Opinion
The Green-German Government’s China Strategy
The German government’s strategy paper was adopted on 13.07.2023. The 64-page document clearly shows the German government’s huge information gap on China’s policy. The new change of course means protectionism due to bad advice from US think tanks paid billions that sabotage the German economy.
China’s success is based on reforms. And in the last ten years in particular, the People’s Republic of China has achieved enormous milestones in the areas of the rule of law, high technology, poverty reduction, climate protection and the protection of people with disabilities. Development has never stood still and will never stand still. Chinese-style socialism aims to shape people’s lives in harmony, peace and prosperity, in harmony with nature and in mutual respect. In terms of world politics, humanity is seen as having a divided future, which is why it is important to work together to resolve the world’s conflicts. China does not intervene militarily in any conflict in the world and does not impose its will on any country in the world. All partners choose China because China respects the cultural, political and historical aspects of each nation – including and especially Germany’s will.
Germany itself has faced major challenges in the last ten years. Instead of successes, the entire EU and its transatlantic partners have been confronted with conflicts. For example, several wars for freedom, democracy and the preservation of the “rules-based world order” in Africa, the Middle East and most recently in Ukraine have led to refugee flows and economic instability. At the national level, massive misinvestment in social, transport, education and housing infrastructure leads to unrest. Not without reason, there are also massive protests in other European countries like France. The result is an energy crisis, high inflation and a badly damaged economy.
The German government’s strategy paper, which draws its core elements from the influence of American media in Germany, American think tanks and US green lobbies, now seals the economic and political distance to China. European companies may now find it harder to participate in China’s progress. The main reason is that the German government does not understand what is happening in China. It has not understood the progress China has made in the last ten years. The gap is widening, China’s rise is unstoppable. Instead of working together to tackle the world’s big projects, the German government is sailing into a violent storm.
Rhetorical wordplay undermines One-China principle and recognises Taiwan’s autonomy
The German government’s strategy paper is linguistically characterised by rhetorical-political wordplay that clearly aims at protectionism but superficially gives the appearance of cooperation. This becomes particularly clear in the example of the Taiwan question. Thus, while the German government continues to profess its commitment to the One-China principle, it explicitly refers to it as the “One-China principle of the EU”. Worldwide, there is only one common definition of the One-China principle, which recognises the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate nation of China. In the United Nations and all international organisations, the People’s Republic of China represents the whole of China, including the province of Taiwan. However, the German government is now speaking on behalf of the EU and explicitly mentions in the strategy paper that it wants to support Taiwan alongside the People’s Republic of China in participating in international organisations. This undermines the whole concept of the One China principle and leads to an indirect legitimisation of Taiwan as an independent state.
EU Global Gateway as a chaotic alternative to the Silk Road (Belt and Road)
The German government explicitly distances itself from the Silk Road project as well as from the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Forces Initiative. The BR sees the Belt and Road Project as a means for China to place itself at the centre and to make other countries “dependent”. The German government sees itself in the position of implementing an alternative to the One Belt One Road project. For example, the EU wants to invest 600 billion dollars by 2027 in the infrastructure of countries that pursue European values and interests. So there is no clear concept, but a watering-can-like distribution of funds, which has already not led to success in the last decades.
Here it becomes clear in the wording of the strategy paper that the green federal government does not know what the Belt and Road Initiative means. For example, the Belt and Road Project is supported voluntarily and enormously by all participating states. The Belt and Road Project has been able to contribute massively to poverty reduction throughout Africa and the Middle East in the areas of infrastructure, construction of schools, housing, hospitals, inclusion or technology development. Technology cooperation is being established, universities along the Silk Road are cooperating and logistics are becoming incredibly cheap. Under the project, African students, for example, receive scholarships and can study for free in China and then use their skills to build their country. A secure infrastructure brings stability for the people and stimulates trade. Local products along the Silk Road, for example from small farmers in Pakistan, can suddenly be sold on the Chinese market. It is a project for a common future of humanity in harmony with nature. China’s international policy stands for win-win cooperation, for a multipolar world, for respect for other cultures without lecturing them, and for what it means to live “right”. Nations that have been dominated by the West for decades and actively promoted instability now have a new alternative and are actively moving towards it. After talking to African students in China about the difference between the West and China, they explained that China gives the money to the government, which invests in infrastructure and builds schools etc. with Chinese know-how. The West, on the other hand, gives money to local, foreign organisations that are corrupt, finance warlords and want to determine policy without knowing the cultures.
Due to the distance of the German government and the lack of investment, Germany and the whole of Europe will not get a chance. German companies and technologies as well as German shareholders are excluded by politics and cannot participate in the development of the global community in the Belt and Road Initiative. This also makes it more difficult for Germany to negotiate its own policies in the respective regions. Germany excludes itself.
Protectionism in the area of raw materials, technologies and trade
China is the second largest patent holder in the world after the USA. The key technologies are in Chinese hands. The People’s Republic shares these technologies with all partners and promotes the development of mankind on a win-win basis. The Federal Republic recognises China as a global leader here, for example in artificial intelligence, quantum technologies or autonomous driving. However, Germany wants to separate itself from the Chinese here so as not to become “dependent”. At the same time, the EU/BRD subsidises its own technologies such as AI. The EU chip law is being introduced. Chinese companies are to be excluded from any participation. New raw material partners are to be found. Only, according to the strategy paper, these technologies may only be used by states that represent the fundamental values of the Europeans. This disconnects these technologies from the world market, which is detrimental to competition and reminiscent of the technology ring of the Cold War. In contrast, BR is committed to the transatlantic alliance and wants to share such technologies with the USA, open the market for US companies and link it to security and military cooperation. It is also questionable whether protectionism equates to sanctions and the Chinese Foreign Anti-Sanctions Law could be activated, which would lead to countermeasures by China.
The Chairman of the Board of the Federal Association for Business Development (BWA) Michael Schumann, one of the few German non-political, rational business associations, comments: “We expressly do not welcome this so-called “strategy” of the Federal Government, as it puts additional strain on the relationship with Germany’s most important trading partner at a difficult time. The prioritisation, choice of words and recommendations for action in this document are not in the interest of our companies, which are successfully active in China and intend to continue to be so in the future.”
Climate protection sabotaged by own protectionism
One of the most important bilateral goals of the Federal Republic of Germany is cooperation with the People’s Republic of China in the area of climate protection. The People’s Republic is a global pioneer in renewable technologies. Anyone driving through the streets in China, for example, sees combustion engines less and less often. Paradoxically, the German government’s protectionist policy is aimed at making trade conditions more difficult for important technologies that can be important for climate protection. Research and development of proprietary technologies is also to be protected from Chinese access. In this way, the German government is thwarting its own climate goals and making cooperation more difficult. Chinese subsidies for coal-fired power plants in developing countries are also criticised. Here, the German government wants to slow down developments and work against national security interests in the sense of a “rules-based world order”. In addition, the EU has put the drafting of a new investment law on hold. BR also advocates granting China the status of a developing country, while at the same time criticising that many developments are still needed in China. Such paradoxical formulations can be found throughout the strategy paper.
Ignorance of China’s national development characterises the strategy paper
What is particularly striking about the German government’s strategy paper is the lack of knowledge of internal Chinese developments. As usual, national issues around Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet or Xinjang, freedom of the press and also the more difficult access of German companies to the Chinese market are criticised.
As far as freedom of expression is concerned, constructive criticism is explicitly welcome in China.
Criticism and discussion are the guarantee for development in China. In the academic field, there is even explicit ongoing dialogue with the USA, Germany and internationally recognised organisations such as the World Bank in order to bring about new developments. The academic discussion is lively and criticism from abroad is also welcome in order to improve people’s lives. In addition to academic debate, the public is also strongly democratically involved due to the proximity of the party with its over 90 million members. For example, there are party neighbourhood committees in all housing estates, which look after the residents’ concerns on a daily basis and pass on needs to the relevant authorities. Residents can become party members themselves and thus participate in the democratic and discussion process. This is done at all levels up to the central government, in direct dialogue with the population.
An important component of the strategy paper, especially with regard to the economy, is fair, sustainable and reciprocal trade and the protection of human rights. For BR in particular, it is unclear what developments have taken place within China. The Supply Chain Law even sanctions Germany’s own companies that do not protect human rights abroad. The People’s Republic of China has enacted numerous new laws. Patent, copyright and other protection laws have been strongly aligned with German and international standards. The Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) 2020 or the Cybersecurity Law, which almost corresponds to European data protection law, were also introduced. A new Civil Code was published in 2021, and here too the principles are very much based on the German Civil Code. China has its own labour law that excludes forced labour, even though the strategy paper talks about forced labour in China (Labour Contract Law).
In 2022, the anti-monopoly law in China was also renewed. Companies operating in China also have a special corporate social responsibility. This means they have to take responsibility for environmental protection, the protection of their employees and the protection of their industrial location. For example, a new land reform is currently taking place as an opening-up, in which foreign entrepreneurs can become quasi owners of land for the first time. However, they must safeguard the interests of the general public and protect the environment in rural areas. Private autonomy is also more strongly guaranteed in China than in Germany, where the hurdles are higher. It is quite questionable where the claim of backwardness comes from. Rather, there are more investment opportunities, which are used by the USA but not by the EU. The rule of law has also been expanded exorbitantly in the area of protection of the population and the individual. The training of lawyers is promoted, police officers, civil servants and ordinary citizens are increasingly trained in legal matters. The Chinese rule of law is based on international treaties and has many German features.
The criticism of the oppression of minorities is unfounded. On the contrary, the state promotes cultural minorities enormously and facilitates their access to public institutions, universities, schools or even professional life. In daily practice, this also means nationwide information campaigns about cultural minorities and their protection. Moreover, minorities are always represented in the National People’s Congress, China’s highest organ. In museums, art halls and in films, you can always find photos, statements about cultural minorities. They are respected and admired throughout the country with all 56 cultures.
Another misunderstanding concerns the Chinese party system. For example, the strategy paper says that China has a one-party system. This is factually incorrect. There are several parties under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. In the People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which takes place parallel to the National Congress, these parties discuss new reforms. The parties reflect different interest groups. However, since the Communist Party represents all the people, the interest groups have a similar effect to consultative lobbies and are, for example, artists’ groups etc. that actively participate in the democracy and opinion process.
The policy paper aims to protect women in the human rights dialogue. In socialist China, for example, women have long had equal rights according to communist understanding. Women take part in space missions, stand by their husband’s side and help lead the country. In the Chinese Basic Law and also in civil law, cultures and genders have long been equal.
Obstacles to Chinese activities in Germany
In addition to the economic blockade, cooperation with the Chinese side is also subject to more intense scrutiny. For example, Chinese institutions will be subject to tighter controls, as will Confucius institutes or organisations, while partnerships with institutions in the province of Taiwan will be continued. Universities in Germany are to cooperate more closely with Chinese institutions. The German government wants to establish more of its own soft-power institutions such as Deutsche Welle in China, while it wants to block and restrict Chinese media in Germany, just like Russian media.
Conclusion shows difficult future prognosis for Europe
The German government’s strategy paper makes it clear that a rapprochement with the USA is being pursued while at the same time activating protectionism for China. The choice of words in the paper superficially shows cooperation. However, all the important points for economic cooperation and mutual understanding are missing. The German economy will not be able to participate in the large-scale projects in China or in the Middle East or even in Africa. At the same time, Europe is sealing itself off. The German government allows itself to be misinformed by US think tanks and harms the German people, German economic interests and Europe as a whole. Ignorance about China’s internal affairs is a major communication deficit. As a solution, it is hoped that China will launch educational campaigns and explain profoundly to the West what socialism with Chinese characteristics means for the world. Europe’s initiative to open a new market for its products is to be welcomed, provided that these are made accessible to the world. However, according to the policy paper, this market is limited to allies, which further closes off the world and introduces protectionism in the 21st century.
If there are any further legal questions, readers can contact the lawyer and author of the article, Christian Wagner, an expert in Chinese law.
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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