Seyyed Mohammd Javad Hasheminejad, Iranian terrorism analyst

Since the very beginning of the Islamic Revolution, acts of terror have frequently occurred in Iran, deeply affecting its people and becoming an inseparable part of the country’s collective experience. Statistics frequently cited in Iran’s political discourse, and reiterated by state officials, indicate that by the early 2010s, more than 17,000 Iranians had fallen victim to terrorist attacks. These victims were targeted by over 30 different terrorist groups, with the majority of these attacks occurring during the tumultuous 1980s. Among the most notorious of these groups are the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK), Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), and Takfiri groups such as Jundallah, Jaish ul-Adl, Al-Qaeda and ISIS responsible for the assassination of Iranians from all walks of life. These terrorist acts were carried out through various brutal methods, including indiscriminate shootings, bombings, torture, minelaying, suicide attack and other heinous means.

Since the onset of the Islamic Revolution, the overall frequency and scale of terrorist acts in Iran have shown a general downward trend, which can largely be attributed to various measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran, alongside international efforts. Enhanced diplomacy, improved and more effective security measures, and decisive actions by the Iranian government have played a critical role in this reduction. For instance, in recent years, Iran has bombarded the headquarters of separatist terrorist groups in the northwest of the country. Furthermore, agreements signed between Tehran and Baghdad led to the relocation of these groups from border areas, significantly reducing terrorist activity in the region.

However, this downward trend has varied over the decades. The 1980s marked the peak of terrorist activities against the country, but in the 1990s and early 2000s, there was a notable decline in such acts, accompanied by a decrease in the number of terror victims. This reduction can be partly attributed to the government’s foreign policy during that time, which prioritized confidence-building and strengthening relations with Western countries. The administration adopted a cultural discourse and a policy of de-escalation, which played a key role in reducing terrorist activities. However, the early 2000s witnessed the emergence of Jundallah terrorist group in southeastern Iran. This group’s operations significantly increased the scale of terrorist activities during that decade, targeting both military personnel and ordinary citizens in and Sistan and Baluchistan province. By the 2010s, the situation began to change once again, with the dynamics of terrorism in Iran evolving under different circumstances.

As previously mentioned, by the early 2010s, Iran had recorded over 17,000 victims of terrorism. While the scale and frequency of terrorist incidents are no longer comparable to the intense wave of attacks during the 1980s, a crucial question arises: what about the period between the early 2010s and 2024? Over this 14-year span, what terrorist acts have occurred, and do we not need a more thorough examination of this time frame? This interval, often overlooked in discussions of Iran’s history of terrorism, warrants closer scrutiny to ensure that all incidents and victims are accounted for in the broader narrative.

The 2010s were marked by significant regional developments that reshaped the landscape of terrorism and gave rise to the emergence and activity of Takfiri terrorist groups. During this decade, Iran played a pivotal role on the international stage, particularly in Syria and Iraq, where it actively fought against Takfiri and terrorist groups, most notably ISIS. In these battles, Iran dealt significant blows to these groups while also suffering considerable losses, including the deaths of numerous military personnel and advisors. As part of a retaliatory effort, the tragic January 3 suicide attack at the Martyrs’ Cemetery in Kerman by ISIS occurred, claiming the lives of nearly 100 Iranians, injuring several hundred more, and marking one of the deadliest terror attacks in Iran’s contemporary history.

Other notable incidents affecting Iranian citizens in the 2010s include ISIS’s attack on the Iranian Parliament, two separate assaults on the Shah Cheragh Shrine in Shiraz by ISIS, the attack on the military parade in Ahvaz by the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), the assassination of nuclear scientists by Israeli regime, and numerous terrorist operations in southeastern Iran by Jaish ul-Adl and other takfiri terrorist groups, particularly in Sistan and Baluchistan province and so on.

The 2020s have brought new dimensions to the evolving nature of terrorism in Iran. An analysis of recent reports on terrorist incidents sheds light on these changes. The most recent report, Iran’s 2023-2024 annual report on terrorism, contains several notable findings. First, dozens of terrorist acts attributed to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) were recorded in cities across the country. These acts primarily involved setting fire to public banners and posters, as well as throwing Molotov cocktails at various locations, including religious sites and administrative buildings. The MEK has publicly claimed responsibility for these actions, providing photographic evidence of each incident on their official websites. In addition, there were two instances of cyber-attacks for which the perpetrators officialy assumed responsibility; one by a hacktivist group called Predatory Sparrow, linked to the Israeli regime on Iranian gas stations, and one by the MEK on the Iranian Parliament’s website and Khaneh Mellat News Agency. While these acts did not result in casualties, they represent an update in the methods employed by terrorist groups, including cyberattacks and acts of sabotage targeting critical infrastructure, highlighting the changing dynamics of terrorism in the modern era.

The second key finding is the shifting geographic distribution of terrorist activities. While recent years have seen a significant decline in such incidents in the western and northwestern regions of the country, southeastern Iran, particularly Sistan and Baluchistan province, has emerged as a new hotspot for terrorist operations. Out of the 50 recorded terrorist attacks nationwide in 2023, nearly half—22 incidents—occurred in Sistan and Baluchistan province, underscoring the shifting focus of these violent acts.

These events have significantly increased the number of victims since the early 2010s, highlighting the need to update the official count of Iran’s terror victims, which currently stands at 17,000. This urgency was underscored in a recent press briefing by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, who explicitly stated the necessity of revising the country’s list of terror victims. It was also announced that a newly updated list of terror victims would be unveiled in the near future. Habilian, a human rights NGO representing Iranian victims of terrorism and Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will jointly hold the ceremony for unveiling the updated list of terror victims.

Currently, some leaders of terrorist groups have been apprehended and brought to justice in Iran. For example, the leaders of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA), responsible for numerous bombings in Khuzestan province, and the Kingdom Assembly of Iran (Tondar), behind deadly explosions at a large religious gathering in Shiraz, have faced legal proceedings. Similarly, the leader of Jundallah, implicated in armed robbery, bombing operations, and armed attacks on Iranian police and civilians, has also been tried. However, many other groups continue to operate with impunity, particularly in Western countries, including Europe and the United States. Groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) openly maintain offices and plan operations against Iran, shielded by the protection of these nations. While Iran has conducted court sessions to address the MEK’s terrorist activities domestically, these efforts are far from sufficient. Coordinated international action is urgently needed to bring these groups to justice and ensure accountability on a global scale.

On December 9th, Russia officially announced that it had granted asylum to Syria’s former president Bashar al-Assad and his family. On the same day, the Syrian embassy in Russia lowered the tricolor two-star flag of the “Arab Republic of Syria,” which had flown for over half a century, and raised the opposition’s tricolor three-star flag. Thus, Russia became the first major power to seamlessly transition its allegiance to the Syrian opposition government. Simultaneously, another long-time Syrian ally, Iran, also publicly announced its recognition of the new Damascus regime. The “strategic allies” Russia and Iran, who had been supporting Bashar in his campaigns, pivoted overnight to embrace their former adversaries. Such cold pragmatism—turning a blind eye to old allies’ tears while joining the smiles of new ones—is both baffling and unsettling.

However, reality is as cruel as it is straightforward. Politics is heartless, and the pursuit and defense of national interests are naked and unrelenting. When Bashar’s regime became a liability and an unreliable partner, its abandonment became inevitable. With Russia and Iran increasingly preoccupied with their own troubles, dropping Bashar and switching sides amounted to damage control and a last-minute effort to stop their losses.

The sudden collapse of Bashar’s regime surprised all parties, even those with the most advanced intelligence and information networks. Otherwise, how can one explain Israel’s sweeping bombardment of Syrian military targets and its occupation of more territory, or the United States’ large-scale bombing campaigns against remaining ISIS strongholds in Syria? These actions indicate that neither Israel nor the West anticipated such a swift and thorough collapse of Bashar’s regime. Moreover, they did not expect the opposition forces, particularly the “Liberation of Syria” alliance, which pose an even greater threat to Israel and the West, to seize Syria’s heartland so easily and control all the country’s war machinery.

Deeply analyzing the rapid and disastrous defeat of Bashar’s regime holds significant value. It offers lessons for authoritarian governments regarding governance and decision-making, and it provides insights for all nations on how to maintain diplomatic alliances and ensure their viability under certain conditions.

The primary reason for this historic upheaval in Syria lies within Bashar’s regime itself—or, more broadly, the Assad family, which controlled Syria for over 50 years, and the elite circles surrounding it. The key conclusion is that, despite being trapped in the vortex of war, the regime failed to adapt to the circumstances, make decisions about war and peace, or reconcile national integration efforts. Instead, it relied excessively on external forces to safeguard its sovereignty and regime. Ultimately, this dependence turned the regime into a mere cog in foreign war machines. Once it became dysfunctional, abandonment and replacement were inevitable.

The rise and fall of Syria reflect the broader modern history of war and peace in the Middle East, serving as a microcosm and a living museum of this turbulent process. Since 1948, driven by the ideals of Arab nationalism, Syria actively joined efforts to oppose the partition of Palestine, setting itself on a long-term collision course with Israel and enduring hostility with the West. This path ultimately led Syria to align with the Soviet Union, later binding itself tightly to Russia and Iran in its struggle for survival and development.

The Assad family, belonging to the Alawite sect—a minority within the Shia branch of Islam—long faced suppression, discrimination, and marginalization. During the French colonial period, Alawite men had little choice but to join the military to make a living. This adversity inadvertently enabled the Alawite sect to grow into a dominant force in the Syrian military. It played a central role in overthrowing the Faisal monarchy and became a pillar of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. In the end, the Alawites turned the tide and emerged as the ruling family holding Syria’s destiny in their hands.

In 1967, Syria, whose intelligence chief had been turned by Moscow, was misled by the Soviet Union and false intelligence suggesting that “Israel would launch an attack.” Alongside Egypt, Syria eagerly prepared for war, which prompted Israel, under immense pressure, to launch a preemptive strike. With its singular strength, Israel defeated Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, capturing Palestine’s Gaza Strip (occupied by Egypt), the West Bank and East Jerusalem (controlled by Jordan’s Hashemite Kingdom), as well as the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria. This war reinforced Syria’s image as a victim of aggression and occupation, solidified its role as a frontline state, and strengthened the Assad family’s legitimacy in ruling over a majority Sunni Muslim population.

On October 6, 1973, Syria and Egypt coordinated a large-scale surprise attack known as the “Ramadan War,” the largest blitzkrieg since World War II. Syria nearly recaptured the Golan Heights and put Israel on the brink of collapse. However, with U.S. support, Israel ultimately turned the tide, reclaiming the Golan Heights. Yet, this war shattered the myth of Israel’s invincibility, elevating Syrian President Hafez al-Assad as a contemporary Arab hero alongside Egyptian President Sadat, both becoming new icons of Arab nationalism.

However, on October 7, 2023, Hamas (the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement) launched a surprise attack on Israel on the fiftieth anniversary of the Ramadan War. Ironically, this event ultimately led to the collapse of the Syrian government and the total downfall of the Assad family’s rule, as though history was playing a massive joke. Yet Syria’s current tragedy can be traced back to the misguided path it took after the Ramadan War.

The “victory” of the Ramadan War gave Sadat the political capital and historical opportunity to change course and withdraw from the Palestinian conflict. Egypt had already paid a devastating price—100,000 casualties, hundreds of billions of dollars in losses, and nearly 40 years of lost focus on peace and development. Sadat proactively sought reconciliation with Israel and, through the Camp David Accords, recovered the entire Sinai Peninsula at the cost of abandoning its Arab allies Syria, Jordan, and Palestine.

Feeling “betrayed” by Egypt, Syria aligned itself with Libya and Iraq, raising the banner of Arab nationalism and becoming a stronghold of the Arab resistance movement. Assad, Gaddafi, and Saddam Hussein naturally emerged as the “three strongmen” of the Arab world. They supported and cultivated anti-Israel resistance forces while simultaneously competing for leadership within the Arab world.

However, Assad’s Syria had inherent weaknesses, which made achieving peace through war or independent resistance unattainable—a tragic role that continues into Bashar’s era today. Syria’s limited territory, small population, and complex ethnic dynamics left the majority Sunni Muslim population under the rule of Alawite elites pursuing secularization. Meanwhile, Israel held onto the Golan Heights, a critical strategic area just 60 kilometers from Damascus, which further exacerbated Assad’s precarious position.

This left the Assad regime in a difficult and divided state: internally, it relied on the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party’s “one nation, one party, one leader” ideology, maintaining authoritarian rule under the banner of resisting Israeli occupation; externally, it avoided military confrontation with Israel to prevent further devastation, sustaining a “cold peace” for half a century that allowed for slow national development under relative stability.

Driven by competition with Iraq’s Ba’ath Party for legitimacy and leadership of Arab nationalism—and by the Alawite elites’ fear of the Sunni majority—Assad decisively sided with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1979-1988), turning his back on the broader Arab community. In February 1982, inspired by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic revival triggered by Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood staged an armed uprising in Hama, seeking to overthrow Syria’s “infidel regime.” The rebellion was brutally crushed. This historical event laid the groundwork for Hama’s support during the 2011 Arab Spring and the Syrian war, where local populations either cooperated with or passively watched rebel forces launch massive offensives against the government.

After the 1982 Lebanon War, the Assad regime, which had already lost the Golan Heights and viewed Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence, was unable to directly confront Israel. Instead, it entrusted the national responsibility of reclaiming lost territory to Hezbollah, which had been recently cultivated and armed by Iran. This opened the door for Iran’s westward expansion into the Arab heartland and gradually integrated Syria into the so-called “Shia Crescent.” To some extent, this represented the Assad regime betting Syria’s national destiny and its own rule on a third party rather than following Egypt’s example by courageously seeking peace with Israel to focus on development and improving democracy, livelihoods, and civil rights.

After the 1991 Gulf War, the Middle East entered a promising decade of peace. Saddam Hussein’s army—consisting of over a million elite troops—was crushed by a United Nations-authorized, U.S.-led coalition after attempting to use the occupation and annexation of Kuwait to force Israel’s withdrawal. U.S. President George H.W. Bush launched “Ramadan War” and subsequently worked with Russia (as the successor to the Soviet Union), the United Nations, the European Union, and Spain to initiate the Madrid Peace Process. For the first time, Israel—accustomed to tackling its enemies one by one—was brought under the same roof with its Arab adversaries, including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (along with Palestinian representatives), to negotiate “land for peace.”

Unexpectedly, Assad faced a second and third Arab betrayal. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Jordan—who had originally pledged to confront Israel alongside Syria—separately negotiated agreements with Israel. The PLO secretly signed the Oslo Accords in 1993, establishing transitional Palestinian autonomy, while Jordan normalized relations with Israel in 1994. From that point on, Assad viewed the Palestinian and Jordanian leadership as strangers, even enemies, cutting off all relations.

Assad’s original heir was not Bashar but his eldest son Basil, born in 1962. However, at a time when Assad was growing old and Basil’s personal reputation was on the rise, Basil, who was destined to inherit the regime, died in a mysterious car accident in 1994—an event that rewrote Syrian history. Bashar, who had originally planned to become an ophthalmologist, was immediately recalled to Syria. He swiftly joined the military, rose through the ranks, and was groomed as the successor, ensuring the continuation of the Assad dynasty.

Had Assad lived longer, Bashar might have inherited a legacy of peace and chosen a different path. If his elder brother Basil had not died, Bashar might have become a highly respected international doctor, perhaps even a Nobel laureate in medicine. Unfortunately, while members of royal families can sometimes choose their own future, others cannot—a stark contrast between Eastern and Western cultural traditions.

At the end of 1999, negotiations over the Golan Heights were close to an agreement but collapsed entirely due to an unintended turn of events that rewrote Middle Eastern history and Syria’s fate. In late 1999, Jordan’s King Hussein II passed away. Known for his remarkable emotional intelligence and extensive diplomatic ties, his funeral in Amman attracted an overwhelming number of world leaders and dignitaries.

Perhaps due to a softening heart as he approached the end of his life, pressure from the situation, or simply an inexplicable lapse in judgment, Assad, despite his frail health, broke tradition and personally attended the funeral of King Hussein. Following the Amman funeral, Israel suddenly announced the suspension of Golan Heights negotiations. The Israeli parliament passed a resolution requiring any policy concerning the future of the Golan Heights to receive two-thirds approval from the Knesset, followed by a national referendum.

Years later, reports emerged that Mossad—the formidable Israeli intelligence agency—had secretly swapped a temporary toilet Assad used at the Amman funeral. Subsequent analysis of Assad’s urine confirmed he was in the late stages of cancer and had little time left. Israel’s Security Cabinet feared that Bashar, then only in his early 30s, would be unable to secure his hold on power. If the Golan Heights were returned and Damascus fell into the hands of Arab nationalists or pro-Iranian forces, Israel would effectively be placing a noose around its own neck. Thus, the near-complete peace talks were permanently frozen.

Six months later, Assad passed away. The Israeli government, despite being an adversarial and warring nation, publicly expressed condolences to the Syrian people, government, and Assad’s family, describing him as a keeper of peace who honored his commitments. Bashar al-Assad assumed power as expected and consolidated his regime. However, he permanently lost the best opportunity to peacefully reclaim the Golan Heights. Instead, he found himself forced to bind Syria to the dual vehicles of the “Shia Crescent” and the “frontline state,” eventually becoming the hub of the “Axis of Resistance,” suffering exploitation from all sides. In this sense, Bashar’s Syria resembles the Western Roman Empire in its dying days, collapsing under the final onslaught of northern barbarians, or the Eastern Roman Empire, which, after a thousand years of survival amid wars and sieges, was finally sent to its grave by the Ottoman Empire following its occupation and division during the Fourth Crusade.

Bashar never aspired to be Syria’s angel or reform hero. After assuming power in 2000, he immediately sought reform, relaxed restrictions, and temporarily ushered in a vibrant and praiseworthy “Damascus Spring.” However, as the trends of liberalization and democratization began to threaten political transformation, Bashar, under immense pressure from powerful conservative forces and entrenched elites—and lacking the strength and political wisdom to persevere—abruptly shut the door to reform after just two years. This marked a lost opportunity to sever ties with history, with Iran, and the Shia Crescent, while reclaiming the Golan Heights through separate negotiations. Bashar dared not take such risks, fearing the same fate as Sadat, who pursued peace for land but paid with his life.

In 2005, the assassination of Saudi-backed Lebanese Sunni Prime Minister Rafik Hariri implicated Syrian intelligence and Hezbollah, highlighting the brutal sectarian conflicts in the Islamic Middle East and the struggle over Lebanon. This event triggered the “Beirut Spring” or “Cedar Revolution,” forcing Syria to end its 30-year military presence in Lebanon and further affirming Lebanon’s independence.

The 2011 Arab Spring erupted following Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution,” which brought down several authoritarian Arab governments across the Mediterranean’s northwest coast. Its ripple effect eventually reached Syria on the eastern coast. The brutal handling of student protests in the southern town of Daraa sparked a broader uprising, with unrest spreading to traditional anti-Alawite strongholds like Hama. Bashar, facing his first major test after a decade in power, responded poorly. Instead of apologizing and addressing corruption and mismanagement, he blamed the West for orchestrating a “color revolution” and shut the door to dialogue. This fueled widespread dissatisfaction, plunging the country into chaos.

At a critical moment, Saudi King Abdullah called Bashar, offering $20 billion to create jobs, stabilize the economy, and maintain regime stability—on the condition that Damascus sever its strategic ties with Iran and the Shia Crescent. However, Bashar viewed Saudi Arabia’s proposed antidote as a poison pill, recognizing that his Alawite minority regime depended on the Shia family for survival. Additionally, reclaiming the Golan Heights required the support of Iran and Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia’s outstretched olive branch was rejected, leading it to mobilize the Arab League and align with Western nations to intervene in Syria under the pretext of protecting civilians and human rights. This opened the curtain on the Syrian Civil War, with external funding and support for opposition forces.

At the brink of regime collapse, Russia—engaged in a geopolitical contest with the U.S. and NATO over Ukraine—intervened. To divert pressure and protect its last remaining Soviet-era sphere of influence in the Middle East, especially its Mediterranean naval base in Syria, Russia coordinated with China to veto Arab League and Western-sponsored resolutions in the UN Security Council, thwarting attempts to replicate Libya’s regime-change scenario. Under the guise of counter-terrorism, with tens of thousands of Shia militia and Hezbollah fighters crossing borders to support the regime, Bashar’s government regained most of its lost territory and major population centers. A ceasefire agreement was signed with the opposition in March 2020, stabilizing the situation for the first time in a decade. However, this left the country divided, with lingering roots of civil war and fragmentation.

Bashar understood the importance of eliminating opposition, yet Syria lacks the strength to uproot rebels protected by Turkey in the northwest and Kurdish forces supported by the U.S. in the northeast and east. Russia and Iran are also unwilling to bear the massive costs of direct confrontation with Turkey or the U.S. to fulfill Bashar’s ambitions for reunification. They have repeatedly urged Bashar to settle for stability and form a coalition government through negotiations—an offer he has rejected. Fundamentally, Syria remains a bargaining chip for Russia and Iran’s geopolitical interests. What matters to them is securing their core national interests, not who controls Damascus. Otherwise, how can one explain why Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias abandoned Bashar in his final hour?

Bashar was originally a “laissez-faire” figure. Despite not being religious, his visit to the Lingyin Temple during the Asian Games in Hangzhou turned him into an internet sensation, sparking controversy and unfounded speculation. Perhaps now, as an exiled leader, Bashar can finally let go of the burdens he has carried for 24 years—burdens too heavy for him to bear. He may return to being an ordinary person or even resume his old career in medicine. But Syria, having been placed on the operating table for half a century, remains carved up and bleeding. Who will save it from this torment?

Overthrowing Bashar’s regime and dismantling the remnants of the Ba’ath Party might not end Syria’s decades of bloodshed but could instead mark the beginning of new conflicts and suffering—much like the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime 20 years ago.

On Sunday 8 December, the decades-long rule of Bashar al-Assad and his family in Syria ended. There is now a great deal of uncertainty in Syria. Although the Assad regime has fallen and it is known that Assad and his family have been granted asylum in Russia, it is not yet clear what kind of transition will take place. A mixed group of opposition groups led by HTS is expected to form the next government in Damascus, but there is also the possibility of a power struggle within these groups, in which case there is a risk that the political transition may not be smooth or peaceful.

One might wonder why India and Syria, some 4,000 kilometers apart, are relevant, but the opposition’s overthrow of Delhi’s long-time friend Bashar al-Assad is likely to reverberate far beyond the Middle East and affect India in unexpected ways. This is because the two countries have a long-standing friendship based on historical and cultural ties that has developed over the years, especially during Assad’s tenure. During the civil war that erupted in 2011, New Delhi took a stance in favor of resolving the conflict through a militarized, inclusive, and Syrian-led political process. Its embassy in Damascus has been and remains active. The new Syria, where the political equations may change, has the potential to affect India’s relations with Damascus, which are currently on a very slippery, chaotic, and uncertain ground, and beyond that, the dynamics of the Middle East.

India has two major investments in the Syrian oil sector: A 2004 agreement between ONGC Videsh and IPR International for oil and gas exploration, and another joint investment by India’s ONGC and China’s CNPC to acquire a 37 per cent stake in a Canadian company operating in Syria. New Delhi has also for some time sought to invest heavily in the construction of an India-Gulf-Suez Canal-Mediterranean-Levant-Europe corridor that includes Syria. And India’s close relationship with Damascus could give New Delhi the opportunity to strengthen its ties with other Middle Eastern countries more broadly… For India, maintaining stable relations with Syria and other key players in the Middle East is also vital to counter Pakistan’s rhetoric in these Muslim-majority countries…

In a statement issued on Monday 9 December, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said: “We are monitoring the situation in Syria in the light of ongoing developments. We stress that all parties should work to preserve the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Syria. We support a peaceful and inclusive Syrian-led political process that respects the interests and aspirations of all segments of Syrian society. Our Embassy in Damascus remains in touch with the Indian community for their safety and security.” On 7 December, Delhi had also warned its citizens against travelling to Syria, with Delhi’s immediate concern being the safety of its citizens in the country. According to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, there are about 90 Indians in Syria and as of yesterday (11 December) it had evacuated 75 Indian nationals, including forty-four pilgrims from Jammu and Kashmir.

Well, India clearly has no plan B for a post-Assad Syria. First, Syria’s Bashar al-Assad has been India’s partner for years AND his fall from power and the uncertainty that follows is deeply worrying for India’s political and economic interests in the region. Over the past 13 years, as Syria has been torn apart by a brutal civil war and Bashar al-Assad has been isolated by many global powers for his actions, only a handful of countries have continued to work with Assad. While providing millions of dollars in humanitarian aid to the Syrian government under the name of Operation Friend to Türkiye and Syria, the Delhi government has maintained high-level contacts. The Syrian foreign minister visited India in 2023, and senior Indian diplomats also travelled to Syria. India refused to support sanctions against the Assad regime at the UN and called for an easing of sanctions during the Kovid pandemic, citing humanitarian concerns. It also argued for non-intervention by foreign powers in the Syrian civil war.

So, what was the reason for all this? Let us go from the general to the specific:

First, there is the historical context.

India and Syria have historically enjoyed friendly relations, with regular bilateral exchanges at the highest level since the establishment of diplomatic relations. Both countries have worked together for decades. Both countries were founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. And New Delhi’s foreign policy since 1947 has generally been pro-Arab. Prime ministers such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Syria and developed close ties with its leaders. This meant that India had a personal stake in working with Syria. For example, when the Syrian civil war began in 2011, India provided $240 million for the development of the Tishreen power plant. So, this historical background with Bashar al-Assad and his father Hafez al-Assad ensured that the relationship continued.

What India really wanted was stability.

Unfortunately, as is well known, the Syrian civil war started as part of the Arab Spring movement; countries across the Arab world witnessed massive popular protests calling for the overthrow of dictatorships and new democratic governments, but in some countries, such as Libya, things went terribly wrong. While Western powers supported the overthrow of Gaddafi in Libya, the country descended into civil war instead of becoming a stable democracy. New Delhi also wanted to ensure that Syria did not follow the same path, because India has important interests in the Middle East, from energy resources to economic investment and political relations with Middle Eastern countries, and there are around 9 million Indians living in the region. Therefore, when war broke out in Syria, New Delhi was motivated by a desire to reduce external pressure on Assad: it refused to support sanctions against Syria at the United Nations, condemned the violence perpetrated by both Assad and the rebel forces, and advocated non-intervention by foreign powers in Syria. All this was appreciated by the Assad government.

The terror dimension brought the Indian and Assad governments together.

While Delhi’s stance was appreciated by the Assad government, Bashar al-Assad, in an interview with an Indian television channel in 2017, expressed his concern over India’s confrontation with terrorism and compared the situation with Syria: “I think our independence dates back to the same period in the 1940s. Our geographies may be different, the reasons behind the terrorism that both countries face may be different. But at its core, terrorism is one and the ideologies we both face are similar. In India, terrorism is used for political purposes, and the situation in Syria is no different. It is an extremely dangerous phenomenon.”

In 2014, when ISIL was rapidly taking over large parts of Syria and establishing its own government, leading to foreign intervention, the rise of ISIL also posed a threat to India because it had tried to organize attacks there. And the Delhi government announced its support for Russia’s military offensive to destroy ISIL. Now India fears that the Russian- and Iranian-backed overthrow of Assad could embolden militants beyond the region and give a boost to anti-India militant groups operating in South Asia and Kashmir.

Now comes the crucial part: Kashmir…

Interestingly, Syria has supported India’s position on Kashmir. It has stated that Kashmir is an internal matter for India to deal with. This position of the Assad government makes Damascus a useful partner for New Delhi, as Pakistan often turns to the Islamic world for support on Kashmir. So, while Delhi supports Damascus on many international issues, including the Palestinian cause and Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights, Syria supports India’s position on Kashmir, arguing that it is an internal matter for India to resolve and that New Delhi has the right to resolve it as it sees fit. In the most recent example, while the rest of the Muslim world strongly condemned India’s decision to revoke Jammu and Kashmir’s special autonomy by abrogating Article 370 in 2019, Syria described it as India’s internal affair; Riad Abbas, Syria’s ambassador to India at the time, said: “Every government has the right to do what it wants on its territory to protect its people. We will always stand by India in any action.”

Well, isn’t there an ’emotional’ dimension? Investments…

Delhi will now also be concerned about the fate of its investments in Syria, particularly in the oil sector. Seeking to capitalize on Syria’s geostrategic location, New Delhi has been investing in Syria’s infrastructure and development for decades. We have already mentioned that it has two major investments in Syria’s oil sector and has provided a $240 million loan for the Tishreen thermal power plant project. ONGC Videsh has a 60 per cent stake in Block 24 in northern Syria, covering the Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor regions; for oil and gas exploration activities, ONGC Videsh acquired the exploration, development, and production license with IPR International in May 2004, and later ONGC India and CNPC China jointly acquired a 37 per cent stake in a Canadian company operating in Syria. Delhi has already struggled to operate in Syria due to US and EU sanctions on Syria, and the fragile situation in post-Assad Syria will make it even more difficult for these investments to become operational.

In addition, bilateral trade between the two countries will decline from more than $100 million between 2020 and 2023 to $80 million in 2024. Meanwhile, New Delhi’s Study in India programme, which has also supported capacity building for Syrian youth, offered 1,500 places for Syrian students in undergraduate, postgraduate and PhD programmes in four phases from 2017 to 2018.

Concluding remarks

India’s engagement with Syria is part of its broader strategy to increase its presence and influence in the Middle East AND operates on the logic of a quid pro quo policy of favor for favor or reciprocity. In particular, in return for Damascus’s support on issues such as Kashmir, Delhi – in addition to providing substantial development and humanitarian assistance – supports “Syria’s legitimate right to retake the occupied Golan Heights”. Israel captured the rocky Golan Heights in the Levant from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War… During a visit to Syria in 2011, then Indian President Pratibha Patil said: “India has consistently supported all Arab causes. I would also like to reiterate our dedicated support for Syria’s legitimate right to the Golan Heights and its early and full return to Syria.”

It was a rarity in the Muslim world that Syria under Assad was a staunch supporter of Delhi on Kashmir. BUT now that a new page has been turned in Syria, it is a matter of great interest, especially for India, whether this give and take, the quid pro quo, will continue. There is no doubt that New Delhi is and will continue to monitor the situation closely. And it is now taking a cautious approach to the rapidly changing events in the region, especially the complex atmosphere of a new Syria. What Damascus’s stance will be on Kashmir and where India now stands on Syria’s claim to the Golan Heights are issues that can be revisited. India’s key strategic partners are Russia and Iran, whose influence and position in the region has been severely weakened by the fall of Assad, which has significantly altered the geopolitical dynamics of the region. What should work in Delhi’s favor is that it is seen as a neutral actor in its Syria policy, something that is working for India now, as even militant non-state actors generally have no problems with India and see it as neutral.

And I have saved another crucial bonus for last:

Delhi’s concerns about the new Syrian situation have another dimension, the Turkish dimension.

While Iran and Russia were Assad’s main supporters, Western actors like the U.S were anti-Assad. And Türkiye, as an actor that has always carried the Syrian issue on its back, and never compromised on its principled stance, has been one of the major game-changing powers supporting the Syrian opposition. India was neutral – it is not in the habit of getting involved in situations that do not directly concern or affect it. New Delhi avoided taking sides in the developments in Syria, BUT in a sense, it was a ‘passive’ supporter of Assad. Now, the fall of Assad means that Delhi has lost a friend in the Muslim world.

With the vacuum of support created by Iran’s preoccupation with its own conflicts in Gaza, Hezbollah’s in Lebanon, Russia’s in Ukraine, the fall of Assad and the subsequent – perhaps short-term – possible decline of Russian and Iranian influence in Syria AND Türkiye’s support for the opposition that toppled Assad, Türkiye is on the winning side of history… Thus, reading the current situation in this way, India’s current Syria scenario is based on the assumption that Delhi’s future interaction with Damascus could be shaped by a new dynamic with Türkiye at the helm. In other words, in the event of the formation of a new Turkish-backed regime – which India sees as highly likely – it is believed that a post-Assad Syria might support Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, with the idea that it might not take Delhi’s side on India-Pakistan issues. In other words, when it comes to Türkiye, India, which unfortunately does most of its political reading through the prism of Kashmir and Pakistan, has no reservations about the current Syrian ‘Türkiye Inside’ scenario… BUT I should also mention that they are giving a lot of attention and importance to the fact that President Erdoğan did not mention Kashmir in his recent UN speech…