Opinion
Sudden Changes in Venezuela’s Political Situation and Risks to China’s Interests
How will the Venezuela’s political change affect the world and China?
Zhang Lubo, Ma Xiaolin
On January 3, the U.S. “Delta Force” carried out a military operation inside Venezuela, abducting the incumbent president Maduro and his wife and rapidly transporting them back to the United States, directly placing them into the Drug Enforcement Administration under the U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. President Trump subsequently stated that the United States would “manage” Venezuela until what he called a “safe transition” is achieved.
At present, Venezuela’s Supreme Court has announced that Vice President Rodríguez will serve as acting president. The existing power structure still refuses to accept U.S. intervention. Formally speaking, the state apparatus has not yet collapsed, and the military system has not openly defected. It is impossible that the Trump administration spent months planning merely to seize Maduro; there must inevitably be further action plans. Although Venezuela’s opposition has not formed a single or unified political entity capable of taking over the state, it can serve as political components that the U.S. side can “assemble and use.” The United States is highly likely to continue controlling the situation in Venezuela and attempt to promote some form of arrangement for a “joint transitional government,” and Venezuela may experience a political transformation leaning toward the United States. This sudden change not only provides a demonstration and momentum for right-wing forces in Latin America, but also constitutes a substantive deterrent to left-wing or non–pro-U.S. governments in the region, and will impact China’s interests in Venezuela and even throughout South America.
1. Why Was the U.S. “Decapitation Operation” Able to Succeed So Easily?
From the operational level, this U.S. action was clearly long premeditated and meticulously planned. Special forces were able to complete infiltration, control the target, and withdraw rapidly within a short period of time, indicating that intelligence gathering and inducement preparations were sufficient. This was a systematic operation carried out around clear political objectives. Its focus was not on “eliminating the target,” but rather on systematically creating real conditions, political interfaces, and narratives of legitimacy for controlling Venezuela.
After Maduro was transferred, public opinion operations were rapidly rolled out in coordination. A large number of video clips showing Venezuela’s citizens “cheering” and “celebrating” circulated widely on social media. At the international public opinion level, “popular will” was emphasized and amplified to the greatest extent, thereby weakening the legitimacy foundation of the Maduro regime. The opposition and political forces in exile are striving to compete for legitimacy and future political roles.
It is worth noting that, according to the Associated Press, Maduro and his wife were captured at a residence inside a military camp. Being able to abduct a country’s president from a military camp within just three hours virtually confirms the existence of core insiders who had been turned. This not only shows that the United States is not without points of breakthrough within the Venezuelan military, at least possessing room for maneuver at certain nodes, but also means that it has a certain degree of grasp over the subsequent situation.
Therefore, external observers speculate that the candidates the United States may support include opposition leader María Machado, or Edmundo Urrutia, who has already gone into exile abroad and obtained “electoral legitimacy” endorsements in some Western countries. Trump himself has stated that he will assess “whether Venezuela should be led by opposition leader Machado.”
At present, Venezuela’s opposition exists in three realistic forms. Machado belongs to the symbolic type of opposition. She has a certain degree of social appeal domestically, especially among the middle class and urban strata, and is adept at political mobilization and discursive expression. However, she lacks control over the military, fiscal, and energy systems, and is more like a “symbol of legitimacy” rather than a governor. Edmundo represents an exiled technocratic opposition; his advantage lies in having already been “legitimized” within the political systems of the United States and the European Union, making him usable for interfacing with the IMF, the World Bank, and multinational energy companies. The most critical and most dangerous category is the “marginal people” or swing faction of the old system, including technocrats within the former Chavist system and local military and political personnel. This category can not only maintain the minimum operation of the state apparatus, but is also the core variable capable of determining “whether a transitional government is operable.”
Taking all views together, it is unlikely that the Maduro system will collapse immediately. A mere change of leadership is insufficient to terminate the structural power network. Moreover, due to deep divisions and obstacles arising from strategic disagreements, it is temporarily difficult to form a single or unified opposition to take over the state. The conditions for ending the power struggle are not in place. In the short term, Venezuela’s power pattern will most likely continue to revolve around repeated tug-of-war and localized turbulence between the old power core and the opposition.
What can be determined is that Trump’s adoption of extreme actions is carried out around clear strategic objectives. Its core intentions are at least at three levels: first, to “solve” the root causes of drug trafficking and immigration issues, thereby securing political bargaining chips for the midterm elections; second, at the economic and energy level, to compete for and reshape control over Venezuela’s oil resources, obtaining tangible benefits for U.S. capital and its own energy security. Trump himself has clearly stated to U.S. media that he “will deeply intervene in Venezuela’s oil industry”; third, internationally, to establish U.S. hegemony in Latin America at the lowest cost, exclude extra-regional forces, deter the Latin American left, and at the same time provide clear political support and security guarantees for pro-U.S. right-wing forces.
2. Possible Directions of the Development of the Situation in Venezuela
Most observers believe that before institutional restructuring is completed, Venezuela’s original power structure, military loyalty system, judicial and intelligence institutions will still determine the actual future trajectory. In this sense, military loyalty is the key variable determining the survival of the current regime. If the military continues to remain loyal to Maduro and his successors, the United States may not necessarily be able to achieve its goal of controlling Venezuela.
At present, it appears unlikely that the Trump administration will launch a large-scale ground invasion. This would neither conform to the current limits of U.S. domestic political tolerance nor to the strategic reality of multi-front global competition. The nature of this operation more closely resembles an attempt to leverage changes in political structure at the lowest possible military cost. Some analyses suggest that the fragile power coordination relationship between the vice president and the military high command is facing severe tests, and the situation has entered a zone of high instability. Overall judgment indicates that future evolution broadly presents two main paths.
One possibility is that the military chooses compromise under real pressure. Some senior military officials may, based on considerations of vested interests and personal security, judge that continued resistance no longer yields substantive benefits or meaning, and may even believe that overall resistance will and social foundations are rapidly eroding, thus choosing to detach from the original power structure and seek maximization of personal interests.
Under this scenario, the United States may reach tacit understandings with some remnants of the Maduro system, promoting the establishment of a compromise-based coalition government; or, in the role of “supervisor” or “security guarantor,” take the lead in forming a temporary transitional government and push for so-called “democratic elections,” shaping legitimacy at the procedural and discursive levels. The outcome would almost without suspense result in the victory of pro-U.S. forces.
Another possibility is that the military remains loyal to the Maduro government and chooses to confront the United States. This arrest constitutes an open violation of national sovereignty. If the vice president can, in the name of national righteousness, coordinate the military high command, and if military control retains resilience, the situation will rapidly enter a higher-intensity stage of uncertainty. Under this path, the United States retains at least three operational options.
First, the United States may continue to advance a “decapitation strategy.” Trump himself has publicly stated that “if necessary, the United States is prepared to launch a second round of attacks.” The U.S. side is highly likely to continue striking key individuals and nodes.
Second, the United States may also cultivate or activate proxy armed forces within or around Venezuela, continuously consuming the current regime through a process of “civil war–ization.”
Third, there is also a relatively “low-intensity” variant, in which the opposition leverages momentum to mobilize the public, promotes opposition unity, and continuously challenges the current regime through political legitimacy offensives, forming a “tug-of-war–style confrontation” that similarly, in stages and localized forms, results in substantive submission to the United States.
In addition, it cannot currently be ruled out that Maduro may be used as a hostage to negotiate with Venezuela’s current regime or even with other interested parties. This may be the most “peaceful” approach. Through conditional exchanges, the other side may be forced to make concessions in power structure, policy orientation, or international strategy.
However, regardless of how the above paths evolve, Venezuela has in fact entered a state of being highly influenced and constrained by the United States, and its space for strategic autonomy is being systematically compressed.
3. Negative Impacts on China’s Interests
(I) Direct impacts. Whether the current Venezuelan government is maintained, transformed, or overthrown, the impact on China is obvious. It represents a systemic shock with strong spillover effects, simultaneously affecting multiple dimensions including personnel safety, geopolitical positioning, diplomatic principles, and economic interests.
First, risks to personnel and asset security have risen significantly. The most direct and urgent impact lies in the realm of personnel and asset safety. At present, the Chinese embassy has urgently reminded citizens to “temporarily refrain from traveling to Venezuela” and has requested those already there to “stay away from conflict areas.” This extreme incident will inevitably cause operational disruptions for Chinese-funded enterprises on the ground, project stagnation, and asset depreciation, while the property safety of overseas Chinese residents will also be difficult to guarantee. Rising security uncertainty will weaken medium- and long-term cooperation expectations, causing projects that were already progressing slowly to further lose continuity. If the situation deteriorates, China cannot rule out the need to initiate large-scale evacuation mechanisms, which would bring considerable short-term economic losses and significantly raise Chinese enterprises’ risk assessments regarding investment in Venezuela and even the entire region.
Second, a major setback to geopolitics and China’s Latin America strategy. In 2023, China and Venezuela had just elevated their bilateral relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” a designation that is relatively rare in China’s diplomacy toward Latin America and carries clear political and strategic symbolic significance. Maduro’s direct arrest delivers a frontal blow to this high-level partnership in practical terms, and further signifies a severe setback to the camp of “ironclad friends” in Latin America. If the Venezuelan regime is forced to restructure, or if a new government with explicit anti-China or de-Sinicization tendencies emerges, the political mutual trust, policy coordination, and strategic depth that China has accumulated in the region over many years may be systematically weakened in a short period of time.
Third, challenges to diplomatic principles and the international order. Venezuela has submitted a complaint to the United Nations Security Council, in essence seeking assistance from China and Russia. However, the United States possesses veto power, and the institutional space for maneuver is inherently limited. At the level of principles, the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs” has shifted from “I do not interfere” to “I advocate that no power should interfere in other countries’ internal affairs,” thereby supporting countries’ independent choice of development paths and opposing external intervention. The United States’ use of military means to arrest the sitting leader of a sovereign state recognized by China constitutes a direct shock to this principle. If China’s response lacks sufficient intensity, it will weaken its moral appeal among developing countries. Against the backdrop of this incident, Trump has continued to issue threats against Cuba, and his administration’s new version of the national security strategy has clearly proposed to “revitalize U.S. leadership in the Western Hemisphere” and to treat curbing China’s influence as an important objective.
Fourth, direct impacts on energy security and debt recovery. Venezuela remains one of China’s important sources of crude oil. Turmoil will significantly increase the risk of energy supply disruptions and heighten instability in China’s energy import structure. Over many years, China has provided Venezuela with investments and loans on the scale of tens of billions, and has participated in a large number of infrastructure and energy development projects. These projects were already progressing slowly due to Venezuela’s economic crisis; now, under conditions of high political uncertainty, they face the risk of complete stagnation or repudiation. Whether state-owned oil enterprises or private capital involved in related projects, all will face real pressures of extended investment recovery cycles, asset devaluation, or even losses.
Ma Xiaolin, Professor at Zhejiang International Studies University, Director of the Institute for Mediterranean Studies
Zhang Lubo, Associate Researcher at the Institute for Mediterranean Studies, Zhejiang International Studies University; Deputy Director of the Latin American Studies Center, School of European and American Languages and Cultures, Guangxi Foreign Languages University
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
Opinion
A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West
Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.
It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.
Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.
Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?
It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.
As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.
In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.
Opinion
Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria
At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.
This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.
US moves in the Mediterranean
Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.
Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.
The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.
Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.
Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.
Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?
Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.
So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?
Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.
Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?
In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.
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