Opinion
Taking Stock and Outlook as the ‘Sixth Middle East War’ Nears Its End
October 7 is the second anniversary of the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War.” On that day, representatives of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and the Israeli government met at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh to discuss ending the fighting in Gaza and rebuilding Gaza’s governance around the “20-point plan” proposed by U.S. President Trump. On October 9th, Israel and Hamas announced that they had reached an agreement on a ceasefire. Although this is only the first stage and Israel and the Houthis in Yemen continue to strike each other at long range, this regional war that has dragged on for two years appears to be entering its closing phase.
Over the past two years, this large-scale regional war, which began with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and may temporarily end with the Palestinian-Israeli issue, has, with its heavy loss of life, out-of-control state behavior, and dizzying shifts and realignments of regional power, rewritten the political landscape of the Middle East, profoundly and extensively shocked the international community, and merits a timely summing up and sorting out to take stock of how it has changed the Middle East. What is certain is that the “Sixth Middle East War” will not easily come to a full stop; even if it does, that does not mean the next war can be completely avoided.
“Al-Aqsa Flood” surprise attack and Israel’s tragic “9/11”
On the morning of October 7 two years ago, namely the day after the 50th anniversary of the 1973 “Yom Kippur War” in which Egypt and Syria jointly counterattacked Israel, Hamas, after meticulous planning and repeated rehearsals, launched a blitz offensive against Israel codenamed “Al-Aqsa Flood”: first, with unprecedented intensity, it fired 5,000 rockets in two hours to suppress Israeli depth and provide strategic concealment; then it used drones and rocket launchers to destroy the remote monitoring facilities of the Gaza barrier, broke through the “wall of bronze and iron” with high explosives and bulldozers, and sent 2,000 fighters riding single-seat motorcycles and pickup trucks to thrust into Israel and head to pre-assigned targets; at the same time, a small number of paragliders, under the cover of the rocket barrage, quickly descended on key locations such as the Israel Southern Command and an open-air music festival. In addition, to draw the Israeli army’s attention, Hamas organized makeshift naval raiding teams in simple fishing boats to launch harassment from the sea.
This raid by Hamas was called by military experts a textbook-level tactical assault in modern military history; it very easily and unexpectedly breached the barrier wall that Israel had spent billions of dollars to build and equip with automatic fire systems. The scene was just like half a century earlier, when the Egyptian-Syrian coalition, under modern reconnaissance conditions, successfully launched a desert blitz, crossed the Suez Canal and the “Bar Lev Line,” known as a “modern Maginot Line,” plunging the arrogant Israelis into an apocalypse-like panic.
Within four to five hours, Hamas’s assault caused the deaths of 1,200 Israeli soldiers and civilians, several soldiers were captured, and more than a hundred civilians were taken back to Gaza as hostages. At the same time, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, which had not been involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for 17 years, opened fire from the north, forming a north-south, two-front pincer against Israel. That day, sirens wailed across the geographically small Israel, bullets rained, and smoke billowed. After mobilizing troops to wipe out the Hamas raiding parties, the Israeli government declared a “state of war,” thus opening the curtain on the two-year-long “Sixth Middle East War.”
After clearing the battlefields inside its territory, the Israeli military found about 1,700 bodies of Hamas raiders. Experts analyzed that none of them had been captured alive, none tried to flee back, none attempted to surrender, and each died only after expending all ammunition. The other 300 assault personnel who withdrew to Gaza as planned all shouldered a “deathless” mission of seizing prisoners, holding hostages, and capturing heavy weapons. Hamas’s later propaganda videos showed that these 2,000 raiders all swore to become “martyrs” before launching the attack, determined to go without return.
Thus, this Hamas operation can be described as an extremely rare, organized, one-time suicide attack involving as many as two thousand people in world military history, a shocking piece of “military performance art,” and enough to deliver an enormous double psychological jolt to Israeli society: the first is the historical lesson, namely that 50 years ago Egypt and Syria could create a military miracle and shatter the myth of Israel’s “invincibility,” and today Palestinians can do the same, striking Israel hard with the simplest weapons and equipment; the second is death-defying resistance, namely that Palestinians are not afraid of death, so how can Israel intimidate those who do not fear death?
Hamas’s intention in blitzing Israel was obvious: to stop the further expansion of the Abraham Accords camp before Saudi Arabia was about to normalize relations with Israel; to use the raid to warn Israel’s ruling and opposition circles not to forget the historical scar of the “Yom Kippur War”; to awaken the international community’s sympathy for the Palestinian cause of independence by means of Israel’s frenzied retaliation and the suffering of Gaza’s civilians, so as to avoid the continued marginalization of the Palestinian question.
Israel, which bills itself as the “world’s fourth military power,” was caught off guard and suffered heavy casualties at the hands of the “makeshift troupe” and militia forces it pummels every few years, resulting in “national mourning” and “national humiliation,” even an “Israeli 9/11.” This political and military failure and the shaming of national face thoroughly enraged Prime Minister Netanyahu and his right-wing and far-right allies, and also angered most Israeli citizens, especially the majority nation, the Jews, driving Israel’s state machine to unfurl the wings of death, set the frenzied chariots in motion, and begin to crush across the Middle East, ultimately forming the vast battlefield of the “Sixth Middle East War.”
Why call it the “Sixth Middle East War”
Most scholars and media still describe the series of clashes triggered by the “Al-Aqsa Flood” as “a new round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.” This formulation is neither rigorous nor scientific, and even less realistic. In every sense, this is a new Middle East war triggered by the Palestinian dispute, a historical continuation and internal logic originating from the 1948 Palestine War (also called the First Middle East War or the Israeli War of Independence), the 1956 Suez Canal War (also called the Second Middle East War), the 1967 June War (also called the Third Middle East War or the Six-Day War), the 1973 October War (also called the Fourth Middle East War, or the Yom Kippur War), and the 1982 Lebanon War (also called the Fifth Middle East War, the Israel-Lebanon War, or the First Lebanon War), as well as the result of the evolution of Middle East disputes after the Cold War.
Judging by the number of countries and organizations involved, the degree of casualties caused, the scope affected, and the duration, this war exceeds any of the previous five Middle East wars. The countries directly engulfed by the flames of war include Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Qatar. The belligerents include state actors such as Israel, Iran, and the United States, as well as non-state actors such as Hamas, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi movement, and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces. If we add to the order of battle France, the United Kingdom, Jordan and others that assisted Israel in intercepting missiles and drones, as well as Turkey, which pushed for regime change in Syria, this Middle East war can be described as unprecedented in scale.
This war has caused unprecedented casualties: in the Palestinian Gaza Strip alone, 65,000 people have died and 169,000 have been injured. If the military and civilian deaths in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and Yemen are fully counted, the severity of the casualties is self-evident.
The scope of this war far exceeds that of the previous five Middle East wars, expanding from the Palestinian-Israeli area to the Eastern Mediterranean, then to the Red Sea, and finally to both shores of the Persian Gulf. Its duration also surpasses the total time consumed by the previous five Middle East wars.
Therefore, in any case the series of hostilities triggered by the Hamas-Israel conflict can collectively be called the “Sixth Middle East War,” rather than the vague and temporally indeterminate “new round of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.”
Several main stages and principal battlefields of the “Sixth Middle East War”
Along the timeline, the “Sixth Middle East War” can be roughly divided into several important stages and key battlefields.
First stage: a southern campaign into Gaza, a three-dimensional encirclement and suppression of Hamas. From October 7, 2023 to the end of September 2024, the Israeli army launched a series of military operations in the Gaza Strip to encircle and suppress Hamas’s core forces in a multi-domain manner, destroy its tunnel system, rocket facilities, and military-industrial production lines, and rescue captured soldiers and detained hostages. These operations were successively codenamed “Iron Swords,” “Strength and Sword,” and “Gideon Chariot 1,” and were accompanied by a scorched-earth policy and a starvation policy, in an attempt to completely strangle Hamas. In August 2025, the Israeli army launched “Gideon Chariot 2,” attempting to fully occupy the Gaza Strip, “wipe out” Hamas, and reconstruct the security environment to Israel’s southeast.
From beginning to end, Hamas forces broke up into small units, hid among the population, and engaged the Israeli army with tunnel warfare, urban guerrilla warfare, and rubble guerrilla warfare. Although the Israeli army eliminated most of Hamas’s leaders and main combatants (about 20,000), and rescued dozens of prisoners of war and hostages, it never completely subdued the remaining Hamas forces or rescued the rest of the detainees, and was forced under multiple pressures to accept the Trump administration’s “20-point plan.” The encirclement and counter-encirclement between the Israeli army and Hamas ran through the entire course of the war, and the Gaza Strip remained the main battlefield of this war throughout.
Second stage: a northern campaign into southern Lebanon, a decisive battle with Hezbollah. From September 27 to November 27, 2023, Israel’s large-scale operations in Gaza temporarily came to a pause. It began shifting the focus and priority of its military offensive, concentrating attention and forces to launch a series of operations codenamed “New Order” and “Arrow of the North,” to punish Hezbollah. Through massive bombardment, Israeli intelligence and military severely damaged Hezbollah’s infrastructure in southern Lebanon; by tracking the location of an Iranian envoy, fixing the coordinates of Hezbollah’s senior encampments, and carrying out highly saturated airstrikes, it “wiped out” in one swoop Secretary-General Nasrallah and most of the leadership; by remotely detonating micro-bombs that had long been pre-installed in Hezbollah’s dedicated pagers, it launched a “supply-chain war” against thousands of Hezbollah’s mid- and lower-level cadres… The “catastrophe” brought by the IDF’s northern expedition and the war threat posed to all of Lebanon forced Hezbollah to agree to a ceasefire and withdraw from southern Lebanon, while the IDF still retained the right to take military action at any time.
While launching a general offensive against Hezbollah, the Israeli military also heavily bombed targets inside Syria near Lebanon, especially the border and crossings, as well as the overland corridor that links Lebanon and Iran via Syria and Iraq, cutting Hezbollah’s relief route and the southern line that shields Damascus. In addition, the IDF bombed positions, facilities, and personnel of the Syrian Arab Army on the western front that faces rebels entrenched in northwestern Idlib, laying the groundwork to shift the trouble eastward, overthrow the Syrian government, and cut the western wing of the “Shia Crescent.”
Third stage: looting amid the blaze, overthrowing the Syrian government. On November 27, 2024, the very day the ceasefire between the IDF and Hezbollah took effect, Syrian rebels, with the coordination and instigation of Turkey and Israel, launched a strategic counteroffensive against areas controlled by the Syrian government. The Syrian government, which had held on for 13 years with the help of Russia, Iran, and other Shia-aligned forces, lost in just 18 days a succession of major cities including Aleppo, Homs, Hama, and the capital Damascus. President Bashar fled to Moscow and announced the transfer of all power to the rebels. The reasons were roughly these: Syria’s oil and grain were controlled by U.S. forces and their allied Kurdish fighters; the brutal sanctions brought by the U.S. “Caesar Act” left the government short of money and troops and cost it public and military support; Russia, preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, was unwilling and unable to rescue again; Iran, busy dealing with Israeli offensives, lacked the nerve and capability for urgent rescue; Hezbollah, hard-pressed to protect itself, was likewise unable to come to the rescue again.
Syria, once a frontline and bulwark against Israel, changed hands in an instant. For Israel and the United States it was an awkward and unexpected turn of events, like driving the wolf from the front door only to let the tiger in at the back, because the rebel core was a branch of al-Qaeda, whose ideological base is precisely “anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Zionist.” The day after the Damascus regime change, the IDF took the opportunity to expand its illegal occupation of Syria’s Golan Heights and used overwhelming force to destroy all heavy weapons and equipment of Syria’s navy and air force. Having played a main-force role in the previous five Middle East wars, Syria unexpectedly capsized in the “Sixth Middle East War” as a supporting actor and secondary theater, leading to the collapse of the Assad family and the Baath Party, which had held power for half a century.
Fourth stage: Israel and Iran trade blows, triggering the Twelve-Day War. On June 13, 2025, Israel adopted a preemptive strategy and launched a large-scale air campaign against Iran codenamed “Lion of Ascendance,” destroying dozens of targets related to the nuclear program and missiles, and killing by various means a number of senior Iranian military commanders and nuclear engineers. In the final phase, on June 21 the United States dispatched strategic bombers to carry out long-range strikes against three of Iran’s nuclear installations. In this localized conflict known as the “Twelve-Day War,” Israel completely controlled Middle East airspace; its fighter groups even circled over Tehran for two hours and ostentatiously conducted aerial refueling. Iran, for its part, carried out nearly 20 rounds of “True Promise” counterstrikes against commercial landmark buildings in Israel’s major cities and against military and security facilities, using dense missile and drone attacks to break Israel’s air-defense system. On June 22, after a symbolic airstrike on a U.S. military base in Qatar, Iran agreed with the United States and Israel to a comprehensive ceasefire three days later.
In fact, as early as April and October 2024, Israel and Iran had already launched symbolic duels against each other, escalating decades of shadow warfare and proxy warfare into direct exchanges of fire and tests of strength. The “Twelve-Day War” formally drew the flames of the “Sixth Middle East War” into the Persian Gulf and marked the most dangerous, high-stakes phase of the conflict. A total of 935 Iranians were killed, nearly 5,000 were injured, and over a million civilians were displaced. Israel also suffered a heavy price of 28 dead and 3,238 injured.
Fifth stage: trampling red lines, an airstrike on Qatar. On September 9, 2025, Israel dispatched more than a dozen warplanes to brazenly bomb Qatar, which had been entrusted by the United States and Israel to host space for Palestinian-Israeli talks, aiming to “wipe out” Hamas negotiators, block efforts to release detainees, and prolong the Gaza war. This move drove Israel’s atrocities to the extreme and once again greatly angered the international community, prompting dozens of Western countries to cluster together during the 80th U.N. General Assembly to recognize the State of Palestine.
The airstrike on Qatar was not large in scale, but it became the turning point of the “Sixth Middle East War.” Israel fell into unprecedented isolation, and the United States’ political reputation suffered further damage and grew more embarrassing. The prolonged Gaza catastrophe and Israel’s unbridled launching of wars, even airstrikes on a U.S. ally, forced the Trump administration to speed up mediation to avoid being further dragged down by Israel, ultimately prompting the emergency rollout of the “20-point plan” and providing all parties with a new step to end the “Sixth Middle East War” earlier.
It should be noted that clashes between the Houthi movement and the United States and Israel were intermittent and brought the Red Sea region into the grand battlefield of the “Sixth Middle East War.” After the Houthis reached a ceasefire with the United States in May 2025, the U.S. fleet withdrew from the Red Sea theater, leaving Israel and the Houthis to fight one on one. Because of the long distances, the Houthis mainly harassed with long-range missiles and drones, while Israel chose opportune moments to heavily bomb key facilities in Houthi-controlled areas and carried out “targeted eliminations” of core members, including killing 12 senior Houthi officials in a single strike. The Houthis’ involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was a classic hitch-a-ride performance, an attempt to raise their own voice and legitimacy by waving the banner of Arab nationalism.
What has the ‘Sixth Middle East War’ changed?
At this critical point marking the second anniversary of the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” a brief review and sorting show that a series of new changes and developments have emerged in the Middle East. This war has only losers. If there are any winners at all, then Turkey, which expanded its sphere of influence, the Syrian opposition that came to power unexpectedly, and Pakistan, which extended its nuclear influence into the Middle East, can be said to have won amid chaos. This war has greatly altered the geopolitical landscape and power configuration of the Middle East, and it is still in the process of change with the overall situation yet to be determined.
First, the “Axis of Resistance,” composed of the two state actors Iran and Syria plus four non-state actors — Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthi movement, and the Popular Mobilization Forces — was basically defeated militarily by Israel, and it even triggered the unexpected collapse of the Syrian government. This pattern will have far-reaching effects on the future Middle East peace process, indicating that the outdated thinking of trying to defeat Israel through armed struggle and military games has become seriously detached from reality; the traditional path is unsustainable and impassable.
Second, the “Shia Crescent” that rose with the 2011 “Arab Spring” (that is, what I often call the “Tehran–Baghdad–Damascus–Beirut axis”) has basically disintegrated because Iran was jointly attacked by the United States and Israel, the Syrian government collapsed, Hezbollah’s leadership was “wiped out” and lost combat capability. Having almost completely lost Syria and Lebanon, Iran suffered the most disastrous diplomatic and strategic defeat since the establishment of the Islamic regime over 40 years ago; the radius of its geopolitical projection and resource deployment was cut in half, its sphere of influence was forced to contract sharply, and sectarian conflict and identity politics that have long plagued the Middle East will further fade from view due to Iran’s historic major setback.
Third, Israel used force on multiple fronts and struck multiple countries, completely monopolizing air superiority in the Middle East and reaching the highest level of military influence since its founding. At the same time, Israel’s wanton trampling of the U.N. Charter, international law, and humanitarian law is unprecedented, and the “Greater Israel” dream driven by the far right has aroused widespread concern among Middle Eastern countries. Israel has fallen from a developed country known for technological innovation, strong education, and abundant investment into an abnormal state driven by a war machine; its national and ethnic reputation, hard power and soft power alike, are suffering unprecedented overdraw.
Fourth, the peace process between Arab countries and Israel has undergone a major test. None of the seven entities that normalized relations with Israel (including the PLO) took hardline measures such as severing diplomatic ties or imposing economic and trade boycotts; and in Arab countries’ large and medium cities there were no demonstrations in support of Palestinians like those frequently seen in Western countries. These two major signs indicate that pan-Arabism, popular in the Middle East for more than half a century, has completely exited the stage of history, and they also suggest that Palestine will further bear isolation and passivity from the Arab family in its game with Israel.
Fifth, Russia lost Syria, its last strategic asset in the Middle East, was unable to protect its former ally the “Shia Crescent,” exposing the limits of its strength in being unable to fight on two fronts; it lost great-power status and influence in the Middle East and will find it difficult to restore the ability to engage and speak with authority in the region in the short term. The United States, because of its unconditional and bottomless favoritism toward Israel, has become even more unpopular in the Middle East; the regional security cooperation architecture it promotes is questioned and challenged, and it will continue to pay the price for Israel as a “strategic negative asset.”
Sixth, the United States turned a blind eye to Israel’s airstrike on Qatar, causing Gulf Arab states to lose confidence in U.S. security guarantees and triggering the leading state, Saudi Arabia, to upgrade a mutual defense treaty with Pakistan, the major Islamic power in South Asia, and obtain its nuclear protection commitment. This development means that the Middle East security architecture and nuclear-control agenda have expanded to South Asia, and it also implies the expansion of nuclear possession within the Islamic world, making future geopolitical relations and situation changes in the Middle East and even South Asia more complex.
Simple lessons from the ‘Sixth Middle East War’
The Israeli government reluctantly began negotiations with Hamas representatives and reached a ceasefire. It is expected that the two sides will find it hard to bridge the huge differences and overcome the major obstacles at the key future juncture of disarming the latter. Therefore, when the Gaza war will end remains unknown. The Houthi movement will link cessation of attacks on Israel to peace in Gaza, which means if Gaza is at peace, the Red Sea will be at peace; if Gaza is at war, the Red Sea will be at war…
Whether the window for Israeli-Palestinian peace that has appeared on the second anniversary of the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War” will be implemented by both sides will determine whether this war ends soon. However, according to the logic of historical evolution and conflict dynamics, the end of the Fifth Middle East War did not prevent the “Sixth Middle East War” from breaking out 41 years later, because the core issue of territorial disputes has never been resolved, and because all parties in the Middle East have not yet extricated themselves from the vicious circle of a culture of violence, nor have they withdrawn from the quagmire of zero-sum games and jungle law.
“If Heaven does not change, the Way does not change.” Even if the “Sixth Middle East War” puts a period this year, it will be only a semicolon marking a phase in Middle Eastern conflicts, a historical pause, not the historical end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Middle East wars.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
The caption and the guest list: What the West’s SCO coverage cannot explain about Türkiye
Thomas Karat, behavioral analyst
The photograph that Western agencies distributed from Bishkek arrived with its meaning already fixed. Above an image of the Kyrgyz president escorting China’s Xi Jinping past an honor guard, the caption read COUNTER US POWER. The image itself showed a familiar diplomatic ritual, two heads of state walking a red carpet. The caption supplied what the image did not: an adversary, a purpose, and the direction in which a Western audience was meant to orient its concern. The gap between the neutral picture and the loaded words is a useful place to begin, because it is where the framing of the entire summit was decided before a single line of analysis was written.
On Sept. 1 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization marked its twenty-fifth anniversary in the Kyrgyz capital, with ten member states, more than a dozen heads of government, and the secretary-general of the United Nations among the guests. Most European and North American outlets carried a single Agence France-Presse dispatch, which described the bloc as one that seeks to be a counterinfluence to the West. France 24 reported that the Russian and Chinese leaders had traveled to Central Asia to counter Western influence. British coverage of an earlier session of the same body called it a secretive summit of an “axis of upheaval.” In each formulation the West occupies the grammatical center of a meeting it did not attend. The organization is assigned no purpose that can be stated without reference to Washington and Brussels. It is defined entirely as a reaction to them.
Türkiye is the hole in the caption
The framing meets its first and largest obstacle in the guest list, and specifically in the presence of a NATO member at the table. Türkiye holds the status of dialogue partner in the organization, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has attended its summits in person. A Western reader told that the SCO is an axis assembled against his alliance is not encouraged to ask why a founding member of that alliance keeps a seat in it. The same AFP dispatch that calls the bloc a counterinfluence to the West records, several paragraphs below its lead, that the organization now counts fifteen dialogue partners including Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Türkiye belongs to NATO. Saudi Arabia and Qatar host the forward headquarters of United States Central Command and the largest American air base in the region. An organization built to oppose the West does not assemble this membership, and a caption that calls it one survives only for readers who do not reach the paragraph that contradicts it.
Türkiye’s position is the part of the picture that Western coverage is least equipped to interpret, because the prevailing map allows for only two teams. Ankara is not choosing the SCO over NATO. It is doing something the two-team model cannot represent, treating the organization as a venue to be worked, neither joining it nor shunning it. A state that keeps its treaty commitments in the Atlantic while cultivating standing in a Eurasian security forum is hedging against a future in which the Atlantic order no longer sets the terms alone. That behavior is legible from Istanbul and largely illegible from the outlets that produced the Bishkek caption, which is why their account of the summit reads, from this vantage, as a description of a world that has already begun to pass.
The vocabulary and its tell
The language of the coverage repays close attention. The recurring terms are “counter,” “against,” “anti-Western,” and “axis,” a vocabulary of opposition that grants the bloc no content of its own. The word “axis” carries the heaviest freight. It imports the moral architecture of the Second World War, and more recently of the “axis of evil,” and lays it over a trade-and-security forum whose membership includes a NATO government. The transfer is performed a few lines from the facts that make it untenable, and the proximity is the tell.
There is a structural habit worth naming as well. The AFP copy notes that the organization’s founding declaration describes it as not an alliance directed against other states, and then, in the following sentence, observes that the Russian and Chinese leaders have delivered anti-Western speeches at past summits. The self-description is admitted and immediately withdrawn. The skepticism applied here is selective. When a NATO communiqué describes the alliance as defensive, the same wire services do not append a reminder of its record of offensive operations. The doubt switches on for adversaries and off for partners, a selection that rests on assumption and not on evidence. Coverage outside the Western agency system handles the same material with a cooler hand. Al Jazeera quoted a regional analyst describing the SCO simply as not a coherent anti-Western alliance, a plain and accurate line that appears in no Western headline, because it does not fit the caption.
A bloc that grew in proportion to the pressure
The organization’s history explains more than its rhetoric does. It began in 1996 as a border-demarcation arrangement among China, Russia and three Central Asian republics, a technical body concerned with the settlement of frontier lines. It gained momentum in close proportion to the pressure applied to its members from the West. India and Pakistan acceded in 2017. Iran was admitted after years of sanctions had made membership useful to Tehran and to the bloc alike. The roster of dialogue partners expanded toward fifteen as American secondary sanctions and tariffs demonstrated to a widening circle of governments the value of a forum beyond Washington’s reach. At Bishkek the rotating chairmanship passed to Pakistan, another long-standing American security partner. The pattern is consistent: the organization has grown less by recruitment than by the steady conversion of states that Western policy has pressed toward the exits.
Iran offers the sharpest illustration. President Masoud Pezeshkian took his seat in Bishkek six months into a war with the United States. A week before the summit, the U.S. Treasury announced a sanctions campaign it named Operation Economic Outcast, extending secondary sanctions to five further sectors of the Iranian economy, aviation, digital assets, gold, shipping and technology, and warning in a separate alert that any party of any nationality paying Iran for passage through the Strait of Hormuz risked U.S. penalty. Secondary sanctions do not fall on the target alone. They fall on any government or firm that trades with the target, which makes them an instruction directed at the sovereign decisions of other states, enforced by the threat of exclusion from the dollar system. China, the largest purchaser of Iranian oil, responded that it would firmly defend its interests. A measure aimed at Tehran functions as a demand issued to Beijing, and Beijing traveled to Bishkek. India provides a second instance. Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a scheduled bilateral with President Vladimir Putin days after Washington imposed a 50 percent tariff on Indian goods over New Delhi’s purchases of Russian oil. The instrument intended to discipline India accompanied it to the very table it was meant to keep it from.
The divisions are real, and they are the point
An accurate account of the summit requires equal candor about the organization’s limits, and candor here is what separates analysis from a mirror image of the framing under examination. The SCO is not a unified bloc. Russia and China compete for influence across the same Central Asian ground. India and China share a contested and periodically violent border, which is why Modi and Xi appeared on the same platform but arranged no formal bilateral. India and Pakistan hold membership in the same body while remaining adversaries. A proposed development bank has been discussed for years without becoming a functioning institution. The 40 percent of humanity the organization claims to encompass is a measure of scale, not of common purpose.
These divisions do not rescue the Western frame. They sharpen the judgment it obscures. Agreement among these governments does not exist, and it is not what makes the summit notable. What makes it notable is the preference of states that distrust one another to manage their disputes inside a structure the United States does not control. The arbitration of one it does control is the option they declined. That preference is a heavier comment on the standing of the American-led order than any declaration could produce. It requires no alliance and no shared ideology. It requires only that a critical mass of states has concluded that the Western order is something to work around, and that the working-around now proceeds openly, at the level of heads of state, beneath a caption instructing Western readers to see a hostile axis where a hedging one stands.
The shrinking center
The phrase that recurs whenever Western officials describe global opinion is “the international community.” Bishkek is a reminder of how much that phrase conceals. The community it invokes is a specific and diminishing set of capitals that grew accustomed, during the brief period of unchallenged American primacy after 1991, to mistaking its own consensus for the consensus of humanity. The summit in the Kyrgyz capital assembled a NATO member, a Western-courted partner in India, the Gulf security clients of the United States, and the two most heavily sanctioned states on earth, and it did so under the observation of the United Nations secretary-general. No description of that room as an anti-Western axis can be reconciled with its composition. The description persists because it serves the audience it is written for, offering a shrinking center the reassurance that it remains the fixed point around which the world still turns.
From Ankara, and from the wider vantage of states that have watched the post-1991 order lose its monopoly, the reassurance reads as a lagging indicator. The two men in the photograph were walking to lunch. The power that could not prevent the lunch, could not hold its Indian partner at a distance from Moscow, could not isolate the state it is fighting, and could not keep the head of the United Nations from attending, is nonetheless assured by its own press that the summit was organized around opposition to it. The more accurate reading is the one Türkiye’s own conduct already reflects. The world is not arranging itself against the West so much as arranging itself without waiting for it, and the caption over the photograph is the last place that development will be admitted.
Opinion
In Bishkek, the ‘new order’ gathers to see whether it can become real
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
Ten heads of states and governments, a cast of partners spanning half of Eurasia meet in the Kyrgyz capital promising a world beyond Western dominance. The summit’s quiet battles over money, media and the club’s own contradictions will matter more than its communiqué.
BISHKEK, Kyrgyzstan: This is a city that understands great powers. Soviet engineers drew its street grid. Its economy runs substantially on money earned by Kyrgyz workers in Russia. And when the Shanghai Cooperation Organization holds its annual summit here Aug. 31st to Sept. 1st 2026 the mountain-ringed capital will become, for 48 hours, the seat of this era’s most consequential open question: What does the world look like after Western dominance?
What will the world look like beyond Western dominance?
The participant list alone is enough to illustrate the scale of the stakes. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian will lead the SCO’s ten full members, representing roughly 40 percent of humanity. They include India and Pakistan, Belarus, and the four Central Asian republics, led by Kazakhstan and its President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, alongside dialogue partners whose presence stretches from Cairo to the Gulf and all the way to Ankara.
No Western institution has ever had to accommodate such a company under one roof. No American administration has had to watch it from the outside.
On paper, the agenda is deliberately unremarkable: counterterrorism cooperation through the organization’s Tashkent-based coordinating body, Afghanistan’s instability, trade facilitation, energy, digital development and the ritual invocation of the “Shanghai Spirit” mutual trust, mutual benefit, respect among civilizations. The organizing principle, as ever, is consensus, which is another way of saying nothing said in the plenary hall will offend anyone.
The real summit will happen in the margins, in three conversations the final declaration will not be recorded.
The first is about money and how to move it where Washington cannot reach it
No communiqué will use the word “sanctions.” Yet diplomats from three member states, speaking on the condition of anonymity to describe preparatory talks, said the financial file has consumed more negotiating time than any other: the long-delayed SCO Development Bank, given fresh impetus at last year’s Tianjin summit; the expansion of local-currency trade; the stitching together of national payment systems that would let members settle accounts without touching the Belgium-based SWIFT network and therefore without touching U.S. financial law.
The urgency is not abstract. Russia’s central bank operates under sweeping penalties. Iran has been locked out of the dollar system for a generation. Even India, a Western partner, buys Russian oil in non-dollar currencies to keep its options open. Tariffs and secondary sanctions have turned “financial inclusiveness,” in the organization’s diplomatese, into the summer’s quiet rallying cry.
The obstacles are equally concrete. The development bank has been discussed for more than a decade without being built, partly because every founding member wants it capitalized, headquartered and denominated on its own terms. “Nobody in that room is against de-dollarization,” said one economist who advises a member-state government. “Everybody in that room is against a bank China controls.”
The second conversation is about the United States absent, and everywhere
The months before the summit have seen a burst of American diplomacy conducted largely through intermediaries: reported contacts between the CIA director and Russian intelligence; a Pakistani army chief’s travels to Tehran; Gulf foreign ministers, and on one reading the Jordanian monarch, carrying messages to Beijing. Washington describes the traffic as routine management of a complicated world. In the capitals gathering in Bishkek, it is read as something more evidence that the superpower wants deals.
“Diplomacy by intermediary is either sophistication or exhaustion,” said a European ambassador in Beijing, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity. “The Americans say the first. This summit will spend two days staging the second.”
The calendar sharpens the drama. U.S. midterm elections fall ten weeks after the leaders leave Bishkek, and a president who has staked his brand on ending wars and winning trade disputes has delivered a durable settlement of neither. Advisors openly worry that losing the House would hand the opposition subpoena power and the machinery of impeachment. Analysts expect the summit’s choreography to be calibrated accordingly: handshakes and family photos projecting an alternative order, measured carefully enough not to hand Washington an enemy at the worst possible moment.
Yet the “declining America” narrative has limits that the summit’s own design reveals. India attends in large part to ensure the organization does not become a Chinese-Russian instrument; it has blocked anti-Western language before and is expected to again. The Central Asian states hedge between Russian security, Chinese financing and Western markets. And every member’s sanctions-resistance project is, in the end, a measure of how much the dollar world still matters.
The third conversation is the one an Egyptian started
Among the more concrete proposals at Tianjin came not from a head of state but from Dr Ahmed Moustafa, an Egyptian scholar and specialist in Asian and Eurasian Affairs, who directs the Cairo-based Asia Center for Studies and Translation, attending as his country an SCO dialogue partner continues testing the club’s outer circle. His argument: the organization’s deepest deficit is neither military nor financial but informational.
The West’s real advantage runs through its media platforms and professional networks, which shape the aspirations of the very youth the organization claims to speak for. His proposal, a standing, professionally sponsored mechanism binding member-state think tanks and media, and a professional social platform for the region’s young people, “similar to or stronger than LinkedIn” circulated this summer in summit working groups.
The idea matters less as a business plan than as a diagnosis that Beijing and Moscow have reached by harder roads. For all its demographic weight, the information environment in which the organization’s citizens actually live is dominated by Western platforms and Western languages. Member states have answered with firewalls, copycat apps and an annual media forum. What they have not produced is a digital ecosystem anyone would choose.
Skeptics see a structural reason: professional networks create value through the free flow of information precisely what several member governments are professionally committed to restricting. “You can build a LinkedIn for the Shanghai Spirit,” one diplomat joked. “Good luck making anyone network in it.”
The last conversation is with itself
The family photo will not show the feuds beneath it: India and China, India and Pakistan, Iran which left Tianjin with expressions of sympathy and no security guarantees after its war with Israel and a host government whose national strategy is to be courted by all sides at once. A quarter-century after the organization’s founding, its signature achievement remains the summit itself: proof that rivals can meet, not yet proof that they can build.
“Bishkek will be perfectly staged,” said a veteran analyst of Eurasian institutions. “The question is whether anything survives the motorcades.”
When the leaders fly home over Bishkek on the first of September, they will leave behind banners, a communiqué and a claim: that a new order is not merely desired but operational.
The quieter truth of this summit is that an order cannot be declared into existence. It has to be built payment system by payment system, platform by platform, in the unphotographed rooms where the Shanghai Spirit is tested against arithmetic.
Opinion
What did the Israeli attack in Syria reveal?
Following Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Syria on August 18, relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv have reportedly broken down. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Sheybani announced in the wake of the attack that all communication with Israel had been severed. “We anticipate that talks regarding a security agreement with Israel will resume in the near future. At present, we do not trust Israel. Our priority is the cessation of attacks against our sovereign territory,” he stated.
The minister’s utter helplessness reverberates through his words.
The post-Assad regime in Damascus ascended to power on the back of American and Israeli support. Consequently, the United States and Israel stand as the primary arbiters of Syria’s destiny. It is precisely for this reason that the Damascus administration has abandoned all claims to its rights over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights—virtually resigning itself to the occupation and striking it from the agenda. Upon seizing power, it pledged immediate fealty to Washington: “We will pose no security threat to Israel, and we shall thwart anyone who attempts to do so.” It operated under the delusion that it could forge a functional relationship with Israel—led by Netanyahu, a perpetrator of genocide and a convicted war criminal—by appeasing it through concessions. It was gravely mistaken.
For Israel currently holds sway over a substantial portion of Syrian territory. It establishes military outposts across the country, carries out airstrikes at will, and deploys its armor unimpeded.
Similarly, the Israeli-backed PYD-YPG terrorist organization exercises control over an expanse of land vastly disproportionate to its actual strength—territory exceptionally rich in energy resources—solely through the patronage of the US and Israel. Leveraging that very support, it wrenches outsized political, military, and administrative concessions from the Damascus government.
Evidently, the displacement of Iranian and Russian influence in Syria by that of the United States and Israel has brought profound satisfaction to certain circles in our country. Yet what these quarters fail to see, refuse to see, or cannot bring themselves to acknowledge even when confronted with it, is this fundamental reality: Washington envisions a Middle Eastern order wherein Israel commands supremacy, projects expanding power, and dictates terms, while Türkiye raises no objection whatsoever and instead accommodates itself to this architecture. To compel Türkiye’s acquiescence, the US is actively deploying its vast and varied arsenal of leverage.
Lest we forget, the United States had already brought several Arab states to the desired threshold through the Abraham Accords. That process was ultimately intended to culminate in the open, formal consecration of the de facto rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That trajectory has not been abandoned; it has merely been placed on ice for the time being. Behind the scenes, Washington maintains an intense flurry of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Once the wider Middle East, the Islamic world, and the Arab sphere have been fully conditioned to accept the ongoing reality in Gaza—and once the oppressed, grieving, and beleaguered Palestinian people have been driven entirely from their ancestral homeland—this shelved agenda will be revived.
We know that the Zionist establishment in Israel, aligned with American imperialism, chose not to strike Iran first before confronting the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, the Shia Crescent, and Tehran’s proxy forces. It executed the exact inverse: it struck first at Syria, at Hamas in Palestine, and at Hezbollah in Lebanon. Only after eroding their efficacy did it turn its sights directly upon Iran. In Syria, the previous regime held out far longer than anticipated—enduring for 13 years and 8 months. As a consequence of the civil war that erupted in March 2011, Assad was ultimately overthrown, finding refuge in Moscow.
When 61 years of Baathist rule, including 53 years of the Assad dynasty, came to a close in December 2024, the emergent regime in Damascus wasted no time in pledging its allegiance to the United States, to Israel, and to the Arab states that backed it, chief among them Saudi Arabia. It proclaimed that it would erect a bulwark against Iran, raise not the slightest objection to Israel, and execute Washington’s directives to the letter.
A broad demographic in Türkiye that welcomed this turn of events swiftly began asserting—under the banner of religious and sectarian fraternity—that this transition worked entirely in Türkiye’s favor. The sheer fallacy of this premise was exposed in short order.
And how was it exposed?
It was exposed by Israel immediately laying the groundwork for a Syria partitioned into four enclaves (Druze, Kurdish, Alawite, and Arab). It was exposed by the renewed revelation that the US-Israel axis intends, sooner or later, to carve up Syria along sectarian and ethnic fault lines—mirroring the precedents of Lebanon and Iraq—in a country roughly composed of 70 percent Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Alawites, 10 percent Kurds, 5 percent Christians, and 5 percent Druze and Turkmens.
It was exposed by the fact that the PYD-YPG terrorist organization, even if denied the entirety of its territorial ambitions, has managed to secure a portion of its political, military, and administrative demands through US–Israeli patronage, thereby being permitted to preserve its existence by settling for a reduced perimeter.
And it was exposed by the resilience of Iran, which, despite suffering immense exhaustion and attrition in the face of American and Israeli aggression, refused to capitulate and maintained its resistance. It was exposed by the failure of the US-Israel tandem to achieve its overarching political and military objectives in Iran, bringing to the fore once again the undeniable truth that Iran possesses an institutionalized state tradition, a national consciousness, and an armed force of a depth and resilience that defy any comparison to Libya, Iraq, or Syria.
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