravely mistaken.
For Israel currently holds sway over a substantial portion of Syrian territory. It establishes military outposts across the country, carries out airstrikes at will, and deploys its armor unimpeded.
Similarly, the Israeli-backed PYD-YPG terrorist organization exercises control over an expanse of land vastly disproportionate to its actual strength—territory exceptionally rich in energy resources—solely through the patronage of the US and Israel. Leveraging that very support, it wrenches outsized political, military, and administrative concessions from the Damascus government.
Evidently, the displacement of Iranian and Russian influence in Syria by that of the United States and Israel has brought profound satisfaction to certain circles in our country. Yet what these quarters fail to see, refuse to see, or cannot bring themselves to acknowledge even when confronted with it, is this fundamental reality: Washington envisions a Middle Eastern order wherein Israel commands supremacy, projects expanding power, and dictates terms, while Türkiye raises no objection whatsoever and instead accommodates itself to this architecture. To compel Türkiye’s acquiescence, the US is actively deploying its vast and varied arsenal of leverage.
Lest we forget, the United States had already brought several Arab states to the desired threshold through the Abraham Accords. That process was ultimately intended to culminate in the open, formal consecration of the de facto rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That trajectory has not been abandoned; it has merely been placed on ice for the time being. Behind the scenes, Washington maintains an intense flurry of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Once the wider Middle East, the Islamic world, and the Arab sphere have been fully conditioned to accept the ongoing reality in Gaza—and once the oppressed, grieving, and beleaguered Palestinian people have been driven entirely from their ancestral homeland—this shelved agenda will be revived.
We know that the Zionist establishment in Israel, aligned with American imperialism, chose not to strike Iran first before confronting the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, the Shia Crescent, and Tehran’s proxy forces. It executed the exact inverse: it struck first at Syria, at Hamas in Palestine, and at Hezbollah in Lebanon. Only after eroding their efficacy did it turn its sights directly upon Iran. In Syria, the previous regime held out far longer than anticipated—enduring for 13 years and 8 months. As a consequence of the civil war that erupted in March 2011, Assad was ultimately overthrown, finding refuge in Moscow.
When 61 years of Baathist rule, including 53 years of the Assad dynasty, came to a close in December 2024, the emergent regime in Damascus wasted no time in pledging its allegiance to the United States, to Israel, and to the Arab states that backed it, chief among them Saudi Arabia. It proclaimed that it would erect a bulwark against Iran, raise not the slightest objection to Israel, and execute Washington’s directives to the letter.
A broad demographic in Türkiye that welcomed this turn of events swiftly began asserting—under the banner of religious and sectarian fraternity—that this transition worked entirely in Türkiye’s favor. The sheer fallacy of this premise was exposed in short order.
And how was it exposed?
It was exposed by Israel immediately laying the groundwork for a Syria partitioned into four enclaves (Druze, Kurdish, Alawite, and Arab). It was exposed by the renewed revelation that the US-Israel axis intends, sooner or later, to carve up Syria along sectarian and ethnic fault lines—mirroring the precedents of Lebanon and Iraq—in a country roughly composed of 70 percent Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Alawites, 10 percent Kurds, 5 percent Christians, and 5 percent Druze and Turkmens.
It was exposed by the fact that the PYD-YPG terrorist organization, even if denied the entirety of its territorial ambitions, has managed to secure a portion of its political, military, and administrative demands through US–Israeli patronage, thereby being permitted to preserve its existence by settling for a reduced perimeter.
And it was exposed by the resilience of Iran, which, despite suffering immense exhaustion and attrition in the face of American and Israeli aggression, refused to capitulate and maintained its resistance. It was exposed by the failure of the US-Israel tandem to achieve its overarching political and military objectives in Iran, bringing to the fore once again the undeniable truth that Iran possesses an institutionalized state tradition, a national consciousness, and an armed force of a depth and resilience that defy any comparison to Libya, Iraq, or Syria.
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