Middle East
The formula of Türkiye-Egypt relation: “The past should remain in the past”
The foreign policy priorities of Turkey, after the presidential elections, can be divided into two categories: to find a position in new Asian initiatives while lowering tensions with the West. The primary factors promoting Turkey’s normalization with its neighbors and Middle Eastern nations are the economic challenges that require this foreign policy direction.
In the normalization train of the Arab states, who assessed the damage after the Arab Spring, Turkey believes there is a wagon set out for it. Following the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, a final settlement in Syria will take up a sizable portion of Ankara’s post-election foreign policy agenda.
On the other side, relations with Egypt have a greater impact, the contacts between Ankara and Cairo are extensive, encompassing Turkey’s contacts with the West in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In this context, we interviewed Dalia Ziada, Director of the Center for Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Studies regarding how Egyptians considered about the Turkish election process.
- Egyptian President congratulated President Erdogan. What can that say about a new era which has begun between the two countries?
The Egyptian and Turkish presidents’ phone call in the wake of the elections is an important indication of the sincere intentions of the top policymakers in both countries to start a new page in their relationship. Honestly speaking, there are some giant differences between the perception of each of the two presidents on crucial regional and domestic policies. That includes for example the situation in Libya, the complex maritime conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Islamists’ right for political participation. However, we are seeing an unprecedented determination by both sides to get over these differences and focus on the common ground of economic and geopolitical cooperation.
Ironically, many observers had expressed their pessimism about the potential of the rapprochement process between Turkey and Egypt to succeed as long as the two heads of state, El-Sisi and Erdogan, remained in power. Yet, in December 2022, the two heads of state met in Doha, warmly saluted each other, and then spent 45 minutes talking about the next steps they should take to overcome the obstacles that kept their countries separated for too long. The friendly encounter between the Turkish and the Egyptian presidents cannot be seen as a standard act of courtesy that happened out of sheer coincidence. It was the climax of a year of backstage arrangements by dedicated diplomatic missions and concerned civil society organizations in both countries.
Since then, the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers have been exchanging visits and making public promises about implementing the reconciliation process as soon as the general elections in Turkey are completed. As the election in Turkey has been completed successfully, this week, the two countries need to continue working on completing the reconciliation process for their mutual benefit and the entire region’s benefit.
Mending broken ties between Turkey and Egypt is not only beneficial for the political well-being of the two states. It is equally important for the personal image enhancement of each of the two presidents before their peoples and also before observers from the international community. Egypt is having a presidential election in less than a year. Improving his relationship with President Erdogan will dramatically increase President El-Sisi’s support among the huge Islamist-biased voter base.
- How the Turkish elections resonated in Egypt. What are the prominent evaluations in the Egyptian press?
In general, the Egyptian people are so impressed and inspired by the democratic process in Turkey and the political maturity of the Turkish people who massively participated in the voting at the parliamentary elections and the two rounds of the presidential elections. We wish – we dream – to see a similar democratic process in the coming presidential election which is expected to happen in mid-2024. In other words, the successful democratic practice in Turkey has set the bar high for election processes in Middle East countries, in general, in countries where people are yearning for democratization, such as Egypt and most North Africa countries, in particular.
On another level, the street reaction to President Erdogan’s victory varies greatly from one citizen group to the other. The majority of the Egyptian grassroots citizens, who are mainly characterized by their religious piety, are so excited. They are celebrating President Erdogan’s victory, as they perceive it as a victory of a Muslim idol over the opposition party leaders who exhibited hatred towards Muslims and Arabs.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian intellectual elite, who are mostly secular, are expectedly not so happy with President Erdogan’s victory. Some of them warned that he will encourage the political Islamist groups – such as the Muslim Brotherhood – to seek political competition in Egypt once again and renew the state of political instability in the country. But, in my opinion, that is a little too exaggerated, especially in light of improved ties between the Egyptian and Turkish presidents in the past few months.
On the political stage, most members of the government, political parties, and media agree that it is time for Egypt to reconcile with Turkey and with its elected president. “The past should remain in the past;” they say. That is a healthy attitude, I think, because it will pave the way for a lot of mutual benefits for Egypt and Turkey in the future, and will also be beneficial to the regions of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
- How do you consider the normalization process between the two countries to proceed after the election? Which steps could be taken initially?
In their first phone call after the successful completion of the Turkish presidential elections, presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi agreed to immediately proceed with their reconciliation process by elevating their diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level. That is a very significant first step for two reasons:
First, it fixes the rift that had been broken between the two states in 2013 and had kept the two countries estranged for ten years. The ambassadors were the first scapegoats to be slaughtered during the dramatic breakup between Egypt and Turkey, then. Each of the two countries immediately declared their mutual ambassadors as persona non grata. Therefore, the return of the ambassadors today is like an official declaration of the end of the decade-long conflict and the beginning of the negotiations phase.
Second, upgrading the diplomatic missions to ambassadorial levels is so crucial to accelerate and facilitate the discussions on critical bilateral and regional issues that represent a conflict of interest between the two states. Right now, the mutual diplomatic missions in both countries are limited in size and scope to the level of chargés d’affaires. Therefore, most negotiations between the two countries had to happen through security channels and intelligence bureaus more often than they happened between diplomatic missions. This caused the reconciliation process to go very slowly in 2021.
The rapprochement process only started to leap when the Turkish ambassador, Salih Mutlu Şen, got hired as charges d’affaires in Cairo, in the second half of 2022. He exerted a tremendous effort to wake the embassy from the dead by directly engaging with ordinary citizens in the Egyptian streets and reaching out to media personnel, civil society organizations, and political groups. That paved the way for a successful meeting between the two presidents, El-Sisi and Erdogan, in November 2022 in Doha. After the presidential meeting, the reconciliation process took a whole new turn.
Therefore, I believe that raising the diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level will allow diplomatic channels to take the lead in the negotiation process, thus accelerating the rapprochement process and improving the quality of the outcomes of future negotiations.
However, that is not enough. There must be direct and personal talks between presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi, at the nearest time possible. It is not a secret that the two leaders adopt divergent – if not contradicting – political ideologies. For example, El-Sisi’s political image is mostly built upon his role in removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013. In contrast, Erdogan’s legacy is entirely based on his image as a successful Muslim leader, coming from a political Islamist party, in a secular democratic system of governance. How the two presidents are going to compromise their ideological differences is so important for the success of the reconciliation process between Egypt and Turkey and for ensuring its sustainability in the long term. Such a compromise can only happen through direct face-to-face and heart-to-heart conversations between the two presidents over the coming weeks or months.
In parallel to that, the senior policymakers and government officials from Egypt and Turkey should engage in lengthy discussions about enhancing their areas of cooperation and limiting their areas of conflict. For example, Egypt and Turkey already have a successful record of economic cooperation that can be further improved. In the meantime, there are a lot of areas of potential cooperation between our two militaries, building upon the history of cooperation in the defense industry sector between the two countries. They will also need to discuss their conflicting foreign policies in the Levant region, and the Eastern Mediterranean region, keeping into consideration the concerns and the interests of other key players in these regions, such as Libya, Syria, Greece, and Israel.
Middle East
France explores Syrian transit routes as alternative oil corridor to bypass Strait of Hormuz
France is evaluating the creation of alternative energy routes through Syria to mitigate potential disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz following the resumption of hostilities between the United States and Iran. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot stated that Paris is working on new transit routes for the transport of Persian Gulf oil, with Syria emerging as a prominent option in this context.
“Among the initiatives we have pursued since the beginning of this crisis is the concept of preparing alternative routes, in order to avoid remaining dependent on blockages that could occur here or there,” Barrot said.
Barrot indicated that Syria, which has entered a process of reunification following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad administration, could become a “new regional hub.” The French minister characterized the country as a strategic corridor that could transport Persian Gulf oil to the Mediterranean, thereby reducing the impact of potential shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz.
Stating that France wishes to expand commercial and economic cooperation with the Damascus administration, Barrot expressed that they aim to establish a secure transit route for Gulf producing nations through this cooperation.
According to Barrot, implementing this plan requires a comprehensive assessment of existing infrastructure and the provision of necessary security guarantees. The French minister noted that these efforts are of critical importance for securing global energy markets.
Barrot’s remarks followed French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Damascus on Tuesday. During the visit, Macron met with Ahmed Shara, the former al-Qaeda leader who has declared himself President of Syria.
Patrick Pouyanné, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of TotalEnergies, was among the delegation accompanying Macron. Characterizing Syria as a country situated “at the crossroads of the Middle East,” Pouyanné said it could establish a vital energy link between Iraq and the Mediterranean.
In response to the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Iraq has been shipping its oil via tankers through Syria for export since April.
More than 600,000 tons of fuel were exported through this route between April and June. Last month, Iraqi and Syrian officials discussed the reactivation of the Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline and the establishment of energy transit mechanisms.
TotalEnergies has also signed a memorandum of understanding for an offshore exploration block in the Mediterranean. However, Pouyanné stated that beyond this, the company currently has no concrete projects under development.
Stating that security conditions in the country have not yet stabilized, Pouyanné said, “It is clear today that the security situation does not yet permit us to operate here. However, I believe coming here, to Damascus, is a positive initiative.”
Shortly after Pouyanné’s statements, two bombs reportedly exploded near the Four Seasons Hotel, where the French delegation was staying.
Stating that the Syrian administration must be given time to establish control over the country, Pouyanné said, “We must not demand too much,” adding, “We need to be a little patient.”
Middle East
Senior US military officers ignored system alerts on obsolete targets, leading to strike on Iranian school
Senior US military commanders approved strike lists despite automated system warnings indicating that intelligence on certain targets in Iran was years out of date and required revalidation, according to a CNN report citing three sources familiar with the decision-making process.
The warnings were bypassed to “speed things up” under intense pressure to rapidly designate targets during the opening days of the conflict. One of the targets approved by commanders under these conditions resulted in a strike on a school in Minab.
This military decision is directly linked to the February 28 strike on the Shajara Tayyiba School in Minab, which killed at least 168 children and 14 teachers. The heavy loss of life makes the strike one of the mass casualty events involving the highest number of civilian deaths in the recent history of the US military.
According to the sources, automated system warning messages indicating that the intelligence was obsolete were already integrated into the database used during the target development process. Within this system, a target could only be added to a strike list with the approval of a senior officer. Two sources stated that the decision by senior commanders to ignore these warnings directly contributed to the school being targeted “by mistake.”
Military officials reportedly realized within days of the strike on the school that the error stemmed from outdated information. Despite the passage of months, the Pentagon has not released its investigation report on the incident.
A White House official stated that the investigation remains ongoing, asserting, “As we have said before, the US does not target civilians.”
The Pentagon referred inquiries on the matter to US Central Command (CENTCOM), which declined to comment, citing the active investigation.
School and military facility were located within the same compound
The strike reportedly occurred while the US military was targeting an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) facility located near the Shajara Tayyiba School. Initial military investigative findings also pointed to this conclusion.
Satellite imagery reveals negligence in the target analysis process. Imagery from 2013 shows the school and the IRGC base located within the same compound, whereas imagery from 2016 clearly indicates that the school had been separated from the base by a fence and provided with a separate entrance.
In satellite imagery dated December 2025, dozens of children can be seen playing in the schoolyard.
The strike took place on the first day of operations following Donald Trump’s decision to launch military action, a period during which military officials and intelligence analysts worked under intense pressure to update thousands of targets.
Analysts were unable to update all records in the Pentagon database prior to the operation. As a result, records for multiple targets—including the IRGC facility adjacent to the elementary school—consisted of information that was more than 10 years old.
Due to the accelerated timeline, analysts prioritized updating “high-priority” records, which included moving targets with a high probability of being struck first and locations posing an immediate threat to US forces. Because fixed facilities were deemed a lower priority, the information for the facility near the school was not updated.
Disconnected databases and staffing shortages compounded the error
At the center of the investigation are two separate targeting databases used by the Pentagon. These are known as the Modernized Integrated Database (MIDB), which was built in the 1980s and relies on manual data entry, and the Mitigation and Analysis Reporting System (MARS), a new artificial intelligence-backed digital platform.
Both systems indicated that information needed to be updated before use. However, efforts to fully transition to the MARS system were reportedly years behind schedule, leaving official targeting data still dependent on the legacy MIDB system.
An intelligence analyst had previously noted changes on the ground in a separate digital tool, but because this tool was not connected to the official targeting database, the information did not reach commanders. How this disconnect influenced the targeting of the school is also being examined as part of the investigation.
Following the strike, Donald Trump suggested that Iran might be responsible for the incident, later asserting that responsibility might never be determined. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that the strike would be thoroughly investigated, claiming that the US takes every possible measure to prevent civilian casualties.
However, due to cuts implemented early in Hegseth’s tenure, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response (CHMR) teams within CENTCOM were reportedly facing severe staffing shortages.
Under the cuts made by Hegseth prior to the conflict with Iran, the 10-person civilian casualty specialist staff at CENTCOM was reduced to a single full-time employee.
Sources added that while the remaining staff did everything they could, they lacked adequate resources due to the budget and personnel cuts implemented by Hegseth.
Middle East
US revokes Iran oil license and launches airstrikes following Strait of Hormuz tanker attacks
The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has revoked a general license that permitted commercial transactions involving Iranian oil.
According to a statement issued by the agency, the “General License X” regulation, which had been in effect since June 21, 2026, was fully rescinded as of July 7, 2026, and replaced by the newly introduced “General License X1” regulation.
The statement noted that a wind-down period lasting until July 17 has been granted to allow for the completion of transactions initiated prior to the revocation.
The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted strongly to the OFAC decision, declaring that Tehran will take all necessary measures to protect its national security and interests.
In a statement shared on the ministry’s official Telegram channel, Iran stated: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran decisively condemns the US Department of the Treasury’s decision to revoke the temporary suspension of sanctions on the sale of Iranian oil. This step is a flagrant violation of Article 10 of the memorandum of understanding concerning the cessation of military conflict.”
Following the decision, the US Armed Forces conducted a series of airstrikes targeting Iranian territory during the night of July 8. US officials maintained that the military operation was a response to Tehran’s actions in the region. Washington characterized Iran’s conduct as a violation of the ceasefire regime and a threat to the security of navigation in the region.
The Iranian state broadcaster, IRIB, reported that explosions occurred at various locations across the country. News sources noted that seven explosions were heard near the village of Taherui in the Sirik district, and six explosions were heard near the city of Qeshm.
Previously, US media outlets including The Wall Street Journal and Axios, citing US officials, had reported that despite the active ceasefire, forces of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had attacked oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz.
According to data shared by the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), a tanker off the coast of Oman was struck by an unidentified munition, causing a fire on board. It was reported that the incident resulted in no casualties, injuries, or environmental pollution.
The Wall Street Journal reported that one of the targeted vessels may have been the “Al Rekayyat,” a tanker owned by the Qatar-based shipping company Nakilat.
The vessel sustained damage to its engine room, though the crew was reported to be safe. Axios reported that while the attacked vessels sustained damage, no major destruction had occurred.
On June 18, 2026, the US and Iran had signed a memorandum of understanding that established a two-month ceasefire and envisioned the initiation of negotiations for a more comprehensive agreement.
Following the start of the ceasefire period, the US had also struck targets in Iran on June 27 and June 28, citing Iranian actions against commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
Following those strikes, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had announced that operations would be launched against US facilities located in Arab countries.
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