Russia
The Kursk battles and the crisis of Russian military strategy
While everyone was waiting for Iran to attack Israel, Ukraine opened a new front in the Kursk Oblast bordering Russia. On the morning of 6 August, the Ukrainian army advanced to a depth of 10 to 15 kilometres in the Kursk region, capturing some settlements and carrying out intensive shelling of civilian targets.
At the same time, there were rumours that the Ukrainian army was planning to seize the Kursk nuclear power plant and the Sudja gas station.
At the beginning of the offensive, at 8am, according to the Russian Defence Ministry, about 300 Ukrainian troops, 11 tanks and more than 20 armoured vehicles moved to the border of the Kursk region. The Russian army and border guards (Rosgvardia) initially managed to repel the attack, destroying some tanks and armoured vehicles.
However, the fighting continued and intensified throughout the day, with air defence systems deployed near the border hampering the Russian air force, which went on the offensive, resulting in the capture of three Russian villages by Ukrainian troops.
Immediately after the attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a meeting of the Security Council at 13:00. As at every sensitive moment, the Russian authorities used the rhetoric of an act of terrorism, aimed at minimising the psychological impact on the population, but which for a long time bordered on denial.
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova was no exception, setting out the official position: “We are talking about a new act of terrorism. It is clearly directed against the civilian population.
When you have hundreds of soldiers, armoured vehicles and tanks, air defence systems and thousands of foreign mercenaries on standby, it is not just an act of “terror”, it is an act of war. More specifically, it is the opening of a new front in this war. Perhaps it will fail, but for now they are holding the villages of Kursk.
The fact that Kyiv is targeting an energy and trade route is another matter.
Until now, natural gas from Russia has been transported to the European Union via two gas metering stations: Sokhranovka and Sudzha. In 2022, Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state-owned gas company, refused to supply gas to Europe via Sokhranovka because it is located in the Lugansk People’s Republic. The only remaining route is Sudzha, which is currently under attack. So the aim seems to be to take control of the Sudja station and then destroy it.
It is possible to see another purpose in the current configuration: Kharkiv against Kursk. Kyiv wants to force Moscow to withdraw its troops from Kharkiv in order to regain the territory it has lost in the Kursk Oblast. Although Russia retains the initiative on the front line, it would be the loser in such a situation.
Current situation on the ground
Kommersant quoted Health Minister Mikhail Murashko as saying that 69 victims of the 11 August shelling in Kursk oblast had been hospitalised, 17 of them in serious condition. Of the 29 outpatients, 8 have been discharged.
A rocket attack on Kursk early on Sunday destroyed a nine-storey building and injured 13 people, two of them seriously.
According to local officials, the situation in the border regions remains tense following the attack by Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance troops. However, there are currently no active clashes in the Belyovsky and Oboyansky regions.

Source: Kommersant
The Russian Defence Ministry reported that 14 drones and four Tochka-U tactical missiles were intercepted over Kursk on the night of 11 August.
Meanwhile, Alexei Lihachev, head of the federal nuclear corporation Rosatom, discussed the threat to the Kursk nuclear power plant with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) President Rafael Grossi, stressing the global risks posed by the situation.
Evacuations continue in the region, with more than 76,000 people displaced and more than 4,400 in temporary shelters.
Official discourse and loss of trust
From the beginning, the Russian Ministry of Defence kept the information it released to a minimum. First it said that an attack had been launched by 300 troops, then that it was a thousand and that they had been repulsed. But on the evening of the second day, as Ukrainian troops continued to advance, the evening news showed unrealistic scenes with officials making statements that were far from reality. In fact, at least five brigades of between 7,000 and 17,000 troops had entered Russian territory.
But Kursk residents who witnessed the situation with their own eyes, and war correspondents such as Mikhail Zvinchuk and Yuriy Podoliak of the Rykbar Telegram channel, disagreed:
“It is true that [Chief of General Staff Valery] Gerasimov is doing very well, so much so that we would like to ask him on what objective factors is this optimism based? The need to please the boss? The need to lull the pure of heart to sleep? Or is it denial based on an inability to face reality and the consequences of the situation?
The mainstream media played the same game, with Izvestiya going so far as to publish a story claiming that the Ukrainian army had been driven out of Sudzha. While they do not hold the whole town, there is a pocket of resistance just to the east, where Russian troops are clashing. Podoliak said:
“I would like to draw the attention of our television crews to the fact that there is no need to deceive people and make Izvestiya’s report of the 6th of the month look like it was filmed on the 7th. Why is this important? Yes, it misleads Muscovites and the whole country, but it also does not allow people on the ground to get their bearings and make the right decisions, including the decision to evacuate. And then people die because of these lies.
In times of war, when you don’t have all the facts in your favour, it’s particularly dangerous to create a completely virtual world; the ruling elite can lose the trust of a population that doesn’t understand what’s really going on, but knows very well that something dangerous is going on.
Functional problems in the army far from solved
The new defence minister, Andrei Belousov, is highly respected, but he is not a soldier, and cases of corruption are on the rise. So much so that they sometimes raise the question of internal reckoning, as in the case of General Ivan Popov, who stopped the Ukrainian army’s advance in Zoporoye in 2023 and is now under house arrest. Some ask why Popov is not in Kursk at the moment. These questions show how difficult it will be for the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff to reform themselves through corruption cases alone. And there are many other questions. At least for an army at war: who is responsible for military strategy? And who is responsible for the Kursk Oblast?
Obviously, the process of legionisation of the army in wartime is reaching its limits. We are faced with paid contract soldiers, career officers with a different pay scale, and mobilised soldiers with a different status, and they are all fighting. Moreover, the conscripts remain outside the war zones… And this is an ideological problem.
And all this creates time bombs in society. Perhaps, in order to win the war, it is necessary to put an end to the logic of “special operation”.
Moscow, which has still not changed its position, is calling on the proverbial “international community” to condemn the “terror” in Kursk unequivocally, and to do so at the UN. At the same meeting where the ambush of the Wagnerians in Mali was discussed, a few words were said about Kursk, as if they were events of the same nature.
Moreover, the Russian press assures us that the IAEA is aware of the situation at the Kursk plant. A state of emergency has been declared in the Kursk Oblast, where the population is under attack, its territory occupied and facing a pogrom. Just as in the case of major fires or floods. In this context, however, a state of war should not have been declared in the region, which did not happen.
In other words, Moscow is still within the framework of “special military operation”. On the other hand, Russia is losing time and power in a war that it still does not officially recognise as a war. If it adopts an international discourse centred on negotiations, it will get in return the bombing of Sevastopol and the attacks on Kursk.
Meanwhile, the discourse of the creation of a Kursk People’s Republic “waiting to be liberated” and annexed to Ukraine is on the rise. This does not mean that this fantasy will be realised, but the intention is clear.Russia must take back the territories it currently occupies, otherwise it will be forced to negotiate its surrender, which will inevitably drag the current ruling elite into the depths of history.
Unlike Kharkiv in 2022, there can be no “strategic retreat” because the border has been crossed. In the event of a retreat, it will be impossible not to raise the question of treason, and the Putin umbrella will hardly protect these “great strategists” from popular vengeance. The ruling elite seems to be taking precautions, and there are two reactions.
Dmitry Medvedev wrote the following:
“From now on, special military operations must have a clear extraterritorial character. It is no longer just an operation to regain our official territory and punish the Nazis. We can and must go into the territory of Ukraine that still exists. To Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolayiv, Kyiv and beyond. There should be no restrictions in terms of the recognised borders of the Ukrainian Empire. Now we can and must talk about this openly, without shame or diplomatic fawning.”
Medvedev is right, but to do so it is necessary to review the situation and envisage victory. This requires a change in the ideological framework and political courage. So far there is no sign of either.
Russia
Europe ready for arms and missile control talks with Russia, FT says
Representatives of European nations are ready to renegotiate arms control and military conflict prevention agreements with Russia, according to a Financial Times report citing unnamed European officials.
The US is seeking to include European countries in discussions on a future security architecture.
In this context, Europeans look favourably upon returning to arms control mechanisms, including agreements limiting missile deployment and the restoration of arrangements operating during the Cold War era.
The newspaper cited the Open Skies Treaty, which allowed the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to monitor each other’s military installations, and accords restricting the deployment of specific missile types among potential examples.
Participating states of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) signed the Open Skies Treaty in March 1992.
Signatory states are obliged to permit observation flights by other party nations over their territories using photographic and video surveillance.
Russia withdrew from the treaty in 2021.
Russian authorities emphasized in statements at the time that Russia had done everything possible to preserve the agreement, “despite numerous violations of the Open Skies Treaty by the US, its allies, and dependent states.”
According to information obtained by the newspaper, US President Donald Trump’s administration is seeking Moscow’s consent to organize a multilateral meeting involving European representatives.
A source speaking to the Financial Times noted that the European security architecture is among the main agenda items at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) summit, though Trump will make the final decision regarding the nature of security guarantees the US will offer.
The first day of trilateral negotiations among Russia, the US, and Ukraine concluded on 10 November in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, with the meeting lasting more than four hours.
According to Politico, the parties plan to address territorial matters, including borders and lines of contact, on 11 November during the second day of negotiations.
Sources speaking to the publication stated that resolving the territorial issue and the future security mechanisms of Ukraine and Europe are interconnected and must be discussed in parallel.
“It is obvious that the current system does not work. We need to create something new that will work effectively today,” one source said.
According to Politico and the Financial Times, American negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner plan to invite Europeans to join the negotiations after the trilateral meeting concludes.
“We need Europe at the negotiating table,” a source told Politico.
The Financial Times source likewise stressed that European participation is essential to reach an agreement aimed at ending the conflict.
European capitals fear that Moscow and Washington could agree on security guarantees for Ukraine and the continent’s new security architecture without the involvement of European Union (EU) and NATO allies.
Furthermore, the issue of EU participation in talks resolving the conflict in Ukraine has caused differences of opinion between Moscow and European capitals.
Russia previously stated that the EU currently has no place at the negotiating table due to its stance on the conflict.
Russia
US raises NATO-style guarantees for Kyiv ahead of Abu Dhabi talks
US President Donald Trump’s administration has asked the Russian side whether Moscow objects to granting Ukraine security guarantees akin to NATO’s Article 5 on collective defence, and to having such guarantees provided directly by the alliance itself.
According to a Financial Times report citing a US official, the final decision on the nature of the US security guarantees will be made by US President Donald Trump.
The US official said the White House is seeking Russia’s consent for multilateral negotiations that would also include European representatives.
“At this stage, we firmly believe Europe must be part of the negotiations to end the war,” the official said on the matter.
According to the report, prior to the trilateral talks, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and his son-in-law Jared Kushner will hold consultations with representatives from Ukraine, the European Union, NATO, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
Rustem Umerov, representing the Ukrainian delegation, also confirmed that Kyiv will hold separate coordination meetings with European partners in Abu Dhabi to align positions and subsequent steps.
The newspaper reported that while European diplomats are sceptical about the prospects of a breakthrough in the Abu Dhabi talks, they consider participation in the diplomatic process essential to support Ukraine and prevent broader European security issues from being addressed without their involvement.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated in late October that talks held in Oslo between Ukraine, EU countries, and US representatives discussed granting Kyiv security guarantees similar to the provisions of NATO’s Article 5 collective defence clause.
In February, Zelenskyy described credible guarantees for Kyiv as the “only real basis” for peace.
The issue of security guarantees will form one of the agenda items at the trilateral negotiations between Russia, the US, and Ukraine, scheduled for 10-11 November in Abu Dhabi.
These contacts mark the first trilateral meeting in roughly nine months, following the previous round held in Geneva in February.
Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky will head the Russian delegation at the talks, while the US side will be represented by the president’s special envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.
Rustem Umerov will lead the Ukrainian delegation.
Moscow insists that the future security guarantees slated for discussion at the meetings must also cover Russia.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted that guarantees can only be mutual.
At the beginning of the year, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko stated that security guarantees for Russia are an essential component in reaching a peace agreement on Ukraine.
“We accept that a peaceful settlement in Ukraine must take Ukraine’s security interests into account, but the key issue is, of course, Russia’s security interests,” Grushko said.
Russia
Putin proposes Arctic energy cooperation to US to ease gas sanctions
Following a diesel arrangement with the US and the prospect of expanding Russian fertiliser shipments, Moscow is offering Washington joint cooperation in the Arctic.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow is considering the possibility of working together with US partners in the Arctic region.
Speaking at the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) summit, Putin described the regional situation:
“We are actively working in the Arctic, which I mentioned, with many countries around the world, and we are interested in joint work. Until very recently, our European partners and our Chinese partners were working alongside us at our fields. Now we are considering the possibility of joint work with American partners.”
So, which fields could a partnership between the two countries in the Arctic encompass, and what could Moscow offer Washington in exchange for lifting sanctions on Russian gas? Liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects stand at the heart of the matter.
European companies pulled out of Russian gas projects such as Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 due to sanctions imposed on Russia after 2022.
According to Igor Yushkov, an expert at the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation and the National Energy Security Fund (NESF) who spoke to the Vzglyad newspaper, cooperation with Chinese companies moved to a new dimension following the departure of the Europeans.
Two Chinese shareholders, CNPC and CNOOC, are involved in the Arctic LNG 2 project. Initially, both companies froze their participation out of concern over US sanctions targeting the venture.
Mikhail Vakilyan, an expert at the Institute for the Development of Fuel and Energy Complex Technologies, told Vzglyad that Beijing did not alter its policy, but rather that Chinese firms CNPC and CNOOC simply did not want to risk their access to the US dollar.
Yet, a year and a half later, the picture shifted entirely. In the second half of 2025, China began purchasing gas from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 facility and dedicated a standalone terminal to the project.
Furthermore, it opened a second terminal this year serving exclusively Russian LNG.
China even resumed module deliveries needed to complete the third train of Arctic LNG 2, despite having halted shipments previously.
Moscow seeks markets and turbines, offering technology for Alaska
Despite all these developments, Russia’s expectations from the US in the Arctic remain clear. Mikhail Vakilyan summarised this requirement:
“Russia needs two things: first, markets; and second, hardware. Lifting sanctions on Arctic LNG 2 and its gas carriers will bring back buyers in Japan, India, and South East Asia, eliminating the discount currently enjoyed by China as the sole customer. As for hardware, the turbines driving the liquefaction compressors at Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2 are manufactured by the US company Baker Hughes. Maintenance, spare parts, and modernization for these machines are blocked by US export bans.”
Igor Yushkov viewed the process through the lens of a political and economic trade-off:
“The exact same scheme seen in the diesel agreement is operating here. In exchange for easing anti-Russian sanctions and putting pressure on Ukraine, we are offering the US mutually beneficial projects and broader economic cooperation. We are showing that this cooperation can be versatile across various fields such as diesel, fertilisers, LNG, and similar sectors.”
The tangible offer Russia could present to the US in the LNG sector in exchange for sanctions relief is technological support for an LNG plant to be built in Alaska, referring to the $25 billion Polar LNG project.
Yushkov explained the card held by Russian energy company Novatek:
“Novatek possesses a technological solution applied at Arctic LNG 2 that would also suit the LNG project in Alaska. These are reinforced concrete gravity-based structures carrying liquefaction equipment; essentially floating LNG factories. Novatek has already built two such platforms alongside their equipment and established an offshore super-structure construction centre in Belokamenka. The issue is that both this centre and the Arctic LNG 2 plant itself fell under US sanctions. Therefore, in exchange for lifting sanctions at least on the super-structure construction centre, we could build such a facility for Alaska.”
According to the expert, Russia could cast the reinforced concrete platform at this centre in Belokamenka, install the LNG plant atop it, and tow it to Alaska once completed.
Because building from scratch in the Arctic itself is both costly and creates constraints regarding time and equipment transport, this method offers a much simpler solution.
Nevertheless, Yushkov warned that the plan is not finalised:
“Owing to numerous sanctions-related issues and questions surrounding the project’s economics, it is not certain this scenario will materialize; however, the Americans are still interested in our technologies for Alaska, and Russia is stating it can capitalize on this and deliver it.”
Conversely, Yushkov recalled that Russia remains the primary rival to the US, particularly in the gas sector, and that the US administration has systematically squeezed Russian gas out of the European market in recent years.
According to the expert, helping US LNG capture the market share lost by Russia is hardly a brilliant idea.
Europe’s 2027 ban, China price talks, and rare earth metals
Arctic LNG 2 is not the only Russian project that could benefit from potential cooperation with the US; a new opening could also emerge for Yamal LNG, which is unaffected by US sanctions.
The crux here is not sanctions, but the European Union’s upcoming ban on all Russian LNG shipments starting from 1 January 2027.
Vakilyan explained the approaching risk and a potential solution using figures:
“In the first half of the year, Europe took nearly the entire output of the plant, amounting to 9.89 million tonnes. In two months, these volumes will need a new route and a new buyer; a US trading company appears very well suited for this role.”
Another winner in the equation could be Gazprom, which is conducting negotiations with China for the Power of Baikal pipeline, formerly known as Power of Siberia 2.
Vakilyan said: “Cooperation with the US is Russia’s trump card in price negotiations. China has long negotiated with Gazprom assuming Russian gas has nowhere else to go; an American company in the Arctic would disrupt that calculation.”
Viewed from a wider perspective, Russia and the US share two additional points of contact: oil projects and rare earth metals.
The Vostok Oil project, which awaits the lifting of sanctions on Rosneft, is the first among them.
Vakilyan listed the other areas:
“It is impossible to make headway on the Pobeda shelf, which could not be developed since 2014, without the Americans; that site requires subsea production complexes and drilling services in icy seas, where US companies are strongest. Another issue not apparent at first glance is rare metals. The Trump administration is seeking them across the globe, and Tomtor, one of the largest rare earth metal deposits, lies in the Arctic region of Yakutia.”
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