In handling international relations and diplomatic affairs, China has always adhered to an important strategic principle: “major countries as the key, neighboring countries as the priority, developing countries as the foundation, and multilateral forums as the stage.” Neighboring regions are an important foundation for China’s development and prosperity, a key area for safeguarding national security, a top priority in shaping overall diplomatic strategy, and a critical factor in promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind. Therefore, stability and security in the neighboring regions are of vital importance to China, and managing relations with neighboring countries stands as a major focus of China’s diplomacy. On this basis, the recent turmoil in neighboring countries such as Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia deserves careful study and attention.

Causes of Recent Political Turmoil in Neighboring Countries of China

Nepal. The decree issued by the Oli government to shut down over 20 unregistered social media platforms directly triggered strong dissatisfaction among Gen Z youth, serving as the fuse that ignited this round of large-scale social unrest in Nepal. The direct causes are as follows:

1) Young people believe that the Nepalese government is stifling their freedom of speech.

2) Young people are extremely dissatisfied with the corruption in Nepal and the phenomenon of “second-generation rich” showing off their wealth online.

3) The unemployment rate among young people is high, and the Internet is their main means of obtaining economic income.

4) The Internet is the main communication channel between Nepalese citizens and overseas citizens.

However, these are only the superficial manifestations of the contradictions. The deeper crux lies in the corruption of government officials, the widening gap between the rich and the poor in society, and the struggles between political parties. In this incident, the Nepalese people did not target a single political party or its leader; instead, they directed their anger at all political parties, the entire government, and the entire elite or ruling class. This dissatisfaction stems from their discontent with national development and government governance. Essentially, the interweaving of economic stagnation, disordered governance, and the neglect of people’s livelihood has trapped Nepal in a vicious cycle of “protest-suppression-more intense protest”.

Indonesia. The fuse of this round of unrest in Indonesia was the bill passed by the Great Indonesia Movement Party-to which President Prabowo belongs-in the parliament in August this year. The bill proposed a 50 million Indonesian rupiah (approximately 3,000 US dollars) housing allowance increase for members of parliament. For context, the monthly salary of an ordinary Indonesian wage earner is only 5 million Indonesian rupiah. Coupled with the nationwide “Free Nutritious Meal Program” launched in February (which involves the military engaging in business activities) and the subsequent passage of the Amendment to the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law by the parliament (which relates to the military’s intervention in politics), this series of events triggered widespread public concern and anger over the government’s fiscal direction. The protest groups, which were previously dominated by students, expanded to include a broad participation of workers, the unemployed, and the middle class. While the protests were targeted at specific “policies”, their core criticism was directed at Prabowo himself and the military forces he represents behind the scenes. This is because the new policies introduced by Prabowo fail to fundamentally address Indonesia’s underemployment dilemma or increase Indonesians’ incomes. Instead, they may trigger new fiscal instability and inject uncertainties into Indonesia’s political, economic, and social sectors. Essentially, Indonesia’s protests and the subsequent unrest are the result of long-standing structural issues combined with the accumulation of a series of short-term incidents.

Thailand. The recent turmoil in Thailand originated from the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, specifically regarding the ownership of the Preah Vihear Temple and its surrounding areas, which subsequently escalated into a military conflict between the two countries. In June, Paetongtarn Shinawatra called Hun Sen, the de facto leader of Cambodia, to discuss the escalating border tensions. However, Hun Sen publicly released the audio recording of their conversation. This “phone gate incident” ultimately led to Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s resignation in disgrace. The territorial dispute between Thailand and Cambodia is a long-standing issue left over from history, but it eventually evolved into a domestic political problem in Thailand. Although the conflict between the two countries subsided in the end under the witness of China and the United States and with the mediation of ASEAN, the fundamental issue remains unresolved. From the perspective of Thailand’s overall political landscape, the influence of the Shinawatra Family has been weakened. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of the military conservatives dominating the political situation, Thailand’s “orange-red-blue confrontation” pattern is unlikely to undergo a fundamental change in the short term. Here, orange generally represents the People’s Party, a radical left-wing political party; red stands for the Pheu Thai Party, which has close ties to Thaksin Shinawatra and advocates reform; and blue symbolizes the right-wing camp that upholds traditional values and holds conservative stances. No matter who becomes the prime minister, they may face impeachment over seemingly minor disputes, or even be forced out of office through constitutional means. This indicates that the phenomenon of frequent prime ministerial changes in Thailand will continue for a period of time in the future.

Myanmar. Myanmar has been trapped in prolonged chaos and instability since the February 2021 military coup, which triggered full-scale clashes between the military junta and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).Currently, Myanmar is grappling with four major predicaments. First, it faces economic hardship due to Western sanctions. Second, conflicts have intensified between the military junta and EAOs, as well as between the junta and the “National Unity Government” (NUG) represented by Aung San Suu Kyi, pushing the country toward civil war. Third, the military junta exhibits poor governance capabilities. Fourth, the junta is mired in a legitimacy crisis and remains unrecognized by the international community. As a result, Myanmar has fallen into a situation of “one country, two governments” and “one country, three armies”. The three military forces are the Myanmar Armed Forces controlled by the junta, the Myanmar National Defense Force (MNDF), and the People’s Defense Force (PDF)-both of which are under the command of the NUG. This chaos is further compounded by multiple factors. These include the power struggles among neighboring major powers, the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in color revolutions, and the tangled interests of gray industries and criminal groups. Together, they have plunged Myanmar into extreme disorder. In the past, conflicts between the Bamar ethnic group and other ethnic minorities were the primary source of tension. Today, however, political oppression and economic distress have shattered the confidence of some Bamar people in the military junta. Coupled with pervasive incitement, Myanmar now resembles a volcano, ready to erupt at any moment.

It is evident that the political turmoil in these countries exhibits the following characteristics. First, prior to the outbreak of unrest, these countries had already been mired in prolonged political instability. Cabinets were frequently reshuffled, and governments constantly faced legitimacy crises. Second, while symbolic incidents triggered the unrest, the protests were no longer confined to local issues or specific policies—instead, they spread to questions about the system and institutional flaws. However, the structural problems inherent in these countries’ institutions cannot be resolved by a single incident. Third, young people and social organizations played an increasingly prominent role in these protests. Fourth, symbolic incidents drove the outbreak of demonstrations and their escalation into violent protests. As seen in the aforementioned countries, all witnessed a shift from peaceful assemblies to actions such as storming public institutions, clashing with police, arson, and looting. This evolution has resulted in severe casualties and economic losses.

Political Outlook for Neighboring Countries in the Coming Months

In the next six months, the aforementioned neighboring countries will either enter a transitional government period, kick off election cycles, or undergo cabinet reshuffles—making further political turbulence highly likely. For example,

1. According to Xinhua News Agency, Sushila Karki, former Chief Justice of Nepal’s Supreme Court, was sworn in as Prime Minister of Nepal’s interim government at the Presidential Palace on the evening of September 12. She will lead a six-month transitional government to pave the way for the national election scheduled for March 5, 2026. Karki’s appointment is the result of negotiations between Gen Z protesters, Nepal’s President, and the military. Many Nepali young people have placed unusually high hopes on her, expecting her to end corruption and drive reform. For Karki, addressing key issues of concern to young people—such as social equity, political reform, and economic development—within just six months will undoubtedly be an immense and challenging task.
2. On September 5, Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of Thailand’s Bhumjaithai Party, secured a majority vote in a special session of the House of Representatives and was elected Thailand’s new Prime Minister. As noted in relevant commentary, Anutin took office without the support of the Pheu Thai Party, and his term is expected to be short-lived—leaving his minority government highly vulnerable. Anutin has also explicitly stated that the new government will serve for four months, after which a general election will be held.
3. Myanmar has long been trapped in civil war. Since the 2021 coup in particular, Myanmar’s military junta has extended the state of emergency multiple times, drawing dissatisfaction from both the public and the international community. However, Myanmar’s leader Min Aung Hlaing has announced that the country will hold an election on December 28, 2025.
4. On September 8, Indonesian President Prabowo announced the first large-scale cabinet reshuffle since he took office in October last year. Among the changes, the removal of Finance Minister Sri Mulyani became a focal point of public attention—an adjustment widely seen as a response to the large-scale public unrest in August.

The aforementioned neighboring countries represent a model of “fluctuating political development”. In other words, they have consistently encountered various challenges during the process of achieving national independence and advancing their political agenda, leading to twists and turns in their political progress.For instance,

1. Since gaining independence after World War II, Myanmar has been plagued by political instability, driven by power struggles between the country’s military and local ethnic groups. Entering the 21st century, in addition to the conflict between the military junta and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the rivalry between the military bloc and the so-called “pro-democratic forces” backed by the United States has largely shaped the trajectory of Myanmar’s political development.
2. Since the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1990, Nepal has seen 29 prime ministers and two periods of direct royal rule over the past 34 years. On average, each government has lasted only 13 months, with the shortest-lived administration in office for a mere 60 days. To date, no government has completed a full five-year term.
3. The alternation between military coups and dynastic politics has been the defining thread of Thailand’s political development over the past 70 years. In the last two decades, forces aligned with Thaksin Shinawatra have won the prime ministerial election six times, nearly monopolizing the position of popularly elected prime minister. In a sense, Thailand has effectively formed a “dual-core structure” dominated by the King and Thaksin: the prime minister’s office is held by members of the Thaksin family or their protégés, while the monarchy remains with the Chakri dynasty. The recent political upheaval in Thailand is a major setback for the Thaksin family, but it does not signal their decline—they could still stage a comeback at any time.

The fundamental cause of the aforementioned political turmoil in neighboring countries lies in inadequate and unbalanced economic development, coupled with a widening wealth gap. These issues remain unsolvable in the short term, so it is foreseeable that public protests in these countries will continue to emerge from time to time. For example,

1. According to the World Bank, Nepal only transitioned from a low-income country to a lower-middle-income country in 2019. Its GDP growth rate stood at a mere 2% in 2023, while the unemployment rate and inflation rate reached as high as 10.7% and 7.1% respectively. Neither traditional political parties nor emerging ones have put forward effective measures or delivered tangible results to boost economic development. Meanwhile, frequent scandals involving these parties have further complicated Nepal’s political landscape.
2. During Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s tenure, her administration was mired in the “phone call scandal” and domestic political infighting. Measures to revive Thailand’s economy, boost its tourism sector, and her handling of Thailand-U.S. tariff negotiations were all subject to severe criticism. Her lack of experience and inadequate competence became a focal point of domestic public discourse in Thailand, leading to a steady decline in both the administration’s governing legitimacy and public approval ratings.
3. Over the past decade, Indonesia has maintained a relatively high economic growth rate and achieved remarkable results in sectors such as the digital economy and mineral downstreaming. Today, it stands as the largest economy in ASEAN and the only member of G20 from the region. With a per capita GDP approaching 5,000 U.S. dollars, Indonesia has been classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank. Even so, pressing issues remain prominent within the country, including corruption, inadequate safeguards for people’s livelihoods, and insufficient national capacity building—all of which have fueled public dissatisfaction.

The political turmoil in the aforementioned neighboring countries will further invite infiltration, interference, and pressure from the United States and Western nations. Prior to the unrest, the governments of Thailand, Myanmar, Nepal, and Indonesia had mostly adopted China-friendly policies. They actively aligned with the Belt and Road Initiative, engaged in infrastructure development, and saw steady growth in trade volumes with China. Against the backdrop of China-U.S. competition and the 9/3 Military Parade—where Indonesian President Prabowo, Nepali Prime Minister Oli, and Myanmar’s Acting President Min Aung Hlaing were all invited to attend—the U.S. and Western countries, having failed to contain China through nations like the Philippines, turned to targeting China’s neighboring states. Their aim is to destabilize these China-friendly governments, create instability on China’s periphery, and divert China’s attention.

While the unrest in these neighboring countries stems from internal factors, the protests were clearly influenced by external forces during their development. This led to peaceful demonstrations gradually spiraling out of control and turning violent, showing certain characteristics of “color revolutions”. From a historical perspective, regions affected by “color revolutions” in the modern world have generally spread along the trajectory of “Eastern Europe → West Asia → Central Asia → East Asia/Southeast Asia”. Key countries on this path are either China’s strategic pivots or traditional China-friendly nations.

Adverse Impacts of Neighboring Countries’ Situation on China

The most direct impact of political turmoil in neighboring countries is that it hinders the smooth advancement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Currently, the core concept guiding China’s engagement in Southeast Asia can ultimately be condensed into one word: development. To achieve development, infrastructure serves as a crucial pillar—a principle encapsulated by the saying, “When roads are connected, prosperity follows.” Political instability in neighboring countries may lead to sudden policy shifts, contract breaches, and project suspensions. These outcomes directly threaten the asset security and profit expectations of Chinese enterprises, and impede the progress of the BRI in this region.

Political instability in neighboring countries will undermine China’s strategic goal of building a regional economic hub. ASEAN has surpassed the EU to become China’s largest trading partner, and Southeast Asia also serves as a key region for China to advance both the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Political turmoil will weaken the executive capacity of governments in affected countries, slowing progress on cooperative projects such as the implementation of free trade agreements and cross-border infrastructure connectivity. This, in turn, will hinder the economic development of these countries and the region as a whole, as well as the advancement of regional economic integration.

Against the backdrop of China-U.S. strategic competition, the stability and development of neighboring countries are of great significance to China in competing with the United States. Currently, a “Three-World” structure has emerged around China: China and the U.S. each stand as one pole, with numerous “middle countries” in between. Even countries like Vietnam, Singapore, and South Korea—while once leveraging the U.S.’ so-called “Asia-Pacific Rebalance Strategy” and “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to pursue their own interests—have maintained a fundamental stance of seeking “balance” between China and the U.S., rather than making an “either-or” choice. As China’s economic strength and political influence further grow, the existence of these “middle countries” and their development trends will become more prominent. Winning over more middle countries will thus become a key part of China-U.S. competition. In a word, China needs a stable, peaceful, and developing neighboring environment, and the stability, peace, and development of countries such as Nepal, Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia are conducive to China.

Yang Chen, Executive Director and Associate Professor, Center for Turkish Studies, Institute of Global Studies, Shanghai University