In an interview with RIA Novosti, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Russian President’s special envoy to Syria, stated that Moscow could not provide Israel with guarantees to prevent “arms smuggling” from Syria to Lebanon.

Earlier reports from the Israeli press indicated that Israel would like to see Russia as a mediator in the Middle East peace settlement. Lavrentiev confirmed that Israel had requested guarantees from Russia to prevent Shiite groups from moving military equipment through Syria to Lebanon. However, he clarified that this demand could not be met.

“This would require the establishment of new checkpoints along the border, a task that does not fall within the competence of the Russian military in Syria,” Lavrentiev explained.

When asked about Israel’s expectation of a security guarantee, Lavrentiev responded, “First of all, we cannot give such a guarantee.”

Reports have previously indicated that Israel has been in contact with Moscow regarding the regional settlement process. It was even suggested that Strategic Planning Minister Ron Dermer, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest advisors, was planning a confidential visit to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Itamar Eichner, a columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, noted in his column yesterday that Israel understands Russia’s influence over Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. “This is why Tel Aviv seeks guarantees from Moscow to prevent arms smuggling and to stop the Lebanese terrorist organization from recovering from the war,” Eichner wrote.

Commenting on Israel’s desire to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border, Lavrentiev highlighted a recent attack near Khmeimim Air Base in Syria. Although this incident took place about a month ago and did not directly impact Russian troops, Lavrentiev felt compelled to address it.

“Israel carried out an airstrike near Khmeimim. They did not target the air base directly, as they know this would have serious consequences for Israel. Reports suggest that the strike targeted warehouses and buildings in the vicinity,” Lavrentiev stated.

He also mentioned that the Russian Defense Ministry had “sent a representative to Israel” for further discussions.

Russia’s federal budget has returned to a deficit in 2024 due to increased spending, with the deficit reaching 389 billion roubles in October.

The Russian Finance Ministry announced that the federal budget returned to deficit in the first ten months of 2024, with expenditures exceeding revenues by 220 billion roubles—or 0.1% of gross domestic product (GDP).

According to preliminary data from the ministry, the budget showed a surplus of 169 billion roubles from January to September. Thus, the October budget deficit may have reached 389 billion roubles.

Despite the current deficit, this year’s budget deficit remains lower than in the same period last year, when it reached 1.05 trillion roubles (0.6% of GDP) due to a decline in Russia’s energy revenues following Western sanctions imposed in response to Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine.

Last month, budget revenues rose by around 4% compared with September, reaching levels similar to October 2023. Ten-month revenues increased 28.4% year-on-year, totaling 29.67 trillion roubles.

Non-oil and gas revenues grew 26.6% year-on-year to 20.13 trillion roubles, while oil and gas revenues climbed 32.3% year-on-year to 9.54 trillion roubles.

The monthly expenditure also continued its upward trend. According to the Ministry of Finance, spending in October increased 23.3% month-on-month and 26.8% year-on-year.

From January to October, the Finance Ministry spent 29.89 trillion roubles, a 23.7% rise from 24.16 trillion roubles spent in the same period last year.

This autumn, authorities approved an increase in spending above the planned 2024 budget rule from 1.3 trillion roubles to 1.5 trillion roubles.

Consequently, the Finance Ministry now forecasts total budget spending for 2024 to reach 39.41 trillion roubles—7.5% higher than initially planned and 21.8% more than last year.

If this forecast holds, an additional 9.52 trillion roubles will be spent in the remaining two months of the year, comprising nearly a quarter of the annual target.

Following this extra spending, the Russian budget is projected to close 2024 with a deficit of 3 trillion roubles or 2% of GDP, marking the third consecutive year in deficit.

Russia has built a shadow fleet at an estimated cost of around $10 billion, now transporting approximately 70% of its oil and oil products on these tankers. This fleet allows Russia to largely evade restrictions associated with the $60-per-barrel price ceiling. Western sanctions targeting individual tankers and their owners have proven largely ineffective in curbing Russian exports.

According to a report by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), cited by the Financial Times, the shadow fleet nearly doubled its capacity to 4.1 million barrels per day in June this year, up from 2.4 million barrels during the same period last year. This represents an increase of almost 71%. Crude oil is now carried almost entirely (89%) by older tankers, with an average vessel age of 18 years, while 38% of oil products are transported by these aging ships.

Some of these tankers are insured against oil spills by Russian companies, though most are reportedly uninsured. The KSE recommends the creation of “shadow zones” in European waters, restricting access to tankers that cannot prove adequate insurance coverage. However, the report warns that under current conditions, “a major environmental disaster is only a matter of time.”

The Financial Times also notes that four tankers in the shadow fleet have experienced engine failures over the past two years at critical points, such as the Danish Straits and the Dardanelles. So far, these incidents have not resulted in oil spills.

Western countries have begun imposing sanctions on individual tankers, as well as on their owners and operators. Benjamin Hilgenstock, one of the authors of the KSE report, stated that these sanctions have been effective in deterring some ships from continuing their operations. However, he emphasized that the overall impact on weakening Russia’s shadow fleet has been limited.

In contrast, Craig Kennedy, an expert on Russian oil operations at Harvard University, noted that Russian oil companies often prefer foreign ownership and operators to conceal their connections to shadow fleet vessels. This practice complicates efforts to sanction the entities involved. Kennedy estimates that Russian companies have spent over $10 billion acquiring old tankers since 2022, primarily financed through Russian banks.