Asia
The truth on Haqqani assassination; Sacrificed in the game of throne
Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, the Taliban Minister of Refugees and a senior member of the Haqqani network, was killed in a suicide attack in the Ministry’s building in Afghanistan’s capital city, Kabul. He was the only armed Taliban minister who attended all official and unofficial meetings with a gun. Some senior officials of the former government have described the killing of Haqqani in a suicide attack as “martyrdom”, but a large number of citizens criticized these officials for expressing sympathy on his death. The citizens said that a large number of innocent Afghans were killed by the Haqqani network suicide squad which was under observation of the Khalil Haqqani in the past 20 years before they take power in 2021. They said that the families of the victims were a “little consoled” by the death of Haqqani.
At the same time, the Taliban’s Ministry of Information and Culture ordered media operating inside the country to use the word “martyrdom” in their reports instead of death. This order caused a number of media outlets to edit their already published news. A number of citizens of the country have attributed the killing Khalil Haqqani to the differences between Hibatullah Akhundzada the supreme leader of the Taliban and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the interior minister and head of Haqqani Network, referring to the “Amir and Khalifa” game of thrones.
In the past 20 years, the Haqqani network has taken responsibility for numerous suicide attacks in Kabul and some other provinces, as a result of which hundreds of people, including women and children, have been killed and injured.
After taking control of Afghanistan, this network has proudly praised its suicide fighters many times and given land and government facilities to their families. In the latest case, a senior member of this network and the uncle of Sirajuddin Haqqani, known as the “head of suicide bombers”, was killed in a suicide attack.
Khalil Haqqani was killed in a suicide attack at his ministry’s headquarters and the attack took place while he was constantly armed at the most official meetings and it was said that he did not trust his bodyguards either. Hours after the attack, the Taliban group published a photo attributed to the suicide bomber on social media and said that the attacker was holding a metal rod and had told the security guards that his hand had undergone surgery. He then detonated his explosive materials during the official meeting.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said that Khalil Haqqani was killed in a “barbaric” ISIS attack. He called Haqqani’s death a “big loss” for the Taliban and emphasized that this event cannot weaken the strength of the Taliban government. Sirajuddin Haqqani and a number of other members of the Taliban leadership praised him. Later, ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack.
It came as shock that Khalil Haqqnai killed by a suicide bomber
Apparently, it was not expected that someone like Khalil al-Rahman Haqqani, a famous and senior member of the Haqqani network, would become a victim of a suicide attack. Perhaps, after Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s interior minister, he was the second prominent figure in the Haqqani network. Khalil Haqqani has played an effective and unique role in the provision of Haqqani’s financial resources.
It is said that he provided financial aid to the Haqqani network through Pakistan and some countries in the south of the Persian Gulf. Now that he has been removed from the field, the Haqqanis may be in some trouble. The US had set a bounty of five million dollars for revealing his whereabouts and he was also in the blacklist of the United Nations.
While it is still early, it is also difficult to talk about the visible and hidden sides of the Haqqani assassination despite the Daesh group having already claimed responsibility for this. Considering the way the Taliban have been ruling for more than three years, the internal differences of their regime, the claim of enmity of this group with ISIS, etc., the following points can be raised:
First:
The Haqqanis are known as the main planners and agents of suicide attacks in Afghanistan. Siraj Haqqani has frequently appreciated and consoled the survivors of the suicide bombers and distributed a huge amount of money to them. His consolation went beyond this and ordered that a “memorial minaret” be built in the Garde Siri district of Paktia province for the person who blew himself up in front of the US soldiers, something that is confusing to understand.
Just a few days ago, he went to Gilan district of Ghazni and during his speech, he once again praised the suicide bombers and called the freedom of Afghanistan the result of their sacrifice. Meanwhile, the rest of the important figures of the Taliban apparently do not speak widely about the suicide bombers. Now that one of the famous Haqqanis has been the victim of a suicide attack, it is not known whether Siraj Haqqani will continue to spread the culture of suicide.
Second:
Considering the status and credibility that Khalil Haqqani had in the Taliban regime and the Haqqani network, his loss is a big psychological blow to the Haqqanis, in a situation where (according to some claims) they are trying to stand against Mullah Hebatullah, the leader of the Taliban. Since the Taliban came back to power, no one from the Haqqani family had been killed like Khalil Haqqani. Mullah Hebatullah’’ block has lost a key member – Dawood Mozmal, the former governor of Balkh.
Khalil Haqqani showed himself to be so influential that he even carried weapons during official meetings with foreign officials (both Western and non-Western) and his bodyguards protected him with unique looks. Something that maybe even Hebatullah will not do. Therefore, it is difficult and time-consuming to fill Khalil Haqqani’s vacancy in the Haqqani network.
Third:
When we think about the perpetrator of the attack, several options come to mind: ISIS which has already claimed responsibility, but we should not forget about internal disputes, family quarrels, foreign intervention, opposition forces, etc. The prevailing suspicion is based on the involvement of ISIS; A group that is skilled in suicide and perhaps learned from the Taliban. Daoud Muzamel was also assassinated by ISIS. The Taliban also attributed the attack to ISIS, but this group has not claimed responsibility so far.
Some consider the internal conflicts of the Taliban to be the cause of terror, and in this context, Sirajuddin Haqqani’s statements against Hebatullah are cited. It is also mentioned in the references of western newspapers and institutions that “Sirajuddin and Hebatuallah” seem to be at odds with each other. Of course, in recent days, the Sirajuddin criticized Hebatullah more than ever before.
Since the Haqqani network is a complex and secretive organization, it is possible that those inside this organization may have provided a platform for assassination. The role of foreign intelligence also comes to mind, but it does not seem justified. It cannot be attributed to the opposing forces of the Taliban either because while they don’t have the ability, they also avoid doing it.
Fourth:
The Taliban’s claim about providing national security in Afghanistan has once again turned into a hoax. The Taliban have repeatedly claimed that the war is over, that national security is ensured, and that the migrants should return to Afghanistan and continue their lives. Of course, by making this claim, they have also received concessions from the world. Now, the assassination of a Taliban minister, even with high security arrangements, revealed that this group is not even able to provide security for someone who was carrying an American M4 weapon in an official meeting with foreign women. Of course, this is not the first time that the Taliban’s claims are wrong.
Fifth:
The assassination series is likely to continue. It is not known whether the next victim is from the Haqqani bloc or Hebatullah. Whatever and whoever it is, the result is the deepening of the Taliban’s internal discord and the world’s disbelief in what this group calls the provision of national security.
Of course, repression and suffocation will intensify more than in the past, because they suspect more citizens. It is possible that the Taliban officials will end their demonstration meetings with the people and refrain from traveling to the provinces. Anyway, the truth of Haqqani’s assassination and its consequences will be revealed more in the following weeks and months.
Asia
Analysts warn new surge in Chinese exports threatens global markets
Financial Times writer Ryan Avent has written that a fresh, rapid surge in China’s trade surplus could signal a new wave of the “China shock”.
Economists define the “China shock” as a spike in Chinese exports to global markets that intensifies competition for manufacturers in advanced economies and curtails employment in certain sectors.
The term gained widespread currency after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, accelerating the inflow of inexpensive Chinese goods into the US and other nations.
The US was the country hit hardest by the initial shockwave. Between 1999 and 2011, more than 2 million jobs were lost because domestic producers were unable to withstand the competition.
Avent argued that the effects of the initial wave are still felt across the American economy because China failed to carry out the rebalancing that the world expected.
The share of net exports in China’s gross domestic product contracted during the 2007-2019 period, allowing Western nations to focus on national security and other matters.
Avent reported that the trade surplus is now escalating rapidly once again, posing a threat to the economies of wealthy nations.
The writer pointed to the stagnation of domestic demand following the collapse of the real estate market six years ago as one cause of this surplus. Another prominent factor is the Beijing government’s channelling of massive resources into manufacturing in pursuit of self-sufficiency.
Attention was also drawn to the role of the depreciating yuan. An appreciation of the currency could require China to alter its foreign exchange interventions, reduce purchases of foreign currency and assets, and sell those assets off. That scenario could trigger currency depreciation and rising interest rates in other countries.
The Wall Street Journal also reported in the spring of 2024 on economists’ concerns regarding a potential second wave.
Experts predicted that global markets would once again be flooded with inexpensive goods, stating that China was manufacturing far beyond domestic demand to overcome its economic troubles.
Moreover, it was stressed that China is now competing in high-technology fields such as automobiles, computer chips, and complex machinery manufacturing.
Meanwhile, Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) University in Moscow, told the Russian media outlet RBC that the US has imposed sanctions on the Chinese economy since the first shock period, adding that these measures would very likely tighten in the event of a fresh export wave.
According to assessments reported by the Financial Times, this new process could also shake China’s own economy. Alongside rising output, entry-level manufacturing plants across the country are turning toward automation and reducing personnel.
This trend could trigger a painful departure from labour-intensive production, leaving millions unemployed. Manufacturing activities in China that previously capitalised on cheap labour are shifting to other Southeast Asian countries.
The Beijing administration rejected allegations that its industrialisation steps pose risks to other countries. As reported by the Xinhua news agency, China’s Ministry of Commerce stressed that claims of a “China shock 2.0” are groundless. The ministry stated:
“The US and other Western countries have circulated the so-called ‘China shock 2.0’ narrative, asserting that China’s industrial development has shaken Western monopolies and narrowed growth space for Global South countries. This claim is unsupported by concrete data and is entirely unfounded.”
Asia
Iran and China run secret barter network to bypass oil sanctions
Iran is operating a covert, barter-like trade mechanism to bypass sanctions on its oil sales and procure billions of dollars in goods from China, including military hardware.
Speaking to the Reuters news agency, two senior Iranian officials and three sources closely monitoring the matter said the Tehran administration receives credits for goods imported from China instead of cash in exchange for the oil it sells to the country.
The sources, who spoke on condition of anonymity, emphasised that this method of swapping oil revenues for Chinese goods provides an immediate financial lifeline to the Tehran government at a time when the US has intensified economic and military pressure over its nuclear programme.
China, the world’s largest crude importer, continues to access discounted Iranian oil through this arrangement while shielding its banks and exporting companies from the risk of international penalties.
Although the Washington administration has imposed sanctions on several small-scale Chinese entities facilitating the transport of Iranian oil, it avoids sweeping measures that could shake the global economy.
The US has stepped up its pressure as it seeks to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing war between the two countries.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said last month that countries failing to cut commercial ties with Tehran would risk exclusion from the dollar system.
It remains unclear how the barter mechanism has been affected by the US naval blockade imposed on Iran as part of the six-month-old war.
However, since the reimposition of the blockade on 14 July, no shipments of Iranian oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz to China have been recorded.
Beijing and Tehran, which describe Western unilateral sanctions as illegal, refrain from disclosing publicly how they sustain their trade.
Sources state that Tehran introduced this system to obtain pharmaceuticals, vehicles, and communications equipment. Chinese manufacturers are said to have no direct contact with Iran, and there is no indication that they are violating sanctions.
On the other hand, the mechanism was utilised at least once last year under contracts supplying Iran with millions of dollars’ worth of air defence equipment. The sources provided no details regarding the shipments in question, and the transactions were not independently verified.
The United Nations conventional arms embargo returned alongside other sanctions in September 2025 following the collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers.
Tehran had withdrawn from the terms of the agreement, while Beijing and Tehran described the European nations’ automatic reimposition of sanctions as legally flawed.
Responding to questions from Reuters, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it had no knowledge of the trade structure in question.
Beijing stated that it opposes unilateral sanctions lacking United Nations Security Council authorisation and having no basis in international law.
Iran’s diplomatic missions in New York and Geneva remained silent on the inquiries. A US official speaking on behalf of the White House stated only that they are working with international partners, including the EU, to prevent Tehran from achieving its nuclear goals.
According to data analytics company Kpler, China purchased more than 80% of the crude oil exported by Iran in 2025. This share equates to an average of 1.4 million barrels per day.
Although the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement in 2021 covering energy and infrastructure, the operational details of their cooperation remain largely confidential.
The model in question constitutes only one of the networks through which Iran procures goods and services from China without passing through international banking channels.
A Western official and two other individuals tracking the matter said that a buyer acting on behalf of state-owned Chinese oil company Zhuhai Zhenrong deposited hundreds of millions of dollars each month until this year into ChuXin, a shadow financial entity based in China.
These deposits reportedly represent payment for oil purchased from a Hong Kong-based company linked to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Approximately 70% of the oil revenues routed through ChuXin is allocated to infrastructure projects in Iran. The remainder is transferred to the accounts of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) established to disburse payments to companies supplying goods to Iran.
Sources close to Iran’s decision-making apparatus confirm the existence of this financial mechanism.
Fund management is shared between a firm acting on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and another entity linked to the Central Bank of Iran. When the Central Bank of Iran authorises importers, money transfers are directed to supplier firms. While the name ChuXin does not appear in official records, one source noted that the structure exists solely on balance sheets.
Andrea Ghiselli, an international politics specialist at the University of Exeter, stated that Beijing uses these indirect networks to demonstrate that it will not bow to US secondary sanction threats.
Highlighting that Chinese leaders aim to protect their own banks and firms from being pushed out of the global financial system, Ghiselli said: “They want to create deniability.”
Asia
China leads $54bn capital injection into state banks and insurers
China’s Ministry of Finance will lead a total capital injection of $54 billion into state-owned insurance companies and banks as part of a coordinated push to reinforce the capital structure across the country’s financial system, according to details disclosed by the institutions in statements on Sunday.
China Life Insurance (Group) Co, the country’s largest life insurer, will receive 35 billion yuan ($5.2 billion) in capital support, whilst China Taiping Insurance Group will receive 7 billion yuan.
In a separate announcement, People’s Insurance Company (Group) of China (PICC) said it plans to raise up to 15 billion yuan via a private placement of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance. The company stated that the proceeds will be used to replenish its capital.
The initiative could fortify the financial position of state insurers, which have been called upon to support the equity market with medium- and long-term funds. At the same time, it could position these institutions to help regulatory authorities manage smaller and higher-risk insurance companies.
Financial sector stability
China’s insurance industry has been contending with shrinking profitability caused by prolonged low interest rates. Solvency ratios across numerous small and medium-sized insurers have also deteriorated.
China Export and Credit Insurance Corp stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 10 billion yuan to boost the company’s core capital. China Reinsurance (Group) announced that it will execute a capital increase of 3 billion yuan.
“The capital injection represents an important step for enhancing the financial sector’s capacity to serve the real economy and promoting high-quality development across the financial and insurance industries,” China Life said in a statement. The insurer added that the capital support will improve the group’s resilience to risks.
Taiping also noted that the funds provided will strengthen the company’s solvency and other core metrics.
Banks benefit from recapitalisation plan
Separately, three state banks announced on Sunday that they will receive capital support totalling 290 billion yuan.
The recapitalisation framework was first announced during the annual parliamentary meetings in March this year. The move broadens a funding mechanism deployed last year to strengthen the capital structures of several other major state-owned lenders.
Agricultural Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), two of the country’s largest state-owned lenders, announced plans to raise up to 160 billion yuan and 100 billion yuan, respectively, through private placements of A-shares to the Ministry of Finance, China National Tobacco Corp, and affiliated entities.
Both lenders confirmed that all net proceeds will be deployed to replenish their Core Tier 1 capital. The measure is expected to help sustain credit expansion at a juncture when Beijing is increasingly relying on state lenders to support economic growth.
Weak credit demand remains a persistent headwind for the world’s second-largest economy, while continuing to erode profitability across the banking sector.
Export-Import Bank of China, one of the country’s three policy banks, stated that the Ministry of Finance will inject 30 billion yuan of capital into the institution, thereby bolstering its capital base.
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