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“The British may not like the Americans, but they have no choice but to stand behind them”

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On July 4, the United Kingdom will hold snap elections to elect a new parliament and a new government. Decades of economic stagnation in the United Kingdom have been accompanied by a political and social crisis exacerbated by the Brexit process and the rise of geopolitical tensions that began with its inclusion in the holy alliance against Russia.

On the other hand, there is something “unique” about British imperialism. London has long been the nerve center of global financial flows. In the aftermath of the 2008-9 financial crisis, the Gulf countries’ ties with British finance capital came to the fore, while in the 2010s a similar issue arose with China, with London becoming the most important focal point of the global renminbi trade in the West.

At the center of all these financial flows is the famous City of London, or simply The City, also known as the “Square Mile” in reference to its small size. The City, which has its own separate administrative and legal structure, is somehow involved in all the conspiracy theories about finance in the world, as it has always had a dark side.

Tony Norfield, author of The City: London and the Global Power of Finance (Verso, 2017), which focuses on the role of finance in the functioning of the City of London and British imperialism, strongly emphasizes that finance is an integral part of the capitalist world system and that it would be absurd to attempt to separate the two.

However, the City of London and finance also point to the specific nature of British imperialism, with the financial sector in particular playing a critical role in both British GDP and investment structure.

Norfield does not think it is possible for London to pursue a policy independent of Washington. In his view, even if the British wanted to do so, they are too weak to act separately from the US. The rise of China and the pivot of Asia and Latin America towards China, as well as Russia’s victory in Ukraine, are inevitable, Norfield believes, despite all British efforts to the contrary. Norfield writes about his thoughts on current affairs on his personal blog “Economics of Imperialism.”

Let me start with Britain’s role in global finance. The City of London is not well known in Turkey. But especially in the 2010s, City officials have developed deep ties with the AKP government. For example, Public-Private Partnership projects, which are often criticized in Turkey, were approved through Britain and the City of London in the same decade; even the legislation was taken from Britain. Can you tell us a little bit about what distinguishes the City of London from other financial centers and the importance of the City for British imperialism?

Yes, it’s a big topic, of course, but one thing you might remember is that in the middle of the financial crisis in 2008, there was a lot of discussion about interest rate swaps and the sheer volume of them. You know, if you look at how much they are technically involved in terms of hundreds or even thousands of billions of dollars worth of swaps.

What many people overlook is that the legal basis for these interest rate swaps is actually in English law. This may seem strange because not many swaps are done with people in Britain, but it reflects the fact that the British influence on finance is quite large. And this is really based on historical factors because the growth of the British empire, especially in the 19th century, even before that, meant that all kinds of commercial, maritime, transportation, insurance and trade relations, most of these were dominated by the British.

The British, for example, in an earlier period, were the biggest slave traders. So basically they played a very big role in international trade, partly because of their imperial ambitions. In the case of India, for example, they more or less closed down the Indian shipbuilding industry and the Indian shipping industry. Indians were able to build ships, sail ships and go from port to port. But what the British did was that they prevented ships from docking in colonial India unless it was a British port. So a large part of the shipping and shipbuilding industry in India closed down and was instead dominated by the British.

In insurance, marine insurance, Lloyd’s of London I think is the biggest marine insurance company in the world. And of course Lloyds is made up of wealthy individuals who are members. But it still reflects this historical factor, it’s a historical factor that continues today.

The multiple connections that the British have actually go back much further than the Americans. Even though the US is the largest economic power, obviously much larger than Britain, it is quite clear that the connections on which financial and business transactions can be built are very strong in the case of Britain and are actually more widespread than they are for the US.

So what happened? There are actually two phases. First, in the 19th century the City of London was a major financial center for the world economy, as I said, finance, shipping, insurance, insurance in general and trade, basically trade. One historian put it quite nicely and said that England was not the workshop of the world, it was the warehouse of the world. In other words, a lot of goods came in and were sent out again.

So Britain has a long history of being a kind of trading center and financial relationships were built on that basis. So, again, maritime insurance, trade, finance and things like that, and this was very important for the British.

So, even though the British economy in the 19th century had a deficit in commodities, the money that it made from insurance and the investment income from all its investments overseas meant that its current account was actually about 5% of GDP. So it had a huge deficit in trade but a huge surplus in investment income and various financial incomes, including insurance.

This was hit by the First World War of 1914-1918. As you know, this damaged world trade and meant that Britain was in a weaker economic position. In the inter-war period they tried to remedy this. Although they used the empire as a basis for doing that, it didn’t go very well.

Then, in the post-war period, the British were in a much weaker economic position, but they used their relationship with the US to continue to strengthen their financial dimension. So in the period immediately after the war, for example in the 1950s, you saw that trade financing was predominantly in British Pounds, not in US Dollars. Again, this seems a bit unusual because of the dominant economic position of the US, but that’s what happened. There was also, especially during the 1960s, the growth of the euro markets. The center of the euro markets was largely in London. The City of London was attracting foreign banks to come to London where they could do these transactions. This was because of the low regulations that existed in the City of London to circumvent local laws in the US that restricted the amount of interest that could be paid on a bank deposit.

European markets, for example, have very different regulations and the Bank of England and the City of London have much less regulation. So most of the big boom in international finance through the euro markets took place in London.

And despite the relative weakness of the UK economy, which was never in very good shape during this whole period, British finance used the US dollar, but it acted as a kind of financial trading instrument. So even today you see that the City of London, or the UK more generally, is not like that.

The City itself is a relatively small area. There’s also Canary Wharf and some other places within London. So geographically it’s not exactly a city, but the City of London, even after Brexit and despite the weakness of the British economy, is still the largest foreign exchange trading center in the world. It’s also one of the biggest financial derivatives trading venues between banks and their clients, like interest rate swaps and things like that.

The banks in the UK, not all of them are British banks of course, but the banks in the UK had the largest international links compared to other countries. And this again was creating stress. I emphasize how big the City is despite the relative weakness of the UK economy, certainly compared to the US, but also compared to a number of European countries.

And you know, they had a big role in setting regulations for the bank, for international agreements, for all sorts of things, because of this accumulation of expertise and because of this role that they played as an allied partner and accomplice with the US. That gave them a lot more freedom and influence than they would have had on their own as the British economy.

The City has a separate administrative structure alongside the British state apparatus. We hear some people in Turkey, some people close to the government, talk about London barons, London bankers trying to interfere in our domestic politics. Because the City of London is a kind of, you know, dark place, an ominous place for foreigners.

I think a lot of the discussion about this on the internet is completely wrong. The City of London has been given all sorts of privileges in terms of financial regulation, but it’s not as if it’s a separate power in its own right. This has been the policy of every government. It has been a deliberate policy of Conservative governments and Labour governments, particularly since the 1970s. To stimulate the financial sector, loosen regulations and allow the city to expand massively.

In 1979, exchange controls were relaxed. From 1986 or 87, I can’t remember, the so-called big boom happened. Then governments did not say, no, this is a bad idea, let’s change it. No, they continued it and they did more and more.

And under the Labor government in 1997, one of the biggest supporters of City was Gordon Brown, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer. He even ridiculously praised Lehman Brothers, as I mentioned in my book on the City. This was just a year or so before everything went to hell. This was a consistent British government policy.

So, okay, even though the Bank of England is a different institution, different governments, different policies, etc., it is completely wrong to portray the City as some kind of demon that sits indoors. This is a deliberate, precise and consistent part of British policy. And that’s because they make a lot of money out of it, or the British economy does.

And again, this was looking at the period when a former Labour government was in power. And they were actually praising all these jobs, big bonuses and a lot of tax revenues from tax revenues.

This is something that ironically the Brexit policy has messed up because it has been a factor in reducing the economic benefits for the City.

We’ll come to that. Okay, but I read an article in Politico yesterday and it said that the City has already won the elections because both Labour and the Conservatives have guaranteed how the City will function. But again, in your book you emphasize that all capitalist corporations carry out important financial operations. Where do you think the particular anger towards financial activities comes from? Could it be that the masses, especially the non-proletarian masses, are confronted with the capitalist structure, with the financial sector as one of its 1001 faces?

In general, there is a public opinion that looks at banks, the city, finance and things like that as a negative for the economy of the country. And this was a little bit less. During the boom years, so to speak, when everything looked ridiculously great, stock prices were soaring, all sorts of financial indicators looked good, there was a more popular view against the greed of bankers, that sort of thing. And of course, even young people earning millions of pounds, let alone big executives, were dealing with this sort of thing. It was an easy focus of resentment.

Then the financial crisis of 2008 and the bailout of the banks and things like that became a big thing and there was widespread dislike and hatred of bankers, that sort of thing. But what none of them could deny was that finance was an important factor for the British economy in terms of tax revenue, news and that sort of thing.

So there is a popular view against banking and finance, and it is very common among left radical people. But it’s a very simplistic view. Maybe I should not say that, but I think it’s a stupid view because it ignores the fact that the financial sector is a necessary element added to the functioning of capitalism.

As you mentioned, I talk about this in my book and I even give an example, let’s take Apple. Apple is a huge technical marvel of a company in the US. It also owns one of the biggest bond trading companies, right? It’s funny, I always thought Apple was all about consumer technology and stuff like that. No, they have a huge amount of financial derivatives deals.

It’s involved in a lot of bonds and it’s got a company called Braeburn. Right? Braeburn is a kind of Apple and it’s based in Nevada and a lot of people don’t know about it. They know about iPods and iPhones and Macs and things like that, but they do not really know about Braeburn.

Every big company, not just Apple, every big company has to have a finance arm in terms of dealing with currency risk, interest rate risk transactions and everything else. So you can not escape that. Every single company does it, technically an industrial company, a commercial company or whatever, has to do it. And this is a necessary, inevitable factor of capitalist markets.

So if you don’t like finance but you want capitalist markets, then there is a contradiction. In your view, these things inevitably arise from capitalist markets. So you can’t get around that. You have to do something about capitalist markets, if you don’t like capitalist finance. Otherwise you are on the losing side.

Yes, but related to the previous question, in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis and during the Brexit debate, attention was simultaneously drawn to the City of London’s evasion of EU regulations and to the hyperinflation of the financial sector in the UK and the relative decline in the competitiveness of the so-called productive sectors. Was this debate purely populist or was it an extension of real material class interests for Britain? I mean, there is some debate about industrial capital versus finance capital and so on.

I think this is again a misguided, ill-informed debate. Let me put it this way, there is no great distinction between an honest and wonderful industrial capitalist and an evil finance capitalist, because all these necessary links are there where you find, for example, an oil company like British Petroleum, BP, right? Yes, they do.

They will have a big treasury trading department because they deal with the ups and downs of oil prices, cash flows and all kinds of things. So every big industrial company necessarily has a financial aspect. True, technically they produce things or they are engaged in other things, but they have to do them.

But at the moment most of the world’s production takes place in a number of countries, particularly in Asia, where wages are relatively low and production costs are lower. And that means that the richer countries are focusing on having a monopoly position in the narrower industrial areas – specialized engineering and so on. Or they get involved in commercial power.

Let’s go back to Apple. They get everybody else to produce for them. And they rely on licensing and commercial monopolization to make their big profits. So they do not produce a lot. They outsource all the production elsewhere, but they still make a big profit because they can make big mark-ups.

So everybody else produces for them and they raise prices. It’s an extreme case, but it’s similar to what most of the rich capitalist countries do. So you see that in all these countries in general the share of manufacturing and industry is declining and instead the services sector is growing.

I mean, of course you need a service sector, don’t you? You cannot live in an economy with only manufacturing, mining or industry. But what happens is that the trading power of the rich countries is an important way for them to siphon value from the rest of the world. This is part of their parasitism on the world economy.

The financial dimension is also an important part of it. So this commercial parasitism and financial parasitism is an important part of the infrastructure of the rich powers that run the world economy. You know, they have a problem when the financial sector goes crazy and explodes, but when the post-crisis period comes and they want to do something else, they try to re-impose it in a different way.

Right now they are having even bigger problems with Russia, China and a number of countries trying to build something different. On top of all this, there is the parasitic system of domination over the world economy that the US, the British and other western powers have been in charge of for decades.

So you disagree with the claim that there is no capitalism anymore and that we are living in a new feudal world order?

No, that’s absurd. It is basically, if you want to call it that, imperialist capitalism, and in many ways a much more parasitic and corrupt capitalism.

You know, rather than having the good old 19th century concept of, you know, I’m a greedy capitalist, but at least I’m investing and producing and things like that. Right? No, what they are doing is they’re setting up a commercial monopolized system to control things and, you know, in the financial commercial sense, it means benefiting their producers as long as they still own them. But even if they don’t own the producers and they outsource the production to you, they want to make sure that the financial links and the commercial links are run by them and that all the big price increases happen for their benefit. That’s what happens, isn’t it?

Yes, I see. Now let’s talk a little bit about the Brexit discussions and this is also relevant. With Brexit, some of the Thatcherite Tory economists said that they wanted to make the UK a new Singapore, and you criticized that very harshly in one of your articles. But don’t you think that complaints about bureaucracy in the EU, Brussels’ attempts to regulate financial institutions, and Tory criticism of a move away from the free market, all of these things represent a bifurcation with capitalist institutions and ideas on the continent?

It’s always been a problem for the British because for a long time Europe seemed to be the main growth area of the world economy, not anymore but for a while it was. With the growth of the European economy and the growth of the EU, there was a big debate in Britain about whether to join the EU or not. Throughout the 1960s there was a lot of internal British debate: Should we join? Should we not join?

And they found that their previous imperial connections were not doing them much good economically. Most of Australia and New Zealand, for example, was one long railroad. The Canadian connections were not as strong. So basically it looked like Germany, France, Italy, Spain. These European countries were growing. Maybe we should have joined them.

The problem was, if the British did that, then would they still have a dominant position? That was always the problem and that was always the calculation they had to make.

In the early 1970s they finally decided: Yes, we have to do this. So they joined the European Economic Community. It made a lot of economic sense for them, but they were using their ties with other Europeans to put economic pressure on their own industries, which were in decline, and to have a competitive whip to improve them and put them in better shape, whereas before they had strong ties with the old empire, the Commonwealth, which gave them a privileged position, but it meant that they were no longer competitive in the rest of the world.

So the Conservative government in the early 1970s and the Labour governments afterwards tried to make the British economy more competitive so that it could compete a little bit more with the Europeans. But they had a big problem, even in the European context, of how to maintain your dominant position when you are no longer so dominant economically.

And they were very concerned about losing their political power. So that was why they didn’t want to join the European Union; or they joined the EU, but they didn’t want to join the new order of creating a single currency and having the euro, because that would be a step too far and it would mean that they would lose their influence. So they didn’t like to do that.

They were also afraid that it would weaken the City’s position and instead give more direct power to, for example, Germany, to the European Central Bank and things like that. So they didn’t like that and they wanted to step back from doing it.

There was always this tension, they wanted to have the connections. In fact, the City of London was doing most of the euro-related business in Europe, and the Europeans didn’t like that very much because the size of Frankfurt or Paris as an alternative financial center was relatively weak to do that compared to the size and power of the British financial system dealing with European finance.

You also mentioned in your Singapore article that during the Brexit debate some Londoners, particularly hedge funds and venture capital, were trying to separate the UK from the EU. But other institutions, some banks and pension funds, and asset managers were in favor of staying. How do you explain this phenomenon?

Brexit was a very stupid economic idea, completely stupid except in a few narrow dimensions. And that’s why you saw that the big companies didn’t make a big deal out of Brexit, because just over half of the population was in favor of Brexit. So they didn’t want to make a big deal out of it and piss off half of their customers. They didn’t want to talk too much about it.

But in the financial sector, for example, or in the business world, the people who were really in favor of Brexit were either hedge funds or venture capitalists, people like that who thought they could benefit from less regulation, lower wages and that sort of thing. So they had a more Brexit-oriented perspective. They also appealed to a more nationalist version which, frankly, most of the British working class supported. So it was British nationalism against a so-called European power that they didn’t like. We were going to be free, we were going to be able to do separate things and that sort of thing. It was a rather silly nationalist view and it actually undermined the social welfare aspects of the British working class. But the British working class generally supported this nationalist, anti-European view.

I’m not saying that Europeans are great progressives and that’s a negative thing from that perspective, but it was certainly a bit stupid from an economic point of view, and it opened the way for a more reactionary perspective that could be implemented by whatever government, in this case a Conservative government rather than a Labour government, because the trade unions, for example, were generally a bit more pro-European because they saw more positive social welfare events in Europe than were likely to happen outside Europe, outside the EU. So this was a reality.

And it was also an anti-immigration against EU migrants, undermining our living conditions and, you know, trying to get British welfare benefits and that kind of thing. That was the anti-immigration aspect of populism, it was anti-European stuff, which led to the British working class, not everybody but most of them, having an anti-EU view, which was the fuel for the Brexit view, which was linked to the anti-EU Nigel Farage type, UKIP type view.

But economically it’s a stupid thing, economically Brexit was a bad mistake. You know, you see the way the European Union is going, it’s not very progressive, it’s also dominated by the US and it’s doing stupid things.

So my position, to be honest, was to abstain. I thought that the European Union was bad and I thought that the great British alternative was bad. I mean, you know, I wouldn’t say that one was better than the other, but, you know, it was clearly absurd to have the view that there was a great British alternative.

Throughout 2010, the UK and the City of London became a hub for Chinese financial flows and in particular the renminbi. In turn, the UK joined the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, attracting Chinese investment to Britain despite the crisis. Did Brexit have anything to do with these developments, or was it just a coincidence? Does China still see Britain as a gateway to the western hemisphere?

The British expected more positive economic growth from Asia, whereas the European dimension of growth looked rather weak by comparison. But at the same time they were afraid of Asia’s growing economic power. So it was a bit of a mixed view. So, yes, for a while they wanted more Asian engagement in the economy, but at the same time they were afraid of a larger Chinese dimension and then they easily bought into the American paranoia about China. And that always undermined how much the British could embrace the Asian perspective. So, you know, they. Basically they wanted to be involved in Asia but as long as it could keep Western power in place, which they had a big role in. So that was the angle they were trying to push. And that led to this absurd “Singapore on the Thames” alternative, which went nowhere and looked silly.

But the British are in the middle of nowhere in this respect, frankly, they are not strong enough to implement some kind of independent view. As far as the Americans are concerned, they are number two or three on the list. The Europeans don’t like them very much, but they are stuck. They look a bit stupid, frankly.

But they will always, you know, try to strengthen their great international position. We are not Americans. We are not as aggressive and imperialistic as the Americans… But they are doing a lot of what the Americans are doing.

Today the European Union also announced new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. According to news reports, Germany, Sweden and Hungary opposed the new tariffs, while France and Spain in particular pushed for new tariffs. So how realistic do you think Europe’s decoupling from China, or “de-risking” as it is officially called, is?

First, it cannot be done. Secondly, whether from a British perspective or a European perspective, it is an attempt to prop up a very weak European economy.

But we can say that many German companies are completely against this idea of decoupling. And decoupling from China cannot be done. Basically, it cannot be done. And it’s stupid to try to do it.

And it’s not only China. They are worried about Korea, they are worried about India, they are worried about basically all kinds of things where they cannot compete with Asia. That’s the bottom line. You know, they cannot compete with the growing power of the Asian economy. So they want to do these kinds of things but basically they cannot compete. That’s the whole thing.

And they’re going to pick China in particular, because China is a big economy that continues to grow, a stronger, competitive economy. So they will claim that Huawei is doing all this bad spying, whereas the great Google, the great Amazon and all these kinds of things don’t spy as much as the Chinese do. It’s just ridiculous.

And they just want more western, American based power rather than Chinese risk, which they don’t like, which is not an independent power.

Lately we have been hearing a lot of talk in the western media about China’s overcapacity. Before it was about China dragging emerging economies into debt. Do you think there is any truth in all this? Does China’s great economic power aim to make countries, especially in Asia and Latin America, dependent? Or accusations of dumping from the EU?

This is absurd. You know, many African countries, for example, are choosing China as a more progressive alternative, a productive alternative to western domination. That’s it and it works for them, doesn’t it?

Who is going to build these things? I mean bridges, roads, railroads, power stations, etc. It’s not going to be the fucking Brits, Europeans and Americans. It’s going to be the Chinese. So it’s not a debt trap. And frankly this whole debt trap hoax is nonsense and has been proven not to be true. But basically they want to argue that.

Of course, I’m not claiming that every Chinese investment is great and every European investment is completely terrible, that’s not true. But to say that China is a debt trap and everything else is good is nonsense. There is all sorts of evidence that this is nonsense and that they cannot compete. But they don’t have as much control as they did when the Anglo-American view of the wonders of Western power was dominant. And that’s the point. And they are worried about losing that. That’s basically the issue.

You said this in one of your articles. In the past years, the BRICS countries have done some things outside the western financial system. It is also argued that the sanctions policy of western imperialism, led by the US, has failed and accelerated this process. But unlike Russia, China is still cautious about relations with the US, given the tensions between the other members of the bloc. What are the prospects for BRICS as an alternative?

Basically very good. And this is the way to go. It’s a good idea to build something more productive and different than the Western-US-Anglo type of domination that many Asian countries, Latin American countries and African countries have suffered and know they have suffered in previous decades.

There will be all kinds of conflicts and grievances and all the rest, but this is a more productive alternative than what was offered to them by the British, Americans and Europeans.

So this is the way to go and they are doing it in all kinds of ways. This will continue. The Americans will complain, the British will complain, the Europeans will complain, but it is a good thing that they are trying to build an alternative productive economy that is not dominated by parasitism, by the parasites of the western world. Basically, they are trying to get out of this trap and it is working. It’s better for them. And they see it every time. One of them now sees that there is an alternative to this nonsense and they don’t want it anymore, so they are trying to build an alternative. And that’s it.

There might be a mess here and there, whatever. It may not always work exactly. Yes, but to build an alternative to these things; that’s what they have to do and they are doing it.

Turkey, Asia and other countries should join in. Not the western nonsense that is trying to dominate them instead.

Finally, let’s talk about the ongoing occupation of Gaza, the war in Ukraine and Britain’s role in all this. Britain has been actively supporting Israel since October 7th. In addition, London has established a very close financial and political relationship with reactionary Arab regimes that have overt or covert relations with Israel. Given the financial infrastructure of British imperialism, what can you say about the role of the British government in the Middle East at the moment? As far as Ukraine is concerned, Britain seems to be pursuing a tougher anti-Russian policy than the US in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region, as well as in the South Caucasus. It has established deep relations with Poland, the Baltic states, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Is Britain trying to create a cordon sanitaire against Russia?

The British, of course, are strong allies with the Americans and they see any real challenge to American power as a problem for them. It’s kind of like, you know, being the great helper who wants to be a great alternative or not an alternative but has their own thing. It doesn’t exactly suit them but they can’t do anything else. They want to be bullies but they are dependent on the Americans. That’s the real issue. They want to pretend that they have alternatives, but they don’t. They need to depend on the Americans to increase their power.

So they are more anti-Russian when it comes to Ukraine than the Americans are when it comes to Ukraine. They are more against what the Russians are doing than the Americans are. But this policy will lose because Russia will win.

But instead they want to strengthen something else because they are worried about losing their power, the power of the Americans and the West in general. And something else is being built that is not the power of the Americans and the West. That’s why they don’t like it.

That’s how all these things should be looked at. That is the key point. Anything that happens today is about whether there will be western power, mainly American power, and the British have their own point of view or European power or whatever, and instead there will be an alternative built by other countries.

The British don’t like it, the Americans don’t like it and they try to argue how terrible it is. But these other countries are obviously trying to build a better alternative. That’s what we are trying to build.

What about the Middle East connections and the Gaza war going on in the Middle East in Palestine?

Yes, the British have a reactionary role in this. They have a terrible role in this. But you know, there is no way they can be a progressive force in Palestine, in Gaza, in the Middle East, in West Asia. It will always play a reactionary role. They realize that now with their policy of supporting Israel in every way, it depends on supporting the Americans.

But it has to fail. I hope so, but it’s not something that they are really going to back down or try to do something different. All their policies are reactionary and stupid and they will fail.

So you still think that the UK will act as a kind of lapdog of American imperialism around the world?

Yes, because that’s basically their only option. They want to be independent, they want to be a great alternative. They don’t like the Yanks. They want to be something different but they can’t be because they are too weak. So they want  British stuff. But the British don’t do anything for anybody, they don’t build anything and they are not an alternative for any other country. So basically they support the reaction, not the alternative. That’s how it works.

So they have to support the reaction in the Middle East and in the rest of the world and that’s what they are doing.

I think the basic idea is that the Europeans are losing. They may not like the Americans very much and they want to be different from the Americans, but it turns out that they are not that different. The Americans, one of them, is trying to ruin you too. Okay, I’m British, but that’s basically what they’re doing. So if you want to build something different you have to look elsewhere.

INTERVIEW

“The current interests of German capital coincide with the CDU-SPD coalition”

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Germany’s long-swinging SPD-Greens-FDP coalition government (“traffic light”) has collapsed. The collapse seems to have started when the FDP raised the flag to its coalition partners over the budget and the constitutional debt brake. But the German economy’s problems, which began before the Ukraine war and the anti-Russian sanctions, combined with high inflation, energy costs and a declining export market in China, have once again led to Europe’s largest economy being labeled a “sick man”.

Arnold Schölzel, a member of the editorial board of Junge Welt, Germany’s daily left-wing newspaper, argues that Germany’s growth, the war in Ukraine and the simultaneous financing of social expenditures have come to an end and that the FDP’s demand for sharp social cuts is in fact the program of the next federal government.

Schölzel points out that the CDU/CSU, which seems to be opposed to loosening the constitutional debt brake, is preparing to back down in a new government. Schölzel believes that there are still nuances between the parties and that this will be one of the issues of the upcoming election campaign.

Noting that German capital has interests in Eastern Europe and Ukraine, the journalist reminds that Eastern Europe in particular is a “reserve of cheap labor” for German industry and underlines that capital supports pro-war policies. Therefore, it is highly likely that the German economy will go along with the militarization of society from now on.

Schölzel sees the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a “continuation of the CDU/CSU” and believes that the interests of German capital lie in a CDU-SPD coalition.

‘FDP ANNOUNCES PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT GOVERNMENT’

As it turns out, the collapse of the traffic light coalition in Germany was in fact long overdue. An economic crisis “invented” by the Ukraine war and anti-Russian sanctions, and defeats in this year’s European Parliament and East German state elections, had shown that the government’s time had come. Does the collapse lie simply in the difference in economic programs between the FDP and the SPD-Greens? How far do the parliamentary parties differ in their proposed solutions to the economic and political crisis in Germany?

This government was a wartime government from the start. It entered the USA’s proxy war in Ukraine with considerable financial resources and waged an economic war against Russia – with devastating consequences not for Russia, but for German industry. She accepted the blowing up of the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea pipeline, presumably  by the US-government. As a result, the German economy has been in recession for two years and is at the bottom of the list in terms of growth among the industrialized countries. This pushed the state budget to its limits. The simultaneous financing of growth impulses, war and social benefits is no longer possible. The FDP wanted sharp social cuts. In doing so, it announces the policies of the next federal government.

‘EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES A RESERVE OF CHEAP LABOR FOR GERMAN INDUSTRY’

The reactions to Chancellor Scholz and his government from the German business community are also striking. All the spokespeople of capital, especially the industrialists, align themselves with the CDU/CSU and demand immediate elections, citing the return of Donald Trump and the Ukrainian War as justification. But when it comes to the debate on the constitutional debt brake, there seems to be no unity. Is the debt brake really that important? Is it possible to support Ukraine, fight against Trump’s potential tariffs and at the same time reduce the German national debt?

The German capital was and is in agreement with Scholz’s war course. It has sharply reduced economic ties with Russia and also supports a hostile policy towards China, albeit more cautiously. Both industry and the CDU/CSU have now declared their willingness to reform the debt brake. They demand subsidies for industry and arms deliveries to Ukraine. The German economy has long-term interests there – as in all of Eastern Europe. The Eastern European countries serve as a workbench for German industry and as a reservoir for cheap labor. German industry sees it as Germany’s backyard. There are still differences on the question of how deep the social cuts should be. This will probably be the focus of the election campaign.

Does the German state see the economic restructuring program and the militarization of the state, the economy and society as one and the same? The new conscription law, the debate on conscription and the modernization of the Bundeswehr seem to be propagandized as a way out of the crisis. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Eva Högl said last summer that young people learn “structure, comradeship, a sense of duty” in the Bundeswehr, “all qualities from which the economy also benefits”. Are we facing a plan to militarize the economy?

Yes, those in power are concerned with the militarization of society as a whole. They say this quite openly: The Bundeswehr should advertise in schools – there is a new law for this in Bavaria. The healthcare system is gearing up to treat large numbers of injured people. The German War Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) summarized this in the term “war capability”. It would have to be produced in four to five years because Russia would then probably attack NATO. Overall, it is a reactionary-militaristic restructuring of the state in which, above all, civil rights are restricted.

‘FASCISM IN GERMANY WAS REHABILITATED BY THE UKRAINE WAR’

When it comes to the Israeli aggression in Gaza, the AfD and the Greens support the same parliamentary bill. Similarly, when it comes to the “fight against irregular migration”, the CDU/CSU almost matches the AfD. Although all parties refuse to cooperate with the AfD, is it possible to say that AfD policies have already become “mainstream” in German politics? In any case, the AfD is likely to play a role in Germany’s future.

The AfD is a continuation of the politics of the CDU/CSU. The difference: It allows open fascists in the party. The CDU and CSU have been fighting racist incitement against migrants and asylum seekers for 40 years. The AfD has taken this over and expanded it: it has increased racism and consciously encourages violence. The AfD has always been on Israel’s side because of the oppression and murder of Muslims. This has increased further with the current genocide in Gaza. The Greens are the most bellicose German party today. They use racist clichés against Russia in the Ukraine war and completely agree with the racist position of the Netanyahu government. The Greens denounce any criticism of Israel’s policies as anti-Semitism and are successful in doing so. Because of the fascists in the AfD, there are still reservations among other parties at the federal level about working with the AfD. Things are different at the state level; cooperation works in the municipalities. Since fascism there was rehabilitated in Germany, particularly with the war in Ukraine, it may well be that the AfD will also be accepted at the federal level in a few years. As long as it still pretends to strive for peace with Russia, this is unlikely.

‘CONDITIONS ARE BEING CREATED FOR GREATER INDEPENDENCE FOR GERMAN IMPERIALISM’

It can also be linked to the question above: The cry for a “strong and decisive government” has an important place among the voices rising from within the ruling class. The polls indicate that the CDU/CSU would be the winning party in a possible federal snap election. Can the CDU/CSU alone meet this demand for a “strong and stable government”? Will German politics be forced to turn to “non-political” actors or institutions?

The date of the next federal election was negotiated between the CDU/CSU and SPD. This is symptomatic: they communicate despite all the rhetoric. As things currently stand, only a coalition of both parties can form the next government. In my opinion, this also corresponds to the current interests of the German capital. The ruling class is not yet committed to an authoritarian regime domestically, but is preparing the conditions for it. In terms of foreign policy, it cannot yet break away from the USA, but is striving for a stronger leadership role in the EU and perhaps in NATO. This also creates the conditions for greater independence for German imperialism in the future.

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INTERVIEW

‘Turkic world is preparing for economic integration’

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The Turkic Investment Fund, the first international financial institution of the Turkic world, is preparing to announce its policy document on January 1, 2025. Ambassador Baghdad Amreyev, President of the Turkic Investment Fund answered our questions.

You are quite new to the financial international cooperation institution. And you had your first Board of Directors meeting in May. Could you tell us what the outcomes of that meeting were, and what is the roadmap for implementing the strategies and resolutions that were discussed there?

As you know, the decision to establish the Turkic Investment Fund was made by the leaders of the Turkic world at their summit in Samarkand in 2022. In November 2022, they signed a special agreement for the establishment of the Turkic Investment Fund, which is the first financial mechanism and institution of the Turkic world. I was appointed as the founding president there.

We then began preparing the establishment agreement, and in a very short period of time, we finalized the agreement. On March 16, 2023, during an extraordinary summit of Turkic leaders in Ankara, the finance and economy ministers of our countries signed this establishment agreement in the presence of our leaders. It was a truly historic moment.

By the end of 2023, the ratification process was completed in our parliament, and as per the agreement, the Fund officially came into force on February 24, 2024. This is what we consider the “birthday” of the Fund.

A lot of organizational work has been completed since then. On May 18, as the President of the Turkic Investment Fund, I convened the inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors, which is the highest governing body of the Fund.

Cevdet Yılmaz, The Vice President of Türkiye also participated in that meeting, right?

Yes, The Vice President of Türkiye, His Excellency Mr. Cevdet Yılmaz, also participated in and chaired this meeting. It was a great honor for us.

The meeting was highly successful, and the Governors made several key decisions, including the completion of the institutionalization of the Fund. They also established the Board of Directors and gave them instructions to prepare key procedural documents and other necessary actions.

Since then, in June and August, I convened two meetings with the Board of Directors, during which we made crucial decisions for the commencement of the Fund’s operational activities. Establishing the operational structure and preparing the investment policy are ongoing tasks.

Our investment policy, in particular, is still being drafted.

The investment policy is still underway, then.

Yes, it is still underway. This is an essential document, as it will outline the priorities of the Fund, specify which projects we will focus on, and what our role will be.

During the first meeting of the Board of Governors, Mr. Ramil Babayev from Azerbaijan was appointed as Director General of the Turkic Investment Fund, responsible for managing the Fund’s operations.

Once the investment policy is finalized and the management structure is fully in place, we will be ready to commence operational activities.

I understand that your policy preparations are still in progress, but can you give us a sense of which key sectors or industries the Turkic Investment Fund will support?

Yes, our priorities are quite clear, and I have spoken about them on many occasions. First of all, it’s important to note that the Turkic Investment Fund serves multiple purposes. If we only needed to finance projects within our own countries, there would have been no need to establish a new fund. We already have numerous funds and banks for that.

However, the Turkic Investment Fund was established not only for financing projects within our countries but also to contribute to the economic integration of our nations. The Fund’s main focus will be to finance joint projects that promote integration and cooperation among our countries. This is vital for the unity and economic strength of the Turkic world.

Could you elaborate on the concept of economic integration for the Turkic world?

 

Any political or economic block has its final causes. Our goal is to bring together our economies to unite the potential to serve the Turkic world. Economic integration means working together to strengthen our economies and unite our economic potential. We are seven countries. By encouraging trade, facilitating investments, and supporting joint ventures in areas such as infrastructure, energy, and transportation, we aim to build a stronger and more united Turkic world.

What do you mean by “economic integration”? Are you talking about a common Turkic currency or infrastructure as part of this integration?

Economic integration doesn’t necessarily mean having a single currency or unified infrastructure, at least not initially. It’s more about deeper engagement in each other’s economies through joint projects, especially in key sectors such as energy, transportation, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

Our goal is to create an economic and political bloc that can work towards common objectives, much like the European Union or other regional groups. We need to support each other’s economies and collaborate on joint projects that benefit all our countries. This is a key condition for the unity of the Turkic world.

I understand the Fund was the missing part in the Turkic world. Now, you believe that you filled this gap.

The Turkic unity has been very fresh. The Organization of Turkic States and other related cooperation organizations were established 10-15 years ago only. It is very short period. Of course, we need time. I am sure the Turkic Investment Fund will accelerate this process.

We need to work together to make our economies more competitive and resilient. Over time, the Turkic Investment Fund aims to become the primary financial tool for promoting economic integration within the Turkic world.

One of the Fund’s key priorities is to attract foreign investments into our countries. There are two ways to do this: First, by supporting national projects and encouraging foreign partners to participate, and second, by collaborating with other international financial institutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank, among others.

Of course, we are not able to finance ourselves for huge projects but those financial institutions are so eager to contribute to our projects.

Well, Ambassador Amreyev, I understand that you have a positive cooperative perspective regarding other powers in Asia in terms of both institutions and countries. But at the same time, they bring some kind of geopolitical challenges. China, Russia, some other neighbouring European countries… How would Turkic Investment Fund navigate these geopolitical challenges? Following this, another question could be that: If the Turkic block rising as a global power and Turkic Investment Fund wants to be an active player in finance sector, how would you sustain your strategies given those facts?

The investment fund is a financial institution, not a political organization. This is why the Turkic Investment Fund is not involved in the geopolitical competition or challenges of today’s troubled world. Yes, we recognize the dramatic challenges facing the global community, but addressing those is the job of politicians. As financiers, our role is to contribute to cooperation rather than competition. By focusing on cooperation, we can help mitigate some of these global challenges and reduce the intensity of international competition.

Our role, therefore, is a positive one, working with other economic and financial institutions. Through constructive cooperation and joint projects, we aim to support and promote collaborative efforts in our complex world.

On the other hand, we also recognize that globalization has significantly increased competition worldwide. Consequently, our countries face challenges in attracting investments. This competition is real, and our goal is to help our countries navigate these challenges and become more competitive. By successfully supporting the growth of our economies, we can play a crucial role in enhancing the competitiveness of our nations.

Currently, six countries are full members of the Turkic Investment Fund—Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Hungary. We also expect that Turkmenistan will join as the seventh full member soon. Additionally, the Turkic Investment Fund is open to cooperation with non-member institutions. Our establishment agreement allows other countries to join if they meet the required conditions and agree to the terms. This allows for constructive cooperation with external partners as well.

Regarding international financial institutions, we are open to working with all of them. We are already in negotiations and have observed a growing interest from various financial institutions in collaborating with us. By working with large financial funds, banks, and institutions, we can participate in significant development and infrastructure projects within our member countries.

These large financial institutions recognize the need for cooperation, and this implies substantial investments in major infrastructure projects. For example, there is growing interest in expanding energy infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, particularly in light of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has increased the importance of the Turkic world for Europe. We know that the European Union plans to invest billions of euros in energy projects within the Turkic region. Can you give more information about the projects?

Large infrastructure projects are costly and require the participation of multiple financial institutions. As I mentioned, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as several Asian banks, are keen on establishing such cooperation. We already have several projects in the pipeline, particularly in the energy sector to be financed. While Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are oil and gas producers, what we need now is more cross-border energy infrastructure such as pipelines and powerlines to transport these resources efficiently.

Building the transportation network is important, not just for production but also for consumers. That’s why we see growing interest from other international financial institutions. Our national governments have plans, and I know Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are involved in initiatives to build gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Europe. Our countries and our European partners are paying great attention to these projects.

There are also other energy projects in the Turkic world. For example, there are major plans to build an energy plant in Kyrgyzstan that will serve Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These huge infrastructure projects are already being studied by various financial institutions, and there are numerous areas for cooperation. Of course, we are closely working with our governments, monitoring their priorities, plans, and programs. We also consider the decisions made by national governments and at our summits and intergovernmental commissions, ensuring that we align with the priorities of our member states, which are our shareholders.

We know that Hungary, for example, has been highly appreciated by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) for its contributions, especially during its EU presidency. Hungary’s role in connecting Europe and the Turkic world is considered very important. At the same time, Hungary has officially stated that it is contributing a significant amount of money to the Turkic Investment Fund. Can you give more information on this?

Yes, this is not a secret. The fund was initially established by five member states, and then Hungary joined with an equal share. Each country contributed $100 million, making the initial capital of the fund $600 million. As I’ve mentioned, this starting capital will be significantly increased in the coming years to make the fund more competitive and attractive for cooperation with other international financial institutions.

Will the shares always remain equal?

Not necessarily. The initial capital was contributed in equal shares, but additional capital may be decided later and won’t necessarily follow the same distribution. As for Hungary, it has joined as a full member with the same share as other members. I must say that Hungary has played a very constructive role in Turkic cooperation since they joined the Organization of Turkic States in 2018. Hungary actively participates in all cooperation mechanisms alongside other OTS member states. Recently, I was in Budapest, where we finalized Hungary’s accession to the fund, making them a full member. Hungary truly plays an indispensable role in connecting the Turkic world to Europe, and between the European Union and the Organization of Turkic States. We appreciate Hungary’s role, and I believe it will continue to grow in the future, contributing not only to the integration of the Turkic world but also to its global integration into the world economy through closer cooperation with the EU.

Just to clarify about the contributions to the fund—how much will be each country paying? For instance, in Türkiye, there is discussion about whether Türkiye is contributing state funds for projects like energy infrastructure and pipelines in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. People are curious about the exact figures to be transferred from treasury to the investments in other countries.

As with any international financial institution, all decisions regarding project financing and prioritization will be made by the Board of Directors. The interests and contributions of each country will be considered, and there won’t be any “losers”—only winners.

Thank you very much for this great interview, Ambassador. It sounds like many things are still in progress, but can you give us one headline for now? Which region of the world is most likely to cooperate with you on large-scale projects in the near future? Will it be Europe, Asia, Russia, or the Gulf countries? What will be the biggest surprise regarding Turkic Investment Fund cooperation?

First of all, the Turkic Investment Fund is a newly established financial institution, and we will commence our operational activities on January 1, 2025. We are in close contact and negotiations with financial institutions in Europe, Asia, the Islamic world, and the Arab world. We see strong interest from their side, and we are equally eager to develop relationships with them.

I think the biggest surprise will be our success in the Turkic region, within our member states. We are seriously committed to contributing to the economic development of our countries and supporting entrepreneurs who are working together on joint projects. We are here to support them and encourage more joint ventures among the Turkic countries and their companies.

As I mentioned, the ultimate goal is to contribute to greater economic integration among the Turkic countries, which will serve as the foundation for a more united Turkic world. This is our main purpose.

Thank you, Ambassador Baghdad Amreyev, for this diplomatic interview. We look forward to hearing more after January 1, when the policies, investments, and projects of the Turkic Investment Fund are officially launched.

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INTERVIEW

We asked experts about BRICS – 3: What are the challenges facing the member countries?

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As the fallout from the BRICS Summit in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, continues, we put questions about the agenda to Dr. Nina Ladygina-Glazounova, the General director of the BRICS & SCO Innovative Diplomacy Centre.

Ilber Vasfi Sel: Mrs Nina, you also attended the summit in Kazan. You are already continuing your work as a “professional “bricsologist” in the institution of which you are the General director and co-founder. For Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, the summit is seen as both symbolic and practical. What do you think? How do you assess the significance of this summit for Russia? How will this summit affect Russia’s global agenda? There are also competing countries within BRICS. Given the rivalries and conflicts among the member countries, how do you see the BRICS goal of deepening cooperation in various fields?

Nina Ladygina-Glazounova: The significance of the BRICS Summit in Kazan for Russia lies primarily in the complete failure of the West’s policy of isolating Russia, demonstrating recognition of Russia’s long-term importance on the world stage, despite the general tensions. The BRICS Summit in Kazan has become the event of the century, bringing together heads of delegation’s from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Congo, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Palestine, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam and Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina).23 of them were at the level of Heads of State and Government not only from the BRICS member countries (Russia, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, South Africa and Saudi Arabia as an invited country), but also from the countries of the Global South, which showed great interest in the Summit, as well as the heads of five international organisation’s: the United Nations (Secretary-General – Antonio Guterres), the Eurasian Economic Commission (Chairman – Bakytjan Abdiruli Sagittayev), the Commonwealth of Independent States (Secretary General – Sergei Lebedev), the State of the Union of Russia and Belarus (State Secretary – Dmitry Mezentsev), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Secretary General – Zhang Ming) and the BRICS New Development Bank (Bank President – Dilma Rousseff).

We asked experts about BRICS – 1: Can the independent BRICS payment system succeed?

The declaration issued on the 23 of October, after the meetings of the Sherpas and heads of delegations of the BRICS countries, the way to promote the institutional development of BRICS adopted by consensus, and for the first time in history of BRICS, the countries included in the union are not specified in the first paragraph of the declaration.

What could this mean?

It can be assumed that the main reason is primarily due to the expansion and uncertain status of Saudi Arabia, which is still in the process of accepting its status as a full member, although it participated as an equal in most BRICS formats and meetings.

Particular attention was also paid to the media, ICT and the dangers of fake news and the dissemination of unverified information about our countries.

Thanks to the summit and the whole range of horizontal formats of this year, Russia was able to expand its opportunities to enter new markets during its year of its Chairmanship in the BRICS, which is certainly a positive moment, and the country should have followed this direction from the very beginning, from the moment of its formation, and not look only at Western countries as the main direction. Now, if we look at it as a “puzzle”, the process of diversifying the economy and moving away from production focused exclusively on components from abroad has begun, and the influence of foreign component manufacturers on us has gradually diminished. Russia has agreed to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran.

Also, thanks to the summit, Russia was able to once again to discuss the main points and reach an agreement with Iran on signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.

Today we can confidently say that the most powerful BRICS countries are Russia, China, India and Iran. In other words, countries that have become the antipode of the unipolar Western world… We can talk about a global union of BRICS countries that surpasses the G7 in its parameters, and this is about the economic future of our planet.

Despite their common objectives and their focus on a multipolar world, and despite the preservation of their own identities, the BRICS countries face various forms of competition and territorial challenges, especially with their neighbours.

China and India are both large emerging economies competing for the influence in global markets and the developing world, and have territorial disputes with each other. At the same time, India and China announced progress in resolving long-standing border issues with the help of Russia’s diplomatic efforts, and this was a significant achievement at the summit. We see geopolitical tensions between Russia and South Africa have emerged since the start of the special military operation. Russia and China are close partners in all areas, but there are areas in the individual political agendas of both countries where they may clash, such as in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.

During the summit, BRICS countries and their future partners drew attention to Palestine and the Middle East region as a whole, while nearly two billion Muslims around the world watched the events in Kazan. Many heads of delegation’s declared their position in support of Palestine, a very sensitive and fragile region that requires rapid peaceful coexistence and compliance with UN conventions. Accordingly, the Summit adopted a strong final declaration that underlined the importance of the Palestinian issue for the world Muslim community.

We see how Brazil is not very happy with Venezuela’s rapprochement with the BRICS and this is one of the main reasons why we do not see it in the list of partner countries (13 countries have been granted BRICS partner country status: Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and Vietnam), like Pakistan is not on the list because of the position of India. But BRICS will not be a platform for confrontation in relation to the G7 due to different ideas about the world order in different states and civilizations. We have Narendra Modi, who builds his policy on resolving all conflicts in the world peacefully and through negotiations, but he very rarely touches on issues related to Pakistan… Because there has been a conflict between them for many years and at the same time we see how China and Russia are promoting Pakistan as a BRICS partner now.

Therefore, I believe that BRICS should promote mutually beneficial areas of cooperation, such as increasing trade turnover, mutual investment to avoid conflicts, it is necessary to resolve issues of demarcation of spheres of influence in certain regions “on the shore”, socio-humanitarian exchanges to allow us to get to know each other better and perhaps “bury the hatche” in the case of some countries, as well as regulate possible interventions in cultural expansion, like the Republic of Turkey is doing through “soft power”.

On the other hand, we have South America, that is very unstable in every sense, socially, politically, economically, and under the strong influence of the United States. But it is important to remember that when you come to the BRICS as a platform, you have to forget all this (competition and territorial challenges), because you have to think about the big picture and the global agenda. And the Kazan Summit, which can be called truly peaceful, was the event that brought together some of the participants in the BRICS+ format, for example, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, to discuss advancing the bilateral peace agenda, including a peace treaty, border demarcation and other issues of mutual interest, and encouraged them to negotiate to resolve mutual issues that had previously stalled.

Summit declaration also describes the mechanisms already in place for foreign exchange reserves in national currencies. Although they are not yet as large and comprehensive as existing institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, but they already pose a serious threat to them. The BRICS Pay mechanism has also been launched – a payment system project similar to the Chinese CIPS system and the international SWIFT system, to which you can link international payment cards Visa and Mastercard or national bank cards such as MIR, RuPay, China UnionPay and use it in the BRICS+ countries. A direct, clear and effective way to find collective solutions with the participation of developing countries is de-dollarization through the ever-wider use of national currencies and it is time for us to have what we call a new reserve currency.

The convergence of representatives of numerous civilisations and cultures, who unconsciously want to promote their own agendas for the good of their own countries, makes it difficult to take decisions towards something united on issues that are only open to the countries of the Global South, such as the reform of the UN Security Council or climate change (recall that Vladimir Putin also carefully hinted at this in his statement about using the green agenda to harm society).

It is clear that the role of the BRICS will increase, and the BRICS countries are already driving global economic growth, shifting the geopolitical landscape towards Eurasia and the South as a whole. According to the results of the current year, the average economic growth rate of the BRICS is estimated at 4 per cent. This is higher than the G7’s rate of just 1.7 per cent. With such a difference in economic growth rates, most of the increase in global GDP in the foreseeable future will be generated in the BRICS. OPEC Plus is actually part of the BRICS, and Russia and Saudi Arabia are actually the leaders there. They set global oil prices. But it is worth remembering that most of the trading platforms are owned by Western companies that lobby their interests to fight this, and it is necessary to unite for a common and prosperous future.

BRICS is different from the UN in that everyone sits at the same table and has an equal voice with a more equitable representation of member states. Perhaps BRICS can be an alternative to the UN in the future, the reform of which is advocated by all BRICS countries. But it will be a long process.

Aware of their problems and territorial disputes, the BRICS countries want to focus on a common agenda of global cooperation. From 1 January 2024, with the accession of new countries to the Union, strong ties and dialogue should be established in the name of a common goal, not just “a priori”, since such a format should not be based as an association on the Anglo-Saxon ideology with the primacy of the United States and European colonial powers. The Union has enormous potential to promote common interests and to foster multipolar global governance based on equality and respect.

BRICS as an association has enormous potential to advance common interests and promote multipolar global governance based on equality and respect. Consensus is also, on the one hand, a guarantee that the national interests of any participant are guaranteed, but also a factor that does not simplify the introduction of negotiations.

Ilber Vasfi Sel: Dr. Ladygina-Glazounova, Harici thank you for your comprehensive and insightful responses.

We asked experts about BRICS – 2: Can Türkiye join BRICS?

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