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Sudden Changes in Venezuela’s Political Situation and Risks to China’s Interests

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How will the Venezuela’s political change affect the world and China?

Zhang Lubo, Ma Xiaolin

On January 3, the U.S. “Delta Force” carried out a military operation inside Venezuela, abducting the incumbent president Maduro and his wife and rapidly transporting them back to the United States, directly placing them into the Drug Enforcement Administration under the U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. President Trump subsequently stated that the United States would “manage” Venezuela until what he called a “safe transition” is achieved.

At present, Venezuela’s Supreme Court has announced that Vice President Rodríguez will serve as acting president. The existing power structure still refuses to accept U.S. intervention. Formally speaking, the state apparatus has not yet collapsed, and the military system has not openly defected. It is impossible that the Trump administration spent months planning merely to seize Maduro; there must inevitably be further action plans. Although Venezuela’s opposition has not formed a single or unified political entity capable of taking over the state, it can serve as political components that the U.S. side can “assemble and use.” The United States is highly likely to continue controlling the situation in Venezuela and attempt to promote some form of arrangement for a “joint transitional government,” and Venezuela may experience a political transformation leaning toward the United States. This sudden change not only provides a demonstration and momentum for right-wing forces in Latin America, but also constitutes a substantive deterrent to left-wing or non–pro-U.S. governments in the region, and will impact China’s interests in Venezuela and even throughout South America.

1. Why Was the U.S. “Decapitation Operation” Able to Succeed So Easily?

From the operational level, this U.S. action was clearly long premeditated and meticulously planned. Special forces were able to complete infiltration, control the target, and withdraw rapidly within a short period of time, indicating that intelligence gathering and inducement preparations were sufficient. This was a systematic operation carried out around clear political objectives. Its focus was not on “eliminating the target,” but rather on systematically creating real conditions, political interfaces, and narratives of legitimacy for controlling Venezuela.

After Maduro was transferred, public opinion operations were rapidly rolled out in coordination. A large number of video clips showing Venezuela’s citizens “cheering” and “celebrating” circulated widely on social media. At the international public opinion level, “popular will” was emphasized and amplified to the greatest extent, thereby weakening the legitimacy foundation of the Maduro regime. The opposition and political forces in exile are striving to compete for legitimacy and future political roles.

It is worth noting that, according to the Associated Press, Maduro and his wife were captured at a residence inside a military camp. Being able to abduct a country’s president from a military camp within just three hours virtually confirms the existence of core insiders who had been turned. This not only shows that the United States is not without points of breakthrough within the Venezuelan military, at least possessing room for maneuver at certain nodes, but also means that it has a certain degree of grasp over the subsequent situation.

Therefore, external observers speculate that the candidates the United States may support include opposition leader María Machado, or Edmundo Urrutia, who has already gone into exile abroad and obtained “electoral legitimacy” endorsements in some Western countries. Trump himself has stated that he will assess “whether Venezuela should be led by opposition leader Machado.”

At present, Venezuela’s opposition exists in three realistic forms. Machado belongs to the symbolic type of opposition. She has a certain degree of social appeal domestically, especially among the middle class and urban strata, and is adept at political mobilization and discursive expression. However, she lacks control over the military, fiscal, and energy systems, and is more like a “symbol of legitimacy” rather than a governor. Edmundo represents an exiled technocratic opposition; his advantage lies in having already been “legitimized” within the political systems of the United States and the European Union, making him usable for interfacing with the IMF, the World Bank, and multinational energy companies. The most critical and most dangerous category is the “marginal people” or swing faction of the old system, including technocrats within the former Chavist system and local military and political personnel. This category can not only maintain the minimum operation of the state apparatus, but is also the core variable capable of determining “whether a transitional government is operable.”

Taking all views together, it is unlikely that the Maduro system will collapse immediately. A mere change of leadership is insufficient to terminate the structural power network. Moreover, due to deep divisions and obstacles arising from strategic disagreements, it is temporarily difficult to form a single or unified opposition to take over the state. The conditions for ending the power struggle are not in place. In the short term, Venezuela’s power pattern will most likely continue to revolve around repeated tug-of-war and localized turbulence between the old power core and the opposition.

What can be determined is that Trump’s adoption of extreme actions is carried out around clear strategic objectives. Its core intentions are at least at three levels: first, to “solve” the root causes of drug trafficking and immigration issues, thereby securing political bargaining chips for the midterm elections; second, at the economic and energy level, to compete for and reshape control over Venezuela’s oil resources, obtaining tangible benefits for U.S. capital and its own energy security. Trump himself has clearly stated to U.S. media that he “will deeply intervene in Venezuela’s oil industry”; third, internationally, to establish U.S. hegemony in Latin America at the lowest cost, exclude extra-regional forces, deter the Latin American left, and at the same time provide clear political support and security guarantees for pro-U.S. right-wing forces.

2. Possible Directions of the Development of the Situation in Venezuela

Most observers believe that before institutional restructuring is completed, Venezuela’s original power structure, military loyalty system, judicial and intelligence institutions will still determine the actual future trajectory. In this sense, military loyalty is the key variable determining the survival of the current regime. If the military continues to remain loyal to Maduro and his successors, the United States may not necessarily be able to achieve its goal of controlling Venezuela.

At present, it appears unlikely that the Trump administration will launch a large-scale ground invasion. This would neither conform to the current limits of U.S. domestic political tolerance nor to the strategic reality of multi-front global competition. The nature of this operation more closely resembles an attempt to leverage changes in political structure at the lowest possible military cost. Some analyses suggest that the fragile power coordination relationship between the vice president and the military high command is facing severe tests, and the situation has entered a zone of high instability. Overall judgment indicates that future evolution broadly presents two main paths.

One possibility is that the military chooses compromise under real pressure. Some senior military officials may, based on considerations of vested interests and personal security, judge that continued resistance no longer yields substantive benefits or meaning, and may even believe that overall resistance will and social foundations are rapidly eroding, thus choosing to detach from the original power structure and seek maximization of personal interests.

Under this scenario, the United States may reach tacit understandings with some remnants of the Maduro system, promoting the establishment of a compromise-based coalition government; or, in the role of “supervisor” or “security guarantor,” take the lead in forming a temporary transitional government and push for so-called “democratic elections,” shaping legitimacy at the procedural and discursive levels. The outcome would almost without suspense result in the victory of pro-U.S. forces.

Another possibility is that the military remains loyal to the Maduro government and chooses to confront the United States. This arrest constitutes an open violation of national sovereignty. If the vice president can, in the name of national righteousness, coordinate the military high command, and if military control retains resilience, the situation will rapidly enter a higher-intensity stage of uncertainty. Under this path, the United States retains at least three operational options.

First, the United States may continue to advance a “decapitation strategy.” Trump himself has publicly stated that “if necessary, the United States is prepared to launch a second round of attacks.” The U.S. side is highly likely to continue striking key individuals and nodes.

Second, the United States may also cultivate or activate proxy armed forces within or around Venezuela, continuously consuming the current regime through a process of “civil war–ization.”

Third, there is also a relatively “low-intensity” variant, in which the opposition leverages momentum to mobilize the public, promotes opposition unity, and continuously challenges the current regime through political legitimacy offensives, forming a “tug-of-war–style confrontation” that similarly, in stages and localized forms, results in substantive submission to the United States.

In addition, it cannot currently be ruled out that Maduro may be used as a hostage to negotiate with Venezuela’s current regime or even with other interested parties. This may be the most “peaceful” approach. Through conditional exchanges, the other side may be forced to make concessions in power structure, policy orientation, or international strategy.

However, regardless of how the above paths evolve, Venezuela has in fact entered a state of being highly influenced and constrained by the United States, and its space for strategic autonomy is being systematically compressed.

3. Negative Impacts on China’s Interests

(I) Direct impacts. Whether the current Venezuelan government is maintained, transformed, or overthrown, the impact on China is obvious. It represents a systemic shock with strong spillover effects, simultaneously affecting multiple dimensions including personnel safety, geopolitical positioning, diplomatic principles, and economic interests.

First, risks to personnel and asset security have risen significantly. The most direct and urgent impact lies in the realm of personnel and asset safety. At present, the Chinese embassy has urgently reminded citizens to “temporarily refrain from traveling to Venezuela” and has requested those already there to “stay away from conflict areas.” This extreme incident will inevitably cause operational disruptions for Chinese-funded enterprises on the ground, project stagnation, and asset depreciation, while the property safety of overseas Chinese residents will also be difficult to guarantee. Rising security uncertainty will weaken medium- and long-term cooperation expectations, causing projects that were already progressing slowly to further lose continuity. If the situation deteriorates, China cannot rule out the need to initiate large-scale evacuation mechanisms, which would bring considerable short-term economic losses and significantly raise Chinese enterprises’ risk assessments regarding investment in Venezuela and even the entire region.

Second, a major setback to geopolitics and China’s Latin America strategy. In 2023, China and Venezuela had just elevated their bilateral relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” a designation that is relatively rare in China’s diplomacy toward Latin America and carries clear political and strategic symbolic significance. Maduro’s direct arrest delivers a frontal blow to this high-level partnership in practical terms, and further signifies a severe setback to the camp of “ironclad friends” in Latin America. If the Venezuelan regime is forced to restructure, or if a new government with explicit anti-China or de-Sinicization tendencies emerges, the political mutual trust, policy coordination, and strategic depth that China has accumulated in the region over many years may be systematically weakened in a short period of time.

Third, challenges to diplomatic principles and the international order. Venezuela has submitted a complaint to the United Nations Security Council, in essence seeking assistance from China and Russia. However, the United States possesses veto power, and the institutional space for maneuver is inherently limited. At the level of principles, the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” has shifted from “I do not interfere” to “I advocate that no power should interfere in other countries’ internal affairs,” thereby supporting countries’ independent choice of development paths and opposing external intervention. The United States’ use of military means to arrest the sitting leader of a sovereign state recognized by China constitutes a direct shock to this principle. If China’s response lacks sufficient intensity, it will weaken its moral appeal among developing countries. Against the backdrop of this incident, Trump has continued to issue threats against Cuba, and his administration’s new version of the national security strategy has clearly proposed to “revitalize U.S. leadership in the Western Hemisphere” and to treat curbing China’s influence as an important objective.

Fourth, direct impacts on energy security and debt recovery. Venezuela remains one of China’s important sources of crude oil. Turmoil will significantly increase the risk of energy supply disruptions and heighten instability in China’s energy import structure. Over many years, China has provided Venezuela with investments and loans on the scale of tens of billions, and has participated in a large number of infrastructure and energy development projects. These projects were already progressing slowly due to Venezuela’s economic crisis; now, under conditions of high political uncertainty, they face the risk of complete stagnation or repudiation. Whether state-owned oil enterprises or private capital involved in related projects, all will face real pressures of extended investment recovery cycles, asset devaluation, or even losses.

Ma Xiaolin, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies

Zhang Lubo, Associate Researcher at the Institute for Mediterranean Studies, Zhejiang International Studies University; Deputy Director of the Latin American Studies Center, School of European and American Languages and Cultures, Guangxi Foreign Languages University

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A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order

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The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.

The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”

One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.

The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.

Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.

Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.

On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.

Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.

When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.

The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.

The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.

The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism

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Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.

As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.

In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.

Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.

Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion

NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.

And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.

The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.

The collapse of the Atlantic system

Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.

In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.

Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.

For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.

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Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing

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Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.

For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.

Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.

It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.

The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.

Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.

This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.

For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.

China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.

All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.

The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.

Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.

Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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