Diplomacy
Economic sanctions, a political tool
Sanctions are a part of international diplomacy in today’s world, applied by sanctioning countries as a non-military tool to force the target countries to respond in a desired manner. In fact, sanctions are an economic weapon in the field of non-military struggle that takes diplomacy beyond the level of negotiation and into the realm of action.
Sanctions are usually designed in terms of three objectives: offensive, defensive, and communicative.
In the offensive dimension, the goal of the sanctioning country is to change a specific behavior of the target country. In other words, the sanctioning country tries to change the behavior and actions of the sanctioned state by applying pressure. In the defensive dimension, the goal of the sanction is to slow down the development process and reduce the strategic capabilities of the target country.
In the communication dimension, sanctions can be used as a tool to convey the message of the sanctioning country’s dissatisfaction with the policies or actions of the sanctioned country. Sanctions are imposed on countries in both political and economic areas. In the political dimension, the goal of sanctions is to force the target country to comply with the policies of the sanctioning countries. These types of sanctions can be imposed with goals such as overthrowing the political system of the target country or demonstrating the power of the sanctioning country.
In the economic dimension, sanctions may be imposed to pressure a country to change its political behavior or to destabilize the economy and domestic politics of the target country. Sanctions can be imposed unilaterally, multilaterally, or comprehensively. Unilateral sanctions are imposed by one country against another without regard to UN Security Council resolutions.
Comprehensive or global sanctions are adopted by international bodies such as the United Nations or the Security Council and are intended to change the policy or behavior of the targeted country. Multilateral sanctions are imposed by several countries or international organizations with different motives and often have a greater impact on the sanctioned country.
Economic sanctions
One of the most common types of sanctions globally is economic sanctions, which are implemented with the aim of weakening the economic power of the target country. In this type of sanction, the sanctioning country attempts to expose the target government’s inefficiency and make it appear incapable of responding to the needs of its citizens.
Economic sanctions inflict a heavy blow on the country’s economy; they cause a decrease in national output, a depreciation of the currency, an increase in unemployment, a rise in prices, and a budget deficit. These sanctions also lead to a significant decrease in gross domestic product, a decrease in exports and imports, an outflow of foreign capital, and a contraction in international investment.
A country that is subject to severe economic sanctions will, over time, face economic fragility and disrupt the balance between supply and demand, which will ultimately lead to economic stagnation.
Economic sanctions as a political tool
Hegemonic powers such as the United States, due to their political, economic, ideological, and military superiority, have always tried to shape the international system based on their interests and institutionalize the acceptance of their hegemony among other countries. Economic sanctions are an alternative to military power and reflect the anger and dissatisfaction of the sanctioning country with the policies of the target country.
United States uses economic sanctions as an effective political tool to impose its demands and national interests
These sanctions are usually imposed against developing countries or political regimes opposed to the United States.
Economic sanctions can have profound negative consequences in the political, social, economic, and legal spheres. These types of sanctions can also be called “international sanctions” because they are implemented with the aim of imposing trade restrictions, investment bans, increasing customs tariffs, restricting financial relations, and preventing the transfer of technology.
Economic sanctions can be imposed for a variety of reasons, but one of the most important is to change the political system of the target country. Sanctions are sometimes not only intended to isolate a country, but can also serve to overthrow its political system. A historical example of this type of sanctions is the economic and political pressure on Iran during the prime ministership of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh.
After the nationalization of the oil industry in 1950, Britain and the United States imposed an oil embargo and imposed severe financial restrictions to suppress this anti-colonial movement. These sanctions, aimed at weakening the Iranian economy, led to internal crises and ultimately the coup of 1953 that overthrew the Mossadegh government.
Sanctions are often designed to create internal unrest by pressuring the public and creating public discontent, in the hope that this discontent will lead to regime change. Another reason for imposing sanctions is to change the policy and policy of the target country.
Sanctions are powerful tools in international relations and are sometimes designed to force target countries to change their policies.
The purpose of sanctions, or so-called restrictions and pressure, is to force the target country to accept the demands of the international community or the sanctioning country. This pressure is usually applied in the form of economic, trade, financial or even diplomatic barriers.
The sanctioning country attempts to force the policymakers of the target country to change course and accept its demands by increasing costs and reducing benefits. Sanctions create indirect pressure on policymakers and decision-makers by affecting the country’s economic and social structure.
These sanctions restrict trade by reducing access to financial resources, technology, and technology, and cause welfare problems for citizens. The combination of factors that sanctions impose on the social and economic structure of society leads to the formation of public dissatisfaction and internal pressure on the government.
Prominent examples of sanctions aimed at changing the domestic policy of the target country were the sanctions imposed by the United Nations and Western countries on South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. These sanctions were imposed due to apartheid and racial discrimination policies and included trade restrictions, sports embargoes, and blocking access to international financial markets.
Economic pressures, trade restrictions, and diplomatic isolation forced the South African government to move toward a more democratic and open system. Another important example is the sanctions imposed on Iran by the UN Security Council, the European Union, and the United States over its nuclear program.
These sanctions, which intensified in the early 2000s, imposed restrictions on oil exports, imports of sensitive technologies, and access to the global banking system. The aim of these sanctions was to force Iran to halt sensitive nuclear activities.
Sanctions are also imposed to weaken the economic structure of the target country
This effective tool limits the executive power of the target country to advance policies by reducing its financial and economic strength. This is done by creating barriers to access to global markets, advanced technologies, exports and imports, and freezing foreign assets.
Such restrictions can disrupt supply chains, reduce foreign exchange earnings, and halt the target country’s development or military programs. A prime example of these effects is the sanctions imposed on Iran, which have had particularly devastating effects on the oil and gas sector.
Declining oil revenues have led to a decline in domestic investment, high inflation, and a devaluation of the national currency. Banking sanctions have also restricted international trade, making it difficult to import essential goods and increasing economic and social pressure.
Sanctions accelerate the process of policy change by targeting the economic structure of the target country. In this type of sanctions, international financial resources are blocked and the bank accounts and foreign exchange reserves of the target country are frozen. This blockage increases the costs of production and imports and ultimately leads to the inability of the target country to pay its debts.
When exports and imports are restricted, key industries such as oil and gas are affected. Economic restrictions prevent access to advanced technologies and hinder economic development. This leads to higher inflation rates, economic stagnation, devaluation of the national currency, reduced foreign investment, and increased unemployment, ultimately putting more domestic pressure on the government.
Sanctions are often imposed in response to specific actions by countries.
These actions may include human rights violations, support for terrorism, or military aggression. Examples of this type of sanctions include sanctions imposed on Russia for its annexation of Crimea and its military aggression against Ukraine.
In response to the invasion of Ukraine, the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Security Council imposed sweeping sanctions that have dealt a heavy blow to the Russian economy. These sanctions have included the removal of Russian banks from the SWIFT financial system, the freezing of central bank assets, and restrictions on dollar and euro transactions. Exports of advanced technology, military equipment, and sensitive industries such as oil and gas to Russia have also been banned. These measures have led to a depreciation of the ruble, rising inflation, and stagnation in key sectors of the Russian economy. Restrictions on access to foreign currency and advanced technologies have posed serious challenges to Russian industries.
In fact, economic sanctions are political tools that powerful and hegemonic countries use to implement national interests, exert power, and control the international order. Economic sanctions can cause a decrease in production, a collapse in the value of the national currency, an increase in unemployment, a decrease in investment, and inflation.
These sanctions are designed with various motives and goals and are usually imposed by developed countries against developing countries. These pressures are applied with the aim of forcing countries to accept the policies of the sanctioning country and have both positive and negative consequences. Economic pressure and sanctions cause inflation and public discontent, which can lead to political and social instability in the target country.
On the positive side, sanctions may lead to greater self-sufficiency, de-dependence, and independence for the sanctioned country. Sanctions force governments to increase their focus on domestic production and take measures to counter the pressures.
Diplomacy
FIFA abandons $4.2 billion commercial stake sale following widespread revolt
FIFA and Gianni Infantino have backed down from plans to sell a stake in the organization’s commercial and event operations following widespread backlash.
In a statement issued late Friday night, the embattled FIFA president said:
“After carefully listening to all views, it has become clear that this project, regardless of the level of support, causes divisions that are now contrary to the interests of the objective originally established. Our goal has always been, and will always be, to unite and improve. As a result, this proposal will not be implemented.”
Infantino’s proposal met with fierce resistance from UEFA, CONCACAF, and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC).
UEFA indicated that all 55 of its members would boycott FIFA competitions, including the World Cup, if the plans remained on the table.
In its statement, FIFA noted that “nobody is selling football,” and while asserting that it “acknowledges and respects the feedback and concerns expressed publicly,” emphasized that it would continue to implement suggestions.
It added that it “reaffirms its commitment to an open and democratic process of consultation.”
Shortly after FIFA issued its statement, the AFC released its own declaration of solidarity with UEFA and the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF).
Infantino subsequently suffered two major internal blows.
First, his adviser Carlos Cordeiro resigned from his position, sharply criticizing the plan in a statement as “a bad deal for FIFA member associations, a bad deal for football, and a bad deal for the long-term future of the game.”
Then, FIFA Chief Operating Officer Kevin Lamour told the Associated Press that staff felt “deceived” by Infantino and that after raising the issue, he would “sleep better, even at the cost of losing his job.”
Lamour said:
“This is the project of a single person. Leaving aside that this project should not proceed… it is now time for the political leaders of world football to ask themselves the right questions and make the right decisions.”
These developments left Infantino cornered, and by Friday afternoon, numerous figures within the organization—speaking to The Athletic on condition of anonymity to protect their jobs—believed it was no longer a question of “if” the cord would be cut, but “when.”
Joshua Kushner’s venture capital firm Thrive had not withdrawn from the deal as of Friday night, but that became moot when FIFA management ultimately decided to kill the project via a public statement.
Joshua Kushner is the brother of Jared Kushner, the son-in-law of Donald Trump.
On Tuesday, world football’s governing body had announced its intention to establish FIFA Forward Enterprises (FFE), a new private entity to manage its flagship events, including the World Cup and the Club World Cup, with plans to sell a 21% minority stake in FFE to external investors.
The sale was targeted to generate $4.2 billion (£3.2 billion) in revenue. FIFA stated that this amount could be immediately distributed to its 211 member associations under a new funding stream named the “FIFA Fast-Forward Program” (FFFP).
Under the plan, FIFA’s total development funding would have exceeded $10 billion over the next four years.
Despite mounting criticism in recent days, FIFA confirmed that if member associations opposed the FFE plan but the proposal was accepted, the dissenting federations would each receive $20 million (£14.9 million) for the 2027–30 cycle, regardless of whether shares in FFE were sold to private investors (to be followed by $22 million for 2031–34 and $24 million for 2035–38).
However, had a given member association accepted the FFE proposal, it would have received $40 million for the 2027–30 period, with subsequent payouts remaining the same.
The three confederations that explicitly took a stand against FIFA’s plan represent 137 of the 211 FIFA member associations.
FIFA had stated that for the proposal to move forward, it required the approval of a majority of the 211 member associations as well as the 37-member FIFA Council, which consists of Infantino and eight FIFA vice presidents.
Strategic reactions and leadership crisis
South American football confederation CONMEBOL did not reject the plans in a statement on Friday, but noted that financial and commercial decisions “must always serve the interests of football and never take precedence over the essence of the game.”
According to a report by The Athletic, Infantino’s future leadership of FIFA was called into question during UEFA and CONCACAF meetings held on Thursday.
Infantino assumed the FIFA presidency in February 2016, succeeding Sepp Blatter, and was expected to run unopposed in the next election scheduled for March 2027.
There is also talk among European officials of putting forward Nasser Al-Khelaifi, the Qatari CEO of beIN Media, to run against Infantino.
Lise Klaveness, President of the Norwegian Football Federation, told VG: “My clear impression right now is that he has suffered a major loss of trust. We did not vote for him last time and were skeptical about this. There are many good aspects to FIFA, but if you take a lax approach to governance principles and rules, you lose trust quickly.”
Diplomacy
Defense Priorities director warns US air strategy in Middle East faces tactical limits
The collapse of a tentative memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, coupled with the diminishing strategic returns of American air power, has left the United States locked in an unsustainable, low-intensity conflict with Iran, according to Benjamin Friedman, Policy Director at the Washington-based think tank Defense Priorities.
Speaking in an interview on the YouTube channel Harici with host Sarp Sinan Hacır, Friedman attributed the failure of the short-lived US-Iran memorandum primarily to the Trump administration’s diplomatic missteps, vague draft language, and unrealistic expectations regarding a comprehensive settlement.
“Both sides really deserve some blame, but the Trump administration deserves the bulk of the blame for drafting an agreement that was so vague on key terms,” Friedman said, citing ambiguities surrounding the timeline for unfreezing Iranian assets and the scope of American commitments to restrain Israeli military operations in Lebanon.
Friedman emphasized that deep-seated mistrust in Tehran, exacerbated by repeated instances where diplomatic engagement was followed by Israeli or American military strikes, led Iranian negotiators to adopt an unyielding posture. At the same time, he noted that Iran likely miscalculated by using disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz to aggressively force leverage.
“The Trump administration remained intent on this sort of grand bargain that would restrain Iran seeking weapons development… and I think they continue to misread the Iranian willingness to sign that kind of deal,” Friedman noted, adding that Tehran viewed its leverage over the Strait of Hormuz as essential despite the risk of provoking further strikes.
Expressing deep skepticism over the prospects for a lasting diplomatic breakthrough, Friedman criticized the administration’s reliance on informal envoys such as Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner over professional diplomatic channels, predicting that the baseline outcome will remain an unpredictable, episodic conflict.
“What’s more likely is a kind of on-off-again kind of war—sort of what we’re in now, where we have occasional strikes, with the United States perhaps by accident adopting the Israeli model of ‘mowing the lawn’ periodically,” Friedman said.
Addressing the efficacy of US air power, Friedman argued that military operations against Iranian targets have reached a point of diminishing returns. While early strikes successfully eliminated critical high-value assets—such as over-the-horizon radar systems that targeted anti-ship missiles—Iran’s ballistic missile and long-range drone capabilities remain largely intact and operational.
He pointed to a recent strike on a base hosting US personnel in Jordan, launched from western Iran over a distance exceeding 1,000 kilometers, as evidence of Tehran’s sustained strike precision and the tactical limits of American interdiction efforts.
“The war is a failure for air power even in a tactical sense,” Friedman stated. “Initially, we looked at it and said we had a lot of success in destroying targets, but as more information came out, it turned out they had maybe more than half of their missiles and launchers survive the initial phase of the war.”
Friedman observed that the global proliferation of low-cost, high-precision guidance technology has permanently altered the strategic landscape, neutralizing the traditional invulnerability of forward-deployed US installations. “The precise effects of air power that used to be almost a monopoly of the United States… is actually making our posture in the region less sustainable,” he said, warning that similar vulnerabilities would be vastly amplified in any potential high-intensity conflict with China.
As an alternative to open-ended military engagement, Friedman suggested that Washington consider a complete military withdrawal from the region, even if it entails accepting Iranian transit fees on commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. “The cost of preventing that through perpetual outbursts of warfare is much higher than just accepting it,” he noted.
Turning to regional dynamics, Friedman addressed Israel’s current absence from active strike operations against Iran, characterizing it as a calculated move to preserve its own air defense interceptors while relying on Washington to bear the operational and political burdens of containment.
On European security and the broader alliance structure, Friedman offered a critical assessment of the NATO summit in Ankara and the administration’s “NATO 3.0” concept. He described the white paper led by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth as an effort to coerce European states into escalating defense expenditures and purchasing American hardware under the threat of reduced security guarantees, rather than executing a structured, strategic US posture adjustment.
“This is not a real US withdrawal; it’s a kind of pressure to up your loyalty in a particular way,” Friedman said, noting that major European powers such as Germany, France, and the UK lack a compelling existential incentive to construct independent, large-scale conventional war-fighting capabilities.
Regarding bilateral relations with Ankara, Friedman noted that US-Turkish tensions have eased considerably following the shift in American posture in Syria and progress toward resolving long-standing friction points, including the F-35 program and S-400 procurement. He added that while Israeli leadership under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has expressed frustration over Washington’s constructive engagement with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the White House has maintained its strategic course despite pressure from domestic pro-Israel lobbying groups.
Addressing internal Republican Party dynamics, Friedman highlighted the evolving public stance of Vice President J.D. Vance, whose cautious criticism of Israeli influence and emphasis on divergent national interests reflects broader ideological shifts within the conservative base.
“Vance is more representative of the shift in the Republican Party,” Friedman said. “He’s criticizing them in a limited way and saying, ‘Our interests are different.’ From the perspective of those of us who would like the United States to have a more distant relationship from Israel, it’s progress.”
Looking ahead to the upcoming US midterm elections, Friedman anticipated that a loss of congressional control by the Republican Party would severely curtail the administration’s domestic executive overreach, though its structural impact on foreign policy execution and Middle Eastern operations would remain comparatively limited.
Diplomacy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham pledges full support to Ukraine in meeting with Zelenskyy
UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham has met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Portsmouth, England.
Zelenskyy is the first world leader Burnham has met in person since taking office, with the prime minister committing to building a “firm partnership” between the United Kingdom and Ukraine.
Demonstrating their support, the two leaders toured a military base in Portsmouth where 200 Ukrainian troops are currently undergoing naval training exercises.
Burnham described his meeting with the Ukrainian president as “warm” and said he plans to visit Ukraine soon.
“We will build this together and address the various issues President Zelenskyy is facing, many of which we discussed today,” Burnham said.
The meeting follows an announcement by London that it will share intellectual property rights to assist Kyiv’s war effort.
The new prime minister announced that the UK will share the “Stone Cloak” electronic warfare system—which is fitted to drones to prevent detection—and will assist Ukraine in mass-producing the technology.
Burnham has focused primarily on domestic matters since replacing Keir Starmer, who faced criticism from elements within his own party for spending too much time abroad and focusing heavily on foreign affairs.
However, Burnham sought to signal continuity in Britain’s policy toward Ukraine. In one of his first phone calls after becoming prime minister last week, Burnham invited Zelenskyy to visit the UK “as soon as possible.”
Starmer spent his final full day as prime minister in Kyiv, where he announced £255 million in funding for Ukraine.
Speaking to Sky on Monday, Zelenskyy said his telephone conversation with Burnham had been “very good.”
The Ukrainian leader noted that Starmer had previously assured him that “the new government would maintain the policy of supporting Ukraine during the war.”
The new prime minister told the Ukrainian leader it was “no coincidence” that he was his first international visitor since moving into Downing Street.
“The purpose of this is to send a very clear message. We stand 100% with Ukraine, I personally stand 100% with you, and I will fully deliver on every commitment this country has made to Ukraine,” Burnham said.
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