On 24 September, the Institute of Global Studies of Shanghai University organised a workshop on ‘Türkiye’s Re-Asia Initiative’.

Moderated by Prof. Guo Changgang, Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University, the workshop discussed China and Türkiye’s foreign policies, the rising global South, the BRICS agenda and Türkiye’s membership bid.

Opening the event, Prof. Guo Changgang said: “As Ankara is applying to join BRICS, it is a good time to talk about Türkiye’s Asia policy,” highlighting the Re-Asia Initiative.

“Türkiye’s efforts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and participate in ASEAN show that Türkiye has adopted a ‘pendulum’ position between the West and the East,” said Prof. Dr. Gürol Baba of Ankara Social Sciences University. Gürol Baba said Türkiye’s move to join BRICS will make it a more ‘visible’ actor in the region: “Türkiye is an active middle power. It should cooperate with like-minded powers. For example, Türkiye is a founding member of the MIKTA group. BRICS is also a place where Türkiye can find like-minded countries. Baba said Türkiye wanted to keep East and West together in its foreign policy.

Prof Zou Zhigiang of Fudan University said: ‘Türkiye is changing its Asia policy. This is because an Asia that is economically and technologically confident, competitive and rising in every sense cannot be ignored. Türkiye is currently seeking to increase its engagement in the region. President Erdoğan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in 2022 for the first time as a NATO country. It has also been confirmed that Türkiye has applied to join BRICS,” he said. Prof Zou summed up why Türkiye attaches such importance to Asia in 4 points:

1. Accumulated frustration with the West and the European Union. It is now clear that Türkiye’s EU membership will not happen in the near future.

2. Türkiye is seeking strategic autonomy. It wants to be a central power in the world and pursue a balanced policy. It wants to be a centre between East and West and not give up its NATO membership.

3. The growing global influence and attractiveness of the SCO and BRICS.

4. Türkiye’s domestic economy faces challenges. New economic markets and capital inflows are vital for Türkiye.

Prof Zhou Shixin of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies commented on China’s Asia policy:

“China is seen by the US as the biggest threat, so it is blocked and ostracised by the US and some of its allies. China-US relations are one of the most important factors driving the regional power shift and order transition in the Asia-Pacific. China is expanding its presence and increasing its influence in the Asia-Pacific. China is acting as a modern and sovereign country, making great efforts to defend its territorial integrity and sovereign independence and to achieve national reunification. China also seeks peaceful and equal coexistence and interaction with the US, but does not seek to coerce the US. China seeks to strengthen security and economic relations with more regional countries on the basis of the principles of ‘friendship, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness’. China seeks to manage and resolve territorial disputes with its neighbours primarily through bilateral diplomatic consultations and negotiations”.

Commenting on Türkiye’s Asia Re-entry Initiative, Prof. Zhou said that Ankara has demonstrated its willingness to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy based on the Strategic Depth Doctrine and made the following suggestions: “Türkiye can focus more on Southeast Asia rather than South Asia and Northeast Asia, Türkiye can interact with Asia-Pacific countries as a sovereign country, not as a NATO member, even with Japan and South Korea. Türkiye could promote more economic cooperation rather than security cooperation, Türkiye could apply to join the ASEAN Regional Forum as an Asian country, and Türkiye could negotiate more free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific countries beyond South Korea (1 May 2013), Malaysia (1 August 2015) and Singapore (1 October 2017) before joining the EU. As a result, China is willing to help Türkiye further coordinate with some regional countries.”

Prof Zhou Yiqi of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies spoke about China’s Middle East policy:

“There are four major parties in the Middle East: Arab countries, Israel, Iran and Türkiye. China has strengthened its relations with most of the major powers there. However, Türkiye remains the only party that has not yet signed a partnership agreement with China. Diplomatic relations between the two: Strategic Cooperation Relations. Although relations between China and Israel are rather poor, there is still a relationship of innovative partnership. In addition, China has successfully negotiated the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. China’s partnership between these two countries has become a bridge that brings them together.

The traditional stereotype is that China is only interested in economic issues and is a free rider on security in the region. However, after its mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its efforts to bring peace to Gaza, China has become an active player in Middle East security issues. However, this still differs from US efforts to use the alliance as a bargaining chip. China has always been quite fair in the Middle East, which has earned it trust. But it is also on the side of justice, for example on the Palestinian issue.”

Commenting on Türkiye’s Re-Asia Initiative, Prof. Zhou Yiqi said: “I think it is important for Türkiye to improve its relations with China, because China-Türkiye relations are even weaker than China-Israel relations. China is looking for stability in the face of apparent uncertainty. But I don’t understand why the foreign minister went back to Türkiye and suddenly raised taxes on electric cars imported from China. Such issues have become a hot topic on Chinese social media and this is definitely not positive for people-to-people understanding,” he said.

Dr Selçuk Aydın of Boğaziçi University commented on Türkiye’s relations with Asia:

“The origins of modern Türkiye go back to the early 19th century. The biggest event of that period was the abolition of the Janissaries. In other words, while the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a transformation, this process was expressed with a ‘new’ term. If we look back to the 1920s, there were again discussions about ‘New Türkiye’. When Erdoğan came to power, all the news was about ‘New Türkiye’. In fact, Asia is nothing new for Türkiye; it already has historical, cultural and religious links. I think Dr Serdar has been working on Uighur and Xinjiang issues. Historically, this region has been very connected and interacted with Türkiye.

Secondly, Türkiye’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is a great initiative. There is a mystery in Türkiye about China and in China about Türkiye. How is Türkiye perceived? For China, the concept of Türkiye is probably limited to NATO. Then there is the Xinjiang issue. There are two important issues that hinder Türkiye’s cooperation with China.

The first step we need to discuss is Türkiye’s dissatisfaction with what the US is forcing it to do in the Middle East. Especially the Syria incident. That was a turning point in diplomacy. Another example is the FETO case. Gulen had a close relationship with the US and there was a coup attempt. After this incident, Türkiye’s diplomatic direction changed. After the Arab Spring, Türkiye realised that the US did not support liberal movements in the Middle East, but only focused on its own interests. Subsequently, Türkiye became more involved in Middle Eastern affairs, for example by mobilising its military abroad in Syria, Azerbaijan and elsewhere.

We need to analyse Türkiye’s foreign policy from these perspectives. First, history, which is also intertwined with religion. The Ottoman Empire was the centre of the Caliphate. The second is the racial dimension, which also bears traces of the late Ottoman Empire. Turkish consulates are therefore the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy. The third pillar of Turkish policy is the promotion of a non-Western approach. This is related to the foundations of modern Türkiye and is very anti-colonialist. At the same time, Türkiye is geographically close to Western countries and has historically cooperated with them.

Türkiye’s neighbours are often in civil war or conflict. So Türkiye has to look to Asia, because China has incredible lessons to teach in that region. China may be the only superpower that wants peace in the Middle East.”

Commenting on Türkiye-China relations, Dr Serdar Yurtçiçek said:

“Professor Yiqi mentioned that there are four important powers in the Middle East (Türkiye, Arabia, Iran and Israel) and although China has very good relations with three of them, it has not been able to improve its relations with Türkiye. The reason for this is the Uighur issue, as Selçuk mentioned earlier. Since 2016, I have been living in China and researching Türkiye’s China policy. During this time, I have met many Chinese academics and politicians. The conclusion I have drawn from my experience and research is that the most important issue between Türkiye and China is the Uyghur issue, and unless this issue is resolved, all other areas of cooperation cannot be built in a relationship of mutual trust. Last year, former ambassador Emin Önen said: ‘There is mutual understanding on 99 points in Türkiye-China relations, but let’s not agree on one point. This should not hinder the development of bilateral relations’. Prof. Yang Chen said that China wants to improve its relations with Türkiye, but this point is as important as the other 99 points and the two countries should keep their mutual promises. That point is the Uighur issue. And it is clear that Turkish academics and politicians do not understand how important the Xinjiang issue is for China and that it is a non-negotiable issue in terms of national sovereignty.

After the Second World War, Turkish-Chinese relations developed largely within the foreign policy boundaries drawn by the United States. In particular, the fight against China in the Korean Civil War and Türkiye’s eventual accession to NATO led to Uighur figures such as Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra defecting to Türkiye, making Türkiye a centre for anti-China Uighur separatist organisations. Even diplomatic relations between Türkiye and China only started after the US established diplomatic relations with China.

The situation was no different before the Second World War. Türkiye prioritised its friendship with the Soviets in its foreign policy and was wary of taking any steps that might anger the Soviets. For example, in 1944, Türkiye and the Republic of China almost signed a treaty of friendship, but Türkiye cancelled the treaty at the last minute so as not to anger the Soviets. This was because Türkiye had serious problems with the Soviets, especially the issue of the Straits Convention. The situation was similar in China. Xinjiang was largely under Soviet control. According to a Turkish diplomat, if a Chinese official wanted to go to Xinjiang, he first had to get permission from the Soviet consul in Kashgar.

Today, for the first time, there is a possibility of strategic relations between China and Türkiye without the shadow of a third country. Türkiye’s application for BRICS membership should be seen in this context.”