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Revisiting the Bandung spirit in a multipolar world

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Fang Xuting, Research Assistant at Center for Turkish Studies, Shanghai University

How China articulates its diplomatic discourse?

From April 18 to 24, 1955, government delegations from 29 Asian and African countries and regions convened in Bandung, Indonesia, for a historic Afro-Asian Conference. On the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, against the backdrop of a rapidly transforming global order marked by the rise of the “Global South” and the restructuring of traditional international power dynamics, revisiting the memory of the conference and the enduring “Bandung Spirit” acquires new strategic significance. For contemporary China, it offers fresh value in advancing multilateral diplomacy, deepening South-South cooperation, and contributing to the reconfiguration of the international order.

Historical context of the Bandung Conference

In the 1950s, during the intensification of the Cold War, the two ideological blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union increasingly competed for influence in the Third World. Leaders of newly emerging states in Asia and Africa sought self-determination, while anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movements gained momentum. The colonial system began to unravel. Independent nations in Asia and Africa became bolder in asserting neutrality in international affairs and grew increasingly active in United Nations forums in the early 1950s. For example, India repeatedly spoke on behalf of Asian and Arab countries, calling for a ceasefire and peaceful resolution to the Korean War. It openly criticized American military policy, showing no fear of power politics.

At the Bogor Conference held in late 1954, five countries—India, Indonesia, Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and Pakistan—issued a joint communiqué to formally initiate the first Asian-African Conference in 1955. Based on the principle of “independent governments,” thirty countries, including China, were invited to participate.

From the perspective of China’s diplomatic transition, the Bandung Conference represented a significant moment when the newly founded People’s Republic of China moved away from a revolutionary foreign policy and toward one based on state diplomacy. It symbolized a departure from the binary Cold War alignment toward an independent foreign policy grounded in peaceful coexistence. In fact, even before the conference—particularly following the Korean War (1950–1953)—China had already shown interest in moderating its foreign policy to present a more peaceful image to its Asian and African neighbors.

Although China’s participation in the Korean War was only a part of the broader conflict, its role was militarily decisive. The war’s outcomes significantly influenced the trajectory of socialist movements and national liberation struggles in Asia. The emergence of socialist states in both Asia and Europe enabled a geopolitical counterbalance to Western powers. For a considerable period, the bipolar confrontation between East and West maintained a strategic equilibrium, as Western powers led by the United States were no longer facing only the socialist bloc in Europe, but an alliance of socialist countries in both Europe and Asia.

Moreover, the war marked the first direct military confrontation between China and a major Western power since the founding of the People’s Republic. Through tenacious combat, China compelled the United States to return to the negotiating table, rescued the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from crisis, defended its own national borders, solidified the Sino-Soviet alliance, and elevated its international standing. China emphasized the war’s just cause—”resisting U.S. aggression and aiding Korea; safeguarding the homeland”—and linked its narrative to global anti-imperialist struggles, resonating strongly with the anti-colonial aspirations of newly emerging Asian and African nations. These rhetorical and ideological alignments laid a strong foundation for China’s solidarity with the Third World.

Lastly, China’s diplomatic and military engagement during the Korean War, including the Panmunjom negotiations, provided valuable experience in dealing with the West—an experience that would later prove instrumental in Zhou Enlai’s diplomatic success at the Bandung Conference.

On April 18, 1955, the Bandung Conference officially commenced. By the evening of April 24, the final plenary session unanimously adopted the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference—the first joint statement in history issued collectively by 29 Asian and African countries. The communiqué included the Ten Principles of Bandung, which addressed issues related to anti-colonialism and national independence, adopted resolutions promoting global peace and cooperation, and reaffirmed the common aspiration of the Asian and African peoples to oppose aggression and uphold world peace.

The historical value of the Bandung spirit and China’s contributions

The Bandung Conference was the largest and most representative intercontinental summit of its time, covering the widest geographic area and population. It embodied the collective will of Asian and African nations to oppose imperialism and colonialism, safeguard national independence, and promote peace and development. The spirit of Bandung—seeking common ground while reserving differences, peaceful coexistence, solidarity, cooperation, and joint struggle—has since become a cherished intellectual legacy in world history. It had a profound impact on how developing countries later approached international relations. As a staunch supporter and active participant, China contributed significantly to the formation of the Bandung Spirit by offering Chinese wisdom and diplomatic experience.

1- The integration of China’s five principles of peaceful coexistence

The concluding section of the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference included a declaration on promoting world peace and cooperation, which was adopted unanimously based on a Chinese proposal. This declaration outlined ten principles for conducting international relations, such as respect for fundamental human rights and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; recognition of the equality of all races and nations, large or small; and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The Ten Principles of Bandung fully incorporated all elements of Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and further developed them.

2- China’s consistent anti-imperialist and anti-colonial position

China’s leadership, reflecting on the historical context of the 1950s characterized by “war and revolution,” defined the newly founded People’s Republic as a socialist nation that had suffered colonial aggression and attained national independence. This identity guided its foreign policy during the Bandung era. At meetings leading up to the conference, Zhou Enlai articulated a typology of countries within the capitalist bloc, arguing that China should isolate the United States, win over the intermediate states, and unite with the most oppressed nations. Accordingly, China’s primary objective in attending the Bandung Conference was to break its international isolation and fully support the just struggle for national liberation in Asia and Africa—thereby playing a foundational role in shaping the Bandung Spirit.

3- China’s introduction of the “seeking common ground while reserving differences” diplomatic approach

Given the diverse ideological orientations of participating nations and the anti-communist propaganda led by the United States and its allies, many delegations were wary of China. Some even argued that both colonialism and communism should be condemned. Faced with this challenge, Zhou Enlai offered a conciliatory and inclusive response: “There are disagreements among us, but acknowledging such differences is, in itself, a form of agreement”. China deliberately adopted a “non-argumentative” approach, avoiding revolutionary or ideological rhetoric in response to accusations. This enabled the conference to proceed smoothly.

During the conference, China adhered to the principle of seeking common ground while reserving differences and signed the Treaty on Dual Nationality with Indonesia. Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Sunario praised the agreement as one reached “in the spirit of goodwill and tolerance between two Asian nations,” a spirit that, in his view, had guided the Bandung Conference itself.

The contemporary relevance of the Bandung spirit and its inheritance by China

Over the past 70 years, the global landscape has undergone profound transformations. The colonial system has collapsed, the bipolar Cold War confrontation has become a thing of the past, and economic globalization has deepened. Peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit have become the dominant themes of the era. However, the essential contradictions in the international community have not fundamentally changed. The unjust and unequal political and economic order persists, and tensions among civilizations, ideologies, political systems, and development models continue to exist.

Currently, three key characteristics define the global landscape. First, in the security domain, great power rivalry, bloc confrontation, regional conflicts, and domestic unrest interact and reinforce one another, shaping the international security order. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 may signal the end of the post-Cold War era and the beginning of what scholars have termed a “post-post-Cold War era,” marked by increasing global instability.

Second, in the ideological domain, the West’s narrative of “democracy versus authoritarianism” clashes with the Global South’s advocacy for “multiple modernities.” While the United States promotes value-based diplomacy and exclusionary alliances such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, Global South countries prioritize development rights and sovereign equality, rejecting the binary logic of alignment. Meanwhile, algorithmic amplification on social media has intensified information warfare, turning global public opinion into a new arena of great power soft power competition.

Third, in the economic domain, the rise of the Global South and the emergence of new forms of South-South cooperation have reshaped the global development landscape. Compared with the past, southern countries now possess greater material capacity, developmental experience, and institutional platforms. Their structural power has grown significantly, allowing them to play increasingly influential roles in today’s global transformations.

As a participant in the Bandung Conference and a key leader of the Global South, China must inherit and advance the Bandung Spirit by aligning it with the characteristics of the new era in order to effectively articulate its own diplomatic discourse in an increasingly multipolar world.

1- Using “peaceful coexistence” to mitigate bloc confrontation

China must continue to oppose Cold War thinking and promote a “comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable” approach to security. At the conceptual level, China’s proposed Global Security Initiative aligns with many of the Global South’s concerns. As such, it can serve as a guiding framework for forming a Global South Security Perspective. In practice, China should strengthen both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy among Global South nations. Two typical forms of multilateralism have emerged:

First, multilateral cooperation among major Global South powers, with BRICS as a typical example. In the context of intensifying great power competition, BRICS expansion—particularly the inclusion of Middle Eastern states—signals that the mechanism may play a greater role in security governance. Platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS should be used to coordinate security interests and counter the exclusivity of Indo-Pacific strategies.

Second, cooperation between Global South powers and entire regional groupings. Examples include China’s engagement with Africa, Arab states, and Pacific island nations. Forums such as the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum provide platforms for de-escalating regional hotspots and rejecting bloc-based confrontation.

2- Offsetting value-based diplomacy with the principle of “seeking common ground while reserving differences”

The concept of seeking common ground while reserving differences, first proposed by Zhou Enlai at Bandung, emphasized resisting ideological dogmatism in favor of pragmatic cooperation. Today, China must challenge the “democracy versus authoritarianism” narrative by emphasizing the principle of sovereign equality and the right of all nations to choose their own development paths. The principle of mutual respect and inclusiveness should guide international relations, supporting a model that emphasizes dialogue among civilizations and reciprocal learning among systems.

China must oppose unilateralism, zero-sum thinking, and hegemonic practices, while promoting a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation. It should also accelerate the construction of a Global South discourse system that prioritizes development rights. On international platforms such as the UN Human Rights Council, China must resist the politicization of human rights by Western powers. Moreover, international communication should be strengthened through platforms such as CGTN and TikTok, using effective Belt and Road cooperation cases to counter perception warfare.

3- Driving development paradigm transformation through South-South cooperation

From the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to the Bandung Spirit and the emergence of new South-South cooperation, the core has always been respect for the diversity of development paths and partnerships grounded in equality, solidarity, and mutual benefit. The goal is to overcome poverty and underdevelopment, build a just global order, and realize unity in diversity.

China must deepen the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly in Asia and Africa, focusing on infrastructure and capacity cooperation. According to the Outlook on the High-Quality Development of the Belt and Road Initiative for the Next Decade, China should prioritize “small but beautiful” livelihood projects, thereby fulfilling the Bandung ideal of economic mutual assistance.

China must innovate in South-South cooperation models. Traditional international development paradigms—largely shaped by the modernization experiences of developed Western countries—tend to flow unidirectionally, compelling recipient nations to conform institutionally to Western norms. In contrast, China should continue promoting the co-modernization model it has pursued with Africa. This approach emphasizes mutual interaction and shared agency, stimulating local initiative through bottom-up consultation, joint construction, and co-sharing, and thereby fostering more equal and sustainable development partnerships.

China must serve as a model of modernization. The new practices of Chinese-style modernization not only provide a solid foundation for China’s leadership in Global South development, but also offer alternative development paths to other Global South countries. With China–Africa co-modernization as a key strategic focus, China can help pioneer a new paradigm of international modernization cooperation.

In 1955, by seizing the opportunity presented by the Bandung Conference, the People’s Republic of China successfully broke through Western isolation and blockade, presenting itself as a trustworthy partner for the Third World. Seventy years later, China should once again draw upon the Bandung experience, integrating the Bandung Spirit with the practice of diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era. In doing so, China will help construct a more just and reasonable international order and contribute to world peace and development. This is not only a tribute to history, but also a response to present challenges and an exploration of the future.

Diplomacy

Greece’s Marinakis says paying Hormuz transit fees beats enduring Red Sea shipping crisis detour

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Evangelos Marinakis, one of Greece’s leading shipowners, has announced that he is prepared to pay up to $200,000 per transit to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to civilian maritime traffic.

Speaking to the Financial Times, Marinakis stated that paying a transit fee would be a far better option for him than having the strait closed to navigation.

As the chairman of Capital Maritime Group, which controls a fleet of 185 vessels including approximately 35 tankers, Marinakis emphasized that shipowners have been forced to use alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope for years due to attacks launched by the Houthis in the Red Sea, a detour that has generated substantial additional costs.

The Greek shipowner indicated that paying a transit fee of $100,000 or $200,000, depending on the size of the cargo or the vessel, is far more reasonable than enduring the current logistical challenges. He added that such payments could offset all the losses experienced so far.

Following US strikes on Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Tehran administration had introduced transit fees of up to $2 million for certain vessels transiting the waterway.

In May, Iran announced the establishment of a state agency tasked with managing the Strait of Hormuz. It was stated that the institution in question would provide real-time updates regarding maritime activities in the waterway.

Ebrahim Azizi, the chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, had noted that only commercial vessels and countries cooperating with Iran would be able to benefit from the facilities provided under this “professional mechanism.”

US President Donald Trump has explicitly opposed the imposition of transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz. In a statement on the matter, Trump said, “We want the strait to be open. We do not want any transit fees to be charged. This is an international waterway.”

On the other hand, the draft text of a planned 60-day ceasefire extension agreement between the parties stipulates that the Strait of Hormuz will remain open without any transit fees being demanded.

According to the draft details reviewed by Axios, the US in return commits to lifting the blockade it has imposed on Iranian ports. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, announced that the management of the Strait of Hormuz has been excluded from the scope of the agreement with the US, asserting that the issue will be addressed solely by littoral states.

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Pashinyan promises aid to farmers hit by Russian import restrictions

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Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pledged compensation for Armenian farmers affected by restrictions on exports to Russia.

According to Sputnik Armenia, Pashinyan made the announcement during an election campaign meeting in the Gegharkunik region.

Speaking at the event, Pashinyan said the subsidies would be designed to offset losses incurred by producers.

The prime minister also acknowledged that some Armenian products had failed to meet required quality standards, adding that such companies would receive support aimed at improving product quality.

Addressing alternative markets for Armenian exports, Pashinyan said several Armenian business delegations were already engaged in negotiations abroad.

He added that Armenia had received offers for the purchase of roses as well as fresh fruits and vegetables.

Pashinyan argued that Armenia’s agricultural output was not particularly large, describing this as an advantage under current circumstances. According to the prime minister, “a respected supermarket chain in Europe” would be capable of selling the entire volume of these products on its own.

Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) imposed temporary restrictions on imports of stone fruits and grapes from Armenia effective July 2.

The ban covers cherries, sour cherries, apricots, plums, peaches and nectarines, among other products.

On the same day, a temporary suspension was also introduced on certification procedures for live fish shipments from Armenia. Russian authorities had previously restricted the entry of flower products originating from Armenia into the Russian market.

In addition, Russia’s Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) halted the import of all consignments of Jermuk mineral water from Armenia.

In a statement, the agency said levels of bicarbonate, chloride and sulfate ions in the mineral water exceeded established limits and could mislead consumers regarding the product’s medicinal properties.

The Russian regulator argued that the growing number of violations stemmed from the abolition of Armenia’s Agriculture Ministry and the transfer of its responsibilities to the Economy Ministry.

Rosselkhoznadzor further stated that Armenia’s Economy Ministry was experiencing structural problems and was unable to adequately perform the supervisory functions assigned to it.

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Zelenskyy urges US to grant Ukraine license to produce Patriot missiles

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he has asked the United States to grant Ukraine a license to manufacture missiles for the Patriot air defence system.

In a post on social media platform X, Zelenskyy argued that current US production of missile defence interceptors is insufficient and could contribute to crises in different parts of the world.

“Producing 60-65 missiles a month is nothing compared with the challenges we face today. This is no secret, and Russia knows it as well,” Zelenskyy wrote. “We need to expand production. As I requested from the previous US administration, I am asking the current administration to grant Ukraine a license to produce Patriot missiles.”

Zelenskyy said US companies possess advanced technologies that are not available in Ukraine, while Kyiv could contribute its extensive battlefield experience in return.

He also argued that granting such a license would benefit not only Ukraine, but also the Middle East and any country Washington chooses to support.

Washington pledges to maintain defence support

Zelenskyy’s remarks came a day after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on May 30 that Washington would continue supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities and ensure military shipments to Kyiv continue.

“We want them to be able to defend themselves, and we will find a way to help them do that,” Hegseth said.

Several days earlier, Yuriy Ihnat, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force, warned that the country’s air defence forces were experiencing a shortage of missiles.

“Due to certain supply problems, we are practically at starvation levels when it comes to missiles today,” Ihnat said.

Concerns persist over air defence missile stocks

In April, Zelenskyy warned that Ukraine’s stockpile of air defence missiles could be exhausted at any moment.

He said that under current conditions, air defence missiles were more critical for Ukraine than the air defence systems themselves.

Highlighting what he described as a critical shortage of Patriot missiles, Zelenskyy said: “We are facing a deficit now that could hardly be worse.”

Concerns that Ukraine could face a severe shortage of US-made air defence missiles had previously been reported by Reuters.

The situation was expected to worsen as the United States and its allies depleted significant portions of their arsenals during tensions with Iran, a point Zelenskyy also underscored.

In a separate statement in January, Zelenskyy said Ukraine lacked sufficient missiles for both US- and European-made air defence systems.

The Ukrainian leader said he had been forced to personally secure every package of missiles from European countries and the United States.

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