On April 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced to the media at the White House that he had set a final deadline for Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the U.S. If Iran does not abandon its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. will “definitely” take military action, and Israel will be deeply involved and become a “leader” in this. Clearly, “Trump 2.0” has added more military threat to Iran, but overall, this pressure resembles drawing a bow without fully pulling it—extreme pressure that may reignite the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” set seven years ago.

Trump met with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which the U.S. announced it was holding direct negotiations with Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi confirmed on April 8 that indirect high-level talks would take place on April 12 in Oman, but denied any direct talks as claimed by the U.S.

Analysts believe the summit focused not only on bilateral trade tariffs and the Gaza situation, but also on coordinating a unified stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Based on Trump’s statements, Israel is expected to strike Iran if it crosses the nuclear threshold—i.e., acquires actual nuclear weapons—by targeting its nuclear facilities. The U.S. seems to want to keep military action as “Plan B,” exerting heavy pressure through negotiations first and resorting to military means only if talks fail, possibly in coordination with Israel.

Iran, long accustomed to U.S.-Israeli military threats, seems unfazed by this war intimidation. Iranian President Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran “does not seek nuclear weapons,” emphasizing the country’s long-term need for nuclear science and energy. On April 10, Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated on platform X that if external threats persist, Iran may suspend cooperation with the IAEA, expel inspectors, and consider relocating enriched materials to secure domestic sites.

Less than 100 days into “Trump 2.0,” the administration is in full attack mode, waging economic war on all trade partners in the name of “Make America Great Again.” By attempting to open the “Pandora’s box”of disrupting the global trade system, he seeks to force all trading partners back into a corner. While global attention is focused on avoiding U.S. economic coercion and “public robbery,” geopolitical conflicts are momentarily overshadowed.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Trump’s return focuses on two major battlefields: the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East, with the latter’s key goal being the subjugation of Iran—a goal unfulfilled in his first term. Thus, the new U.S. Iran policy under Trump centers on threats and coercion, supplemented by engagement and negotiation, with gradually increasing pressure and strategic encirclement, avoiding military action unless absolutely necessary.

Currently, the Trump administration is “riding the momentum,” fully cooperating with Israel to weaken and dismantle the “Axis of Resistance.” Following actions against Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and resistance forces in Iraq, efforts now focus on resolving the Gaza issue, with military strikes targeting Yemen’s Houthis, while maintaining pressure on Iran to achieve “Middle East peace under Trump”: expanding Arab-Israeli normalization and isolating Iran—the region’s long-standing anti-U.S. and anti-Israel force.

For some time, the Trump administration has unconditionally supported Israel, using transactional strategies like promoting “clearing Gaza” or “taking over Gaza” to pressure Arab states into aiding Israel. It aims to usher in a “post-Hamas era” and reshape the political and geopolitical ecology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it strikes Yemen’s Houthis under the pretense of protecting Red Sea routes and portrays Iran not just as a partner but as the master of the Houthis, seeking justification for continued suppression of Iran.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Trump is displaying a more aggressive war stance than during his first term, publicly declaring “if talks fail, we will strike,” openly supporting Israel in bringing war to the Persian Gulf. The U.S., in collaboration with Israel, is exerting high pressure on Iran, and clearly enjoys three advantages:

First, Iran has suffered major setbacks in over a year of the “Sixth Middle East War,” and its bottom line of avoiding full-scale war has been thoroughly exposed. The “Axis of Resistance” is also scattered and fragmented.

Second, U.S.-Russia relations have drastically reversed. After suffering a strategic diplomatic failure in the Middle East, Russia is now focusing on dividing up Ukraine’s land and mineral resources with the U.S.

Third, although Russia and Iran still maintain good relations, Russia has openly stated that it has no intention of intervening if Iran is attacked.

When Trump first took office in 2017, after half a year of observation and bargaining, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. At that time, I wrote that Trump didn’t withdraw just for the sake of it. Unlike other withdrawal actions rooted in isolationism, America-first ideology, and anti-globalization/multilateralism, Trump’s move was strategic — “retreating in order to advance.” By dismantling the nuclear agreement, he aimed to start anew or add terms, in an attempt to solve the broader Middle East issue in one go and serve America’s core interests and Middle East policy.

On May 21, 2018, the U.S. State Department proposed a complete “Plan B,” not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat but also to bury Iran’s painstaking geopolitical achievements in the Middle East and reshape regional dynamics and U.S.-Iran/Israel-Iran relations. This plan was essentially a replica of the U.S. strategy toward North Korea — a typical “carrot and stick” approach. However, compared to U.S. demands on North Korea, this plan was stricter, more comprehensive, and far-reaching — aiming to resolve historical and current contradictions in the Middle East and return the region to a relatively balanced framework.

Therefore, Trump’s renewed focus on Iran’s nuclear issue is merely a rehash of old issues, and hasn’t yet reached the high-pressure levels or demands of seven years ago. At that time, the U.S. policy toward Iran was a well-prepared, strategic combination — probably now forgotten by many — known as the “Pompeo 12 Conditions.” It is thus worthwhile to revisit this list in evaluating today’s Trump-style Iran policy.

Pompeo’ 12 Conditions

 In his speech at the Heritage Foundation, Pompeo emphasized that Iran must meet 12 demands in exchange for the lifting of all U.S. sanctions and a full restoration of bilateral relations. Otherwise, Iran would face “the most severe sanctions in history.” These 12 conditions fall into categories, urging Iran to completely abandon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, release detained individuals, stop supporting terrorism, and halt interference in the internal affairs and security of regional countries.

The four demands related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were:

-Iran must declare all military nuclear activities to the IAEA and permanently and verifiably abandon them.

-Cease all uranium enrichment, never pursue plutonium reprocessing, and shut down heavy water reactors.

-Allow unconditional IAEA inspections at any site.

-End the development and launch of ballistic missiles, and halt development of nuclear-capable missile systems.

Even from a nuclear non-proliferation standpoint, these conditions go far beyond those in the Iran nuclear deal and aim to completely strip Iran of its ability to acquire nuclear weapons or deliver them via long-range missiles.

The Remaining Eight of the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” and Their Implications

Three of the conditions relate to non-state actors. They require Iran to:

-Immediately cease support for so-called “terrorist organizations” in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad;

-Stop supporting “terrorist forces” such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and surrounding areas, and cease sheltering senior al-Qaeda leaders;

-End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (especially the Quds Force)’s support for “terrorists” and “armed groups” around the world.

The U.S. believes Iran is the patron or ally of various extremist organizations in the Middle East, especially a stumbling block and root cause preventing Palestinian and Arab concessions to Israel. It sees Iran as a troublemaker hindering peace in the region. Thus, resolving the Middle East issue thoroughly must start with Iran.

Four conditions relate to Iran’s relations with regional states:

-Respect Iraq’s sovereignty, allow Iranian-backed Shia militias to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society;

-End military support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels and work toward a political solution for the Yemen conflict;

-Withdraw all Iranian military forces from Syria;

-Cease threats to destroy Israel, missile launches at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, threats to international shipping, and cyberattacks.

Additionally, the U.S. demanded Iran release all “detained” American citizens and those of its allies and partners.

These eight conditions, unrelated to nuclear weapons or missile programs, go far beyond nuclear issues. They show the U.S.’s intent to comprehensively constrain and curb Iran’s military and diplomatic activities in the Middle East and globally. This is a strategic countermeasure against Iran’s regional expansion, which threatens U.S. allies like Israel and Gulf states and intensifies sectarian and ethnic conflicts. It aims to pressure Iran to halt foreign influence and give up the gains it made during its expansion.

As a “reward” for complying with these 12 conditions, the U.S. promised to sign a new nuclear agreement with Iran if it made real, visible, and sustainable changes. It would also lift all sanctions, gradually restore diplomatic and economic ties, allow Iran access to advanced technologies, and support its economic modernization and integration into the global economy.

Clearly, this is the Trump administration’s new Iran strategy—a roadmap to comprehensively resolve the U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israel hostilities and reshape the geopolitical landscape. It includes both the “spiked club” of pressure and the tempting “carrot” of incentives. The aim is to downgrade Iran from a “regional superpower” back to a normal state, as it was before the Islamic Revolution, to eliminate all of the U.S. and its allies’ security concerns.

Iran completely rejected the “Pompeo 12 Conditions,” seeing them as an ultimatum demanding total surrender. To accept them would mean abandoning the grand vision and sacrifices of the Islamic Revolution and returning to a submissive, ordinary state. The Trump administration followed up with more sanctions. But Iran endured until Biden took office—and now again under Trump’s return.

From “Trump 1.0” to “Trump 2.0,” eight years have passed. The nuclear deal hasn’t been revived, and the nuclear crisis hasn’t escalated into war. But the current geopolitical and security landscape is clearly more unfavorable to Iran: it suffered military defeat in the Eastern Mediterranean, lost the strategic western flank of the “Shia Crescent” due to Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Damascus regime.

In Israel’s large-scale raid in October 2024, it successfully opened an aerial corridor from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, launched warning strikes deep into Iranian territory, and exposed Iran’s weak bottom line of lacking will to retaliate symmetrically. Now, as “Trump 2.0” begins, Iraq—the key node of the “Shia Crescent”—faces diplomatic pressure to break away from Iran and rejoin the Arab world. Overall, Iran’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating, while U.S.-Israeli control of Eastern Mediterranean airspace increases the risk of military escalation. The pressure Iran faces now exceeds that of “Trump 1.0.”

Although Pompeo is no longer on the “Trump 1.0 chariot,” the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” reflect the core thinking of Trump’s national security team regarding the Middle East and remain the foundation of U.S. policy toward Iran. Far from being discarded, these conditions may be gradually revived under “Trump 2.0,” tightening the strategic bowstring to pressure Iran toward compromise.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Following a protracted period of fluctuating relations, negotiations between Iran and the United States commenced on April 12 in Muscat, Oman. While not the first instance of dialogue between Tehran and Washington, the current geopolitical landscape imbues these talks with exceptional significance, as the fate of the Middle East hinges considerably on their outcome. Consequently, the character of these negotiations differs markedly from previous encounters.

Tehran enters this round of negotiations amidst a challenging environment: the legacy of former President Trump’s maximum economic pressure campaign persists, coupled with rhetoric hinting at potential military action against Iran. Israel’s ongoing military operations in Gaza, widely criticized and labeled by some as genocide, continue as it projects an image of success; Hezbollah appears constrained within Lebanon’s internal political dynamics; the political landscape in Damascus has shifted, potentially affecting the established support lines Iran previously relied upon for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups opposing Israel; Iranian-aligned forces in Iraq are preoccupied with internal political strife; and Iran itself confronts a severe currency and economic crisis. Simultaneously, Israeli lobbying efforts reportedly seek to persuade influential US figures to support decisive action against Iran. From Israel’s perspective, Iran purportedly lacks the strategic capacity for a sustained, high-intensity conflict against it.

Despite this assessment, Iran maintains it is not negotiating from a position of weakness. Ali Larijani, advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated that a military attack on Iran would mean “gambling with the lives of American soldiers”. Iran acknowledges the potential for significant damage to its strategic infrastructure from a US or Israeli attack but warns that its retaliation would inflict severe consequences on both nations.

Iran has also articulated a broader retaliatory strategy, threatening not only direct retaliation for an attack but also targeting US troops and interests throughout the Middle East, including in allied Arab nations. Such actions could destabilize key regions, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and potentially impact maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This escalation would place the already delicate security balance in several Arab states under immense strain.

Therefore, while Iran-US negotiations are not unprecedented, the current context imbues them with exceptional significance for regional security.

From Saturday talks to Saturday negotiations!

Following several hours of indirect discussions on Saturday, both delegations reported a positive atmosphere. Accounts from both sides regarding the tenor of the talks were largely consistent, with both the Iranian chief negotiator and the White House offering favorable evaluations. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator, described the discussions with the United States as “constructive”, “promising”, and “mutually respectful”. Araghchi said, “I have explained Iran’s position with determination and a forward-looking approach. Both sides have decided to continue this process in a few days.”

Meanwhile, the White House described the initial indirect talks hosted by Oman as “entirely positive and constructive”. The White House emphasized that the parties agreed to resume negotiations the following Saturday.

A notable point reportedly emerging from the US side emphasized a commitment to resolving disputes through diplomacy and dialogue whenever possible.

Initial reactions from both Tehran and Washington presented a consistent and cautiously optimistic narrative. This convergence has fostered a temporary de-escalation following weeks of heightened tension and raised hopes for short-term easing of friction.

Nevertheless, the path forward remains complex and challenging. While initial signals are promising, preparedness for various outcomes is essential. The willingness to continue talks might suggest, for now, that the US is not immediately demanding Iran’s “red lines” – such as the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program or severe restrictions on its missile industry – be met as preconditions. Conversely, Iran seems prepared to offer more substantial assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, potentially including restoring uranium enrichment levels closer to those stipulated in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Barring unforeseen disruptions, it is plausible that future negotiations could address topics such as the easing of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and reduced pressure on purchasers of Iranian oil.

Upcoming negotiation sessions, potentially scheduled for Saturdays, appear poised to be critical junctures for Iran and the broader Middle East, making the outcomes of these weekend discussions highly anticipated.

Risks

Despite the cautiously optimistic mood following the initial talks, significant risks loom over the negotiation process. Chief among these is potential opposition from Israel. Israel may view these talks as undermining its preferred strategy towards Iran and could take actions to disrupt the process. Potential disruptive actions could range from releasing sensitive intelligence on Iran’s nuclear or missile programs to covert operations or targeted provocations, such as assassinations of Iranian officials. Furthermore, influential pro-Israel lobbying efforts in Washington represent a significant factor, potentially shaping the perspectives of US negotiators—an avenue of influence less available to Iran.

Donald Trump’s potential influence and unpredictable nature also represent a significant variable. His political style often involves projecting strength and seeking public acclaim, sometimes employing confrontational rhetoric. This approach can include language perceived as condescending or insulting by negotiating partners. Given Iran’s sensitivity to perceived disrespect or arrogance from the US, such rhetoric could derail negotiations abruptly. Iran’s preference for indirect talks, while perhaps appearing strategically complex, may stem from deep-seated mistrust rooted in historical grievances concerning perceived US arrogance and past policy shifts. Therefore, alongside potential Israeli actions, the unpredictable nature of US politics, particularly concerning figures like Trump, poses a substantial risk to the sustainability of any diplomatic progress.

Internal Iranian politics present another layer of complexity. Significant diplomatic achievements could bolster the political standing of the current Pezeshkian administration. However, such success might also galvanize domestic political opposition. While the current administration under Pezeshkian and negotiator Araghchi may adopt a more cautious public approach compared to their predecessors (like the Rouhani administration and negotiator Jawad Zarif), the risk of internal efforts aimed at undermining the negotiations to discredit the government remains.

Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, noted in a recent interview, “Strangely enough, in these 40 years, whenever we have wanted to open up with various countries, there has always been some negative event either inside or outside the country.”

This historical pattern highlights the potential for similar disruptive incidents to affect the current talks.

On March 28, after “disappearing” from my social circle for nearly 48 hours, I returned to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, coinciding with a new wave of airstrikes by the US and British air forces. Despite the danger at hand, my thoughts were still lingering in the past 48 hours—full of excitement and memories of my journey to and from Saada province and its steep mountains. We were not only among the first group of foreigners invited after the Houthi forces took control of the capital, but also pioneers lucky enough to explore the Houthi headquarters. Although the visit was brief and superficial, everything we saw and heard felt novel and fascinating.

March 26 marked the tenth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab-Islamic coalition’s military intervention in Yemen’s civil war. For the Houthis, it also marked the tenth anniversary of their religious jihad against the Saudi coalition and the United States. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” with the coalition’s air force unleashing bombs and missiles across Yemen under the pretext of saving Yemen’s legitimate government and halting the Houthi advance after their capture of Sana’a.

At 5 a.m. that day, our “international brigade”—comprising former officials, journalists, and scholars from the US, UK, South Africa, Malaysia, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia and China—departed in a convoy arranged by the Houthis to visit their “revolutionary base” and “uprising headquarters” in Saada province.

For security reasons, our trip was kept secret. We departed at dawn when there were few pedestrians or vehicles on the streets. Instead of the armored and bulletproof vehicles we previously used in Sana’a, we traveled in identical white Toyota Land Cruisers, with a lead vehicle flashing lights but sirens off to guide us quietly out of the city.

Less than a week before the end of Ramadan, the city of Sana’a, which had been noisy all night due to evening iftar and pre-dawn suhoor, fell silent at dawn. We drove easily through the dark, sparse streets and left the city smoothly as the sky lightened, heading north on the Chinese-built Sana’a–Saada highway toward Saada city, the provincial capital 230 km away.

Sana’a and Saada, two adjacent inland provinces in Yemen’s northwestern highlands, have no rivers or tall mountains along the route—only continuous brown hills, gravel, and desert. Occasional small green oases provided a glimpse of life on this famously barren ancient land. While the scenery was monotonous and lifeless, it felt fresh and memorable to us.

No matter how far we traveled, on both sides of the road were clusters of short plants—either exposed to the sky or covered with white mesh—densely planted qat trees. Their leaves contain the hallucinogenic substance cathinone and juice that suppresses hunger and boosts alertness. Reportedly, 70% of Yemenis are addicted to qat. Though water is scarce, 60% of it is used to irrigate qat trees. In short, Yemenis can go a day without food, but not without qat.

After traveling nearly 200 km and reaching the border between Sana’a and Saada provinces, our driver told us this area was once occupied by Al-Qaeda and was only fully cleared by the Houthis after 2015. Although the Houthi-controlled area is in a state of war, we didn’t see any signs of conflict—no soldiers, military vehicles, camps, air defense systems, or war scars. Even the few security checkpoints were almost symbolic. In contrast, I experienced far stricter and more numerous checkpoints in southern Iraq last year, making that place seem more dangerous than Yemen.

Our vehicle was playing Yemeni pop songs all the way—rhythmic and powerful, in a typical Arab rap battle style. The melodies were modern and catchy, with tunes that deeply resonated, and the lyrics were passionate and stirring, featuring buzzwords like “Gaza” and “Palestine.” The driver said this was a representative work by a Houthi rap artist named Iras Laith (Iras being the Arabic name for Jesus, and Laith meaning “lion”), whose songs have gone viral globally, especially in the Third World. The U.S. government has reportedly placed a $26 million bounty on him.

Yemeni friends familiar with Irsa said that whenever he performs his rap, his comrades dance the traditional jambiya (curved dagger) dance around him, and his popular songs have seen massive downloads online. A Houthi soldier mentioned that in order to protect Irsa, the Yemeni people have hidden him—just as they’ve hidden their “revolutionary leader,” Hussein’s brother and heir to the cause, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

Three and a half hours later, in a slightly dim and dusty atmosphere, we passed through the “Saada Gate,” damaged by U.S. or Saudi coalition airstrikes, and arrived at this city—considered the “eye of the storm” in Yemen and even the entire Middle East. We checked into the so-called five-star “Yemen Star International Hotel,” a six- or seven-story building. It is located on a side street off Saada’s main road and had clearly just been renovated, possibly even unfinished. We guessed we were among its first guests. Although the hotel lacked internet, it had most basic facilities and satellite TV with various foreign-language channels, including programs from the “Yemen TV” run by the southern government.

During our time in Saada, we experienced a rare extended internet outage, causing an unintentional scare for our families back home. On the morning of the 27th, I happened to see a text alert about a missed call—only then did I realize my daughter and other colleagues and students had tried to reach me multiple times and had been searching for us all night. Since we left the hotel at dawn on the 26th, we had lost connection with our contacts back home via social media and WeChat. In the rush to leave, I hadn’t anticipated a full communication blackout. Before departure, I had only briefly informed a contact at the embassy and a colleague at Xinhua News Agency via WeChat that I was joining the group heading to Saada. Since we didn’t return to Sana’a that day, and I had my phone on silent due to recent daily meetings, it ended up causing needless worry for friends, family, and colleagues. I truly feel sorry—though that’s another story.

Looking out the hotel window, the city of Saada was not large, shielded to the north by hills—about one kilometer wide east to west, and three to four kilometers long north to south. The city consisted mostly of low-rise buildings, many with tin roofs, and only seven or eight mid-rise buildings under ten stories tall. On the sunlit northern hills a few kilometers away, three giant Arabic slogans were spelled out in white stones: “Muhammad,” “Ali,” and “Persistence Means Victory.” The emphasis on the name “Ali” alone reveals the Shia religious identity of the people of Saada.

Yemen’s main population follows the Zaidi sect, the smallest branch of Shia Islam. Zaidis believe in the fifth-generation Imam Zaid, a descendant of Muhammad and Ali, whom they regard as the hidden Mahdi. Because of this, they are also called the “Five-Imam Sect.” Alongside the “Seven-Imam Sect” (Ismaili) and the “Twelve-Imam Sect” (Twelvers), Zaidis form one of the three major Shia branches. Zaidis have primarily survived in Yemen’s Shia-majority population and are theologically closer to Sunnis due to their recognition of the authority of the first four caliphs, making them the most moderate of all Shia sects.

Upon arriving in Saada, after a simple lunch, former Minister of Information Dayfallah al-Shami accompanied us to visit the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombing sites and the Saada Martyrs’ Cemetery. One site bombed by the U.S. was a cancer center under construction. At the scene, at least two top floors had been pierced by missiles, and the floor below had partially collapsed. Some group members found an unexploded heavy bomb in the basement. According to the site manager, this was the site of the March 24 U.S. bombing. No casualty information was mentioned.

After leaving the U.S. bombing site, we were taken to visit bombing sites left behind by the Saudi-led coalition. Along the way were several ruins, but our hosts specifically took us to see two bombed-out buildings at Saada University, one of which was a student dormitory. It’s said the bombings occurred around 2017. Desks and chairs under the rubble suggested that part of the facility had indeed been classrooms or laboratories. The seats scattered outside had been eroded by wind and rain, leaving only rusted metal frames… As for why the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombed civilian facilities, only the historical archives may one day tell us the truth.

On the 24th, while in Sana’a, we had also visited one U.S. and one Saudi coalition bombing site respectively. The U.S. strike was said to be on a residential building, but the remains didn’t look like a home—there were no signs of domestic items. Organizers said 15 people were injured and two died, though we weren’t arranged to visit any of the wounded in the hospital. The Saudi coalition site was from a few years ago and reportedly extremely tragic: over 800 people attending a funeral were “deliberately” bombed, resulting in more than 150 deaths and around 600 injuries.

What struck us the most was the Saada “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” where hundreds of war victims lie. Especially heartbreaking was the “Children’s Martyrs’ Corner,” where dozens of boys and girls who died prematurely are buried. In front of their flower-like portraits, mourners had placed bunches of fake flowers. Four of the deceased children were from the same family—it seemed they perished together in a single car, the twisted wreckage of which now hangs above their resting place. Previously, we had also visited a “Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Sana’a, but the emotional weight there couldn’t compare to the children’s section in Saada.

After our first day in Saada, we returned to the hotel together in a minibus. On the way back, we passed through the main street, where the run-down buildings resembled those in Sana’a. Infrastructure was very poor, and street shops were mostly ordinary stores, repair shops, eateries, or fruit stands. The streets were packed with people, and puddles and mud from recent rain made the roads chaotic. Cars and motorbikes weaved wildly, and there wasn’t a single traffic light on the main street. A few traffic police vaguely attempted to direct traffic. What caught my eye most was that nearly every motorcycle carried three or four children—an indirect sign of Yemen’s high birthrate and youth-heavy population.

That night in Saada wasn’t peaceful. Our thoughtful hosts knocked on the door to ask if we needed toiletries. We politely declined and hinted not to be disturbed again. However, at midnight, they knocked again and brought a large bag of unopened pajamas and toiletries, which was quite touching. In the deep of night, as we were fast asleep, they knocked a third time to deliver a hearty breakfast—flatbread, chickpea paste, eggs, drinks, and mineral water—placing the tray at our door.

Around noon on the 27th, our hosts, having taken a good nap after iftar, appeared leisurely in the hotel lobby and “suddenly” informed us that we would be going to Maran, a town on the northern border of Saada province, 70 kilometers away, to visit the hometown of Hussein, the founder of the Houthi movement. It was another unexpected delight. We divided into Toyota off-road vehicles, crossed Saada city, and headed for the northern mountains of the province bordering Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the week, all our activities had been notified at the last minute. We were never told in advance who we would meet—not even the drivers knew our next stop; they were only told to follow. Due to the wartime situation and open threats from Israel and the U.S. to assassinate Houthi leaders, the secrecy of our movements was for the safety of both our hosts and us foreign guests. We fully understood this and respected the principle: “guests follow the host.”

Heading north from Saada, the 70-kilometer journey involved crossing mountain after mountain—the farther we went, the higher the mountains, and the steeper the roads. Although the quality of the mountain roads rivaled provincial highways back home, they were still winding and twisty, taking two full hours for a one-way trip. Unlike the semi-hilly, semi-desert landscape along the Sana’a–Saada highway, this mountainous route revealed large oases, terraced fields, sparse trees, and even streams and small dams, indicating that northern Saada is a relatively agriculturally developed area, though still mostly at a subsistence level of natural economy.

Approaching the birthplace of the Houthi movement—the town of Maran, where Hussein launched his rebellion—the terrain was dominated by towering ridgeline mountains running east-west, averaging over 200 meters in height. Each mountain had three to five typical Yemeni earth buildings about ten meters tall. The mountains around Maran are densely packed, with earthen buildings scattered across peaks, forming a breathtaking skyline that resembled a miniature “Great Wall.” The scene evoked an ancient system of warning beacons, signaling threats across great distances.

Below this “Great Wall” were clusters of earth buildings that resembled a mix between farmhouses, forest forts, and watchtowers. These provided shelter from the elements for local farmers and served as strongholds against outside threats. This remote area—far from the centers of power in both Yemen and neighboring countries—offered an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare. It’s here that the Houthi movement was born, grew strong, suffered setbacks, and rose again—ultimately expanding from Yemen’s northwest corner to take over much of the country.

Finally, deep in the mountains, just 20 kilometers from the Saudi border and adjacent to the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran, we arrived at Maran—a small, picturesque town nestled in the hills. This was Hussein’s hometown and resting place, located in a naturally defensible spot with steep terrain.

The Houthi forces built a majestic “Martyrs’ Cemetery” on a high point resembling an eagle’s beak, constructed primarily in off-white stone and offering panoramic views of the surrounding mountains. On the town’s broadest hilltop—nearly 1,000 square meters—they also built a grand marble plaza for Hussein’s tomb. At the center lies a beautifully crafted rectangular sarcophagus engraved with Quranic verses. Along a long flight of concrete stairs descending the mountain, another burial site can be found, along with a cave where Hussein once hid from government troops during the early revolutionary days.

Shami, our guide and recently resigned Minister of Information, accompanied us throughout. He vividly narrated the life of Hussein and the legends of the Houthi movement, especially the six-year “First War” from 2004 to 2010, recounting dramatic life-and-death struggles between the Houthis and the government, and the key figures who played roles in that era.

What stood out was Shami’s emphasis that the Houthi movement doesn’t operate on a cycle of revenge and has moved beyond tribal narrow-mindedness. Many former mortal enemies who once exchanged gunfire with them are now colleagues and comrades, holding positions in the Houthi-led administration. In fact, none of the Houthi officials who accompanied us to Saada—including the escorts, bodyguards, and drivers—were from Saada. They hailed from Sana’a, Ibb, Marib, and even more distant provinces. Former Houthi Prime Minister Habtoor, whom I had interacted with several times, is from Aden and once served as its governor—suggesting he is likely a Sunni Muslim.

My Houthi friends told me that they don’t differentiate by sect or region; they believe in “One Yemeni Family.” The Houthi movement’s ability to sweep through northwest Yemen and ultimately control more than half the country would have been impossible without such inclusiveness.

In 1962, a republican revolution broke out in North Yemen, ending more than 1,000 years of Zaidi Imamate theocratic rule. Afterward, Zaidi elites and the population found themselves caught between the internal pressure of Yemen’s secular republicanism and external pressure from Saudi-supported Sunni Salafism, and were gradually marginalized. In 1992, aiming to revive “Zaidism,” religious leader Hussein from Saada established the “Believing Youth” movement. Through religious schooling and preaching, it spread religious and political ideas, resisting the republican regime led by Saleh internally and countering Saudi ideological expansion externally, while also laying out a vision for an Iranian-style Islamic regime.

In 1994, four years after Yemeni unification, civil war broke out. Hussein, who belonged to the same powerful Hashid tribe as Saleh, led Saada tribal militias to help the government suppress the southern rebellion—partly out of tribal interests and other political calculations—thereby growing his own power.

After 2001, as the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Saleh government was forced to align with the U.S., supporting troop deployments to both countries. While the Houthis did not support international terrorism, they consistently adhered to anti-American and anti-Zionist ideology, focused on liberating Islamic lands and reviving Islam. This caused the two sides to become enemies again. In 2004, a six-year civil war broke out between the Houthis and government forces. Hussein was killed early in the conflict. His successors renamed the “Believing Youth” to the “Houthis” in his honor, vowing to carry on his fight until a ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. The country plunged into political chaos. Losing both military and popular support, and abandoned by the Hashid tribe, Saleh was forced to resign. With backing from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the Hadi government—mainly supported by southern factions—was established. In 2014, amid efforts to form a federal system, the Houthis rebelled again, claiming their interests were not being protected. They swiftly entered the capital, seized power, and—teaming up with Saleh for the third time—set up parallel administrative and legislative institutions to replace the Hadi government, forcing it into exile in Saudi Arabia.

On March 25, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a “Ten-Nation Coalition” of Arab and Islamic countries to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, and on March 26 officially began airstrikes against the Houthis—ushering in a new phase of the conflict. The Houthis declared Saudi Arabia, its allies, and their Western backer, the United States, as enemies. The following year, with Jordan and others mediating, the Houthis began peace talks with the coalition. In 2017, Saleh—accused by the Houthis of betrayal and of negotiating for personal gain—broke ranks. Disputes over military control further escalated tensions. Eventually, Saleh was intercepted and executed by the Houthis while fleeing Sana’a.

By 2023, the Houthis had become a powerful force, controlling half the country. They extended Hussein’s anti-American, anti-Israel ideology abroad and, for the first time, intervened in the Israel-Palestine conflict. They became a solid pillar of the “Axis of Resistance,” opened a front in the Red Sea, targeted Israel, and even launched airstrikes deep inside Israeli territory—triggering military retaliation from the U.S., U.K., and others.

On the night of the 27th, after having iftar in Saada, we concluded our rapid tour of the Houthi stronghold and began our overnight journey back to Sana’a. The drive took nearly four hours, with no streetlights along the way—our young driver relied entirely on his familiarity with the roads. He had been driving all day, and we worried about whether he had the strength to stay alert. But Yemenis have their own way—both the driver and the bodyguard riding shotgun kept chewing qat leaves for energy, seasoned by years of battlefield experience. The bodyguard, only 23 years old, was already a veteran with five years of combat experience.

While we were away from Sana’a, media reports indicated that the U.S. and U.K. had launched airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport and other targets. Shortly after midnight, we returned to the noisy city of Sana’a. We had barely settled into our hotel for half an hour, just beginning to notify friends and family via WeChat, when a series of thunderous explosions erupted in the clear night sky. The sound of F-16 fighter jets circling overhead followed, along with sporadic anti-aircraft fire. Drawing on my extensive frontline experience in Gaza and Baghdad, I could almost identify every model of jet, missile, bomb, or bullet just by sound. My immediate reaction: “The U.S. is launching an airstrike.” And this was the first time during my week in Yemen that I directly experienced and heard a U.S. strike.

On the 29th, I left Yemen as planned, bidding farewell to the Houthi movement, with whom I had only just begun to interact and was far from familiar. Yet, the Houthis have now risen to become a key part of the “Axis of Resistance” and an important player on the Middle Eastern stage. This political “celebrity” or “nouveau riche” type of non-state actor, despite Yemen’s extreme poverty and streets full of struggling citizens, has positioned itself as the backbone and vanguard of “Palestinian liberation.” In my view, its enthusiastic promotion of the Palestinian cause is a strategy aimed at shielding itself under the banners of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism, using the turmoil it stirs in the Middle East—especially in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean—to gain broader domestic, regional, and international legitimacy. Ultimately, this is a bid to force the international community to recognize it as Yemen’s sole legitimate representative, or at the very least, to secure dominance and voice in the process of forming a joint government.

This trip may not have yielded every possible gain, but it still brought many insights—some even unexpected. That said, the regrets are obvious. Despite our repeated requests, we never got the chance to visit the front lines to see Houthi soldiers, equipment, or camps. We had no opportunity to speak with their top leader—Hussein’s brother and successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. We didn’t visit the crucial Red Sea port city of Hudaydah under Houthi control, let alone conduct a full investigation in rival-controlled areas like Aden or Taiz.

Fouad, an advisor to the Houthi “Prime Minister” who coordinated my entire visit, tried to reassure me, saying, “It’s okay. Come again next year. We’ll take you to Aden, or anywhere else you want to go.” This wasn’t just his personal wish—it likely reflects the broader ambition of the Houthis to one day unify and rule the entire country.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

The Houthi War: The “Sixth Middle East War” and the Palestinian Narrative