Connect with us

Middle East

The formula of Türkiye-Egypt relation: “The past should remain in the past”

Published

on

The foreign policy priorities of Turkey, after the presidential elections, can be divided into two categories: to find a position in new Asian initiatives while lowering tensions with the West. The primary factors promoting Turkey’s normalization with its neighbors and Middle Eastern nations are the economic challenges that require this foreign policy direction.

In the normalization train of the Arab states, who assessed the damage after the Arab Spring, Turkey believes there is a wagon set out for it. Following the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, a final settlement in Syria will take up a sizable portion of Ankara’s post-election foreign policy agenda.

On the other side, relations with Egypt have a greater impact, the contacts between Ankara and Cairo are extensive, encompassing Turkey’s contacts with the West in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In this context, we interviewed Dalia Ziada, Director of the Center for Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Studies  regarding how Egyptians considered about the Turkish election process.

  • Egyptian President congratulated President Erdogan. What can that say about a new era which has begun between the two countries?

The Egyptian and Turkish presidents’ phone call in the wake of the elections is an important indication of the sincere intentions of the top policymakers in both countries to start a new page in their relationship. Honestly speaking, there are some giant differences between the perception of each of the two presidents on crucial regional and domestic policies. That includes for example the situation in Libya, the complex maritime conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Islamists’ right for political participation. However, we are seeing an unprecedented determination by both sides to get over these differences and focus on the common ground of economic and geopolitical cooperation.

Ironically, many observers had expressed their pessimism about the potential of the rapprochement process between Turkey and Egypt to succeed as long as the two heads of state, El-Sisi and Erdogan, remained in power. Yet, in December 2022, the two heads of state met in Doha, warmly saluted each other, and then spent 45 minutes talking about the next steps they should take to overcome the obstacles that kept their countries separated for too long. The friendly encounter between the Turkish and the Egyptian presidents cannot be seen as a standard act of courtesy that happened out of sheer coincidence. It was the climax of a year of backstage arrangements by dedicated diplomatic missions and concerned civil society organizations in both countries.

Since then, the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers have been exchanging visits and making public promises about implementing the reconciliation process as soon as the general elections in Turkey are completed. As the election in Turkey has been completed successfully, this week, the two countries need to continue working on completing the reconciliation process for their mutual benefit and the entire region’s benefit.

Mending broken ties between Turkey and Egypt is not only beneficial for the political well-being of the two states. It is equally important for the personal image enhancement of each of the two presidents before their peoples and also before observers from the international community. Egypt is having a presidential election in less than a year. Improving his relationship with President Erdogan will dramatically increase President El-Sisi’s support among the huge Islamist-biased voter base.

  • How the Turkish elections resonated in Egypt. What are the prominent evaluations in the Egyptian press?

In general, the Egyptian people are so impressed and inspired by the democratic process in Turkey and the political maturity of the Turkish people who massively participated in the voting at the parliamentary elections and the two rounds of the presidential elections. We wish – we dream – to see a similar democratic process in the coming presidential election which is expected to happen in mid-2024. In other words, the successful democratic practice in Turkey has set the bar high for election processes in Middle East countries, in general, in countries where people are yearning for democratization, such as Egypt and most North Africa countries, in particular.

On another level, the street reaction to President Erdogan’s victory varies greatly from one citizen group to the other. The majority of the Egyptian grassroots citizens, who are mainly characterized by their religious piety, are so excited. They are celebrating President Erdogan’s victory, as they perceive it as a victory of a Muslim idol over the opposition party leaders who exhibited hatred towards Muslims and Arabs.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian intellectual elite, who are mostly secular, are expectedly not so happy with President Erdogan’s victory. Some of them warned that he will encourage the political Islamist groups – such as the Muslim Brotherhood – to seek political competition in Egypt once again and renew the state of political instability in the country. But, in my opinion, that is a little too exaggerated, especially in light of improved ties between the Egyptian and Turkish presidents in the past few months.

On the political stage, most members of the government, political parties, and media agree that it is time for Egypt to reconcile with Turkey and with its elected president. “The past should remain in the past;” they say. That is a healthy attitude, I think, because it will pave the way for a lot of mutual benefits for Egypt and Turkey in the future, and will also be beneficial to the regions of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

  • How do you consider the normalization process between the two countries to proceed after the election? Which steps could be taken initially?

In their first phone call after the successful completion of the Turkish presidential elections, presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi agreed to immediately proceed with their reconciliation process by elevating their diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level. That is a very significant first step for two reasons:

First, it fixes the rift that had been broken between the two states in 2013 and had kept the two countries estranged for ten years. The ambassadors were the first scapegoats to be slaughtered during the dramatic breakup between Egypt and Turkey, then. Each of the two countries immediately declared their mutual ambassadors as persona non grata. Therefore, the return of the ambassadors today is like an official declaration of the end of the decade-long conflict and the beginning of the negotiations phase.

Second, upgrading the diplomatic missions to ambassadorial levels is so crucial to accelerate and facilitate the discussions on critical bilateral and regional issues that represent a conflict of interest between the two states. Right now, the mutual diplomatic missions in both countries are limited in size and scope to the level of chargés d’affaires. Therefore, most negotiations between the two countries had to happen through security channels and intelligence bureaus more often than they happened between diplomatic missions. This caused the reconciliation process to go very slowly in 2021.

The rapprochement process only started to leap when the Turkish ambassador, Salih Mutlu Şen, got hired as charges d’affaires in Cairo, in the second half of 2022. He exerted a tremendous effort to wake the embassy from the dead by directly engaging with ordinary citizens in the Egyptian streets and reaching out to media personnel, civil society organizations, and political groups. That paved the way for a successful meeting between the two presidents, El-Sisi and Erdogan, in November 2022 in Doha. After the presidential meeting, the reconciliation process took a whole new turn.

Therefore, I believe that raising the diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level will allow diplomatic channels to take the lead in the negotiation process, thus accelerating the rapprochement process and improving the quality of the outcomes of future negotiations.

However, that is not enough. There must be direct and personal talks between presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi, at the nearest time possible. It is not a secret that the two leaders adopt divergent – if not contradicting – political ideologies. For example, El-Sisi’s political image is mostly built upon his role in removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013. In contrast, Erdogan’s legacy is entirely based on his image as a successful Muslim leader, coming from a political Islamist party, in a secular democratic system of governance. How the two presidents are going to compromise their ideological differences is so important for the success of the reconciliation process between Egypt and Turkey and for ensuring its sustainability in the long term. Such a compromise can only happen through direct face-to-face and heart-to-heart conversations between the two presidents over the coming weeks or months.

In parallel to that, the senior policymakers and government officials from Egypt and Turkey should engage in lengthy discussions about enhancing their areas of cooperation and limiting their areas of conflict. For example, Egypt and Turkey already have a successful record of economic cooperation that can be further improved. In the meantime, there are a lot of areas of potential cooperation between our two militaries, building upon the history of cooperation in the defense industry sector between the two countries. They will also need to discuss their conflicting foreign policies in the Levant region, and the Eastern Mediterranean region, keeping into consideration the concerns and the interests of other key players in these regions, such as Libya, Syria, Greece, and Israel.

Related Topics:
Continue Reading

Middle East

Iran to receive hundreds of Chinese shoulder-fired missiles within weeks, sources say

Published

5 days ago

on

29/07/2026

By

Iran is expected to receive its first shipment of 400 Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks as it seeks to rebuild its air defenses amid an ongoing war with the US.

Three sources with knowledge of the agreement disclosed the information to Reuters.

Valued at between $60 million and $70 million, the purchase represents one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to bolster its short-range air defense capabilities since the outbreak of hostilities with the US and Israel.

According to the sources, the contract covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, including Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missiles.

The deal was signed with Hong Kong-based Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which reportedly acted as an intermediary between the Iranian side and the Chinese supplier.

Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not yet responded to a request for comment from Reuters regarding the information provided by the sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following statement:

“The relevant reports are completely baseless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and bringing an end to the conflict.”

Beijing-based Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, the parent company of Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, did not immediately respond to a request for comment sent on Tuesday.

Iran needs to rearm following months of conflict during which the US and Israel struck facilities tied to its missile, drone, and air defense programs. Tehran responded to those attacks with salvos of ballistic missiles and drones.

The fighting demonstrated the difficulty of defending static military and strategic installations against advanced fighter jets and precision-guided munitions.

Washington abruptly halted its two-week bombing campaign on Saturday. However, US President Donald Trump said attacks would resume if negotiations aimed at ending the five-month war—which has theoretically been under a ceasefire since April—fail.

The delivery of hundreds of MANPADS systems would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons.

However, the sources cautioned that while the agreement has been signed, the delivery schedule, quantities, and other operational details remain subject to change.

Under the plan agreed upon by the parties, initial deliveries will be transported by air from the western Chinese city of Urumqi before being routed through Pakistan to Iran. The sources did not clarify whether transport following the transit through Pakistan would occur by air or land.

The Pakistani military’s public relations wing, ISPR, said in a statement:

“Allegations that Pakistan is playing a role in the supply of air defense weapons from China to Iran are completely fabricated and contrary to fact.”

Two Western intelligence sources and an Iranian official said Tehran is also exploring the option of using overland routes to transport Chinese-made military equipment and dual-use components more covertly, reducing the risk of shipments being intercepted.

The procurement process underscores how the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to rely on a combination of domestic arms production and foreign suppliers, despite years of sanctions and defense import restrictions.

Reuters previously reported, citing individuals familiar with the discussions, that Iran was close to concluding a separate deal to purchase anti-ship cruise missiles from China. Reuters was unable to confirm whether that agreement was finalized.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Saudi crude exports from Yanbu plunge 40% as Yemeni strikes force reliance on costlier routes

Published

6 days ago

on

28/07/2026

By

Crude oil shipments from Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu Port on the Red Sea coast have dropped by 40% over the past few days.

According to data published on July 26 by maritime intelligence firm Vortexa, the Riyadh administration has begun utilizing the SUMED pipeline in Egypt and alternative transit routes in an effort to bypass the naval blockade declared by forces aligned with Sanaa.

The sharp decline in shipment volumes follows retaliatory operations and the enforcement of a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia by the Yemeni Armed Forces, operating under the Ansarallah movement.

Riyadh has maintained military strikes and blockade measures against Yemen for nearly 12 years.

A Sunday report by maritime intelligence firm Windward, drawing on Vortexa data, noted that Saudi Arabia has established a new logistical framework to maintain its export flows. “Saudi Arabia has created an alternative export route functioning via the SUMED pipeline and the Cape of Good Hope,” the report stated. The agency reported that this shift has driven up transportation costs by approximately $9 per barrel.

The market analysis report provided the following assessment regarding the operational mechanics of the transition:

“Saudi crude shipments have not stopped; they have been split into two distinct routes. Tankers berthing at Yanbu Port are now operating with their AIS signals completely turned off. Vessels are concealing their locations to avoid inclusion on Ansarallah’s target list. Saudi Arabia has established an alternative export route operating via the SUMED pipeline and the Cape of Good Hope. Although this route increases costs and transit times, it demonstrates that the market is capable of adapting to changing conditions.”

Saudi Arabia previously activated a similar alternative route via Yanbu during the initial phase of the US-Israel war, following Iran’s first blockade measures directed at the Strait of Hormuz.

At the time of the Windward report’s release, satellite imagery published by SoarAtlas revealed the ongoing situation at Saudi Aramco’s Jizan Oil Refinery. Massive fires triggered by attacks carried out by the Yemeni Armed Forces were shown to be persisting at the $12 billion facility. Images captured on Saturday documented dense black smoke continuing to billow from a giant oil storage tank at the site.

The Yemeni Armed Forces publicly announced their latest military operations against Saudi Arabia on July 25. They stated that the strikes were executed in response to the Saudi-led coalition resuming aerial bombardments against the Yemeni port city of Hodeidah.

An official statement issued by the Yemeni military under the Ansarallah-led administration provided the following details:

“In response to this overt and criminal aggression, the Yemeni Armed Forces carried out two specialized military operations. In the first operation, sensitive Saudi Aramco facilities in Jizan were targeted with dozens of ballistic missiles and drones. In the second operation, sensitive Saudi Aramco facilities in Yanbu were struck using ballistic and cruise missiles alongside unmanned aerial vehicles.”

Spokespersons for the Yemeni military emphasized that the strikes were “precise” and “direct,” while residents in the city of Yanbu were reported to have heard explosions over the weekend. In the early hours of Saturday, Saudi airstrikes had targeted fuel storage facilities and telecommunications infrastructure in Hodeidah.

Mahdi al-Mashat, President of the Ansarallah Supreme Political Council, issued a warning to the Saudi Arabian leadership in a statement on July 27. “We say to the Saudi enemy that those offering you false hopes will be of no avail. Anything short of an end to the aggression and the complete lifting of the blockade is mere fantasy,” al-Mashat said.

In line with their naval blockade decision, the Yemeni Armed Forces have also targeted two Saudi oil tankers with missiles in recent days. The Sanaa administration officially initiated its maritime restrictions on July 20 under the stated principle of “a blockade for a blockade.”

This latest phase of heightened tension began in early July when Saudi Arabia launched an airstrike targeting Sanaa International Airport for the first time after a prolonged hiatus. Yemeni forces responded by striking Abha Airport in Saudi Arabia with missiles and drones. The attack marked the Yemeni military’s first direct retaliatory strike inside Saudi territory since 2021.

The Saudi-led coalition initially intervened in Yemen in 2015 after Ansarallah took control of the capital, Sanaa, and ousted the Riyadh-backed government. The United Arab Emirates joined as a principal coalition partner, while the UK, the US, and Israel provided logistical support.

During peace negotiations conducted between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 2023, the parties came close to a final agreement before talks stalled. Nevertheless, those contacts effectively served to freeze large-scale combat operations for an extended period.

The air and sea blockade enforced by Saudi Arabia for over a decade has deepened the humanitarian crisis, particularly due to commercial flight restrictions imposed on Sanaa International Airport. These measures have prevented critically ill and injured civilians from traveling abroad for medical treatment, while the coalition’s military intervention has driven widespread famine and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. Prior to Riyadh’s latest airstrikes, Yemeni forces had been conducting a general mobilization aimed at expelling coalition elements from the country.

Continue Reading

Middle East

Pentagon faces severe budget crunch as Middle East operational costs drain key military funds

Published

2 weeks ago

on

22/07/2026

By

The US Department of Defense is facing a severe budgetary shortfall driven by the escalation of the war with Iran, according to current and former American officials cited by The Washington Post.

Officials noted that funding for several critical areas could be completely exhausted in the coming weeks. Budgets allocated for this year’s operations of the Navy and Air Force, which have deployed warships and aviation assets to the Middle East, are projected to run out by the end of July.

To cover the funding deficit expected before the start of fiscal year 2027 on October 1, the Pentagon is internally redirecting its budgetary resources. Under this approach, military exercises and training sessions designed to maintain troop combat readiness are being scaled back or canceled. Additionally, funds originally allocated for the maintenance and repair of military equipment and facilities are being transferred to operational expenses.

In recent weeks, the Department of Defense requested permission from Congress to shift $4.3 billion—initially allocated for personnel training and weapons procurement—to cover emergency requirements. However, no decision has yet been made regarding this request.

The White House has also requested that Congress allocate $67 billion in emergency supplemental funding to cover military expenditures. Despite this, the House of Representatives plans to begin a one-month recess on Thursday, which will delay any decision on the funding for at least several weeks.

“Everyone needs to look at this situation and shake off the complacency,” said Representative Pat Harrigan, a Republican from North Carolina, commenting on the development.

Pentagon Spokesperson Sean Parnell emphasized the critical importance of defense funding, stating that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth will do everything necessary to maintain the combat readiness of the armed forces.

Secretary Hegseth and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, are scheduled to present the justification for the funding allocation at an upcoming hearing before the Senate Appropriations Committee. Russell Vought, the Director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, is also among those scheduled to testify before the committee.

Vought stated last month that the cost of the war had reached approximately $30 billion. However, this White House calculation did not include the cost of rebuilding and repairing US bases damaged as a result of Iranian attacks in the Middle East.

Current and former officials warn that if Congress fails to act, military leadership will soon be forced to make even deeper compromises.

In closed-door discussions, Pentagon officials are expressing more profound anxieties. They emphasize that supplemental funding is urgently required to replenish munitions stockpiles, which are vital for deterring adversaries such as Russia and China.

The US defense budget for this year stands at approximately $1 trillion. This figure includes $150 billion in one-time funding approved by Congress last year for various priority goals, ranging from designing advanced weapons systems to stimulating the domestic defense industry. Meanwhile, the Donald Trump administration has requested a $1.5 trillion defense budget for 2027.

Internal Pentagon assessments indicate that when accounting for base repairs, the replacement of destroyed aircraft, and the replenishment of munitions stockpiles, the total cost of the Iran war could rise to between $80 billion and $100 billion, according to reporting by NBC. Sources state that the repair costs for US military facilities in Bahrain alone could reach $1 billion.

Senators are expected to question Hegseth on the collapse of the ceasefire, rising war costs, and the American service members who lost their lives in Jordan, Bloomberg reported.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey